low-end disruption

Will there come a time when Samsung will earn more profits from the iPhone franchise than from its own Galaxy product line?

The problem for Samsung is that although it still sells the most phones ((over 80 million but we don't have a precise figure)), and the most smartphones, the price and margins for these products are collapsing. The pattern is shown in the graphs below:

Phone operating margins peaked in Q1 2014 at 20% but are half that level today. These margins have dropped to levels Samsung had in 2009, before the Galaxy launched and before they had any substantial revenues from smartphones.

In contrast, the semiconductor group is growing both revenues and margins. Margins and operating profits are both 50% higher than those of devices.

We also know that Apple is Samsung Semiconductor's single biggest customer. We can't be sure how much of the total revenue/profit comes from Apple but if the pattern continues then Apple could be the greatest contributor to Samsung's profitability in the near future.

How could this be? Wasn't Samsung supposed to "disrupt" Apple?

The reality is that Samsung's own smartphones are being disrupted by good-enough Android devices, typically made by Chinese brands. This low-end disruption is also affecting LG, another phone maker and Apple supplier.

Unlike Samsung and LG, Apple is less susceptible to low-end disruption. What Apple offers is a brand promise, an ecosystem, associated products and services and what amounts to a new market. It's this parallel value network that competes with Android/Google, rather than with Samsung.

Samsung is a supplier in the Apple network and a licensee in the Google network. As a result, it has a near monopoly position with a platform controller (Apple) and a commodity position with a platform licensor.

Neither position is one of control, but the current market stage benefits Samsung within the Apple ecosystem more than  in Google's ecosystem. It's a situation analogous to one where Intel made both x86 chips and PCs that ran Windows. Long term it's likely that the sole-source chip business does a lot better than the multi-source systems business.

That should be a warning to others who hoped to survive as Android OEMs. They don't have semiconductors to sell to Apple.

 

Like a siren, it calls.

The Auto Industry is significant. With gross revenues of over $2 trillion, production of over 66 million vehicles and growing ((The industry continues to grow, registering a 30 percent increase over the past decade, mainly due to Asia and China in particular)) it seems to be a big, juicy target. It employs 9 million people directly and 50 million indirectly and politically it must rank among the top three industries worthy of government subsidy (or interference). Indeed, in many countries--the US included--government interference makes it practically impossible for a producer to go out of business, no matter how poorly it's managed or how untenable the market conditions.

But this might be the tell-tale sign that danger lurks. Theory suggests that incumbents going out of business is an essential indicator of industry health. Without their exit, entrants are never allowed to bring disruptive ideas to bear and innovation simply stops. Is this interference with mortality the only indication of entrant obstacles? Are things about to change? Is there pressure for innovation? Can we spot other indications of a crisis in this industry?

Taking the US as a proxy, here is a graph of the number of new car firm entries (and exits):

The total number of firms ((counted as brands)) that entered the US market is 1,556. The blue line graph shows the entries and the orange line shows the exits. This sounds impressive, but note that the year when the peak of entries took place was 1914, exactly 100 years ago.

1914 was also the year when penetration of the market first reached 10% and the rapid slope of adoption was joined. You can follow this adoption rate as the red line in the graph above ((The line is on a log graph and shows the P/(1-P) where P is the penetration of households)) ((Note that all line graphs have the same x-axis but have different y-axes.))

The first analytical task for the entrant today is therefore to ask why there have been so few others succeeding in the last century. In the last half-century 14 tried and all failed.

One clue is the third set of data plotted above: production figures. The blue area represents the production total for the industry on a yearly basis. ((The graph is split into cars and trucks. You can plainly see the recessions and the patterns of war and peace)). Note that all three data sets have some relationships to each other: Production growth is dependent on new demand growth and that on a household basis demand ceased growing in 1990. Production and penetration accelerated when entries ended. Given the economies of scale in manufacturing, a consolidation occurred and barriers to entry exploded when volumes became significant.

This leads the casual observer to conclude that production is the predominant consideration for participants and that the entire industry revolves around this measure.

Indeed, production is everything. Capacity utilization is the first priority for an auto manufacturer. Capacity is why firms are not allowed to die and entrants are not allowed to enter.

But you don't need the data to tell you this. There are other clues. I will summarize these observations in the following "ten commandments" for the industry:

1. It's easier ((read: cheaper)) to design and build a Ferrari than a Ford. At its logical extrapolation of this rule one can observe that a Formula One team is a trifling hobby compared to the effort needed to build the shabbiest of hatchbacks.
2. Low-end disruption happened early in the adoption curve. The very first cars were luxuries, but the Model T from Ford set up the Ford production system as a template for all and it was a low-end disruption. It happened 100 years ago. The Volkswagen Beetle and the Toyota Tercel were also low-end and they built non-US concentrations for production in the 60s and 70s. Same can be said for Mini, Fiat, Renault and Citroen. More recently Korean and Chinese entrants have appeared but they have not been disruptive.
3. Almost all meaningful innovation occurs in the production system (not the vehicle). The improvements in vehicles are many but they have not been meaningful in the sense of shifting any of the power in the industry. Certainly not to new companies. The production system innovations of Ford, GM and Toyota  allowed them to establish what is to date an unassailable power base of production. If you want to find the next "big thing" in automobiles, look for a new production system.
4. To understand how cars will or won't change, study roads. There were roads before cars, but not paved and not for going far. Road construction and the deep understanding of safety, capacity and economic impact took 50 years between 1920 and 1970 in the US. ((Thanks to Steve Crandall for many of these insights. He further notes via Twitter that ~1.5% of the US land mass is paved for transportation)) The cars pay for the roads and, as a result, they pay for the logistic system that allowed all forms of powerful businesses to emerge.  Walmart, McDonalds and Amazon and the entire retail, food and agriculture sectors owe their existence to the roads that car adoption paid for. Furthermore, the real-estate and entire living structure of many countries depends on roads. If you want to change the car you have to also understand how the roads need to change. ((Hint: for cars to improve through the reduction in the need to be driven, an understanding of their environment--roads--is mandatory. This is an information problem mainly but it's also a regulatory and tax problem.))
5. There has never been a disruption based on drivetrain innovation. Everything to date has been sustaining. Since 1886, the internal combustion engine has been dominant. Even though there have been diesel, natural gas, all-wheel drive, front wheel drive and electric drive, none of these innovations have changed who controls the profits in the industry. Hydrogen fuel cells won't either. The reason is simple: incumbents can easily adopt/buy any improvement/innovation as it sustains their production-oriented profit formula. Entrants with drivetrain innovation can't build a business model moat around the idea without a production base.
6. China is the largest producing (and consuming) nation. The global center of production shifted over the years and tends to follow consumption. As a new middle class emerges, the fact that China is leading now should not be surprising. As each new producing center was built, it created an opportunity for local entrants, however they did not displace the incumbents rooted in other markets. This is mainly because they were protected and they were protected because of political considerations including jobs, taxes (roads), etc.
7. Almost all car companies own each other. There is a vast cross-ownership network and a disinterest in independence. This is again due to production-led thinking. The spreading of over-capacity or under-capacity risk leads firms to disregard product or market considerations and enter into joint ventures and partial acquisitions. Portions of manufacturers are bought and sold by competitors almost as regularly as they are bailed out by governments. Competition is therefore perverted if not prevented.
8. For most motorists, congestion is a bigger problem than any deficiency in the vehicle. We think people want better cars, but they don't. Cars stopped getting "better" and started becoming worse when congestion became common and congestion became common when saturation was reached. We can't build more roads (see Commandment 4) and as populations grow, the traffic becomes unbearable. The vehicle's role switches from freeing to constraining. The industry is adding cupholders to alleviate the problem.
9. Contract manufacturing is nearly non-existent. Unlike other industries which modularized long before saturation, automobile manufacturing is largely inter-dependent. You can't buy your chassis from one maker, the body from another and fit the electronics, user interface and engine from a few others. All available configurations come from one brand. This is symptomatic of the production system leading to innovation insufficiency.
10. It's easier to make a car go fast than to make it go far. This rule is partly corollary to the first rule (Ferrari vs. Ford) but it is also alluding to fuel and energy considerations. Fuel has always been seen as a handicap for the industry. Crises of availability have been around since the 20's. Somehow demand has led to supply but there are new, unpriced costs to bear. For the industry to continue it needs to solve its own range problem.

All these topics and much more have been discussed in Asymcar, the podcast for those interested in entering the automobile industry.

As technology companies listen to the siren's song they should contemplate the basis of survival in the industry. Whether your approach and innovation sustains the hegemony or changes it will largely depend on your business model being asymmetric to the incumbent. Determining what is and isn't symmetric should be the first step in your analysis.

Publicly, Mr. Lazaridis and Mr. Balsillie belittled the iPhone and its shortcomings, including its short battery life, weaker security and initial lack of e-mail. […]

Internally, he had a very different message. “If that thing catches on, we’re competing with a Mac, not a Nokia,” he recalled telling his staff.

From How BlackBerry blew it: The inside story - The Globe and Mail

The whole article is worth reading, detailing as it does the decision process inside BlackBerry during the painful disruption of its core business.

What struck me most however was how similar their decisions were to those of Nokia at about the same time. Consider:

• The engineering priorities placed on optimization around constrained hardware. Although engineers knew how to build the right products, the business priorities caused them to be deployed in the wrong direction.
• The delays these misdirected efforts caused. Mobile phones have narrow windows of opportunity but long lead times. A strategic mistake is very costly and most probably impossible to remedy. In the case of BlackBerry, buying QNX came too late while for Nokia the deprecation of Symbian was catastrophically managed.
• The feedback loop from network operators which shut down any initiatives for improved user experiences. Your best customers provide all the wrong information when the market is being disrupted. Ignoring them is impossible while complying is a strategic mistake.
• The demand from network operators to develop "killers" to competing platform-based products ((Ironically, Nokia was asked to do a BlackBerry killer)) and the subsequent "jumping at the opportunity".
• Listening to large buyers at the expense of users. While BlackBerry was guided to omit consumer features from its enterprise buyers, Nokia never secured enterprise buyers of any significance ((though they tried very hard to get them)). Nevertheless it created the "E series" business-friendly phones which suppressed features like cameras and music.
• The celebrity sponsorships and wasted promotional efforts in the face of structural failures.  This is manifested today by HTC as well.

The parallelism of this synchronized failure can be seen in the following graph showing smartphone volumes.

The striking thing is how the two companies peaked are almost precisely the same time and how that moment (end of 2010) was not related to the entry timing of their nominal disruptor.

Recall that both companies cite the iPhone as the factor which caused a shift in the basis of competition. But the iPhone launched in mid 2007 (at the beginning of the graph's date range.) BlackBerry had 16 quarters of growth after the iPhone and Nokia nearly the same. The stock prices of the companies also prospered for a period long after the iPhone entered the scene validating a do-nothing approach. So this is the crux of the incumbent's dilemma: how do you rally a response when you don't feel any pain? It's worse actually: how do you embark on a painful course of action while feeling comfortable and safe?

The reason the companies did not suffer immediately from the iPhone was because it (and its Android equivalents) took time to reach the core customer bases. Remember that the iPhone was not "good enough" to be an enterprise product at launch and Android was not the first to serve the low end of the market, where Nokia was dominant.

Vision is worth exactly nothing without timing.

But enough about ancient history. The crucial question is what does it teach us. It's tempting to suggest that this disruption is happening again with the iPhone today.

There is one big problem with this. The iPhone was not a low-end disruption. It was exactly the opposite. The BlackBerry and the Nokia products were striving for the low end. They observed the discipline of constrained resources. They were expanding into emerging markets. They watched every fraction of a penny on the bill of materials. The low end was manna for the whole industry. Even Microsoft with Windows Mobile was better positioned for the low end than Apple.

Instead, what Apple did was unthinkable. It entered with a high end product. It even promoted its high price ($500, subsidized!) This is why it was laughed at.

Theirs was "the Mac in a phone" idea. The reason it worked was that it was not a phone. The reason it worked is because it was the hardest disruption to spot:

A new market disruption ((The reason Clayton Christensen and his disruption consulting black belts could not spot it is mostly because new market disruption requires deep industry domain knowledge))

Disruption is not a process that merely rewards breaking convention. Any fool can rebel against the status quo. To change it requires a process that rewards asymmetric competition. Finding a way to be seen as irrelevant and yet conquering at the same time. Being disruptive is, above all, being imperceptibly valuable.

For iPhone the core asymmetry was that it was a computing product and not a telecommunications product. Every decision thereafter flowed from the calculus of computing and not the compliance with telco convention. The ecosystem, the rapid rate of improvement, the rich user experience, the tie into other product lines.

It was this asymmetry which confused every observer. Predicting how a high end product can conquer the low end is fiendishly counterintuitive.

In contrast, spotting low end disruption is a parlor game. There is little challenge in observing a cheaper alternative competing as a commodity. For  evidence look at how markets react. Whereas they could not understand the value of the iPhone (or iPod or iPad) they reacted instantly to the whiff of a commoditization play. Angst surrounding cheaper alternatives pervades. ((The contrarian should note that commoditization plays are hard bets to win since everybody can spot them.))

The problem with the low end disruption thesis is that low end is also much easier to respond to, especially now that everyone read the book. The incumbent simply needs to have a flexible cost structure and a vast margin to dip into. Most failures to respond to a low end disruption come from companies stuck in a high cost structure not from a failure to see a low end alternative. ((Christensen case studies almost always cite how the low end disruption was perceived easily but the response was felt to be marginally worse than not responding or fleeing upmarket.))

Apple's costs are mostly variable and their fixed (R&D and SG&A) are growing far slower than sales. There are huge margins and more cash being spun out than anyone can figure out what to do with it.

The distressed response to the low end tends to be a retreat into the higher margins and an abandonment of existing customers.

I don't see Apple doing either. Rather, it is gradually adjusting its portfolio toward lower end alternatives. Note that demand for the lower end product is far less than for the high end. Instinct would suggest that they should have stuck with the 5S alone. But it moved down anyway. It also did so with the iPod, iPad and Mac mini.

The idea that Apple is vulnerable to the low end is a relic of an idea. It goes back to the Mac of the 1990s, at a time when the world-wide computing market was orders of magnitude smaller than today and where purchasing and development decisions centralized in the hands of a few large companies ((essentially B2B as Ben Thompson points out)). And even when looking at that competition, the Mac somehow managed to survive.

That's not likely to be the case for those who found themselves in competition with the Mac in its pocketable re-incaration.

 

During the first quarter this year HTC, RIM and Nokia all surprised investors with bad news. The effect is evident in the share price of these companies which, in the case of RIM and Nokia is around book value, and in the case of HTC, neared 12 month lows and a 70% drop from peak.

These "misses" in earnings and expectations are on top of the already woeful news from Sony Ericsson and Motorola, which have not had profits for years and LG, which has been borderline since late 2009.

In combination, this seems to imply a dearth of profits in an industry that is, by all measures, booming. Units are up 7% with smartphones up 47%. Revenues are up 20% and overall profits are up 52%. This are exceptionally strong numbers. Few industries can measure growth in double digits.

So if the industry is booming but the majority of participants in the industry are loss making (and surprisingly so) then what is going on? There are two answers: new market disruption and low end disruption.

The new market disruption is the migration of a large number of demanding customers away from phones-as-voice-products to phones-as-computing-products. The low-end disruption is the migration of a large number of less demanding customers from branded phones to unbranded, commodity phones.

The New Market Disruption

The new market disruption is evidenced by the shift of fortunes to Apple and Samsung and away from every other device maker. Here is the profit picture:

Of the vendors tracked (public companies who report mobile phone divisional performance), Apple obtained 73% of operating profits, Samsung 26% and HTC 1% [1][2].

The "share of profit" picture is potentially misleading because it could imply that the profits available are a constant. They're not. The absolute profits picture below shows how the industry actually expanded available profits by quite a lot. Two years ago the vendors generated profits of $5.3 billion in the first quarter  and last quarter they generated $14.4 billion.

Seen this way, the story isn't so much that Apple "took the profits from the incumbents". Rather, it's that Apple created a vast new pool of profits. And one need not look far to find out where they came from: operators. These profits were mostly carrier premiums for the iPhone 4S.

Before shedding tears for operators, consider that although this does amount to a current transfer of profits from carriers, the decision is a popular one. Hundreds of operators have made it. It's unlikely that they all colluded to be robbed. Indeed, they willingly hand over these premiums because the iPhone ensures a competitive advantage or preserves their customer base from churning. The calculations that go into a decision to range the iPhone are compelling enough that 250 operators made the decision (though, crucially, there are still 250 who have not).

Following this value proposition to its logical conclusion would suggest that the industry is rewarding those who can supply computers-as-phones which preserve the cash flows of what is essentially a trillion dollar data services business. Vendors which cannot offer this solution saw their businesses implode. At least on the high end.

The low end disruption

Simultaneous with this shift of the high end to smartphones-as-app-and-service-platforms came an explosion of growth in unbranded phones. As Apple led and most brands followed the new market, the old market of voice-oriented phones was abandoned to new entrants offering cheap "good enough" phones. Nokia tried to preserve its volumes and margins there but it's becoming increasingly difficult.

The following chart shows how the "Other" vendors have come to make up about 44% of the market.

Note that although this "feature phone" segment is not growing, it is still a large market (250 million units a quarter). The entrants in this market are numerous (perhaps in the thousands) and they are offering white label and unlicensed knock-off products. They are also offering unregulated (i.e. without IMEI numbers) products which are technically illegal and sold mainly in underdeveloped countries which have no incentives to enforce regulations.

This is a consequence of feature phones reaching the point of being "good enough". The feature set and quality are adequate for voice, text, games and even media playback and are priced at $30 or less.

This commoditization of the low end is pressuring what would normally be the fallback cushion under an underperforming smartphone business. The crisis for the incumbents comes from not only being unable to shift to the new market as fast as needed but also from not having cash flows from a low end that was thought to be sustaining.

This combination of two disruptions is why we see an explosively large and growing market failing to reward all but two of the participants.[3]

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Notes:

1. You can download, view and interact with a motion chart for the industry data here. All data is sourced from company filings except for some estimates where data is missing.
2. Operating profits are sales minus cost of sales minus operational expenses attributed to the business. When not available, opex is estimated as a percent of total in proportion to sales. Note that operational income excludes taxes, depreciation and other capitalized costs.
3. We cannot say that the thousands of low end entrants are unprofitable. They are probably enough profits to sustain them and even to attract more entrants, but we have to also recognize that there are likely to be very low margins.

In an Harvard Business Review post Rob Wheeler makes the case for the Kindle Fire as a disruptive innovation. I believe that it is but crucially I disagree that the Kindle Fire is a low end disruption.

My assessment of the Kindle Fire is based on the two attributes which Amazon highlights as the key selling points which offer a basis of differentiation and potential for asymmetric competition: a low price and a new browsing model. I believe that these two attributes result in two opportunities: one for low end disruption and another of new market disruption. I reject the first and tentatively support the second.[1]

The price

It's immediately obvious that the price point of the Kindle Fire is well below alternatives. That forms the basis of disruptive potential, but before we jump to analyzing the disruption hypothesis we should determine whether and to what extent Amazon profits from the device directly. Profitability gives us a clue to where Amazon will apply resources and thus establish its trajectory of improvement.

We know the margin on the Fire is low because we can calculate the bill of materials for 7" tablets. Gene Munster of Piper Jaffray estimates that Amazon "loses" $50 for each unit sold. We also know that the design Amazon used is essentially very similar to the RIM PlayBook and was sourced from the same ODM. RIM priced the product at $499 but has struggled to find buyers and is reluctantly dropping the price. We also can estimate that Apple with a product having more than twice the screen size is keeping modest (~30%) gross margins for at a price point approximately double that of the Fire. It does seem that Amazon does not have much or any margin to dip into.[2]

So the Fire can be classified as a low price product. Does that make it a low end disruption?

Disruption requires asymmetry but it also requires the ability to go up a trajectory of improvement along the basis of performance that a majority of users demand. The first condition is met, but what of the second? In a combined system where one asset is used to leverage another--the subsidized being sacrificed to benefit the profitable--success is conditional on one element being "good enough" while the other "needing improvement". Investment follows accordingly.

But investment decisions have consequences. The subsidized device is starved of investment while the profitable service is nurtured. We see evidence of short cuts in investment in the off-the-shelf nature of Kindle products: from a second-hand (unsanctioned) OS to a second-hand (ex-RIM) hardware. Meanwhile, Amazon spends heavily on capex for the infrastructure that delivers the profitable content.

If the hardware is indeed commoditized and cannot be usefully improved, then this model works. If, on the other hand, the hardware and systems software can benefit from dramatic improvements in technology then the model fails. The very asymmetry of a service vs. a product turns into the latter having all the advantages and the former failing to gain traction.

I'll give three examples of this how service model creates limitations which lead to a failure to disrupt a product model.

The Game Consoles

The first is the game console business. In consoles, the vendors maintain long hardware product life-cycles to recover their hardware investment and subsidy by maximizing the number of games attached to each console. If you plot product cycles you realize that the bigger the subsidy, the longer the hardware lifecycle. The result is a very wide turning circle which prevents innovation in new dimensions.

Consider that the Playstation or the Xbox could have been a low end computing disruption. The original Xbox was in fact a PC. It was supposed to bring PC dynamism to the console business and create a cottage industry of new developers building games on commoditized hardware. However by the second generation the Xbox was a locked down, custom architecture, pure gaming machine. Gone was Intel, gone was the PC architecture and gone was any dream of cheap development.

This is entirely due to the economics of subsidized hardware. It compelled Microsoft, the world's greatest software company, built on the open and cheap PC architecture to make closed, expensive hardware. Sony followed in kind as did Nintendo. Each generation of consoles was a sustaining improvement on gaming and had no ambition beyond gaming[3]. The subsidy and the dependence on an integrated content value network led to a distinct lack of disruption and an insular industry which continues to seek out increasingly immersive experiences for increasingly demanding customers while itself being disrupted by casual, mobile gaming.

The Set-top boxes

The second example is the TV set-top box business. There again, the vendors maintain long hardware cycles in order to recover subsides. There too, the main value driver is the content and its distribution which stipulates the architecture, and through subsidy, defines its evolution. This offers the vendor no motivation to improve the user experience[4], secondary uses or the absorption of new streams of content (like those the internet can offer.)

Again, the set-top box could have been a budding disruptive opportunity for Microsoft. They invested billions in the 1990s to acquire placement of software on set-top boxes in an attempt to penetrate the living room. And again Microsoft was not alone. Since then Tivo, Google and Apple and many others tried to attach cheap hardware to video streams. They all failed to get on a disruptive trajectory. And again, the blame can be placed on the stifling effect of subsidies and dependencies on services or content which dictate where the value and hence the investments should go.

The Blackberry

The third example is the RIM Blackberry. Although RIM made most of its money on hardware and was by no means subsidizing it, the differentiation of their product was undoubtedly its service value. Both as a corporate device with BES and as a consumer device with BBS, customers "hired" the product as a service. By being committed to this model RIM management became blind to the hardware and client OS software innovations coming down the pike.

Through their own admission, they could not accept a touch screen because it would make the messaging experience too slow and it is messaging that sells Blackberries. They could not accept apps (and hence platform orchestration) as a differentiation because their customers did not hire Blackberries for "lifestyle apps". Merely being differentiated as a service leads to blindness and enough hesitation that you run off the disruptive rails.

People ascribe myopia or incredible absence of mind to RIM's management but the opposite is true. They were deeply committed and observant of the things which made the Blackberry successful. It just happened to be something that stopped being relevant.

The iPhone

I'll add one more "bonus" example on this. The iPhone is also a subsidized product and it seems very successful. How come it won? The answer is in details. As I mentioned, the other products ended up in poor life cycles or incorrect motivations. The iPhone differs in that the lifecycle of the product is much shorter (2 years ownership with 1 year for product updates). The shorter lifecycle works for the iPhone because it has a very high service revenue base to dip into to offset the subsidy. Something none of the content models above could count on.

Consider that each game console subsidy needs to paid off by a handful of game titles whose royalties to the console maker are modest. Or that the TV box needs to ride on top a service that also has thin margins from a stable or slightly shrinking user base. In contrast, the iPhone enables vast new consumption worth thousands of dollars to the operator. This is the famous ARPU uplift that smart phones enable. Users are doubling their telecom spending when they move to smartphones.

The margins for Kindle content are thin. Very thin. Apple runs its content business at break even though it transacts billions of items per month. The amount of content that needs to pass through the Kindle ecosystem (with lower prices than Apple charges) will need to be astronomical to make it profitable on the shortened cycle time the iPhone enjoys. Thus the Kindle is likely to languish in a leisurely update cycle with users encouraged to hang on to their devices for years. This is the case at least with the original e-Ink Kindles. How eagerly awaited are new generations? How many users stampede to update the hardware or even upgrade the software? How many users have owned every version of the Kindle?

Service Scale

Finally one last point about services. As Amazon asserts, they see Kindle as a service, which, I concede, is asymmetric to a product business. The problem is that services don't scale as well as products. Consider that none of the content streams that Amazon will depend on are available outside the US. The Kindle has not been a strong seller internationally. This is because book rights are limited to national boundaries as are movie rights and song rights. Apple has only this week finally completed the rollout of iTunes music to all of Europe! A process that took almost a decade. And they are still unable to sell music in most of Asia and forget about movies or TV shows.[5]

The reality is that there are no global service brands. Not in telecommunications (operators are, at best, regional), not in Media (TV, radio, publishing are a local businesses), not in Banking (not even in commercial banking) and not in Retail (even Wal-Mart was humbled trying to export its disruption). The internet has not broken down any of these boundaries and even Amazon has modest reach outside the US for any of their franchises. Services are local but products can be global.[6]

To wrap up, this discussion on the asymmetry of device-based services to product models leads me to conclude that the Fire will not have the opportunity to disrupt the iPad or tablets in general. Amazon sees the hardware and software of a device as a commodity and the content and its distribution as valuable. This assumes that the device is "good enough" and will not require deep re-architecting or that new input methods can be easily absorbed. In short, they see the tablet as at the end of its evolutionary path. Apple sees the exact opposite. The iPad is 18 months old, and as they say in the ads, they see it as only the beginning.

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Notes:

1. Due to length of discussion, in this post I will make the case against the low end disruptive potential and use a second post to make the case for it being a new market disruption.
2. Presumably, Amazon will also distribute only through Amazon.com and thus not incur channel mark-ups. This means that comparisons with other tablets should be at a price nearer to 70% of retail.
3. Gaming networks and video streaming are extensions but neither leveraged open architectures.
4. See also discussion from June 2010 on the challenges to Apple TV that Steve Jobs enumerated.
5. Apps are another story. Because it controls the medium, Apple can and does sell apps in every country where the iPhone or iPad or iPod touch is available.
6. Note also that because of distribution through Amazon.com, the Kindle cannot reach as many buyers as a tablet selling through the tens of thousands of points of purchase that operators and retail shops offer.

 

The question of low end disruption should be a concern to any manager. It's one of the most important sources of growth and has led to a vast amount of wealth creation.

Apple was an early low end disruptor by selling personal computers at a fraction of mini-computer prices. Toyota also offered "cheap" cars as an entrant in the market. Pixar made blockbusters for a lot less than live action studios. Google offers good enough office software without a license. Finally Microsoft built its whole business on low-end business software at knock-down prices.[1]

All these entrants made fortunes often at the expense of entrenched incumbents. Disruption grows the pie but also transfers a lot of value away from existing competitors.

So it should not be surprising that new products like the iPad should be scrutinized for their vulnerability to low end disruption. Brian Caufield asks the question if Apple has any future with the iPad given the potential for $99 tablets.

The question is indeed why not introduce an ultra-cheap tablet, for example from Amazon, which makes up for the low price with an innovative business model like selling content or user behavior data. After all, game consoles are sold this way. This is the classic razor/razor-blade business model.

The answer to why not is actually not simply that the economics don't work. They might work some day even if they really don't today.

The answer to why not is that the iPad is not good enough.

Disruption (low-end or otherwise) happens when a product over-shoots the market. It makes sense to compete on a new basis, be it low price or convenience or customization, if the prevailing basis of competition has led the prevailing products to be more than good enough. If you look through all the examples of low-end disruption, you'll find that the incumbents were motivated to flee up-market and to continue to improve their products even though they exceeded the demands and expectations of mainstream buyers.

For the iPad to be vulnerable, it has to be way better than the mainstream users' needs. Which asks the question of what needs are being served. If it's book reading, it probably is more than good enough. But if it's replacing a laptop computer, certainly not. Being too feeble is the most common complaint about the iPad. Being a bloated over-functioned and overly complex solution looking for a problem is definitely not on buyer's list of concerns.

So on this basis, the iPad and other tablets pass vulnerability tests with flying colors. The product is woefully inadequate for mainstream computing.

The consequence is that people will yearn and beg for more functionality and will drop the last generation for the next without hesitation. This pattern of breathless upgrades is symptomatic of a product racing up a trajectory of improvements which are relevant to buyers.

So until buyers find the n+1 version of the iPad to be superfluous and over-specced, having too much battery life, too big a screen, too much storage and with more speed and bandwidth than needed, the iPad need not fear the low end.

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Notes:

1. Other classic low-end disruptors are: Wal-Mart, GE Capital, Toys 'r Us, Sun Microsystems, Dell, Hyundai, MySQL, Amazon, Visa, Embraer, E-trade, Macy's, Japan Steel, Circuit City, Home Depot, Yahoo Travel.