The Story of Japanese Innovation

The Asahi Shimbun Interview Part 2

Horace Dediu / Takeshi Narabe & Dylan Weir / Asahi Shimbun Interview, April 2026

Takeshi Narabe • 06:41
So you also compared [Apple] with the Japanese companies. Actually Japanese companies are very keen on marketing and doing some anchors many times. And I think [historically] they didn't know what consumers want. But you mentioned that is also […] their advantage […] because they only made what [management] wanted. But on the other hand, Apple exceeds the consumer's expectation or make a new market.

Horace Dediu • 07:37
The story of Japanese innovation is fascinating and I hope you give me a little bit of time to reflect upon this because I think it is also part of the story of Apple. I have a great admiration for the history of Japanese innovation. And it was something that, again, Professor Christensen taught me and made me appreciate.

Of course, during the 1970s, and maybe even earlier, but at least from the 70s onward, Japanese innovation was the world leader. It was in consumer electronics, it was in automotive, it was in many heavy industries, it was phenomenal. And the reason a lot of that happened was because Japan was constrained. Japan didn't have access to as much capital or as much land or as much resources as a lot of the industrial nations at the time. And those constraints taught it to be lean and efficient and how to think about "just in time", the Toyota production system, etc. And that wisdom came from a constraint.

As a result, Japan [began to] teach the world during the 90s and onward about how to do better manufacturing. And they taught Apple. Apple at the time was in awe. Steve Jobs was in awe of Japan. Nobody could come close. Also, Sony was a phenomenon. In fact, in interviews with executives; I was just watching an interview with [Jon] Rubinstein, who was at the time heading the iPod.… He said they were absolutely paralyzed with fear that Sony would beat them at this game. Even though [Apple] were by far the market leader, […] it wasn't Microsoft, it wasn't Motorola, it was Sony that was the worry.

Now, what happened? I think one of the things that Christiansen doesn't say--[which I do] because I come from a software engineering background--one thing that I think Japan didn't understand starting in the late 90s was the power of software. And I think it's a cultural problem. Software has a different culture fundamentally. The software engineers in general are like cats. You know, managers want to manage dogs because dogs are predictable and they tend to follow the instructions. People who do software tend to be very much more independent, but they need to be coordinated.

So it's a very difficult management problem, and it doesn't fit so well, perhaps, with corporate culture in Japan, at least at the time we're speaking of. And so one of the aspects, I think, that was critical in the late 90s was this, I would say, cultural crisis. By the way, it's also a problem in Europe. One of the reasons Europe did not succeed with software was precisely because of the cultural aspects as well.

But that's one element and I think it's not the only element but you address the question of customer understanding and this is very crucial as well. I think the Japanese were for many decades thinking that if you build good things, especially as they were better than what was in the market, then customers will buy. Simply focus on quality and the customer will decide eventually to switch.

That's a very logical decision, a very logical plan. And you don't have to worry too much about marketing and branding and all of these aspects, which are again, perhaps a cultural difference. Or you could hire someone to do that for you, but fundamentally the management inside Japan couldn't think in the same kind of marketing ways that American marketers would think.

But as far as the customer discovery problem, this is true. And it is something even American companies don't know how to do, or European companies don't know how to do. […] The way Apple suggested they do it (this is what they've told us,) is that they have to talk amongst themselves. They talk to each other as they did about the iPhone and said: "What do we dislike about our phones? How can we make them so more usable?"

And this fundamentally is because they always had this inquiry internally about why are things hard to use? Why can't we make things easy? Some of that is evident in Japan, but I think it wasn't thought of through the lens of interfaces. It was thought of more like being compact, being portable, being good [to the touch]. But it wasn't as much about how do you interact visually with something. A lot of things go into that. Obviously, you have to have a different sensibility about the two-dimensional display and so on. 1

And so my point is that the Japanese weren't stepping back enough and asking these, what Christiansen would call, jobs-to-be-done questions. "What do people really want to accomplish with products", even if we haven't yet envisioned what they are? How do we work, how do we think about these design questions. Designers, by the way, say "we don't just make things look good. We think about how they are to be used". You know that philosophy of deeply understanding the user behaviors that is part of the Jony Ive philosophy. But it wasn't just him. It was before him and after him. [Apple designers] have been thinking the same way.

So it's a design philosophy. It's a real introspection, asking yourself, how should the world be? How should we improve the lives of people? And that's hard to really be very concise about. So I apologize, I'm [going on] so long about it. But it is part of the decision, part of the culture, again, of Apple, where they are looking at themselves.

Famously, by the way, this is another anecdote about Apple. It is that they don't do focus groups. They don't obtain that [product] knowledge by surveys. They don't obtain it by asking even indirectly what the customer wants or gathering loads and loads of market data. Lots of [research] companies will sell you market data and tell you all kinds of insights, cutting everything into demographics, into segmentations of various kinds.

The theory of jobs[to be done] is that usually you need to ask [only] five people. You don't need a large sample. You don't need to survey 10,000 people to find out that there's a desperate need for companionship. Should a machine be a companion? That's a very basic question.

A question which is, by the way, answered by AI. A lot of AIs are just hired as companions. But you don't discover this by surveying what people own today or what they're buying today, [or] what they ask for. You observe and you maybe do a little bit of inquisition on the spot and you just tease the customer's intentions.

I said many times, many of the best [product] ideas are taboo2. [For instance] People do things on social media which were once considered not just impolite, but sinful. You know, the idea of being vain is a sin. The idea of bragging and being boastful is considered sinful or [at least impolite]. And I used to say that all the social media can be segmented on the seven deadly sins that were part of the [moral] conversation centuries ago.

It was the church who would say these are bad things you shouldn't do them. Gluttony or covet thy neighbor. Every single social media is positioned precisely on [one] sin. Now, the discovery of this wasn't because Facebook surveyed what people do as sinful and provided it to them. Rather, they gave options and then the algorithm discovered it in a way. Apple [by the way] chose, I think [wisely], to stay out of there.

But you can see how the discovery of social media didn't come from a process of surveying people, asking them what would they like. They would have said "I want to have communications" or "I want to have cheap communications." They wouldn't say I want to send selfies, (which by the way didn't exist,) of myself doing everything all day long.3

Next in series: Part 3: Low-end, Game consoles, Secondary Markets, Displays and AI

Previous in series: Part 1: Integration, culture and market creation

Interview as published: 聞 Asahi Shimbun on Apple & Innovation

1. What I was trying to say here was that the Japanese approach to the display of two dimensional information is different due to the writing style. Japanese visual layouts are denser and more information-rich--some would argue more beautiful. There is less of an expectation by the consumer for simplicity which implies an acceptance or even appreciation of complexity.
2. By taboo I mean unspoken prohibition, something implicitly forbidden or embarrassing. To which nobody would admit to or request.
3. Narcissism is an observed behavior predating Christianity and the 7 sins. It was named after the Greek mythological figure Narcissus who fell in love with his own reflection, popularized at least by Ovid before 8 AD.