Takeshi Narabe • 16:20 [Y]ou also mentioned about the Japanese companies, overshooting, performance oversupply was also one of the reason that Japanese electronics giants were outmaneuvered by Apple: the insistence on in-house component manufacturing and a critical absence of software and service-led business as you mentioned now.
Horace Dediu • 17:02 It's a tough one. I think I know what you're getting at, but I think the puzzle there is that you try to make things better and you think by making things better you're going to be more successful and that was another observation by Christensen that sometimes you if you listen to your customers they'll ask you to do things better because that's all [the customer] can imagine.
I think the canonical example for me would be the game consoles. [...]Every new generation was more powerful and the way [the platforms] would decide how to improve it would be by talking to their customers and who are the best customers?
They are those who spend the most on games and the most on consoles. and they would survey those [customers] and [the customers] would always say "we need more performance in terms of refresh rate or, I don't know, how many dimensions of performance there are in games--i'm not particularly a user.
So the problem is that it's not just Sony but Nintendo, Xbox, everyone in the gaming industry was listening to the gamers and the most prolific and demanding gamers were those who spent the most money.
But if you compare mobile gaming to console gaming, it was always worse on all those dimensions. But if you [instead] measure how much time people spend on on mobile games, initially it was quite small, but over time it grew and grew and the number of people using phones for gaming is in the billions. In contrast, the number of people using consoles saturated at most at 30 percent of households in the United States. I don't know what it is in every country and there are many still. That's an okay business but it's not measured in the billions of users and arguably those users are not the ones you want to listen to.
The only exception was Nintendo with the Wii, which actually tried to expand to non-consumers, tried to expand to elderly people (so that they can do some movement) with the product or to young children. And that was a brief moment of success in the incumbents. But I think fundamentally, even that too gets passed to the phone.
So this is a classic example. How Apple plays in this game is a very tricky one because...
Horace Dediu and Guy English discuss the future of TV, how we consume media, and the fate of console-style devices. From Apple to Nintendo and beyond, is there one box to rule them all, or can there be?
Interview segment: Cinematographer Barry Braverman talks about working with director Wes Anderson (uncut version to be posted as Screen Time #54)
In the "Race to a Billion" there is a graph showing Android reported activations and iOS cumulative unit sales alongside cumulative console sales. The contrast between mobile phone platforms and game consoles is striking, with an order of magnitude difference in consumption. The best performing console to date is the Wii with about 100 million units sold so far.
[UPDATE: Thanks to Danny Nemer cumulative sales of Sony's PlayStation 2 (using production shipments from FY 2000-05 and recorded sales for FY 06-12) is 155.81 million units]
However, that is an incomplete picture of the game platform business primarily because consoles are not the entirety of the business. Mobile (but dedicated) gaming platforms have been sold for some time.
To give a better picture of the game business we prepared the following graphs. The first shows Nintendo's product lines with actual unit shipments (shown as colored dots in millions of units per quarter) and the trend (shown as trailing twelve months' average trend lines).
Note that fixed and mobile products are both shown on the same graph. The picture that emerges is that for Nintendo, its mobile platforms combined are more popular than its fixed consoles with a total of 186 million mobile devices sold since 2003.
There is also a pattern of generational change. The GBA, DS and GameCube era was superseded by the DS Lite, DSi, Wii era. The Wii era (or generation) was significantly more popular than the GameCube generation. If there is a problem however, it seems to be that the new generation devices or consoles are not forming a new era. The Wii U and 3DS are not growing nearly to the level of the previous generations and have faded quickly.
To summarize, the unit volume graph for Nintendo is below. ((This is a smoothed graph showing what sales would have been if they had been evenly spread out over a 12 month period. The actual sales would total to the same area but would be much more seasonal and thus noisy.))
To confirm that this is indeed disruption we should look at the pattern for another competitor in the console market: Sony. ((We would like to show the pattern for Microsoft but there is no regularly reported Xbox shipment data.))
The graphs above combine both Nintendo portable/consoles and Sony portable/console sales. Note the similarity in patterns of growth. It's one thing to suggest that Nintendo consoles have "failed", it's another to show that Nintendo consoles and portables have failed, and yet another to show that two competitors in the games business seem to be failing in unison across all their product lines. The cyclicality is also over a long period of time: The peak for the combined Sony/Nintendo was in 2008, five years ago.
The chief criticism to the industry-wide view of decline is that there is a new generation of consoles right around the corner. This is the eighth generation of consoles which, it is presumed, will bring growth back to the industry.
But the Nintendo 3DS, launched two years ago, was meant to kick off the eighth generation, and the PlayStation Vita was Sony's response. Then the Wii U was also billed as the successor to the Wii. They have so far failed to re-ignite growth. One might reply that they were merely appetizers and that the main course of the next gen are the PS4 and Xbox One.
Will they create growth again? Surely not for Nintendo, but I would argue that not for Sony or Microsoft either. There might be a burst of sales at launch as the hard core gamers upgrade, but they are unlikely to recruit new gamers the way the Wii did. In other words the PS4 and Xbox One are unlikely to win against non-consumption.
That is where mobile is the clear winner. More people will hire mobile devices for their primary gaming activity. And as mobile devices get inexorably better, they will be hired for use in the setting where consoles have been king: the living room.
The implications are that Nintendo, Sony and Microsoft are beyond the point of no return in this industry. Gaming, as a business, cannot be sustained as a platform independent of a general purpose computer. Like other "applications" that used to have systems built around them conforming to their needs (( Applications such as word processing, financial calculation, media editing, music playback, etc.)) the dedicated-purpose solutions came to be absorbed into the general-purpose platforms. And the modern general purpose computer is the smartphone. (( One interesting question is why didn't the general purpose personal computer absorb console gaming. My answer is that personal computers could not conform to the experiences around the "10 foot" interface and still function well at their main jobs. In contrast, mobile devices through screen sharing have the ability to be much more malleable.))
UPDATE: I added Microsoft console shipment data which became available after 2008.
At this year's WWDC Apple offered an update on Game Center accounts. The data we have so far is shown in the following graph.
Before being acquired, another network, OpenFeint, announced 180 million iOS accounts in October 2011. Another figure to consider is the 40 million subscribers to Xbox Live (out of 66 million Xbox users). This subscriber base is paying for a service (about $1 billion per year) so it's not the same as the free Game Center model.
Rather than being a revenue source, Game Center is designed to engage users and to capture usage information. It also lets us gauge gaming "consumption" on iOS devices. That itself allows us to contemplate it as a gaming platform vis-à-vis alternate platforms.
To consider the figure as a proxy of penetration and engagement, the graphic below shows cumulative sales of gaming devices.[1]
Here are some observations:
There is a pattern of turnover of market participants
Each console "generation" had a clear market leader
The best-selling gaming device was the Nintendo DS closely followed by the PlayStation 2 [2]
Considering the 130 million Game Center accounts, iOS is already the third largest gaming platform
Furthermore, considering the OpenFeint iOS figure of 180 million accounts announced in 2011, iOS has already surpassed the cumulative sales figures for the Nintendo DS
No gaming device has ever reached the 200 million mark
At the current growth rate the number of Game Center accounts will surpass 200 million before the year end
Apple cites the number of games, downloads and payments to developers as evidence of ecosystem health and growth. The figure of Game Center accounts is yet another indicator. It shows growth in and of itself, but it also has the side effect of offering comparative measurement of performance. That measurement compares favorably with other game platforms.
The economics are different but they always are when a disruption takes root.
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Notes:
Based on reported cumulative sales (Wikipedia), excluding gaming devices with less than 10 million cumulative sales (excludes for example PlayStation Vita), excludes also “home computers” due to missing reported figures
With the launch of the Wii console, Nintendo averted disaster. When the Wii launched in late 2006 Nintendo had been facing the simultaneous attack from the "seventh generation" Xbox 360 which launched a year earlier as well as the PlayStation 3, both of which set as their bases of competition 3D graphics at HD resolutions. Many wrote off the company and called the console market a two horse race.
Then, in what seemed a desperate downward leap, the Wii was launched into a different trajectory. It addressed non-consumers with a new, more intuitive controller and standard resolution rather than competing for hardcore gamers with more power and richer graphics.
Because the Wii was asymmetric and addressed non-consumption rather than trying to be a "better" console in what was becoming a horsepower race, Nintendo expanded the console market. Its innovation was interesting enough that many hard core gamers used the console in addition to a PS3 or Xbox and many non-gamers bought it as their first console.
The result is that 95 million Wii's have been sold vs. 66 million Xbox 360's and 62 million PS3's.
The effect of the Wii introduction on Nintendo's console unit sales is shown below (pink line).
The graph above shows that the growth from Wii has stopped. In fact, the console has been in decline since early 2009. Fortunately for Nintendo, the company also developed a mobile strategy. Learning from its Game Boy device, its DS series of portable game consoles allowed the company to diversify its portfolio. The graph also shows the total portable units sold in blue.
However, this strategy has not been enough to protect the company from the disruptive effect of mobile computing. As the following chart shows, each new generation of portable from Nintendo has failed to break out of a general pattern of overall decline.
Contrast the DS product patterns with the iPod touch and iPad--multi-purpose products whose game functionality is "good enough" but whose communications and general-purpose app catalogs are re-defining the basis of competition yet again.
Nintendo bet on the 3DS to reboot the franchise. The 3DS product does show the characteristic initial spike in adoption but the level it launched at is far lower than the level of the iPad. Nintendo has a big hill to climb to even recover the volumes it held in 2009. In contrast, the usurper Apple's volumes are doubling each year.
When products are compared as "ramps" in terms of growth post-launch the story becomes even clearer.
Although the iPhone and iPod touch ramped in similar ways[1] to the gaming platforms, iPad took an entirely different path. The 3DS benefited temporarily from a price cut but it seems to be returning to a well-worn trajectory.
The data points a bleak picture for Nintendo. The Wii was a success due to its competitiveness vs. non-consumption of gaming. But another low end disruption took hold in 2007. Good enough games on phones and mobile computers are taking consumption away from dedicated consoles, both fixed and mobile.
In addition, the rate at which game experiences are improving on iOS imply that they will overtake the "quality" of consoles in the not too distant future. Differences in distribution models also guarantee lower pricing for software for end users and enabling a far larger catalog of titles.[2]
This may sound like another story of fortune gained and fortune lost. The inevitable "what goes up must come down" aphorism. We become used to this pattern and assume it to be axiomatic. But there are causes for each success and causes for each failure.
The lesson here is that a company that disrupts does not necessarily survive. Long term survival depends on the ability for serial disruption. Serial disruption is an uncomfortable state for an organization to exist in. As the story above shows, disruptions are usually enabled by "desperate" necessity. Desperation is not something management is trained to aspire for.
What management strives for is steady state satisfaction and predictability from intelligent planning.
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Notes:
Though the iPhone ramp matched the consoles, the growth for the iPhone is persisting at 100% y/y five years into the product. This means it is outstripping all console installed bases by at least a factor of 2.
The catalog is not only broad but deep in the sense that there are many new game concepts and experiments being tried. The app store is a vast testbed for game and entertainment ideas.
On October 27th, Nintendo published half year results for the fiscal year ending in March 2012. Management stated that the company lost over $900 million with a negative outlook. Nintendo cited weaker than expected sales of Nintendo DS hardware and 3DS software and Yen appreciation as the main reasons for the miss. Is this the end of Nintendo?
Before we look more closely, here is a quick summary: The company is exclusively involved in selling game hardware and software. Their console platform is the Nintendo Wii, which will be followed by the Wii U late in 2012. The Nintendo DS and Nintendo 3DS are the company’s portable game consoles. The Wii and the DS are nearing the end of their product cycles. On the software side, the company is known for gaming titles such as Super Mario and Zelda. Nintendo also pioneered the licensing model to allow third-party developers to produce games for its hardware products.
A closer look
The good news for analysts is that Nintendo publishes their estimates for hardware and software unit sales. This allows us to measure management predictive accuracy. The red line (management forecast) should be as close as possible to the dark green pillars (realized unit sales in the fiscal year).
Until CQ1 2009 devices sales grew in excess of forecasts. A similar pattern can be found for consoles and game titles. After Q1 2009 forecasts have been always higher than results, and more worryingly, the deviation between forecast and sales is widening. Management missed and lowered forecasts for two consecutive years. Management's hope for an increase on the back of initial 3DS sales in the launch quarter (CQ1 2011) did not come to pass and they subsequently lowered forecasts again in the following two quarters.
Looking at all categories, management lowered forecasts almost continuously. The deviation remains the largest in the portable hardware business segment indicating that management was largely surprised about the development.
What caused this reversal of fortune?
Two years earlier the iPhone had launched and by CQ1 2009 iOS reached an installed base of about 38 million, half the number of Nintendo portables in the same period. Furthermore, in CQ1 2009 Android phones came to the market. Smartphones (light blue area of the chart below) sold before (and after) the debut of iOS, but the iPhone redefined the category and an avalanche of smarter phones running iOS and Android followed (blue and orange area). Portable gaming devices from Nintendo and Sony declined ever since: 17% in 2009, 31% in 2010 and already 16% in the last twelve months.
How do the game players stack up?
We already looked at the installed base in the chart above. iOS and Android have outsold Nintendo portable units by a factor of 2.1x and 1.6x. Furthermore, we can see (in the charts below) that the two main mobile platforms have 14 to 26 times more game (and entertainment) titles available. Nintendo and Sony also publish unit sales of directly sold software titles. For Android and iOS we know the cumulative app download statistics. By taking the share of Septembers’ paid and free app downloads as a proxy, we can conclude that also by this measure Android and iOS dwarf Nintendo and Sony [1]. The reach of iOS and Android is further underlined by the more than 500 million downloads of Angry Bird game titles - first released only two years ago - for any platform having sold more than twice the amount of Sony’s cumulative portable game titles and almost as many as Nintendo’s cumulative games titles since Q2/2007.
Who else has skin in the game?
Besides Nintendo, Sony, Apple and Google, who else is making a push into mobile gaming? Before investigating, let’s first have a closer look at Sony. Sony, just like Nintendo, is also active in stationary gaming segment with the PlayStation franchise. The Sony group also has access to entertainment most notable through Sony Pictures Entertainment and Sony Music Entertainment. Furthermore, Sony recently decided to buy Ericsson’s stake in the mobile phone joint-venture Sony Ericsson and is making a push with Android to bring its gaming titles as a differentiator for its own products to the platform. And the other major suspects? Microsoft, also active in the stationary gaming segment with its Xbox franchise, is pushing to bring the Xbox experience to mobile phones with Windows Phone. Amazon has retailed software and games for years and has started to distribute software and games via direct download on its own Kindle devices but also for the Mac. On the Kindle, Amazon is relying on a forked Android version on which it leverages its eBook and other entertainment assets. And then there is Facebook, a social network that wants to be on any platform or device. Out of 800 million users, 350 million access Facebook via a mobile device. Around 50% of Facebook members play games on the desktop. With Project Spartan, Facebook is aiming to bring the desktop experience to the mobile device including a stronger focus on gaming and video.
The competition between Apple and Google is already asymmetrical. Including the other contestants in the competitive landscape reveals Nintendo’s key weaknesses in the portable gaming market: attraction as a platform for developers in terms of ease and reach, pricing of hardware competing with operator-subsidized mobile phones and the jobs-to-be-done or value preposition. The new generation of mobile devices is standing against Nintendo’s dedicated approach. Although slowly adding features such as a browser and “app store” to its portables, Nintendo devices fall short in the variety of jobs-to-be-done compared to smartphones, let alone making a call.
Average selling prices and financial impact
With this market pressure one would imagine that average selling prices decreased for Nintendo portables. But for the last three fiscal years average selling prices for portables have increased, all things equal, mainly due to new product launches. Game title’s average selling prices have remained relatively flat. Note that these are wholesales prices for hardware and a mix of retail and wholesale prices for games. In 2011, for which we do not have data yet, the price of the newest portable, Nintendo 3DS, was lowered from its U.S. debut of 320 250$ in February to 170$ in July which will have a negative impact on ASP going forward.
The effects of Nintendo’s rigid strategy and the fast changing competitive landscape are manifested in the devastating financial performance over the recent quarters with LTM sales, gross margins and EBIT margins declining starting from CQ4 2008 and even accelerating to decline after CQ3 2010.
Furthermore, even though the company has recognized its own difficulties, Nintendo has no intention of adjusting its strategy:
CEO Iwata on the question of whether Nintendo plans to bring its game library to other platforms:
This is absolutely not under consideration. If we did this, Nintendo would cease to be Nintendo. Having a hardware development team in-house is a major strength. It’s the duty of management to make use of those strengths. It’s probably the correct decision in the sense that the moment we started to release games on smartphones we’d make profits. However, I believe my responsibility is not to short term profits, but to Nintendo’s mid and long term competitive strength.
Although realized and obvious, the disruption’s invisibility is often manifested in the paralysis of the incumbent.
Conclusion
According to Isaacson, Steve Jobs apparently always worried who could eat Apple's lunch. The lunch of the iPod, he concluded, was ripe for mobile phones. Subsequently, Apple entered the mobile phone space. Google followed. Since then more powerful mobile phones have eaten the lunch of the dedicated gaming device. The jobs-to-be-done and their priorities in people’s life have not changed, but the tools people use to get them done have. Permanently.
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Notes:
Estimated by multiplying total cumulative app downloads with September’s share of game downloads: For iOS ranging from 72-80% based on Top 150 free and paid app downloads, for Android ranging from 38-47% respectively. This is a very crude estimation, but the gist of it is that 4% for iOS and 11% for Android game downloads as percentage of cumulative app downloads would outsell Nintendo.
I recently posted a comparison between the profit capture of phone vendors in 2007 and the most recent quarter:
The idea was to show what a disruption looks like. A phenomenon where an entrant with none of the advantages of incumbency takes the profits away from companies privileged with ideal market access and knowledge.
The view of profit shift is the ideal view since it shows the "bottom line" impact and thus the denouement rather than more nuanced sub-plot. However, we don't always have access to profitability data. Sometimes we only have access to revenue estimates.
Fortunately revenues have a similar story and are often a good proxy. Consider how the evolution of revenue shares occurred in the same market:
Revenues for Apple and HTC combined doubled from 17% to 33% for the third quarter over three years.
Note the similarity between this evolution and that in the mobile games market (data courtesy of Flurry):
The increase of revenues fro iOS and Android games nearly tripled over a two year period. Although we cannot say the same for profitability as the profits are not comparable since they allocated differently between platform and developer depending on platform, we can say that iOS is certainly driving vastly more value than Nintendo.
Sony and Nintendo may take some comfort from their console businesses which have not felt the same impact from mobility, but one wonders how long those franchises will last. Using an iPad with screen mirroring to a large screen TV already shows promise.
The number of games per platform. All approximate.
Nintendo DS 600
Sony PS3 600
Microsoft Xbox 700
Sony PSP 700
Nintendo Wii 1000
Google Android 3,000
iPhone/iPod touch 22,000
If IDC prediction of 300,000 iPhone Apps by end of next year holds and if the ratio is preserved at about 20% games, then there could be 60,000 games on the Apple platform by next year. It's doubtful that the other platforms will grow by more than 10% in the same time frame. Are there any implications if one game platform has more titles than another? It's interesting that all the other platforms are in the same order of magnitude.
