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Asymmetric Intelligence

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  1. A more complete picture of the iTunes economy

    Research · 59 comments

    As it did yesterday, on occasion Apple reports the cumulative total downloads and payments to developers. Since this is done in variable time intervals, it makes analysis of the value of the app store difficult.

    But not impossible.

    The provision of developer revenues means we can determine the pricing of apps. The pricing of apps and the download totals allows us to determine the revenue of the store. Using the time stamps of the reports allows us to determine these quantities over time.

    I've combined the data we have so far into the following graph.

    Screen Shot 2013-01-09 at 1-9-3.17.11 PM

    It shows three quantities (on three separate scales) at a monthly resolution:

    1. Download rate (in millions/day, interpolated from download totals)
    2. Payment rate to developers (reported change in payment to developers/reported time interval)
    3. Resulting revenue per download (in red, trailing average over a 10 month period)

    Having a price and quantity of app downloads allows for a complete picture of App Store revenues over time, shown below:

    Screen Shot 2013-01-09 at 1-9-3.22.02 PM

    Note that I've separated the developer revenues from Apple's own revenues. The blue area should total cumulative developer payments (to a degree of error.)

    The green area above is what Apple includes in its financial reports as part of "Music" revenues. If we annualize these App Store revenues we can strip them out and show them separately from "other media" revenues.

    Screen Shot 2013-01-09 at 1-9-3.25.04 PM

    Concentrating on the green areas which represent what Apple "keeps" we see the following split:

    Screen Shot 2013-01-09 at 1-9-3.28.55 PM

    Considering that Apple reports the iTunes store to being "slightly above break-even" then we can summarize the chart above as the operating expenses for the store.

    Finally, taking into account all the information above we can draw a complete picture of how revenues flow through the App Store:

    Screen Shot 2013-01-09 at 1-9-3.34.23 PM

     

    Here are some conclusions:

    • The iTunes economy defined as gross revenues transacted through it is now about $12 billion/yr.
    • Over the last five years content owners (media and app) received a total of $24 billion while Apple spent about $10 billion to create those sales
    • Seen as a retail business, iTunes costs about $3.5 billion/yr to operate. This includes merchandising, payment processing and "shipping & handling".
    • Total revenues have risen steadily in a range of 32 to 38% compounded over the last 4 years.
    • Apps are now a third of all iTunes revenues, (about $4 billion/yr) having taken that share in only 4.5 years.
    • Non-app media still make up 2/3 of iTunes in terms of sales value but their growth is now 28% vs. about 50% for apps.
  2. App Store Download Rate Forecast

    Research · 21 comments

    Apple reported over 2 billion unique app downloads (excluding re-downloads and updates) in December. The total downloads reached 40 billion, payments to developers reached $7 billion and the total iTunes accounts reached one half billion.

    The total downloads is shown relative to total songs is shown in the following graph:

    Screen Shot 2013-01-08 at 1-8-2.09.04 PM

     

    Although we have not received an update on song downloads for some time, it's probably safe to assume that twice as many apps have been downloaded as songs.

    This data can be reduced to a download rate:

    Screen Shot 2013-01-08 at 1-8-2.14.08 PM

    The apps daily download rate was about 65 million/day during the holiday period but may be averaging about 50 million/day on a yearly basis. Note however that the rate is increasing at approximately 1 million/day/month. That implies that the average rate will reach 100 million/day in 4 years and may spike to that level by 2015.

    The revenues associated with that rate will be $14 million/day. More about that in the next post.

  3. Below the Surface

    Research · 83 comments

    Early data shows that the PC market has not experienced a "pop" from Windows 8. Market watchers have been anticipating this pop since every previous version of Windows has led to a surge in shipments. PC vendors have also been hoping for this to lift their volumes. Volumes have been stagnant for a while, as the following chart shows:

    Screen Shot 2012-12-13 at 12-13-3.45.58 PM

    If we combine the traditional PC and tablet markets—what I refer to as "large and medium screen PCs"— there has been growth. However the growth is all due to the tablets. When seen in a share split (blue tablets vs. brown Windows PC's) the shift toward tablet computing is clear.

    The question is whether Microsoft will be successful in shifting to this new computing model? Microsoft's problem is not that it has difficulty offering an operating system for tablets. The problem is that the economics of both systems and application software on tablets is destructive to its margins.

    A PC has for several decades been "taxed"[1] with a Windows and Office license. The exact figure is imprecise because of subscription accounting used by Microsoft, but we can take Microsoft revenues for Windows and Office and divide by PC shipments to get an average.

    Screen Shot 2012-12-13 at 12-13-3.47.14 PM

    This view shows how Windows revenues per PC have held steady for the last three years and Office have moved up slightly. In the latest quarter Windows "captured" $52 per PC shipment and Office "captured" $67.

    The problem for Microsoft is that pricing systems software at $50 and a suite of apps at $67 for a tablet that costs $200 to the end-user is prohibitive.

    Firstly because an OEM could not justify paying $50 to Microsoft while competing with another vendor whose (Android) software license costs nothing. It implies an increase in his bill of materials without the ability to charge more for the product and hence a reduction or elimination of margin.

    Secondly because consumers (or IT buyers) would have a hard time justifying $67 for an Office license for every tablet when most apps are either free or under $10. (Apple charges $9.99 each for iOS versions of Pages, Numbers and Keynote which can be installed on several devices.)

    The economics of tablets imply a "commoditization" of system and application software. So what's Microsoft to do?

    The answer is Surface where the software margin is captured in hardware. This explains the pricing of Surface. The price isn't significantly below what Apple charges because Microsoft wants to capture a comparable (30%+) margin. On a $500 product that amounts to $150. After subtracting hardware operating and distribution costs we can get pretty close to the $120 it currently obtains from a PC.

    This also explains the lack of appetite for "partnerships". OEMs which would normally compete on hardware would have to deal with zero margins (or less) after license fees and would be encouraged to cut corners and shave costs, compromising the experience and causing the platform to suffer.

    Microsoft does not like the phrase "post-PC" because it implies the end of its hegemony. They like to think of the PC becoming a new form factor in which they have the same role they've always had. However, looking beyond the form factor we see that mobility itself is disruptive in the implied modularity of the PC.

    Device economics offer the explanation for an otherwise perplexing Surface strategy. The question remains how many Surface units could Microsoft possibly sell to maintain its revenues.

    --

    1. A "tax" is implied only when purchases are mandatory.
  4. The App Revolution (in Filmmaking)

    Research · 21 comments

    The following article is published in Filmmaker Magazine. Fall 2012, Vol. 21 #1.

    There is a saying I once heard: "Once you change the method of distribution, the product has to change."

    This itself is a take on the idea that distribution defines the product. You see this around you every day in the products you buy. Cars are influenced by the dealership networks that sell them. Phones by the mobile network operators and the choice of computer you use at work by whatever the IT department or value added reseller prefers to work with. Mass market restaurants offer what can be sold by wholesalers--typically frozen, long shelf-life staples. Almost every product category is shaped more by what can be distributed than what can be produced. That's simply because in mature economies distribution is harder than production. In consumer products it requires access to wholesalers who then require access to shops who themselves have access to prime real estate which attracts foot traffic. Production only requires capital. Distribution requires relationships, often exclusive ones.

    This pattern is even more pronounced when looking at media products. Production is arguably easier since it's constrained by talent, which is fungible. But distribution is even harder as it is addressing bigger audiences in shorter time frames. You see this lopsided balance of power in the abundance of books being written relative to those being published. There are thousands of films produced and hundreds get distributed.

    But the saying suggests that if distribution were to change then the product itself would change. Indeed, if you can sell ebooks direct, then they tend to evolve into new genres (e.g. Fifty Shades of Grey). If you can sell cheap adult video online it tends to evolve into new genres as well (I'll leave examples to the imagination.) YouTube videos quickly cluster around "Fail" or "Win" compilations which evolved from America's Funniest Home Videos. They get millions of views. Even before the Internet, the availability of cable created the genre of music video, which created the first music broadcast alternative to radio. And of course, cinema itself redefined theater once it could get shown to millions rather than thousands. The new methods of distribution of media affected what gets produced rather than the other way around. Consider the converse: innovative filmmakers who try new storytelling methods are stymied by a lack of acceptance by existing distributors and find their material languishing in festivals or perpetual cult status.

    So we can re-state the saying to a new "Law of new media": Once you change the method of distribution, the medium itself has to change.

    I gave examples of how Internet distribution changed some media formats. However, the Internet itself has not had any effect on long-form cinema so far. In fact, you would be able to tell if Internet distribution did work by watching if the product would change. So far, it seems, at least to me, that the commercially successful product has not changed. One reason has been that film is still a very difficult product to distribute digitally as most of the world does not have the capacity to buy, consume and enjoy films digitally. Another is that the current distributors have had an allergic reaction to the option. As existing products have been crammed into the new distribution chain (e.g. Netflix) the established distributors are experiencing channel conflict and are raising the costs of digital distribution rights. Netflix has seen its costs triple as it ate into Cable market share. Fundamentally, the incumbent distributors are reluctant to open a channel of distribution which conflicts with or reduces margins of the existing channels.

    This brings up another corollary: fundamentally, you can’t move an existing media to a new network. You have to think of it as a deeply rooted-in system, and it's just not going to like moving to another environment. You have to uproot this huge tree, and it just won’t come out and if it did it will not take root in a new place.

    The only way to create this new value network around new distribution is to plant a new tree.

    This is the problem for the technology industry today. The only way technology companies can solve the “content is king” dilemma (which, by the way, is an euphemism for "Hollywood is king and Silicon Valley isn't"), is by allowing new content to flourish on top of new platforms. It’s not about moving the old content to the new platform. It’s about allowing new content to be created exclusively on the new platforms. This new content will therefore, by our law, be a new medium.

    For me, apps are that new medium. Apps offered a new way to package entertainment for “niche time”. The early fart apps evolved into a whole new genre of games which are now challenging the established game studios. The result is that a generation of developers has moved from building PC or web software to apps with cloud back-ends. The first to switch to this new medium were those with the least to lose and with the most modest of goals. Apps have now a more valuable industry than digital music with over 55 billion installs between the iPhone and Android ecosystems. Consumers are increasingly spending their spare time in front of apps. In the US “app consumption” increased from 43 min/day in 2010 to 94 min/day at the end of 2011. This number already exceeds the time spent in web consumption. I find it difficult to doubt that app time will exceed TV time, especially as TV time is increasingly a dual screen experience.

    (Feels like it needs one sentence explaining why. Is it because of their accessibility to small developers, or their ability to reach mobile handsets natively, or because of consumer trend?) If it’s absolutely impossible to move long-form video or long-form cinema to this new medium in such a way that everyone in the world can consume it on every device, then the app ecosystems will take up that challenge and say, “There’s a job to be done, and that’s to enertain people for an hour-and-a-half with characters, plots and wonderful stories, and we will make that happen, and we’ll call this thing an app.”

    And that app will solve that job for that person. It's what's happening to the game console business. The new game apps are distributed differently, priced differently and produced differently. As a result they are used differently and make a different set of developers thrive.

    The new app media will mean that we’ll just have to live in app universes, and go eat popcorn somewhere else. Microsoft and Google and Apple and Amazon and anybody else whose belly is at the bar has been scratching their heads wondering "How do we move that content over to us?" They've been barking up the wrong tree. The fundamental question isn't how to cram old media into a new shiny screen. It is how do you let developers and artists and creative people create stuff that is new and compatible with this new way of living.

    Think also about the history of media -- movies haven't been around forever; music hasn't existed as a recorded medium forever. Not even books. What did people do before these forms of expression? We think of the use cases of going to the movies, or the use cases of sitting in front of a TV on Sunday night, or playing a console game. These things didn’t get done at some point in time. Nor will they be done at some future point in time.

    In a few years we’ll move on and we won’t do those things. Each person will probably have his own screen in front of them--many already do--and whatever we do together we’ll do through a shared screen. We won’t have communal experiences that we associate with the old media. Certainly not in a theater. Maybe not even in a living room. And that is how we will move into a new value network.

    It is inevitable. As a technology provider, you shouldn’t try to squeeze a 19th-century model into a 21st-century model. Just let it go. Create a platform and give people the freedom to create on it. As a media creator, you should try to learn what the new model demands. New forms of interaction, new story telling opportunities, new ways to communicate with audiences. Create experiments and learn. It's the only way.

  5. The omnivorous app

    Research · 67 comments

    Marc Andreessen famously coined the phrase "software is eating the world." It's an apt observation. If you look back on the history of computing you're likely to measure computers sold or devices sold or users harvested or productivity gained. These things are measured because they can be measured. But the greatest cause of value created and captured has been the development of software. An ephemeral product whose value is often ignored in analytical discourse.

    Software is not easily measured and it's not easily valued due to its intractable nature. Firstly, because businesses that make software tend to have weird cost structures--absurdly high fixed costs and operating margins: They operate without income for years and then suddenly are massively profitable with a minimal set of resources. They have a non-linear, "big bang" trajectory.

    Secondly, software companies tend to capture revenues from something other than the direct sale of the good. Software is rarely sold. Services sometimes are sold on the basis of software but more likely audiences for services are sold to a set of bidders, or revenue is obtained in even more circuitous ways.

    Thirdly, because there are curious multi-sided markets for software platforms. Charlie Kindel hints strongly at how difficult it is to understand the dynamics of software platforms. There is the prospect of lock-in of users and data. There are relationships to nurture with developers and there's the principle of an ecosystem that creates network effects. The virtuous/vicious cycles are non-linear and unpredictable even for the experts who have been at it for decades (e.g. Microsoft).

    Given these difficulties, software is seldom seen as the core value proposition for a particular business. But make no mistake about it, Apple, Google, Microsoft, Facebook and Amazon are all software companies. They "monetize" or integrate software differently but software is causal to their profits. Their use of software has also made them all disruptive. Software enabled the disruption of consumer electronics, retail, computers, advertising and broadcast media.

    But we have not seen anything yet. There is another class of software that is poised to lay waste to a new set of industries. The lowly app coupled with cloud-based services[1] is the termite that is set to eat the foundations of the largest of the industries still standing.

    Consider the following:

    • Games. A software industry in itself, the app versions are attracting non-consumers and eventually will get good enough to absorb all  usage and profits. Games merged with "entertainment" concepts will lead to new models of user recreation leading to new global brands that could challenge even Disney.
    • TV. As apps come to the big screen TV will never be the same. Not only will show creators build directly for an audience but advertisers that currently sponsor shows will produce them instead and package the result as an app.
    • Shopping/dining/entertainment/hospitality are changing with location services and with novel "bits to bricks" purchase options (e.g. PassBook). Increasingly services will exploit handheld devices to enable product discovery--the main job retailers are tasked with.
    • Communications. The observation that "phone" is just an app and that messaging can be done in dozens of ways depending on message, relationship, context or even custom is possible because apps conform to the user's needs rather than the user conforming to the tools they get from the network service provider.

    Although these are enormous opportunities in themselves, this is in addition to several industries that are already crumbling (photography, book publishing, to name two).

    I don't need to rely on prose alone to make the point. A graph can also lend a hand.

    Consider that Apple's App Store and Google Play together have had over 50 billion installs in less than four years and that the number of users of apps is at least 750 million. Furthermore, consider that apps have moved from a smartphone phenomenon to tablets and even PCs using OS X or Windows. Within one year these software capsules are going to be in use by one fourth of the global population.

    Nothing has this kind of reach or engagement, not even browsers. What makes the app disruptive, even ahead of a browser-based service, is that it includes incentives for developers (or, more precisely, app producers) to get paid and to have a relationship with the buyer. These two value propositions, in isolation or in combination, are available to millions and consumable by billions. The most democratized market that can be imagined. An unbounded set of producers and an unbounded set of consumers and a persistent connection after the purchase with nothing in between them except a payment mechanism

    The world has never seen such an opportunity.

    The consequences are unforeseeable. Apps are a form of software that goes beyond its ancestral "application" as a product and as a business model. It's the software that will take in and assimilate everything in sight.

    ---

    Notes:

    1. I have a simple rule to distinguish between an app and a service. If you have to supply a username and password to an app, it's a service.
  6. Speaking at TOC Frankfurt October 9 about publishing

    Research · 3 comments

    This is a quick note to mention that I'll be speaking at the Tools of Change (TOC) Frankfurt Conference this October on the eve of the Frankfurt Book Fair. Conference details:

    • Tuesday, 9 Oct. 2012, 8:30 a.m. to 6 p.m.
    • Frankfurt Marriott Hotel
    • Hamburger Allee 2
    • +49 (0) 69-7955-0
    • Directions

    You can get a 20% discount if you use the following code when registering:

    TOCPartner20TSpeaker

    I'll be speaking about the jobs publishers are hired to do. Without giving too much away, here is my synopsis of the talk:

    We're inclined to "categorize" or "segment" media according to its attributes. We think of visual, auditory or written forms as distinct. Within each of these definitions of media we further sub-segment according to the way they are packaged. As in books, periodicals, or TV vs. film and albums and singles. These definitions are convenient because they describe the product and the product has evolved into a distribution chain and a therefore a market. It becomes therefore analogous to think of a book market and a TV market and a periodicals market as if these are what people actually desire.

    But what people desire are more basic things. They desire to feel good or to be comfortable or to escape into fantasy or to be aroused. They have thirsts for knowledge or flights of fancy or needs for belonging. Authors and story tellers have sought to serve these needs for as long as we've been humans, regardless of the medium. When you step back and ask what the real "markets" are you realize that we've categorized according to technical and business means of delivering these needs.

    Business theorists have a word to describe this categorization: segmentation according to product attributes. It's a common practice to define markets according to products rather than what these products are hired to do. The great Harvard marketing professor Theodore Levitt used to tell his students, “People don’t want to buy a quarter-inch drill. They want a quarter-inch hole!” The idea that you can categorize by what consumers want to get done rather than what you are selling them is not new but it's still a very hard thing to get your head around. It's become known as "Job to be done" segmentation and has changed product planning for many firms. If you apply this method to your industry you realize that the products you sell are in competition not with other products like them but with completely new products. A newspaper may be in competition with Angry Birds and a TV show with FaceBook and a Movie with a cinematic themed video game.

    If you take the history of story telling and job to be done analysis into consideration you realize that technology has always played a part in how stories are told and re-told. This technological progress is accelerating and we are now in an era where apps are the new medium which can encompass much of any of the previous story telling mediums. Apps are so flexible and so easily distributed and consumed that they threaten to converge multiple media types. I'll explain how app economics are affecting not just games, but all forms of publishing.

  7. Padcast: Reviewing Apple's Third Fiscal Quarter 2012

    Research · 59 comments

    Here is the second Perspective "padcast" where I discuss:

    1. Top and bottom line growth
    2. iPhone, iPad, iPod and Mac revenue growth
    3. iPad vs. Mac
    4. iOS product mix
    5. Other product line growth
    6. Gross Margins by product
    7. Pricing and revenue per unit by product
    8. Cash and cash growth
    9. Guidance and whether results were a surprise to management

    The discussion is an audio presentation with animated, interactive motion charts which can be manipulated by the user.

    It's available as an in-app purchase for $0.99 on the iTunes app store via the Perspective iPad app.