iPhone

As a rule, I don't like to make a forecast for Apple's performance during quarters where there is no guidance. There is a good reason why there is no guidance. The management does not feel confident that there is enough information to make a reasonable prediction. Keep in mind that the management has very detailed, very frequent updates on their business metrics.

Anyone who has run a business knows that signals of performance are abundant and one can only imagine how many signals arrive at Apple HQ from the 1.5 billion active devices, tens of thousands of points of sale, and a vast network of resellers. There are also billions of interactions in services. Then there are search queries, store visitor counts (online and physical), developer payments, app downloads, content downloads, subscriptions. All this information is collected and analyzed on (probably) a daily basis.

Also when guidance is given, it's usually a month into the next quarter. The company will have already seen about a third of the quarter already pass before they predict the next two thirds.

This last quarter in particular was even more difficult given the delays in launching the new iPhones and the dynamics related to the broader portfolio.

And yet, the company feels that they can issue some "insights on our expectations". Here is what was said about three months ago:

These directional comments assume that COVID-related impacts to our business in November and December are similar to what we've seen in October. […] [W]e expect iPhone revenue to grow during the December quarter despite shipping iPhone 12 and 12 Pro 4 weeks into the quarter and iPhone 12 mini and 12 Pro Max 7 weeks into the quarter.

We expect all other products in aggregate to grow double digits, and we also expect services to continue to grow double digits. For gross margin, we expect it to be similar to our most recent quarters despite the costs associated with the launch of several new products. For opex, we expect to be between $10.7 billion and $10.8 billion. We expect OI&E to be around $50 million and the tax rate to be around 16%.

Luca Maestri, Chief Financial Officer

So, given this information and some hints from IDC, Gartner and CIRP and China I'm willing to offer some estimates:

• iPhone Revenue: $63.9 billion
• Mac Revenue: $9.3 billion
• iPad: $7.4 billion
• Services: $15.1 billion
• Wearables & Home: $12 billion
• Net sales: $107.8 billion
• Gross margin percent: 37.7%
• EPS: $1.48 (Growth: 19%)

Of course, this is very speculative and I don't have a lot of confidence in it. If anything it may be on the high side.

I don't expect there to be guidance for the next quarter with a resumption of guidance only after the pandemic has largely subsided (probably Q3 of this year.)

Remember the Post-PC era?

The term Post-PC was first coined by MIT scientist David D. Clark in 1999 and was quickly adopted by both Microsoft's and Apple's former CEOs. Jobs popularized the term "post-PC" in 2007 (the launch of the first iPhone), and in 2011 when he launched iCloud, a service enabling Apple devices to synchronize data through cloud services, freeing them from dependency on a PC.

The Post-PC era was posited during the late 2000s and early 2010s presupposing a decline in the sales of personal computers (PCs) in favor of devices, phones, tablets, wearables, IoT, etc. These devices were mobile first (i.e. battery-first as opposed to plug-first), connected second and cloud-powered third. They were designed to run "apps" not "applications" and had new ecosystems with millions of developers selling through online-only stores, priced often as subscriptions rather than seat licenses.

In the last decade or so, the PC did endure an overall decline in sales while phones, tablets and wearables climbed to at least 10x volumes of the PC. But the last few months have shown a resurgence in PC sales. Certainly the necessity of working from home is the reason but will this last?

The fact is that the PC did not disappear. It certainly is still in use and there are buyers for it. There just isn't a lot of growth or energy. There hasn't been for a decade. The software and hardware efforts are uninspiring because the talent has moved elsewhere. The creativity, R&D budget have gone the same way.

But what about the Mac? The Mac is the PC from the company that more or less defined the Post-PC era. Would it not be the first to be sacrificed for the new future? As it stands, as the graph below shows, the Mac today is double the business it was decade ago and although it has been overtaken by wearables, it has kept ahead (after a time) of the iPad.

The trouble with PCs, including the Mac, is that they are stubborn in how they define themselves. Like the power user, they see performance along certain dimensions. They also don't see performance along new dimensions which devices offer with glee. For example connectivity to cellular networks (still missing in even the fanciest laptop but available on my watch.) Then there are the sensors which measure my heart rate, activity level, location, altitude, etc. Then there are cameras which on phones now boggle the mind. PC cameras are comical in comparison.

Then there is portability and usability without being plugged in.

Well, it was. With the M1, Apple has finally delivered the always-on feel of a tablet or phone and the more-than-one-day battery life. It also added a lot of neural engine horsepower and a lot of on-chip memory. Apple is delivering a system on a chip which makes the Mac more device-like in its integration. And sales are likely to rise, on the back of a great 2020 for the Mac. The form of the machine might even change with new designs being made possible by the lower heat profile and space savings.

And so I'm writing this post on a Mac. The graph you see above was created on the Mac. It's possible to do all this my iPad and even on my iPhone but it would be harder. But I'm also willing to bet you're reading this on a phone.

And that's the crux of it. The PC is still the machine of choice for authoring while the device is the machine of choice for consuming and consuming will always be more popular. What the iPad has done is taken a share of PC use and in my case I do use it for some tasks like email a lot more frequently. The theory would suggest that the iPad will continue its upward trajectory while the PC would abandon the low end.

This disruption has already happened but it hasn't been complete. The median performance band now belongs to devices but the professional will always ask for more of the performance which they see as productive while the consumer will always ask for more of the performance which they see as convenience. Here the market bifurcates.

What has been problematic with the smaller of the two markets has been the vicious cycle of lack of investment due to decreasing margins, commoditization and talent flight. What Apple is doing once again is ratcheting up the bar for the PC to make sure it's the top choice for creative professionals. And as long as they are productive, the consumers will keep them employed if not in riches.

The latest Apple Watch has a blood oxygen sensor which measures the wearer's oxygen saturation (SpO2). Oxygen saturation is the fraction of oxygen-saturated hemoglobin relative to total hemoglobins in the blood. If the level is below 90% it is considered low and is very dangerous. An alert is issued in that case.

The Watch also monitors (periodically but consistently) the wearer's heart rate and can warn of abnormal rates. It can also detect patterns of irregular heart rhythms and atrial fibrillation.

The Watch can also provide VO2 max or the maximum rate of oxygen consumption measured during exercise. This measurement provides a quantitative value of endurance fitness and reflects cardiorespiratory fitness.

The Watch can also generate an ECG or electro cardiogram which is a graph of voltage versus time of the electrical activity of the heart using electrodes placed on the skin. The ECG can be generated as a PDF and sent to a physician for analysis.

The Watch also monitors sound levels providing a warning of when the wearer is exposed to dangerous sound levels and should consider protecting their hearing.

The Watch can also detect a fall and summon emergency services even if the wearer is unconscious. It can also be used to summon assistance with a push of a button.

The Watch uses machine learning to track sleep and can monitor the vital signs listed above during that time.

The Watch has an always-on altimeter which is working to help with tracking effort by the wearer.

The Watch can detect hand washing and provide a timer so you do it well enough.

The Watch can track all physical activity and provide motivational reminders to meet daily goals.

The Watch can monitor exercise with precision and provide data that helps you improve your performance.

The Watch can also be used to pay for your groceries at the register.

The reason the Watch can do all these things is because it's a computer. A computer with a dual core processor based on the A13 bionic chip also used in the iPhone 11, a retina display that is always on(!) and displaying at least 500nits at all times. It has on-board storage for music, WiFi, Bluetooth and a touch screen.

But although being a computer allows the Watch to do all this and more, no PC can do even one of these things. Nor does a PC have GPS, or Cellular connectivity or NFC and is certainly not swimproof. You don't wear a PC in bed and it does not stay with you 24x7.

The Watch is among a class of devices that have emerged less than five years ago that do many things that PCs can't. They also do many things phones can't.

Biometric sensing (SpO2, ECG, Afib detect, sleep tracking, fall detection, etc.) were not features that were even requested from phones or PCs (or tablets.) Nor did PC users ask for iPhone or tablet features like taking selfies, gesture-based gaming and Lidar.

The Watch has taken on the job of health monitor and health preserver. It isn't a job any other computer would have even attempted.

The story of phones, tablets and wearables is a story of creating new markets, not substituting for old ones. In so doing the new markets are greater than their putative substitutions would allow. This is happening over and over again but it still seems to go largely unnoticed. Keep an eye out for a lot more of this.

The iPad was launched in April 2010, about three years after the iPhone. Followers of the company will know however that the iPad was designed first, starting sometime in the early 2000s.

The iPad was the prototype touch device because it's less constrained but also because Apple was, at its heart, a computer company and the iPad was a computer first, device second.

Concepts of tablets predated Apple's entry and go back to the 1990s. The idea of a "Tablet Computer" was envisioned by Alan Kay as the Dynabook as early as 1968. He famously remarked that if Apple were to build a tablet-sized iPhone it would "rule the world".

But has the iPad come to rule the world?

Ten years is not a long time—the Mac is now 36 and it's still kicking, Windows is only 25 years old—but already 500 million iPads have been sold.

The sales history of the iPad in units is shown below in blue vs. the iPhone in green. (Note, values in last 8 quarters are estimated).

The story that did not pan out for the iPad is that the unit growth did not match that of the iPhone, which, in its first decade sold 1.2 billion units.

But that is because the iPhone and iPad differ in significant ways. Ways which were difficult to anticipate early on.

Difficult because internally the two are basically the same. Both share the same processors and architecture and (until recently) the operating system and user interaction model. They have a similar "bill of materials" (though prices are quite different, with iPhones typically more expensive.)

The main difference has been in the display size. As I noted early on, a few inches of display may not look like a big difference but it is qualitatively very different—as much as a bathtub and a swimming pool both contain water, the quantity of water changes dramatically what you can do with either.

As a result of its size, the iPad is more likely to remain at home; not stationary in one spot, but not "in-hand" at all times. That affects how long it lasts and the tasks it's assigned to do.

As a result, iPads stay in use longer, get passed on to new users and serve for many years. Their average life span is likely well over 4 years and 9 year old iPads are not uncommon. It's therefore very likely that the vast majority of all iPads sold are still in use.

So the true measure of success is not units sold but number of active (and satisfied) users. The iPad user base is probably around 400 million (about 27% of total active Apple devices.) The degree of activity is also telling and is reflected in the million apps built specifically for the platform.

400 million users makes for a healthy ecosystem, especially as the users tend to be willing to spend on apps and services, which in turn, attracts more investment from developers, which leads to more usage, and so on, in a virtuous cycle.

As with all aspects of Apple analysis, the qualitative is just as important as the quantitative, even more so. The quality of the users, the usage and the product is the pre-eminent assessment.

iPad users, usage and product make for a remarkable combination. On the product side, the Fall 2020 line-up is another leap forward. In particular, the price points, breadth of offering, accessories (mini, Air, Pro, pencil, Smart Keyboard, etc.) and the power across the board.

This year sees a performance jump in the middle of the line-up with the usual mind-boggling measurements (some beginning with "nano," and others with "tera".)

So where to for iPad now? What worlds remain for it to conquer? So far has found users in the three "E"s: Enterprise, Education and Entertainment. Pro usage is a niche that is growing in production, especially media. What many might say is that it needs to aim at replacing the laptop, or the PC in general.

It has not done that so far, much to the delight of naysayers. But this is not as big a failure as it might seem.

First note that the Mac user base itself is not nearly as big (110 million +/-10%). iPad could be 4x bigger in user base. The Windows base is larger at 1.2 to 1.4 billion but that resists frontal assault as it is deeply entrenched around enterprise workflows. It's also bereft of profit.

What iPad did do is create its own demand. It sits comfortably aside other platforms not in place of them. Most iPad users also have an iPhone and a PC or a Mac. I happen to have all those and more than one iPad. The iPad did something grander than kick the PC off its perch. It sat next to it and found life quite comfortable.

In March 2016 Ben Bajarin and I put on an event called SUBSCRIBE where we asked, among other things,

• How will the online services business models evolve?
• How will hardware affect software and services and vice versa?
• How will  users, usage, and capital connect?

Now is a good time to look back on that event.

For the keynote I prepared a model which predicted the mobile ecosystems for iOS, Android and Chinese Android over the next 5 years (to 2020). The methodology involved taking a measurement of the revenues of the top internet service companies, building up the categories these companies occupied, estimating how much of those revenues are through mobile distribution and then splitting the result among the three platforms of iOS and the two Androids.

Adding to that the "native" app and content revenues for each platform would yield the Ecosystem total value. Applying a growth rate would offer some visibility into the future.

The following images are screen captures of the Perspective presentation.

Of course there are several potential errors in this methodology. The categories were not all inclusive. I used Social, Media, Search, Maps, email, Messaging, e-commerce, Travel, Enterprise, Storage, Transportation, Travel and Other as the top level categories. There are many products and services who would end up in Other. Moreover, these categories were anchored by the top companies in each category and the share of the top names was not always clear. Finally, the growth rates for these categories were based on historic trends which could change either way.

The online services ecosystem (all platforms) was thus estimated to be $450 billion in 2015, growing to $820 billion by 2019 and $914 billion by 2020.

The mobile split would vary by segment but would be roughly 75% by 2020 (25% would not be mobile). The final assumption was based on the split among the existing mobile platforms. I put a multiple of roughly 50% for iOS and 35% for Google Android and the rest for China Android.

Multiplying all these assumptions gave me a figure of $275 billion for the iOS portion of the global online services market in 2019. (Incidentally, Android was estimated at $207 billion and China Android $110 billion.) Note that this does not mean this was an expectation of Apple's revenues or that this was the opportunity of Apple obtaining any percentage of this revenue. It was simply the value of what would transact through iOS, a platform which would act as a commerce enabler. This was to be the size of the iOS "ecosystem" or co-dependency between Apple and the companies delivering through its platform.

Ecosystems are a powerful idea. As I recall, this term applied to mobile was coined by a Palm executive in the late 1990s when he referred to the value of all the apps built for the Palm Pilot. The biological term refers to the system of multiple species living in close proximity. It implies an equilibrium as each species benefits from the others and the environment. There might be predators and prey but biodiversity is the successful construct.

The idea of an ecosystem for a platform was also the core strength of Microsoft's Windows which created the network effects around it and it has been the goal of every platform since. The nature of computing and networking implies that these systems grow faster and are more resilient than the more traditional value networks of other businesses or industries.

Now this ecosystem was something we wished to highlight in 2016 as a core strength for Apple. It was not considered as such at the time and I thought putting a figure of $275 billion in 4 years' time was a way to highlight the potential. Time since has proven us right.

This week Apple highlighted the result of another research team who attempted to measure the iOS ecosystem. Their conclusion was that billings and sales facilitated by the Apple App Store Ecosystem in 2019 was $519 billion. More than twice the amount I had so optimistically forecast four years earlier.

The authors also emphasize that this is a conservative estimate and should serve as a baseline.

I feel partly vindicated about that figure as my attempt at a figure was intended to highlight the scope of the ecosystem and it is better to have underestimated it than overestimated it. The authors' methodology was also similar in being bottom-up summation of components by categories of services but the information available today is enhanced by the new data Apple made available on subs and Services revenues and install base.

Note that in the graph below the salient data points of subscribers (red triangles) had not begun until 2017 causing the acceleration in Services revenue (yellow line). Note also the additional square points representing install base.

This figure of more than half a trillion dollars of value transacted through iOS should give some pause. It it a very powerful figure that can be combined with the other data from Apple:

• More than 1.5 billion active devices
• More than 1 billion iPhone users
• More than 500 million paid subscriptions
• More than $1/day iPhone hardware revenues for Apple

The half-trillion per year on services implies between $335 and $520 in spending per user (likely closer to $500) per year. This would be in addition to the approximately $365/yr in hardware spending per user (which Apple books as hardware revenue). In the case of the iPhone there is yet more: the cellular network service which may average $350 per year.

To simplify, the "average Apple user" spends $1/day for each device, $1/day for the network and $1.4/day on items bought through the device. Adding a margin of error, that's between $3.4 and $4 per day each user spends. Oh, and there are about a billion such users.

The total spending enabled by iOS thus is close to $1.4 trillion/yr.

That's a significant amount. It's bigger than many industries. There are only about 12 countries with higher GDP (Spain is about the same.)

How does Apple benefit from this?

Apple captures 30% of billings through its App Store. My estimate for these billings were $67.9 billion in 2019 which means App Store billings were 13% of the 2019 ecosystem. Apple's 30% cut of Billings amounts to 3.8% for the whole ecosystem. It's hardly an oppressive number.

If Apple only captures 3.8% what use is this to Apple?

The last decade has seen Apple emerge as the world's largest company in terms of market capitalization, and not doing so with a wild multiple of revenue or earnings, quite the opposite. It did this by creating the world's greatest customer base. Not in absolute scale. Android and Facebook have larger customer bases with multiple billions of users.

No, Apple's one billion users are simply the best billion users. They are the most likely to stick with Apple and they are the most likely to buy more from Apple and—this is crucial—they are the most likely to buy everything else. Those other companies whose sales come from Apple customers have been taking note. They know that Apple customers are desirable customers and choose to target Apple customers, as much as they can. Associating your company with Apple makes a lot of economic sense.

I will admit however that my argument that Apple created a customer base is contrived. The fact is that Apple creates products and services and those products are the root of its power to attract the right customers. By choosing to create the best products it coincidentally chooses to create the best customers. The power flows from product not from pricing or positioning. This is a lesson lost for many.

Developers and regulators might feel Apple's massive power is perhaps too much. In the last decade, the narration around Apple has shifted from Apple being perpetually "doomed" to it being too dominant. Although I'm sure there are some who will try to conflate the two declaring that dominance will inevitably result in doom, most critics of Apple went from laughing (at it) to crying (about its practices).

The argument that Apple should change its practices developed to price as it does, distribute as it does or design as it does because it was too successful or is "unfair" is getting the causality wrong. Dominance won't be altered by a few points of percentage change (on a tiny fraction of ecosystem transactions). Fairness won't be altered when there are thousands of business models and many remain to be invented. Case in point is pornography which is not permitted on the App Store but which exists in abundance thorough other access methods.

The argument is that Apple should be more generous. That it should decrease the "cut" it takes for distribution. Or that it should not enforce revenue split for the customers it exposes to others.

But this is problematic on many levels. The playing field for all developers needs to be level. The customer must be respected and access to that customer should be constrained or certainly metered. Abuses must be policed and that requires leverage.

These practices are inter-dependent and the effect multiplicative, not additive. Apple has a monopoly on iOS and on MacOS and WatchOS and iPadOS. It does this to control the experience, security and safety of the user. It's that control which created the customer in the first place. It should naturally control access to its hard-earned customers.

It does not monetize the distribution of content or apps unless the developer/creator directly charges for the product or service. Distribution is not cost free and to offer it for free is a subsidy which would create additional market and innovation disincentives. The loyalty of Apple users is evidenced by the 600 million paid subscriptions (end of year estimate) that are booked through the App Store. Developers benefit directly as a result.

One could argue that the abundance of services which don't distribute through the App Store is evidence that the system works as intended. Apple's App store front is its property and it reflects its core values.

Being on the shelf in the App Store means you operate on the terms of the shelf owner. If the rules are not agreeable then the half trillion dollars of ecosystem activity is testament to the availability of alternatives.

About a year and a half ago in Lasts Longer I noted that "keeping iPhones in use" became a top priority for Apple's design for sustainability. I considered this provocative because it prioritizes usage and users over units sold, in contrast to how the company was perceived by investors. This new focus was reinforced by the company's dropping of unit shipments data and the addition of Services data including subscriptions count and gross margins.

Apple effectively transformed itself into a services company with customer acquisition, subscriptions (measured by average revenue per user) and retention/satisfaction as key operating metrics. The 1.5 billion active devices and ~1 billion active iPhones and 500 million paid subscriptions are the new data points rather than units sold.

To succeed with this new Lasts Longer strategy, one of the objectives should be that devices become more durable and their durability should in-turn result in more minutes of use and thus more return on initial purchase price. But how can we measure this? We don't have precise data on the use time. We have some anecdotes but no official data. We do know the iOS operating system is now designed to work on older hardware but that does not give us a measure of what is in use.

Luckily we now have an indicator that can help: Bank My Cell published a new data set on various used phone prices. This is a gold mine.

The data consists of prices for about 220 used phone models that changed hands in 2019. The prices are given for the beginning of the year (earliest date when the model was sold) and the end of the year (latest date when the model was sold.)

It's thus possible to see how various models from a number of companies changed in price during the year. The date of initial release of the phones is also given (though initial selling price isn't. It's a bit tricky to determine initial selling price because the model may have been sold for an extended period of time and discounted through that period.)

What we do have allows comparisons between different manufacturers to see, especially for recent (late) models, just how big the drops have been in prices.

I recommend reading the original post to see some of the comparisons between brands. In addition I chose to illustrate some of the differences with the graphs below.

These graphs show phone model prices at the beginning of 2019 (blue) vs. the end of 2019 (red). The models are not individually identifiable but they are shown by the year of introduction. So, in the case of the iPhone, the 2019 cohort (those released around September 2019) are the top line, then the 2018 group is shown in the second line and on down. Thus the oldest iPhones traded during 2019 were iPhones 5, initially released in 2012.

To read the graph, you can scan each line to see the gap between the red and blue triangles to see how much the phones roughly fell in value. The comparison above is between Apple, Google and Samsung.

Here are some patterns I noticed:

• Google phones had larger drops during the year than equivalent iPhones. Just how much the drops were is listed by the original post: "Google lost an average of -51.68% between Jan-Dec 2019. The Pixel 3 (2018) was the fastest depreciating and highest value loss at -56.70% (-$267)".
• The overall picture of Samsung's phones is hard to discern. Flagship Android phones ($700+) dropped in value roughly twice as fast as Apple's. But the the overall picture is messy. Budget phones are mixed with premium and the average pricing seems to quickly go near zero.
• iPhones have a more valuable "mid-range" for models more than 2 years old. Android phones fall hard in the mid range and cluster around zero quickly. This is the heart of the "old but valuable" proposition.

Depreciation rates might seem academic but depreciation is an indicator of a real perception of value and that in itself is a reflection of utility. Users are likely to pay for a used product only if they think it can still be useful in proportion to the price. New product buyers might pay for other things like prestige, status signaling or just wanting to be first. But used buyers are more mindful of what the product can do--they are less likely to benefit from signaling.

Analogously, the used car market often shows the underlying quality or reliability of a car model. If a luxury car plummets in value it means that it becomes a huge burden to late usage, usually due to servicing costs. In previous decades luxury cars were also durable cars but with complexity they became money pits.

In the used phone market hardware repair and maintenance are less consequential but there is a concern for software support, security and privacy. The serviceability of the battery, the camera quality and the fit and finish of the body matter.

Buyers are not stupid. The market speaks words of wisdom. A phone that is worth more will reflect more inherent utility. Remember that a phone is unlocked more than 80 times a day. If it has 4 years of use then it get unlocked 116,000 times. That's not "uses" but unlocks. Actual usage in terms of taps, swipes, or glances could be triple that figure. There are phones on the list that are 7 years old. It's not unreasonable to assume that a moderately well used iPhone has enabled a quarter million interactions.

Remember that phones are used all day, every day. At home and at work. In cars and in planes.

Even on weekends, and on holidays. And even when you're "social distancing".

In fact, the more physically isolated you are the more likely you are to rely on the phone as your social lifeline. In difficult times the product people turn to first and last isn't one of luxury or frivolity. It's a product that keeps you informed, connected, lets you help others and may even keep you alive.

It's in difficult times that the true character of a product shines through. The smartphone, derided, mocked and blamed for all kinds of societal ills is what we turn to first to avoid getting ill.

At time of writing (December 12, 2019) AirPods Pro delivery wait time is over 4 weeks. It's been like this since they shipped. I tried stores in several countries and although units can make an appearance on a shelf, they sell out immediately.

AirPods are part of the "Wearables & Home" category for Apple which used to be called Other Products and include also the Watch, iPod, Apple TV, Beats and HomePod (among other items.) iPod revenues were broken out as recently as 2015 but as the graph below shows, there have been no specifics on any product in "Wearables & Home" since then.

It therefore falls upon us to estimate how much of the entire category is any one product. It's been very difficult as the only clues lie in growth rates, sometimes cited for the Apple Watch and sometimes for "Wearables" alone. As far as I can tell from the available clues, the split is roughly as shown between the Orange and Green areas. Orange reflects estimate for Watch and Green everything else.

This analysis helped me conclude the Apple Watch overtook the historic "peak iPod" which occurred in the fourth quarter of 2007 at $4 billion. My Watch revenue estimate was $4.2 billion in the fourth quarter of 2018. This conclusion was confirmed by statements from the Company.

The problem lately has been that AirPods have become huge unto themselves. There is literally no information about AirPods sales as a product category. The only option is to guess Watch and subtract it from Wearables and then guess again the portion of "non-Watch Wearables & Home" that is AirPods.

Looking forward to the next quarter, I am expecting a 51% increase y/y for Wearables and 24% growth in Watch. This results in a Watch revenues about $5.2 billion and non-Watch $5.7 billion. Now if we assume $1.7 billion for non-Watch-non-AirPods (i.e. Apple TV, HomePod, Beats, iPod, other) then this quarter AirPods will have overtaken peak iPod.

Remember that iPod was the phenomenon which reset all expectations for Apple. It caused Apple to cease calling itself Apple Computer. It (at least psychologically) laid the foundation for iPhone and everything else that followed. In 2005 and through 2007 Apple was "the iPod company". I remember people working in a large search engine company calling Apple "that media company" as a result of over-intellectualizing iTunes.

(One more footnote on the AirPods Pro is that at $250 a pair and $300 for Apple Watch, throwing in a case puts these attached accessories for an iPhone at roughly the same average selling price for the iPhone of a few years ago.)

For the AirPods to overtake the iPod highlights just what a phenomenal category Wearables has become. In combination with Home and other accessories the category is going to decidedly overtake the Mac, having already passed the iPad.

And so it goes, something dismissed as inconsequential–"does not move the needle"–ends up becoming a massive force of change. The iPod was that, the original Apple II, the Mac and yes, also the iPhone. It's the asymmetry of humility that this happens over and over again.

To hear more about the profundities of AirPods Pro tune in to the next Critical Path podcast.

WWDC 2019 included a vast list of releases and it's quite difficult to summarize. The focus is always on software updates but this year the list seems more exhaustive than usual.

The highlights for me are:

1. WatchOS now includes direct App Store access. This continues the separation of the Watch from the iPhone, on a trajectory that remains predictable.
2. Hearing Health/Noise App/period and trends management extends the iPhone's health maintenance "jobs to be done".
3. AR & Swift extend the platform through Reality Kit and Reality Composer and Swift UI.
4. MacOS improves through a new Apple Music app, Sidecar iPad integration, Accessibility and "Find My" Mac offline beacons.
5. iPad and Mac are beginning to share Apps with Project Catalyst.
6. New Mac Pro and new XDR Display are quantum leapfrog leaps in the high-end performance computing market where Apple has lagged for a few years.
7. Sign-in with Apple is a huge and much needed update to identity management on-line. A big deal.
8. iPadOS introduced as fifth Apple OS. Rather than merging iPad and Mac which would be suggested by Project Catalyst, Apple preserves and sanctifies the modularity of form factors based on their differences rather than commonalities.

If there is one thing I took away as most significant it would be the iPadOS spin-off. I don't quite know how this will change the fortunes of the iPad but in declaring itself a platform distinct from iOS it signals that iPad can evolve rapidly in a new direction. The promise and problem with the iPad has always been that it was great hardware held back by software that was not able to take advantage of it.

The core apps, interfaces and connectivity were all constrained, which is not necessarily a bad thing. Constraints make a system and the constraints of the iPhone made it great. Not having a stylus, not having a menu system and not having windowing meant the UX had to be drastically simplified.

But apparently the iPad could not evolve without a re-evaluation of these constraints. The last iPad Pro release hinted at what was coming: it had a full-size keyboard and an immensely capable processor and screen.

So we saw new features such as split view for the same app, Files folder, doc sharing, USB and SD drives support, Zip/Unzip, Desktop class Safari optimized for touch. Download manager, custom fonts, new text editing gestures (copy/paste/floating keyboard). Pencil latency improvement. All these changes are geared toward "productivity" or Pro use.

And yet, the iPad is not Mac. It will remain separate and target Mac non-consumers. Indeed there are three times more iPad users than Mac users and it's quite possible that the iPad base can expand further with enhancement into productivity.

The iPad has not proven to be either an iPhone or a PC killer. It's just in between. It's not a bowl and it's not a swimming pool. It's a bathtub. And yes, bathtubs are never going to be as common as bowls but they have their uses and are not obsoleted by better water containers.

The Operating System idea here is a bit of a conceit. In terms of the kernel and the core APIs there are vast common grounds between all Apple's OSs. But what Apple calls an OS is not just the core code but also the positioning of the idea _to developers_. By branding iPadOS the company is signaling to developers that they should think about the iPad differently.

To a large extent they already do. Coding for iPad has always required a different design approach. But now perhaps Apple is drawing an explicit line enforcing the distinction.

Going back to the list of highlights above, none of them is a "home run", re-enforcing the idea that the company has run out of big ideas. But hitting 8 base hits yields the same result as two home runs. There is a consistent delivery of improvements here that can't be ignored. There's something to be said for polishing rocks until they turn into gems.

The iPhone is the most successful product of all time.

Over 1.6 billion have been sold. Including the iOS products it spun off, the total is over 2.2 billion. Of those 2.2 billion sold, 1.5 billion are still in use.

There are about 1 billion iPhone users.

Economically speaking, iPhone sales have reached one trillion dollars. ((The milestone of $1 trillion iPhone revenues was reached in the fourth quarter 2018 during which time the stock price of Apple fell by 40%.))

Since the iPhone launched, Apple's sales have totaled $1.918 trillion. Of those trillions about one half a trillion was accumulated in the form of  income.

Of that half trillion in income, $360 billion was paid out to shareholders ((As a result, the number of outstanding shares has decreased by 29%)). and $131 billion was paid in taxes.

This sounds like a good business, but no business is good if it is static. What makes a business great is dynamism. The idea is to constantly maneuver for a new or enhanced way of doing business as technologies enable entrepreneurs to fundamentally change how value is captured or allocated.

The iPhone story isn't static, the "pivots" or change in direction are several:

• The App Store, a platform for collaborative innovation where millions of developers are offered the chance to improve the product.
• Accessories, a licensing model for third-party hardware that works with the iPhone
• Distribution through multiple channels
• Integration with other Apple Products
• The marketing of older products alongside new ones at reduced prices
• An expanded product portfolio with a broader range of prices
• Trade-in and financing options

Each of these initiatives contributed to the iPhone growth story but the biggest change in business model was the addition of services. Apple Services grew out of the iTunes business that pre-dates the iPhone and was established to provide content for the iPod.

In 2006, the year before the iPhone launched, Apple customers spent $3.3 billion on iTunes, Software and Services. By 2018 the spending rate was $80.5 billion/yr. It's very possible that this year's spending rate will reach $100 billion/yr. This new division is simply called Services today and consists mainly of third-party apps and third-party content sales as well as licensing.

Recently Apple launched a set of new services that it will offer itself. This includes television, films, financial services and news. Apple already has a music service of its own and file storage (iCloud) both of which are offered as subscriptions.

Apps are also allowed to offer paid subscriptions, and that total has reached 390 million, growing at 30 million a quarter with an expected total of 500 million by 2020. That amounts to one subscription for every other iPhone in use.

Some would argue that even with a $43 billion revenue rate, ($80 billion billing  rate) ((The difference is in the way Apple accounts for App Store revenues: declaring only the 30% portion of sales that it keeps as revenues, and not including the 70% that is paid out to developers. The "billing rate" is what consumers spend, the "revenue rate" is what Apple reports.)) Apple's business is still a hardware business and that comes with low margins, potential for disruption, non-recurring revenues and cyclicality.

This is not the case. Apples's business has high margins (64% gross margin for services, 34% for products), has been resilient over 12 years while attracting hundreds of imitators at lower price points, and has loyalty and satisfaction which results in more than 90% re-purchase rates. Cyclicality is driven by seasonality and product lifespans, not competition.

This common misconception of Apple is why it continues to be valued at a deep discount to not only peer companies who are services oriented (Google, Facebook, Microsoft and Amazon) but also at a discount to the overall market (the S&P 500).

Apple, since its inception, has always been oriented around its customers, not its products. The questions asked by management are "what can the company do to deliver experiences and satisfaction" rather than "what products can the company build".

Every company is bound by its capabilities but the best companies re-shape these bounds because they are defined by priorities.

A priorities-driven company habitually re-designs its processes and its resources. A resources- or process-driven company re-designs its priorities as its capabilities change.

Moving as it does between computers, devices, software, services, retail, logistics and manufacturing means that it's not classifiable as an "x" company where "x" is an industry sector. Rather, the company should be classified by the set of problems it seeks to solve (e.g. communications, community, productivity, creativity, wellbeing).

This disconnect between what people think Apple sells and what Apple builds is as perplexing as the cognitive disconnect between what companies sell and what customers buy.

Companies sell objects or activities that they can make or engage in but customers buy solutions to problems. It's easy to be fooled that these are interchangeable. ((They are only correlated. Purchase decisions are not *caused* by a product's existence. The real cause is a combination of need and supply and time and circumstance of purchase.))

Conversely Apple offers solutions to problems that are viewed, classified, weighed and measured as objects or activities by external observers. Again, it's easy to be fooled that these are the same.

This analysis is, of course, applicable to any company. Here I'm using Apple as a lens. This is because it's just so much easier to tell this story with the narratives and anti-narratives that are so widely disseminated.

We want things to get better. The desire of improvement and an increase in performance is seemingly innate. The old adage goes that using the word "new" is the most effective way to increase sales. "New & Improved" if you want to be redundant.

For many in technology, New & Improved means faster with more of every measurable parameter. More memory, more pixels, more storage, more bandwidth, more resolution. In devices, the tendency has been to communicate "new & improved" through an increase in screen size. We are subject to this to such an extent that phones are becoming unusable with one hand, stretching screens to the edge of the device and then wrapping those screens around the edges and then even folding the screens so that we have to unfold or unroll to use the product. Maybe an origami phone is in the works.

But there is a parallel movement where "New & Improved" means smaller. This is the trend to miniaturization. Smaller is better because it's more portable, more conformable. Things sold by the ounce are better than things sold by the pound. The best computer, the best anything, is the one you have with you and having it with you is more likely if you can take it with you. So that which you can take with you is the best. QED.

Apple has had a great history of miniaturization. The original Macintosh was tiny compared with personal computers of its day. It had a handle so you could take it with you. Apple pioneered laptops with breakthroughs in utility and form which made them truly portable. The iMac followed with a degree of integration and portability which made it iconic. Of course the iPod and iPhone were marvels when they first appeared.

Over the years these products expanded into ranges with "good, better, best" type segmentation. The bigger being the best in performance and the smaller typically being the most convenient. However it seemed that the positioning was toward "bigger is better" for a lot of these products. The iPhones Plus, the iPads Pro, etc. As even the largest were getting thinner, the "mini" versions appeared to be neglected. You could get "good enough" portability from the larger products so why bother with the minis.

It came to a head when the iPhone SE was discontinued last fall. Its demise felt like the end of an era. I always considered the SE as the "Steve Edition". It was the last design Steve Jobs was involved in and it pained me to see it go. With it seemed to go the positioning around "mini".

But also last fall we saw a re-boot of another almost-forgotten mini: the Mac mini. For me the Mac mini was quintessentially Jobsian. I remember that he loved tiny products. His launch of the iPod nano was spectacular; reaching into his jeans' watch pocket to pull it out on stage. Holding the Mac mini up as if a tiny tray. Even the iPod shuffle was a quirky and lovable idea ((probably the first Apple wearable as you could actually pin it to your clothes)). And let's not forget the Mac Cube which made the iMac look huge.

When the Mac mini was released last fall in Brooklyn with a huge spec bump and a thunderous reveal I thought something was up. When the MacBook Air was also out at the same event I felt that the company was signaling something. Perhaps a re-dedication to the low end.

Also in parallel there is the wearables product line. The AirPods and the Apple Watch are jewelry. The essential qualities of products you wear are that they be small and beautiful. The smaller the better. Above all, both the Watch and AirPods are marvels of miniaturization. They pack so much in so little volume and that volume is shaped in such an aesthetically elegant way that they become daily essentials. I use my Apple wearables more than any other Apple product. Watch glances and time with AirPods exceeds the iPhone unlocks and iPhone use time. The fact that we don't even realize that the smallest Apple products are also the ones we use most is a testament to their conformability to us.

So the Mac mini that is suddenly the Mac Maxi in performance, the MacBook which is an extraordinarily small laptop, the wearables success, all pointed in a direction that the iPhone did not: that "mini" was back.

And now we see the iPad mini being re-launched with a huge spec bump. We should take the hint. The iPad mini is just charming. I have been trying it out for a few days and it has worked its way into my routine. I have an iPad Pro that I use on a desk to design presentations (and to deliver them). I use it with a keyboard for dealing with email on my lap or on a plane and take it instead of a laptop when going to meetings.

But the iPad mini worked its way to my nightstand. It the one I reach for when on a couch. It is like an iPhone but when you're at home it's better than the iPhone because you can linger on that new true tone screen. It works well one handed. It now has Pencil support so it can be used for sketching and doodling.

I am an analyst not a product reviewer but I sense how it fills a gap between iPhones and larger devices--in a home setting. Of course it can be used in an office. It is much easer to take with you if you carry a laptop in a bag.

Fundamentally explaining mini is pointless. mini is something that is felt more than it is perceived. You can see the attraction of a tiny product only when you come face-to-face with it. In a picture it's hard to get it--there is no frame of reference. What draws me to a MacBook or to a mini or a Watch is when it's touched and held and carried or worn. The experience of the product is not how it works but how it works with you. You have to be part of it. It's not asking "Does it look good?". It's asking "Does it look good on me?" mini means more personal.

That is the nature of mini and that is why I love the new minis: the iPad mini, the Mac mini, the MacBook (mini) and that is what I dare to hope that there is an iPhone mini coming.

In the latest Apple Earnings report, Apple announced a few details that are relevant to the forecast of the business:

• The global active installed base for iPhone reached an all-time high at the end of December, surpassing 900 million devices. This represents growth y-o-y in each of five geographic segments, and growth of almost 75 million in the last 12 months alone
• There are now over 360 million paid subscriptions across the Services portfolio, an increase of 120 million versus a year ago. Apple expects to surpass 500 million in 2020.
• The installed base grew to 1.4 billion devices by the end of December. This includes all-time highs for each of the main product categories and all five of their geographic segments.

I added all these data points to the previous reported figures related to installed base, subscriptions and Services revenue.

Note that all the data sets show a linear growth path. Most prominent is the paid subscriptions line which is growing at exactly 30 million per quarter. The new projection of 500 million by 2020 is exactly in-line with this projection.

Note also that active devices and iPhones are on similar trajectories. The figure for active iPhones is interesting because it very closely relates to active users. It's extremely likely that 900 million active iPhones means 900 million active iPhone users. An iPhone is useful if it has a data plan associated and it's a costly proposition for most people to have multiple devices and multiple data plans.

This close relationship between iPhone usage and iPhone users means that we can approximate the entire unique user base for Apple. There might be "10s" of millions of users who use Apple devices but don't use iPhones but there might also be multiple iPhones for some users ((I would be inclined to assume that there are more non-iPhone Apple users than multiple iPhone users.))

So it's very likely that the total Apple user base is between 900 and 1 billion. If it's not 1 billion now then it's very likely it will be 1 billion within 12 months.

In May 2010 I made the prediction that Apple would reach a billion users in 5 to 8 years. The prediction was based on the first 100 million iOS users. The company reached one billion active devices in a bit over 5 years and is about to reach 1 billion users 8 years since.

Apple stated in the latest conference call that very little of Services revenues depends on the any previous quarter's unit sales confirming that Services is driven almost entirely from the user base. With almost a billion users, 90+% loyalty rate, 95% satisfaction, 120 million paid subscriptions and 75 million new users/yr, the analysis of Apple as a services company is becoming interesting.