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As previously noted, Apple has overtaken Microsoft (and Google) in operating margin percentage. This is an astonishing statistic as Apple is still largely perceived to be a "hardware company" while Microsoft is a "software company" and Google is a "services company."

To suggest that "hardware" could be more operationally profitable than either software or services is akin to heresy in technology analysis. This reversal is newsworthy indeed. However, even the most casual observer would note that Apple does not derive its market power from hardware alone. It is, in fact, an integrated hardware, software and services company (with a few more roles besides.)

So the emergent successful business architecture in this technologically transitional period is of integration and completeness of solutions.

This shift explains at least at a conceptual level Microsoft's tectonic Surface shift.

But what about another point of view? What does integration mean for Microsoft's income, cost and profit structure? Is integration self-disruptive to Microsoft?

Here's a reminder of Microsoft's revenues and operating income by division:

The challenge of devices for Microsoft is that the licensing of software for devices is very difficult to sell.

In 2011 Microsoft received about $18.7 billion in Windows revenues and $23 billion in Office revenues. The chart shows that this is a fairly steady growth business. According to Gartner, in 2011 there were about 336 million Windows PCs sold and that this too is a fairly stable and mature business.

If we simply divide revenues by PCs sold we get about $55 Windows revenues per PC and $68 of Office revenues per PC sold [1]. The total income for Microsoft per PC sold is therefore about $123. If we divide operating income by PCs as well we get $35 per Windows license and $43 per Office license. That's a total of $78 of operating profit per PC.

Now let's think about a post-PC future exemplified by the iPad. Apple sells the iPad with a nearly 33% margin but at a higher average price than Microsoft's software bundle. Apple gives away the software (and apps are very cheap) but it still gains $195 in operating profit per iPad sold.

Fine, you say, but Microsoft make up for it in volume. Well, that's a problem. The tablet volumes are expanding very quickly and are on track to overtake traditional PCs while traditional PCs are likely to be disrupted and decline.

So Microsoft faces a dilemma. Their business model of expensive software on cheap hardware is not sustainable. The future is nearly free software integrated into moderately priced hardware.

For Microsoft to maintain their profitability, they have to find a way of obtaining $80 of profit per device. Under the current structure, device makers will not pay $55 per Windows license per device and users will not spend $68 per Office bundle per tablet. Price competition with Android tablets which have no software licensing costs and with iPad which has very cheap software means that a $300 tablet with a $68 software bill will not be competitive or profitable.

However, if Microsoft can sell a $400 (on average) device bundled with its software, and is able to get 20% margins then Microsoft is back to its $80 profit per device sold. This, I believe, is a large part of the practical motivation behind the Surface product.

The challenge for Microsoft therefore becomes to build hundreds of millions of these devices. Every year. Sounds like they need a Tim Cook to run it.

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Notes:

1. Microsoft accounts for revenues using deferrals due to Software Assurance pre-payment models for many corporate customers so this figure is not a precise value for each license sold.

 

The history of personal computing has come to be defined as the history of Microsoft. At least since 1981 Microsoft's operating systems have been the consistent market share leaders, and by a very large margin. That is about to change. This year Android will be on more devices sold than Windows. iOS is also set to also overtake Windows next year. The following chart illustrates the wave of mobile platforms that has emerged, and in spite of some notable failures, is overtaking traditional computing.

Of course we should remember that PC themselves overtook entrenched predecessors like minicomputers and mainframes which themselves overtook business computing systems based on adding machines, typewriters and slide rules. This is the cycle of disruption and there is nothing new about it.

However, it always seems to take people by surprise. This is because it happens in unforeseen ways and at unpredictable rates. And so it is that we are surprised by Microsoft's seeming abandonment of a business model that has sustained it for three decades.

Yesterday's reveal of Surface, Microsoft's first personal computer, was a watershed event in the evolution of value chains around computing. In a famous slide Clay Christensen illustrated (in 2004) the value chain evolution in computing from the 1960s to 2000.

As computing moved from the desktop to the pocket the industry re-integrated. First, Apple moved from Product Design into Sales & Distribution with its stores. Then it moved into service with Genius bar. Then it moved into component design with the A series chips and unique batteries. Then it moved into materials with exclusive licensing of LiquidMetal. It also began to own the equipment used in its manufacturing. This in addition owning the operating system.

Now we see Microsoft following in the same footsteps. First applications came early then stores, then service, and now product design. Google is also tracking closely behind as well with its acquisition of Motorola, the results of which have yet to be revealed.

And so we can see value chains evolving in real time before our very eyes. They have always evolved but in technology industries they evolve far more rapidly and will continue to accelerate.

Whether Microsoft or Google will be successful in their integration efforts remains to be seen. The challenges are immense as the value of the existing chains are enormous and the bonds that tie the company to them very strong. Breaking these ties will seem like value destruction and corporate antibodies will be set loose to kill the transitions. HP, RIM, Nokia and Dell are vivid examples of what happens when the response mechanisms have their way.

Apple announced that the total number of iTunes account (with credit cards attached) has reached 400 million. This was touted as being the largest collection of credit card accounts for any retailer and I have no reason to doubt it. However, looking beyond the bragging rights, there are more interesting patterns to observe about this asset.

What I plotted was the cumulative number of iPods sold (green), the cumulative number of iPhones and iPads (yellow), the combined devices total (red) and the reported number of iTunes accounts (blue).

The first observation is that the combined total iPhones + iPads have overtaken cumulative total iPods. The iPhone started in Mid '07, more than five years after the first iPod shipped. The acceleration in that product line is still evident while the iPod decelerates gracefully.

The second observation is that the total device count has reached 680 million in the last decade. It's a big number but it is still a number that is dwarfed by the overall device market. Apple is still around 10% of the devices market today. It should give an idea of how many devices could still be sold in the next decade.

The third observation is the ratio between the iTunes accounts and the total devices sold. Since iPods, iPhone and iPads have been dependent on iTunes, the number of iTunes accounts gives a rough indication of active users. Combining active users with total devices sold should give a rough estimate of the number of retired devices. In other words, if we assume that account holders typically use one device then by taking the difference between devices sold to date and accounts at that point in time we should know how many devices have been retired.

Dividing that number of retired devices by devices in use should give us the retirement rate and that is shown in the following chart:

Note that as the iPod was slowing and the iPhone was still a small part of the total, the retirement ratio was increasing. As the iPhone accelerated, the ratio began decreasing and is still decreasing.

Projecting the retirement rate should give us a way of more precisely estimating  the addressable market for developers, accessories makers, and other ecosystem participants.  Currently that means that about 60% of all Apple's devices sold are still in use. We can tune that figure upward in the next few quarters and make better estimates as Apple releases their shipment data.

The iTunes account data is not just a way to calibrate addressable markets but also a valuable method for measuring device longevity. The distance between the red line and the blue happens to be nearly a constant 8 quarters as shown in the following chart (note change to log scale for the vertical axis).

In February of this year MediaTek introduced an ARM chipset for Android smartphones targeting $160 end user pricing. I've heard estimates that this chipset will sell in the "hundreds of millions".

The question is: are these units going to be "activated" as per Google's definition of Android?

Historically, MediaTek's chips have been used in "grey market" devices. These are typically copies of branded phones and are sometimes shipped without IMEI numbers and hence not even sanctioned by regulatory authorities. If hundreds of million of such Android devices are sold in the next few years then tracking Android will become even more difficult.

The current total is difficult enough. We just received an update on the activation rate (900,000 per day) and that allows us to create a picture of total cumulative activations.

We still don't know the retirement rate so these are not devices in use, however most of these devices have been sold in the last two years implying they are (nominally) still functional. The following chart shows the ramp overlaid with an estimated 24 month product life cycle.

The one million per day Android activation rate has probably already been crossed with all the unsanctioned versions of Android available today. What will be the rate once the MediaTek chipsets are in wide distribution?

Apple has been releasing data about payments to developers with increasing frequency. Last week's $5 billion announcement was the fifth such update and came after about one quarter since the last.

Knowing the payments to developers and the cumulative download count allows us to get a very accurate revenue point for each download. As the frequency increases we can observe growth and seasonality patterns.

The following chart shows how average revenue per app download and the average payment rate to developers has changed since the iTunes app store opened and given the data points available:

The green area in the chart should add up to $5 billion. The average revenue for all downloads is 24c. 

Although there has been a drop in the revenue and payout rate in the last six months, the cause may be due to seasonal effects. We have not been able to see data that might show seasonality in prior years so we can't be sure it exists. However, it makes sense to me that new buyers are likely to engage in a burst of app buying and there are more iPhone purchases in the second half of the year than in the first.

In any case, the current "run rate" of payments to developers is about $7.5 million per day or $230 million per month. Both are up from last year.

Whether revenues are decreasing or not will require some more data. The last period's 20c is not far below the app store lifetime pricing of 24c.

 

At the 2012 WWDC, Apple released new data concerning its App ecosystem. Namely:

1. 30 billion apps downloaded to date (excluding updates)
2. $5 billion paid to app developers
3. 400 million iTunes accounts

These three data points allow us to update our picture of the app economy. First, the app download rate.

As would be expected from an expanding user base, the app download rate has been increasing. It is now at about 49.5 million apps downloaded every day. The history of this rate is shown in the chart below:

I added the same data for iTunes songs and book downloads for comparison. Note that although music and books are available to the same user base (actually higher due to Macs and iPods which do not run apps,) apps are being downloaded at a far faster rate--at least four times faster.

In terms of total, cumulative downloads, the comparison is even more stark:

It won't be long before total app downloads will be double total song downloads. Put another way, in the time it took the App store to reach 30 billion, the song store sold only 3 billion.

On average, songs are more expensive than apps ($1.29 vs. $0.24). What is the difference in value, not just units?

The data shows that apps have very likely overtaken songs as "gross" income. Apple does not book all app income, only the 30% share they keep, but in terms of transaction value, clearly apps are now a bigger business.

What about consumption? Are individual iTunes account holders buying a constant or variable number of songs or apps?

Here again apps show a distinctive pattern of out-performing songs. As far as digital media is concerned, apps are taking the download business by storm.

What about pricing? Is the expansion of the user base into the hundreds of millions leading to a collapse in app pricing?

No. You can see the price as the ratio between the downloads and the revenue to developers. If downloads scale more rapidly than payments then pricing is decreasing. As it turns out the average price of an app has held steady since approximately 1 billion downloads were recorded. That price is now about 24 cents per app (including free).

Finally, how about the content owners? Are payments to the owners of the media beginning to favor developers over music publishers/promoters?

Developers still have a long way to go. We can't be sure about how revenues are shared with music labels, but it's probable that they are still receiving bigger checks than developers. However, under some scenarios this will change quite soon.

The bigger story here is that the iOS app economy has reached a run rate of $4.3 billion per year from a standing start four years ago.

How big will the TV app economy be four years from the launch of an Apple smart TV?

As the chart below shows, the last quarter (first calendar 2012, second fiscal 2012) was robust with 94% earnings growth and 59% net sales growth. Subject to the usual superlatives, the performance was, again, unexpected by many.

Much of that surprise was due to the underestimation of iPhone sales in China during what is a holiday quarter in that nation. Growth this quarter will be more difficult to estimate. The iPhone is still the most important component but the iPad is becoming increasingly decisive in overall performance. In fact, I'm projecting that the iPad will have the equivalent of 73% of the iPhone revenues this quarter.

In this quarter the iPhone is reaching a late stage in its launch cycle but it continues to reach more points of purchase through distribution agreements and it also has a "portfolio" in terms of multiple price points and models available.

The iPad was supply constrained last quarter and may be in balance this quarter. Management has very clearly and repeatedly signaled that the iPad will have a very strong quarter.

So with these clues, here are my estimates for the quarter (with y/y growth in parentheses):

• iPhone units: 28.5 million (40%)
• Macs: 4.5 million (15%)
• iPads: 24 million (160%)
• iPods: 6 million (-20%)
• Music (incl. app) rev. growth: 35%
• Peripherals rev. growth: 20%
• Software rev. growth: 15%
• Total revenues: $41.9 billion (46%)
• GM: 44.8%
• EPS: $11.54 (48%)

This earnings value would imply a trailing twelve months’ EPS of about $44.8. At the current price of $571/share the P/E would be 12.7[1]. Cash and equivalents will probably increase to $118 billion.

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1. Apple's P/E also dropped to 12.7 around Christmas 2008. I did a search for some headlines to recall that time and came across one that seems appropriate: "Unrest Caused By Bad Economy May Require [domestic] Military Action, Says US Report".

Here is a video of my presentation at Mobilism 2012 on the story of mobile phone disruption. Thanks to Peter-Paul Koch (aka PPK) for organizing a great event and allowing me to present to such a smart and knowledgeable audience.

Asymmetric competition | Horace Dediu | Mobilism 2012 on Vimeo

Nearly one third of the time is spent in Q&A, which, even if I do say so myself, is the best part.

Also note the exclusive use of a custom iPad app for wireless presentation (pre-release version of the Perspective App.)

The latest data from comScore showed a few surprises:

New smartphone users dropped to a very low level, below the trend line.

Slightly less than 300k new smartphone users abandoned their feature phones every week during the month. Compared with the 1.5 million per week in November, it's quite a slowdown.

Penetration growth slowed as a result as well. Only 1.3 points of share were gained by smartphones.

It's still likely that the penetration will reach 50% by the end of summer this year (as was predicted in 2010).

When looking at the picture above broken out by platforms, we see signs that the slowing in smartphone growth seems to be attributable to a slowing in Android adoption:

Here are the installed bases in users over time of the different platforms:

The share of users of the platforms is shown below, first as a stacked area:

And also as a line chart:

This last chart shows the first time when Android share dipped sequentially. It should be watched closely as an indicator of a change in market dynamics. As we reach saturation, the basis of competition will change.

Finally, the last chart shows net user gains for the platforms.

Here again we see the lowest user growth for Android since 2009 (and hence since it reached mainstream distribution.)

It's perhaps too early to suggest that we're seeing a slowdown in the US for Android. Perhaps there will be a return to growth in the fall. The concern has to be that rather than seeing the net adds growing--as they have for two years with only two contiguous months of decline--Android net adds have been falling for four months.

A glance at Nokia and RIM's market values today shows that they are both valued below book. With respect to RIM,

The company's share price has collapsed in the past year, and it is now only valued at about $5.4 billion, down from $84 billion at its peak in 2008. Excluding its cash and the estimated value of its patents, RIM's device business and its 78 million subscribers around the world are in aggregate worth less than $1 billion to investors.

Analysis: RIM's new woes seen speeding loss of BlackBerry users - Yahoo! Finance

With respect to Nokia,

MKM: We are downgrading Nokia to Sell from Neutral following our U.S. retail Lumia model checks. We assume no value for the handset business and no value for the roughly four billion euros [about $5 billion] in net cash.

Nokia Suffers From Hang-Ups - Barrons.com

Three years ago the situation was dramatically different. RIM's share price was six times higher and Nokia's about four times higher. Here's what the market looked like in Q1 2010:

This summary view shows individual competitors in the phone market as well as their combined total volumes. The profitability/volumes/pricing can be visualized as well as margins and revenues.

The same visual summary is presented for the first quarters of 2011 and 2012 below:

The change may be subtle to the untrained eye, but it can be summarized as contraction for most vendors and expansion for Apple and Samsung. RIM and Nokia not only contracted in terms of revenues and volumes but also, crucially, lose money.

I've written about this before (many times.) But it's important to repeat again that this is a very short time span. Only three years separate the top chart from the bottom right. The "shape" of the market participants has not changed much but a tipping point has been crossed. This is the point where some participants are disrupted enough that they cannot recover.

Did it happen in 2010, 2011 or 2012? We're only looking at data which results from hundreds of decisions and thousands of actions. It's improbable that there was a single moment when the shift occurred or a single decision that caused it. But it's equally improbable that the disrupted could have countered any of the actions that got them to this point.

The cause (and remedy) for disruption is never found in a single act. It's a process and a way of operating and thinking. Is management to blame? That's always the answer. But how did management go from being smart to foolish so quickly and why did all managers in a firm, even an industry, conspire to become foolish at the same time?

If you study the decisions on a day-to-day basis, management consistently applies all the lessons they learned that led to success in the past. But these lessons lead to decisions that end up with exactly the worst result possible.

The crux of this dilemma is that doing the "right thing" leads to the wrong result. In a comment I questioned the possibility of management in a public company solving the dilemma.

Some have argued that public companies with professional managers entrusted with fiduciary responsibility are inherently incapable of solving the innovator's dilemma and are thus doomed to be disrupted. I'm starting to believe the argument. Whenever you as a manager try to work out the solution to the dilemma, you encounter a value destroying obstacle that cannot be surmounted while maintaining your position in the company. [As you attempt to solve it, you lose your position] Your successor won't make the same mistake and [thus] the whole enterprise collapses.

There are counter-examples however. The reason Apple should be studied is that it gives hope that they have cracked this problem.

Last year we sold ... 2.8 million Apple TVs. This year, just in the first six months of our year we've sold 2.7.

Tim Cook at D10 1:45.

I note the "our" in "our year". This implies fiscal year (that and the fact that he spoke in the past tense before six months had passed in the calendar year.)

Given the public information we have so far, it's now possible to estimate with some confidence the sales history of Apple TV. The following chart is my estimate. It includes all the known data so far with some interpolations to fill in the gaps.

Assuming average revenues per device of $100, we can get an estimate of about $344 million in Apple TV hardware revenues for calendar 2011. This is not a large amount relative to Apple's other lines of business. It is, for example, only 14% of the overall Peripherals revenues and only 5% of the iPod.

However hardware revenues are not the whole story. The business model for the device is in many ways the polar opposite of the business model of the iPhone. Whereas the iPhone employs "break-even" iTunes App Store (and the Music and Video and Book stores) in order to sustain its high hardware margins, the Apple TV business has low hardware margins that sustain content.

The complete picture therefore has to include an assessment of the content attach rates and the agency fees that Apple gets for that content.

Let's assume that each Apple TV is used to generate $10/month in content sales. This is not a lot. It's equivalent to 5 TV shows or one movie purchased or two movie rentals per month. The model I have shows that the installed base of Apple TVs was about 10 million by the end of 2011. That means that the run rate is $1.2 billion in content sales for the Apple TVs in use.

Now Apple does not book all that. They book only about 30% as revenues as their agency fee. That means that Apple TV could be generating revenues at a run rate of $360 million (to Apple.)

If we add that to the $344 million in hardware revenues we get about $704 million for 2011. This is still not a huge business. It is about equal to the revenue from iPad Smart Covers[1]

Looking forward, if Apple TV units sell at double the rate of last year and we increase the footprint accordingly, we could see a revenue rate of $1.2 billion for 2012.

Now this is not a high margin business. The margin on the content may be less than 50%--depending on transaction costs and hosting/traffic fees. The margin on the hardware is also likely to be below 40%. So the business is not wildly profitable. But it probably is profitable. Which means it makes sense to keep it running while waiting for other pieces to fall into place.

As Tim Cook repeated, they are very interested in this space. However, any discussion of the future must include an analysis of the business model and the sustainability in terms of profit that keeps long term development focused on getting the product to be good enough for the right jobs to be done.

What we should think about however is this "polar opposite" business model. Apple is running this as a "hobby" or as an internal experiment. Sales are (relatively) tiny but it generates some profit. Volumes are small but they are growing. It's taking a heck of a long time. It's asymmetric to the prevailing model the company relies upon. It's beneath contempt from all observers. Sounds familiar?

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Notes:

1. In 2011 there were about 40.5 million iPads sold. If we assume half of those purchases also resulted in a Smart Cover purchase and if the average revenue per Smart Cover was $35 then total Smart Cover revenues were $709 million.