Ben Thompson of the Stratechery interviews Horace on the Stratechery Plus Podcast to discuss Horace's journey to become an influential tech analyst: early career in research, business school under Clayton Christensen, and his time at Nokia during the rise of the iPhone.
The conversation further explores Disruption Theory in the context of both smartphones and AI, why Christensen misjudged Apple, and whether AI could challenge today’s tech giants. It also marks the launch of Dediu’s new paid service Asymco One and reflects his continued conviction in Apple Inc. at its 50-year milestone.
Software is eating the world. But are users consuming software?
Every day, the software industry wastes millions of dollarsdeveloping flawed software that's abandoned by users. Yet the industry’s focus continues to be on the supply side: client or server, full-stack or specialized, out-source or in-house.
The Jobs to be Done method presents a fresh approach. By studying the demand side, developers can focus on how products are used by consumers to overcome their daily struggles. This method has brought success to a range of popular consumer products, from Snickers to Tide Pods.
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Bernard Desarnauts had a great idea a few weeks ago: the world needs an event to discuss Apple Watch. After recovering from the shock of not thinking of it first and then from the shock that nobody else had either, I immediately agreed and along with Ben Bajarin and Farshad Nayeri, we quickly rallied to organize and anchor this event: Glance: A Deep Look at Apple Watch.
We had some big questions to answer:
What is the strategy for Apple Watch? Is it an object of beauty and desire, placing Apple in the "luxury sector" or is it a computer infiltrating what is otherwise a technology-free zone with utility in an asymmetric attack?
How can developers discover the killer jobs to be done? Beyond tentpoles what will the primary reasons people will use the watch? What does the data tell us so far? What can be observed from interviews?
Given the sales performance to date, what can we expect from the product? What is the addressable market? What will be the installed base? How quickly will it grow?
What is the platform strategy, especially with the cadence of OS releases? Is Apple treating this as a separate platform? Will it eventually become independent of the iPhone as the iPhone cast off its dependence on the Mac/PC?
What is the hardware strategy? What are the constraints from manufacturing, materials, battery life and screen space? What will be the replacement schedule? What is the role of modular internal designs?
We realized that we did not have the answers. So we recruited a great cast of participants to help us:
Bob Moesta, the founder and developer of the theory of jobs-to-be-done marketing agreed to do a live interview to understand what jobs watches, and in particular Apple Watches, are hired to do.
Josh Clark, the premier UX designer who wrote Designing for Touch will explore the question of user experience in glanceable space.
Liza Kindred is considered the top expert on fashion tech–she’s writing the book on the future of commerce–brings keen understanding of wearables.
Abdel Ibrahim the most prominent blogger and writer on the topic of Apple Watch. Has forgotten more about the Apple Watch than you will ever learn.
Carolina Milanesi one of the most respected technology market analysts, now at Kantar and often quoted on all things Apple.
Greg Koenig, product designer at Atomic Delights will educate us on the atoms that make up the Watch.
Investors who will participate in panel conversations:
Special guest: Jean-Louis Gassée, former head of Apple Engineering, current VC and everything in-between will have a fireside chat with Tim Bajarin Legendary technology analyst who has been around long enough to see furthest ahead.
We will explore Apple Watch as a very curious interaction between form and function, luxury and utility, exclusivity and ubiquity, tiny screens and big audiences, short attention spans, big data.
We have developers, designers, investors, marketers and analysts contributing to what could be the biggest leap in computing since the smartphone.
If you are interesting in becoming one of the innovators on this newest of platforms or planning a strategy to invest, or even (actually especially) if you are a skeptic, you can't miss this conference.
Understanding Apple’s intentions seems to be a popular parlor game and there are many attempts at divining intention from data and market study. These attempts at market research for answers are futile because Apple does not compete in existing markets but rather it creates new markets. For instance, the market for the Apple II could not have been assessed from research into the computing market of 1974. The intention for Apple to enter into music devices and services could not have been predicted through an analysis of MP3 player market in 2000. The iPhone was also not predicated on the market for “Internet Communicators” in 2006 or 2002 when the iPad was first contemplated. ((The market for phones was large but the iPhone pricing and features made it incompatible with any reasonable segment of it.))
Instead of measuring the size of pre-existing markets, surveying the functionality of existing products, or weighing toxically financialized ratios like margins and market shares, I recall this ad (Our Signature, first seen at 2013 WWDC):
This is it This is what matters
The experience of a product How it will make someone feel Will it make life better? Does it deserve to exist?
We spend a lot of time on a few great things Until every idea we touch Enhances each life it touches
You may rarely look at it But you will always feel it This is our signature And it means everything
My interpretation of these lines, coupled with additional public statements can be used to create a “litmus test” for new product categories:
1. The experience of a product. Read: They will work on things to which they can make a meaningful contribution. To me this means that they will build things which require an integrated approach. As Apple is "the last integrated company standing” it means they will work on problems where the system is not good enough. This means that they will not work on problems where an individual modular component is not good enough. By system I mean, in the largest sense: production, design, distribution, sales, support and services must work in a seamless way. Systems analysis implies a broad understanding of the causes of insufficient performance along the dimensions of “experience”. The experiences are what differentiate the products (and lead to high margins) and these experiences are possible only through the control of interdependent modules.
2. Does it deserve to exist? Read: They will work on very few things. They will say no to many things. It’s still true that all of Apple’s products can fit on one table. That may not be true forever, but their product space will not grow as quickly as sales grow. This means that there is no notion of “marginal value” or portfolio theory where products are added because they can be justified as “moving the needle” or balancing demand. Rather, the few things which will be worked on will address non-consumption. Non-consumption of experiences.
3. Enhance life. Read: The things they release are inevitable even though nobody asked for them. The reason this is possible is that there are unmet and unidentified “jobs to be done” which are powerful sources of demand and whose satisfaction leads to unforeseen rewards. The problems that can be addressed are uncovered through a process of conversation with a few people. They are not uncovered through surveys or large n statistical studies. Without the ability to ask the right questions, big data only leads to big misdirection. In contrast, good taste in questions allows small n to lead to big insight. Apple’s ability for finding the right problem to solve comes from this greatness of taste in questions.
So given this litmus test, will Apple build a Car?
I believe the problem of transportation and its proxy, the automobile, provide all the requisite demand for Apple's attention. Technical questions abound and they may still prove unsurmountable before a launch happens, but there are no doubts in my mind that this is a problem Apple would see fit to address.
Non-consumption of unmet and unarticulated jobs to be done can and should be addressed with systems solutions and new experiences.
Turning our focus back to "Jobs to be Done" theory, we look at how producers can exceed the expectations of consumers and the role of the focus group from a "Jobs to be Done" perspective.
We examine "Jobs to be Done" as an essential core of the product development process. Where does this kind of thinking belong in an organization?
Should we be redefining what being "the best" means? We close with a segmentation of social media services based on the seven deadly sins.
The problem with getting better is that if you're more than good enough you're actually getting worse. Improving beyond the point where your improvements can be absorbed is not only wasteful but it's also dangerous. It opens the door to competitors who compete asymmetrically.
This is the perverse and pervasive threat hanging over all system vendors. The temptation to "get better" is not coming from incentives and human nature. It's always there as Moore's Law offers an exponential increase in power. People don't naturally have exponentially increasing needs. For them to absorb this new power, it has to be couched in new uses.
What has permitted the absorption of improvements in semiconductor performance (and production) have been other aspects of the system: the software, communications and services innovations have been positioned on more demanding jobs to be done which, once hired for those jobs, saturate the available processing and storage.
This is most easily evident in how digital photography has advanced. The constraints on sensors meant that quality was initially poor and as cameras were unconnected, they were relatively under-utilized. But once software and communications were added (by inclusion in smartphones) digital photo creation exploded. This, in turn, led to more storage needs both on the device and the servers. In a virtuous cycle, more processing power meant video was possible, then high definition video, then slow motion high definition video. The previous storage limits on mobile devices were quickly overwhelmed. Megabytes of storage became gigabytes and then hundreds of gigabytes. Video editing meant processing power was suddenly in demand again. Cores multiplied.
Third party media (music and videos) storage and playback used to be the main job that storage was hired to do ((Which was far more demanding than office-like documents)) but as cameras got better, user-generated content suddenly bellied up to the bar.
That is now the story for phones, which are gobbling up all the storage and bandwidth we can throw at them. But what about the larger form factors? Are iPads (and laptops) growing in their demands? Paradoxically, it would seem that the smaller devices are hungrier than their larger cousins.
The answer lies with the jobs to be done. If highly portable devices are more usable, they will be used more. Large devices are left behind, literally, because their jobs are not as pervasive in place and time. For a large screen like the iPad to increase its attractiveness, it has to be the stage for a set of jobs that only it can perform.
The new iPad has the horsepower. It has more portability (thinner, lighter) and it has the touch ID convenience. It even has a better camera. But for it to succeed it needs to be hired for a set of jobs as expansive in usage as the user-generated photo/video jobs that the iPhone has been called to do.
I hire my iPad for one such job: to persuade audiences small and large. I use it across a dining table and across an auditorium to appeal with a visual language. I use Perspective to create stories that have to be seen to be believed and once seen, create belief.
The tool is demanding however. As the stories are fed by data and the visualizations are rendered algorithmically and not as stored images it is hungry for processing power. I also need it to record performances which taxes storage. I need to transmit those performances both in real-time and as recordings, tasking the WiFi and cellular bandwidth. I need as much screen as I can get to be able to interact with the elements on screen, of which there may be hundreds. I need to export video versions of performances and thus I need a video studio with all its extravagance. I need it to run for all-day workshops connected to a projector, sometimes through AirPlay, under stage lights, which pushes the battery.
Consider my last padcast. It was recorded in one take lasting 18 minutes. I then exported the results to a video that was uploaded to Vimeo and viewed by thousands. However it took over one hour to render it and due to that constraint I did not have the luxury of editing it. I could not easily add, subtract or annotate the video production. This was done on an iPad Air and I was happy to get it done at all.
But if I had an iPad Air 2, not only would production time be shrunk ((To about half the time)) the things I could attempt to do with a presentation suddenly expand. It's not just about more efficiency but an expansion of scope. More power means more work I choose to do.
So is the new iPad better? As far as the jobs I hire it do do, the new iPad is better. It is in fact not good enough. Which is the best thing to be.
I recently tweeted that any discussion related to wearable technology needs to begin with a description of the job it would be hired to do. Without a reason for building a product, you are building it simply because you can.
The reason a product deserves to exist is that it can do a job that needs doing and that few, if any others can also do it. This happens when the job is unstated and difficult to perceive. Put another way, the difficulty behind jobs-to-be-done based design is that jobs are never plainly evident. In contradiction to invention, where the problem being solved must be as clearly stated as its solution, value-creating innovation meets new and unarticulated needs. Even when created, the value is more subtly perceived, often only after prolonged use.
Which brings me to the M7. Apple chose to highlight a component (curious in itself) which it bills as a "motion coprocessor". It claims to be measuring motion data via accelerometer, compass and gyroscope and processing the information in some way. By bundling the sensors and their management into one integrated chip battery consumption is reduced and these motion monitoring functions are performed more efficiently.
But what for? The examples given during the presentation for an iPhone with M7 don't add up to a lot of benefit. An iPhone could be used as a fitness companion but it would not a very good one. Compared with, for example, a Nike FuelBand, an iPhone could not track your activity well. It's often not moving, sitting on a desk or in a purse or pocket while you are doing exercise. It's too big to take into a basketball game. It can't "observe" your activity because it's not worn during many activities and if it is worn it is in a position which does not inform much about what you're doing. Phones are too big to be used as physical activity monitors.
Hence the question of what is the M7's job to be done. As part of an iPhone, it does not seem to have one. Saving a bit of battery life is not a job, and certainly not one that needs to have billing in a media special event. The answer must be that the M7 was developed for some other, as yet unstated reason.
When the A series chips were created Apple leveraged the in-house design and cost reduction to make a wide range of products with more than 700 million examples built. Designing a chip needs a broad application domain.
Perhaps this is why Apple chose to describe the iPhone 5s as "forward-thinking". The M7 and the Touch ID are like research projects whose actual value will be realized at some future time, in probably different contexts. The M series of chips may become Apple's "low end" microprocessor as the A series climbs the trajectory into core computing tasks (read: phone, tablets, TV, laptops).
M might be the chip for the wearable segment, woven into a whole new fabric of uses and jobs to be done.
This is a quick note to mention that I'll be speaking at the Tools of Change (TOC) Frankfurt Conference this October on the eve of the Frankfurt Book Fair. Conference details:
You can get a 20% discount if you use the following code when registering:
TOCPartner20TSpeaker
I'll be speaking about the jobs publishers are hired to do. Without giving too much away, here is my synopsis of the talk:
We're inclined to "categorize" or "segment" media according to its attributes. We think of visual, auditory or written forms as distinct. Within each of these definitions of media we further sub-segment according to the way they are packaged. As in books, periodicals, or TV vs. film and albums and singles. These definitions are convenient because they describe the product and the product has evolved into a distribution chain and a therefore a market. It becomes therefore analogous to think of a book market and a TV market and a periodicals market as if these are what people actually desire.
But what people desire are more basic things. They desire to feel good or to be comfortable or to escape into fantasy or to be aroused. They have thirsts for knowledge or flights of fancy or needs for belonging. Authors and story tellers have sought to serve these needs for as long as we've been humans, regardless of the medium. When you step back and ask what the real "markets" are you realize that we've categorized according to technical and business means of delivering these needs.
Business theorists have a word to describe this categorization: segmentation according to product attributes. It's a common practice to define markets according to products rather than what these products are hired to do. The great Harvard marketing professor Theodore Levitt used to tell his students, “People don’t want to buy a quarter-inch drill. They want a quarter-inch hole!” The idea that you can categorize by what consumers want to get done rather than what you are selling them is not new but it's still a very hard thing to get your head around. It's become known as "Job to be done" segmentation and has changed product planning for many firms. If you apply this method to your industry you realize that the products you sell are in competition not with other products like them but with completely new products. A newspaper may be in competition with Angry Birds and a TV show with FaceBook and a Movie with a cinematic themed video game.
If you take the history of story telling and job to be done analysis into consideration you realize that technology has always played a part in how stories are told and re-told. This technological progress is accelerating and we are now in an era where apps are the new medium which can encompass much of any of the previous story telling mediums. Apps are so flexible and so easily distributed and consumed that they threaten to converge multiple media types. I'll explain how app economics are affecting not just games, but all forms of publishing.
It looks like the next iPhone will be called the iPhone 5. What's in a name? As it turns out, quite a lot.
Every hardware product that Apple has released has had a brand and a sub-brand. Macs for example use the Mac brand and a sub-brand as follows:
iMac
MacPro
Macmini
MacBook
Thus each sub-brand imparts certain meaning to the buyer. i, Pro, mini, book are all evocative. MacBook even has its own sub-brands:
MacBookPro
MacBookAir
These Mac sub-sub-brands of Pro and Air are specifically designed to also distinguish and convey meaning.
iPods as well use the iPod brand followed by a sub-brand.
iPodClassic
iPodtouch
iPodmini
iPodshuffle
iPodnano
Note how the mini sub-brand was retired from the iPod line to be used exclusively in the Mac product line. That may not be specifically necessary or desirable but it is an interesting coincidence. (The Pro sub-brand is shared between different Mac lines)
However, when we look at the iPhone and the iPad, the nomenclature has been distinctly different. Both products have been using generational naming conventions. This implies no sub-branding as the iPhone and iPad are the only identifiers of brand and hence the only meaning being imparted to the buyer. You either get an iPhone or and old iPhone.
That changed with the iPad however. The third generation iPad became just iPad. This was deliberate (why would they want to confuse buyers?) I think there is some logic to this.
Note the parallel to the convention of the original iPod. When the iPod launched it was just the iPod. Subsequent versions were identified by a generation, but not a specific sub-brand. After the third generation iPod (still called iPod), the mini version was launched, creating the sub-brand convention that remains in use to this day. The iPod therefore was born generational but switched to sub-branding in adolescence.
The possibility exists, therefore, that there will be a sub-brand for the iPad. Perhaps "mini" is being reserved for a new iPad, to distinguish it from the regular iPad (no sub-brand) that is likely to remain in production. The logic is to make room for sub-brands when the core brand begins to cover a wider array of form factors, themselves proxies for separate use cases or jobs to be done.
So what about the iPhone?
The iPhone has remained, stubbornly, after five years, stuck with a generational naming convention vis-à-vis the sub-brand convention used in every other mature product line from Apple. (Note that software from Apple adheres strictly to a generational naming convention because there is no "room" for a sub-brand under a software brand. There can be no "iWork Pro" or "Final Cut EZ". [Update: there once was Final Cut Express])
Prior to today I entertained the possibility that the new iPhone will follow the iPad in dropping generational naming in favor of sub-branding thus implying that the brand would develop into a portfolio of sub-brands (like the iPad seems about to.)
Alas, that possibility now seems moot. The launch announcement seems to clearly point to "5" being the name of the new iPhone. The brand remains iPhone and there will be no sub-branding.
This can only mean that Apple intends to preserve a single product strategy for the brand. There will be no "special" iPhone for different (e.g. low-end) markets. There will be no different form factor to accommodate different use cases. There will be no new jobs to be done for the iPhone.
What a bummer.
However, there may be something more curious happening. Note all the service brands being launched on the iOS platform. There's Siri, (as yet unnamed) Maps, GameCenter and PassBook. These are not Apps. These are services designed to be unique to iOS, perhaps even unique to the iPhone. The difference with the iPhone brand may not be that it spans a multitude of sub-brands in hardware but that it covers a multitude of new service brands. As brands imply meaning, the iPhone brand may imply that it's a platform in and of itself.
“Within five years after discount retailing pioneer Korvette’s opened its first store in 1957, over a dozen copycat discounters had emerged. In contrast, the giant discount furniture retailer IKEA has never been copied. The company has been slowly rolling its stores out across the world for [close to 50] years; and yet nobody has copied IKEA.
Why would this be? It’s not trade secrets or patents. Any competitor can walk through its stores, reverse engineer its products and copy its catalog. It can’t be that there is no money to be made: its owner Ingvar Kamprad is the third richest person in the world. And yet nobody has copied IKEA.
Our sense is that the other furniture retailers have followed the positioning paradigm and defined their business in terms of product and customer categories, which are readily copied. Levitz Furniture, for example, sells low-cost furniture to low income people. Ethan Allen sells colonial furniture to wealthy people.
IKEA, in contrast, has organized its business around a job to be done: “I need to furnish my apartment (or this room) today.” When this realization occurs to people anywhere in the developed world, the word IKEA pops into their minds. IKEA is organized and integrated in a completely different way than any other furniture retailer in order to do this job as well as possible.”
Integrating Around the Job to Be Done (Clayton Christensen, Harvard Business School; Scott Anthony, Innosight LLC, Scott Cook, Intuit; Taddy Hall, Advertising Research Council).
IKEA is the world's leading furnishing retailer and an amazing success story. As Christensen points out the success is all the more perplexing because it seems perfectly defensible. Nobody has tried to duplicate or undermine IKEA.
Positioned around a clear job-to-be-done it integrated design, manufacturing and distribution (including warehousing) as well as "big box" retailing as an experience.
At first glance they seem to be similar businesses in terms of strategy or "architecture" but how do the actual businesses stack up? Can we find data to support any claim of similarity.
Let’s first have a look at the geographic focus of both companies. The graphic below shows that Apple’s retail operations are focused on North America with 74% of its 365 stores in the USA and Canada. By contrast, and maybe as much based on its origin, 73% of IKEA's 325 stores are located in Europe[2].
Unlike Apple however, IKEA has grown much more slowly. IKEA’s first store was opened in 1958 and had 6,700 sqm (72,110 sqf). The first two Apple stores opened in May 2001. Since then the number of Apple stores grew significantly faster (CAGR: 46%) and surpassed the number of IKEA stores in 2010.
The other difference is in sales growth. In 1954 IKEA’s revenue amounted to approximately $1 million but has grown steadily (note in chart below that first five bars represent decades). In contrast, Apple has grown more rapidly and is also more profitable in terms of margin.
Part of the difference in growth is that Apple was able to subsidize its entry: Apple’s retail operations were loss making for the first three years while IKEA had to rely on financing from its own cash flows.
Eventually, Apple retail became self sufficient and is now more profitable than IKEA. The following charts provides an overview of the economics of Apple’s retail operations and IKEA side-by-side:
While Apple’s revenue per store is still growing, IKEA’s business seems more mature and stable. This makes sense because furniture prices are stable and the number of products (SKUs) depends on available area per store which cannot grow. Apple on the other hand is limited only by traffic issues. Its products take little space and can even be stored off-site.
Speaking of traffic, with 655 million visitors in 2011, IKEA had more than twice as many visitors in its stores compared to Apple. However, each visitor spent about $27, while Apple’s store visitors purchased for almost twice as much.
The same story applies in employee productivity. IKEA has three times the number of retail employees, but Apple’s revenue per employee are 1.5x bigger than IKEA’s.
The largest difference is in the efficiency of real estate. In terms of total sales area IKEA’s operations have more than 30 times the sales floor of Apple.
As much as these numbers tell a story, they don't help us understand the cause of success. The two companies have completely different operations and their metrics seem at odds to one another. What works for one could never be applied to the other.
The fact is that there is no magic economic formula for disruptive retail. For example, by measure of sales per square foot, IKEA would not even make the top 20 list of US retailers.
However, there is one major thing they have in common: a clear formula for positioning your retail operations. Both operations are positioned around a job-to-be-done that has a high priority in people’s life. As mentioned in the opening quote, In IKEA’s case it is “I need to furnish my apartment (or this room) today” and in Apple's case Tim Cook said it best:
“Our retail stores provide the best buying experience and the best customer service anywhere. And while that’s important for a buyer of a Macintosh, in some ways it’s even more important for a buyer of an iPad or an iPhone or another post-PC device because these devices are new to many people. There needs to be a place to discover them, to learn about them before they are purchased, and learn how to get the most out of them after they’re purchased.” Tim Cook, March 2012
Apple offers a place where people can discover and get answers about technology without the pressure of making a purchase. The job is to simplify that which is complex for a price premium.
IKEA offers a place where people can get exactly what they need exactly when they need it. The only downside is that "some assembly is required". In a way, their job is to introduce some complexity in exchange for convenience and a discount.
In the end, they both get the job done and are amply rewarded for it.
---
Notes:
Including 13 in Russia.
The acquisition of UK-based furniture retailer Habitat in 1992 is the only exception.
On October 27th, Nintendo published half year results for the fiscal year ending in March 2012. Management stated that the company lost over $900 million with a negative outlook. Nintendo cited weaker than expected sales of Nintendo DS hardware and 3DS software and Yen appreciation as the main reasons for the miss. Is this the end of Nintendo?
Before we look more closely, here is a quick summary: The company is exclusively involved in selling game hardware and software. Their console platform is the Nintendo Wii, which will be followed by the Wii U late in 2012. The Nintendo DS and Nintendo 3DS are the company’s portable game consoles. The Wii and the DS are nearing the end of their product cycles. On the software side, the company is known for gaming titles such as Super Mario and Zelda. Nintendo also pioneered the licensing model to allow third-party developers to produce games for its hardware products.
A closer look
The good news for analysts is that Nintendo publishes their estimates for hardware and software unit sales. This allows us to measure management predictive accuracy. The red line (management forecast) should be as close as possible to the dark green pillars (realized unit sales in the fiscal year).
Until CQ1 2009 devices sales grew in excess of forecasts. A similar pattern can be found for consoles and game titles. After Q1 2009 forecasts have been always higher than results, and more worryingly, the deviation between forecast and sales is widening. Management missed and lowered forecasts for two consecutive years. Management's hope for an increase on the back of initial 3DS sales in the launch quarter (CQ1 2011) did not come to pass and they subsequently lowered forecasts again in the following two quarters.
Looking at all categories, management lowered forecasts almost continuously. The deviation remains the largest in the portable hardware business segment indicating that management was largely surprised about the development.
What caused this reversal of fortune?
Two years earlier the iPhone had launched and by CQ1 2009 iOS reached an installed base of about 38 million, half the number of Nintendo portables in the same period. Furthermore, in CQ1 2009 Android phones came to the market. Smartphones (light blue area of the chart below) sold before (and after) the debut of iOS, but the iPhone redefined the category and an avalanche of smarter phones running iOS and Android followed (blue and orange area). Portable gaming devices from Nintendo and Sony declined ever since: 17% in 2009, 31% in 2010 and already 16% in the last twelve months.
How do the game players stack up?
We already looked at the installed base in the chart above. iOS and Android have outsold Nintendo portable units by a factor of 2.1x and 1.6x. Furthermore, we can see (in the charts below) that the two main mobile platforms have 14 to 26 times more game (and entertainment) titles available. Nintendo and Sony also publish unit sales of directly sold software titles. For Android and iOS we know the cumulative app download statistics. By taking the share of Septembers’ paid and free app downloads as a proxy, we can conclude that also by this measure Android and iOS dwarf Nintendo and Sony [1]. The reach of iOS and Android is further underlined by the more than 500 million downloads of Angry Bird game titles - first released only two years ago - for any platform having sold more than twice the amount of Sony’s cumulative portable game titles and almost as many as Nintendo’s cumulative games titles since Q2/2007.
Who else has skin in the game?
Besides Nintendo, Sony, Apple and Google, who else is making a push into mobile gaming? Before investigating, let’s first have a closer look at Sony. Sony, just like Nintendo, is also active in stationary gaming segment with the PlayStation franchise. The Sony group also has access to entertainment most notable through Sony Pictures Entertainment and Sony Music Entertainment. Furthermore, Sony recently decided to buy Ericsson’s stake in the mobile phone joint-venture Sony Ericsson and is making a push with Android to bring its gaming titles as a differentiator for its own products to the platform. And the other major suspects? Microsoft, also active in the stationary gaming segment with its Xbox franchise, is pushing to bring the Xbox experience to mobile phones with Windows Phone. Amazon has retailed software and games for years and has started to distribute software and games via direct download on its own Kindle devices but also for the Mac. On the Kindle, Amazon is relying on a forked Android version on which it leverages its eBook and other entertainment assets. And then there is Facebook, a social network that wants to be on any platform or device. Out of 800 million users, 350 million access Facebook via a mobile device. Around 50% of Facebook members play games on the desktop. With Project Spartan, Facebook is aiming to bring the desktop experience to the mobile device including a stronger focus on gaming and video.
The competition between Apple and Google is already asymmetrical. Including the other contestants in the competitive landscape reveals Nintendo’s key weaknesses in the portable gaming market: attraction as a platform for developers in terms of ease and reach, pricing of hardware competing with operator-subsidized mobile phones and the jobs-to-be-done or value preposition. The new generation of mobile devices is standing against Nintendo’s dedicated approach. Although slowly adding features such as a browser and “app store” to its portables, Nintendo devices fall short in the variety of jobs-to-be-done compared to smartphones, let alone making a call.
Average selling prices and financial impact
With this market pressure one would imagine that average selling prices decreased for Nintendo portables. But for the last three fiscal years average selling prices for portables have increased, all things equal, mainly due to new product launches. Game title’s average selling prices have remained relatively flat. Note that these are wholesales prices for hardware and a mix of retail and wholesale prices for games. In 2011, for which we do not have data yet, the price of the newest portable, Nintendo 3DS, was lowered from its U.S. debut of 320 250$ in February to 170$ in July which will have a negative impact on ASP going forward.
The effects of Nintendo’s rigid strategy and the fast changing competitive landscape are manifested in the devastating financial performance over the recent quarters with LTM sales, gross margins and EBIT margins declining starting from CQ4 2008 and even accelerating to decline after CQ3 2010.
Furthermore, even though the company has recognized its own difficulties, Nintendo has no intention of adjusting its strategy:
CEO Iwata on the question of whether Nintendo plans to bring its game library to other platforms:
This is absolutely not under consideration. If we did this, Nintendo would cease to be Nintendo. Having a hardware development team in-house is a major strength. It’s the duty of management to make use of those strengths. It’s probably the correct decision in the sense that the moment we started to release games on smartphones we’d make profits. However, I believe my responsibility is not to short term profits, but to Nintendo’s mid and long term competitive strength.
Although realized and obvious, the disruption’s invisibility is often manifested in the paralysis of the incumbent.
Conclusion
According to Isaacson, Steve Jobs apparently always worried who could eat Apple's lunch. The lunch of the iPod, he concluded, was ripe for mobile phones. Subsequently, Apple entered the mobile phone space. Google followed. Since then more powerful mobile phones have eaten the lunch of the dedicated gaming device. The jobs-to-be-done and their priorities in people’s life have not changed, but the tools people use to get them done have. Permanently.
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Notes:
Estimated by multiplying total cumulative app downloads with September’s share of game downloads: For iOS ranging from 72-80% based on Top 150 free and paid app downloads, for Android ranging from 38-47% respectively. This is a very crude estimation, but the gist of it is that 4% for iOS and 11% for Android game downloads as percentage of cumulative app downloads would outsell Nintendo.
