Microsoft has announced that by the end of the year the Groove music service will be phased out. Users are being offered the option to move their music libraries into Spotify.
This brings to an end a long story of Microsoft in the music distribution business. It started nearly 15 years ago with technologies in Windows that allowed for purchase and playback of various media formats. Microsoft sought to enable a large number of music retailers to market music through its formats and DRM and transaction clearing.
Services such as AOL MusicNow, Yahoo! Music Unlimited, Spiralfrog, MTV URGE, MSN Music, Musicmatch Jukebox, Wal-Mart Music Downloads, Ruckus, PassAlong, Rhapsody, iMesh and BearShare and dozens of hardware players licensed Windows formats. Almost all of these services have shut down and the devices disappeared.
The next stage was to offer an integrated experience through the Microsoft Zune player and Zune Marketplace music service. This too failed and was replaced by the Xbox Music brand in 2012. On July 6, 2015, Microsoft announced the re-branding of Xbox Music as Groove to tie in with the release of Windows 10.
There was a time when Microsoft was thought of as the certain winner in media distribution. Inserting media into the Windows hegemony was classic "control point" strategy: owning the access points was a sure way to collect a tax on what transacted through the network.
Instead we are facing a market where media is consumed through new access points: phones, tablets and TV boxes. Netflix, Spotify, Roku, Google, Amazon and Apple are all offering distribution and some are investing in original programming.
It's perhaps worthwhile to recall that Microsoft and Apple both started their media efforts around the same time. Apple's iTunes is 16 years old and the iTunes Music Store opened in 2003, almost 15 years ago. Today Apple is transitioning to streaming with 30 million subscribers. The graph below shows the history of subscription growth to Apple Music and Spotify.
Apple Music is a small part of Apple Services (part of the orange area below).
On a yearly basis Apple Services are this year crossing the $50 billion gross revenue run rate. This year Apple released a new Apple TV 4K and is releasing a new smart speaker called HomePod.
The contrast between Microsoft and Apple is most visibly between the Mac and PC. But the story of how media paralleled mobility and how Microsoft struggled with both is perhaps a cautionary tale.
Microsoft saw the limits of modularity when new product categories emerged and when new user behaviors were created. They attempted to pivot into being more integrated but those efforts also failed. The efforts continue today with Surface devices; looking forward they will continue with AR/VR and perhaps a pivot of Xbox..
But the long arc of history shows how hard it is to succeed in vertical integration after you build on horizontal foundations. Generations of managers graduated from the modular school of thought, specializing rather than generalizing. Now they are facing an integrated experiential world where progress depends on wrapping the mind around very broad systems problems.
Entire industries are facing this orthogonal pivot: media, computing and transportation come to mind. Huge blind spots exist as we see only what we've been trained to see.
Managing the Mac product line must be one of the most challenging problems at Apple. That may not be obvious given the product's success. Consider what it has achieved:
The product is in its 32nd year of market presence. A longevity that in unmatched by any other PC maker.
Apple reached a top five position in the ranking of PC vendors. This was achieved for the first time only this year, far along in the evolution of the market.
With about $23 billion in revenues per year, Apple places among the top four PC vendors in terms of revenue.
With an estimated $5.5 billion in operating margin Apple is the most profitable PC vendor, capturing over 60% of the available PC hardware profits.
The product has retained an average selling price of over $1200 for at least a decade. At the same time the average pricing of Personal Computers has more than halved.
Although volumes have fallen for three quarters, the product grew volumes and sales for 22 out of 29 quarters. As a result, volumes almost doubled in eight years. ((The unit volumes in third quarter 2008 were 2.6 million. Eight years later they are 4.9 million and could easily be over 5 million in the holiday quarter.))
The contribution of the Mac to Apple's revenues is shown in the following graph.
It's attractive and convenient to contrast the Mac with the rest of the PC industry. A David vs. Goliath tale of redemption. The classic comeback story. But the split between the two old rivals (Windows/MacOS) focuses the mind into a limited view of the computing market. The big change in computing has not been a growing Mac vs. declining PC. It has been a huge surge in mobile device use vs. a decline in PC use overall.
This data is visible in many ways. Browsing data shows mobile overtook PC use this year. Shopping data around Black Friday points in the same direction. Data on user interaction captured by comScore is shown below ((Although US only, the global picture is likely to be even more skewed toward mobile as PC didn't saturated global markets before the smartphone swept to power.))
PC use went from half to a third of time while mobile went the other way: from a third to half of time within only four years. All the data is consistent: mobile use has swept PC use aside.
We can see the contrast simply by placing iPhone, Mac and all Windows PC on the same shipment graph.
This contrast is spectacular.
I bring this contrast up because I believe it is what focuses the minds at Apple. For them it's pretty clear where the puck is going. And not just now. Mobile has been foreseeable as a disruption to computing a decade ago–at least to some of us.
And so what do you with the Mac?
To answer this we have to ask what exactly is the purpose of the Mac in the age of the Mobile device?
Note that this is not the same as asking what is the PC in this world. The PC is not having to share a resource pool with an iPad/iPhone. It does not have to answer for its existence to a phone. PC makers and Microsoft are not fighting with an usurper in their midst. They may see the outsider challenger but it's not an inside challenger. This makes all the difference.
Indeed, because no usurper was allowed to emerge, PC/Windows never moved to a mobile evolution of computing. Microsoft's platform future was lost because the antibodies which eat disruptions were left unchecked.
But Apple's immune system was suppressed. It allowed a disruptor to emerge from within. Apple gave birth to its future by suppressing the reaction to that new seemingly parasitic organism. It took an immense willpower to allow this to happen.
But it takes us back to the question of what to do with the incumbent, the donor of DNA and resources. The parent that sacrificed for the child.
The Mac is thus not treated disparagingly. It deserves and gets respect. It is preserved but with limited responsibilities.
Which brings me to the question of what it is allowed to be and hence what it is. It cannot take on the role of being the future. That belongs to the touch screen devices. It will not morph into a touch device any more than a teen's parent will become cool by putting on skinny jeans. What it will do is become better at what it is hired to do.
The key to the Mac therefore becomes that which the iPad/iPhone isn't: an indirect input device. The keyboard and mouse/trackpad are what define the Mac. The operating system, the apps, the UX, are all oriented around the indirect input method. The iPhone's capacitive touch brought about the direct input method, a third pivot in input methods (first was mouse, second trackpad/scroll wheel). Each pivot launched a new set of platforms and the Mac is the legacy of the second.
It's not obsolete but it is a decreasing share of engagement. Alternate ways of doing the jobs it does well with direct input are emerging on the third pivot but they are not yet good enough. The children are still adolescent and making lots of stupid mistakes. There's still life in the parents.
The management thus has to focus on how to make the keyboard/trackpad interface better while still saying and believing that the future is touch.
In this context the newest MacBooks Pro are a logical extension of the second wave of computing while avoiding cramming them into the third wave. They are defined by their constraints. Seen thusly, the move from keyboard/trackpad to keyboard/touchbar/trackpad is pure genius.
The touchbar coupled to the other two inputs is a totally new way to interact with computing products. It's not an "easy" interface as it's not direct manipulation. It remains indirect, a defining characteristic of the second wave. Indirect inputs are powerful and lend themselves to muscle memory with practice. This is the way professional users become productive. The same way keyboard shortcuts are hard to learn but pay off with productivity, touchbar interactions are fiddly but will pay off with a two-handed interaction model. They are not something you "get" right away. They require practice and persistence for a delayed payoff. But, again, that effort is what professionals are accustomed to investing.
This is a leap forward and a big deal. For 32 years the UX model of the Mac has been two-handed typing with one handed gesturing. Now we have the option of two-handed indirect manipulation: one hand on the touchbar and one hand on the touchpad ((the iPad pro already encourages two handed direct manipulation)). Imagine you've been playing guitar with one hand for years and then someone lets you use your left hand. Holy cow.
Even so, it may seem that Apple is pulling punches. The product could have evolved into the full-touch, dual screens, pen input, hybrid model of Windows. But that only makes sense if you don't have a mobile product that is promising the same and tearing up the world at the same time.
You've unleashed a disruptive force and now you're supposed to retrofit the incumbent with the tools to compete. Why not just let the disruptor grow up unhindered.
The Mac is what it is because it's not alone. It's part of a family. It is a parent. It strives to be better but will not take the future from its child.
New market disruptions take root in non-consuming contexts. For instance, mobile phone photography began not because early phone cameras were good. They weren't good at all but good enough when a camera was not within reach. The quality was poor but the photo taken would not have otherwise been taken, making a lousy photo better than no photo.
The result is that the total number of photos taken this year will be ten times higher than the total number of photos taken before the advent of mobile phone cameras. ((The total number of photos taken in 2014 is likely to be around 880 billion. Prior to 2000 the total number of photos ever taken is estimated at 85 billion.))
This rush to use the phone as a camera has meant that phone makers are keen to improve their product (so as to compete effectively with it against each other) and as a consequence they overtake the incumbent camera makers in quality as well as quantity.
The same phenomenon was experienced by fixed component "Hi-Fi" audio products. The quality of mobile music was poor but it was convenient and convenience translated into consumption and consumption translated into quality improvement and eventually the evaporation of usage of the traditional category.
Now consider how ad dollars are getting spent. The following chart shows the eMarketer forecast for ad spending mix across different media in the US.
It would appear that the "Mobile" media is competing effectively against the other media types, especially the non-Mobile digital (i.e. PC-based experiences).
However, if we look at the absolute spending forecast the picture shows that Mobile is responsible for most of the growth in the overall spending.
In other words, Mobile is creating new consumption of ad spending. If the forecast is correct, it suggests that if Mobile was not an option, ad spending would probably remain flat.
Mobile is capturing all the growth but it's also the creator of this growth. The reason for this is that people are consuming mobile (i.e. looking at their device screens) more without necessarily looking at other media much less. Mobile is effectively creating consumption and therefore competing effectively against non-consumption.
Nielsen data backs this up by also citing that user "app time" on devices increased from 18 hours and 18 minutes per month in late 2011 to 30 hours and 15 minutes in late 2013.
That's a lot of screen time which results in a lot more "inventory" of valuable ad space becoming available. Of course the ad buyers will buy the inventory. The value it provides is clear and they will increase their budgets to accommodate it. ((Note that the PC does suffer a decline in ad spending but it's not nearly as much ($8.5 billion drop) as Mobile's gain ($54 billion gain) ))
Note that mobile phone makers did not set out to punish newsprint manufacturers. They did not set out to cause suffering for Canon or Nikon. They did not build devices to crush JVC and Pioneer or the myriad of music, photo, and print industry participants. They just wanted to make better phones.
Because they focused on a job to be done that was not done well by alternative products they created consumption. They then used that additional consumption to expand into obvious adjacent use cases. The result was disruptive.
There was no escape for the incumbents. The approach of making a camera into a phone would be doomed as would making an amplifier into an iPod. The outside entrant approach was the only way to "pivot" if such a pivot was even thought desirable.
This is why non-consumption is such a difficult competitor to those in the business of serving consumers and a pushover for those in the business of doing something else altogether.
Building a successful business is hard. Many try, few succeed and those that do tend not to thrive for long. So success in business it should be respected. Especially in highly competitive industries like technology. The fragility of success however should also give one pause to think about how delicate a business model is.
The presumption that companies can shift business models at will is usually false. Businesses are balanced on a knife's edge of dependency on multiple variables. Almost all resources are expended on preserving this balance.
This being my observation, I take issue with assumptions that large companies can "pivot" on a dime or that they can change their business models "when conditions are right". Consider Microsoft's dilemma. They have all the resources in the world and yet they could not pivot to take advantage of a change so mundane as a low power microprocessor (which enabled a mobile computer and hence a new ecosystem and profit model for software.)
Or consider the dilemma of Apple which after building a successful computer business which included system software, could not pivot to license that system software so others could build computers with it.
Or consider the dilemma of Nokia which had an early and large leadership in smartphones including having its own OS and platform and large volumes and users bases. It could not pivot to allow into an ecosystem and had all its advantages disappear.
Each company thought they could manage change but none of them actually did.
It's with this thinking about inertial navigation that came to consider the idea that Amazon has a flexible business model which, though unprofitable today, will be profitable some day.
The premise that Amazon can, on a whim, change its business model from selling other people's products at a razor thin margin while investing in capital-intensive distribution to selling other people's products at a large margin while not investing in capital-intesive distribution is not credible.
I would argue that Amazon's existing business model is a direct consequence of the market it's in: that it could not be anything else given the circumstances it finds itself in. Enlightenment may be an illusion.[*]
That's not to say that there is no wisdom in the management of Amazon. Quite the contrary; recall the respect that's called for in creating a great business. Managing the business to this point was a work of decades of vision and creativity.
What I take issue with is the premise that Amazon is the "anti-Apple" in its hunger for growth and patience for profits. Apple has its own "Amazon-like-business": iTunes has been growing at a steady 25% or more and it also has its ancillary zero-profit hardware analogue to the Kindle called Apple TV. iTunes is a great business in the Amazon vein, harvesting hundreds of millions of users (and their credit cards.) Presumably iTunes could also some day "flip the switch" and become profitable, but something magical needs to happen. Something like becoming a payments processor or retailer of other things. Analyst beware however. There might be conditions that make such switch flipping extremely difficult.
At an even deeper level, Apple and Amazon are much more alike than they are different. They are both hired for similar jobs (convenience, ease of use and a controlled, predictable environment for average users interacting with technology). They both focus on delighting customers and controlling all the variables which come into contact with that delight. They both have long-term views and are driven by vision rather than competition.
Where they differ is in others' perception of sustainability. Whereas Apple is perpetually given an expected lifespan of less than a decade, Amazon is expected to have an indefinite lifespan. This is because Amazon is seen as having no competition and Apple is seen as having infinite competition. In other words, Amazon is perceived as a monopoly and Apple is perceived as the innovator that is in a permanent state of being disrupted by the low end.
I disagree with both assumptions. I've always thought Apple fragile but dedicated to moving into new markets as older markets are disrupted. It's a tough strategy and one which (literally) nobody believes possible. But I've also thought Amazon's monopoly status fragile. This too is not a popular idea but the company depends on many variables.
Retail is hard and it is being disrupted by technology wielded well by Amazon. But it's also subject to further disruption. Amazon's job to be done can be done by alternatives. Buyers are typically hiring Amazon for convenience, not just price and ease of use is where the value is. But again, new information technology which makes shopping, discovery and delivery of products directly from the vendor, bypassing the aggregator (i.e. retailer) could shift value along the value chain yet again.
By the time Amazon reaches some point of monopoly in distribution it could be too late to make the switch to profit generation.
I don't want to suggest that failure is inevitable, but I want to point out that success is not certain by any means. Disruption happens.
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* It's possible that Enlightenment is also an illusion at Apple. Even if they once had it, there are forces which act on companies that make them lose their wisdom.
RIM shipped 10.6 million Blackberries and 200,000 PlayBooks in the last quarter. Management noted that their sell-through was significantly higher for Blackberry (13.7 million) but seems to be very weak for PlayBook as the prior quarter saw 500k units shipped. Additional PlayBook units this quarter probably mostly went into new channels in Asia and there were no additional sales into North America or Europe.
The figures for units are very poor. How poor depends on the frame of reference. Consider the shipment chart below:
In terms of the competition, 10.6 million units is less than half what Apple or Samsung sold in its prior quarter. It's also less than what HTC sold. RIM's volume rank will likely go to fifth place as a smartphone vendor.
In terms of its performance relative to its own history, the Blackberry volume dropped by 11% year-on-year and 18% sequentially. This is the second quarter that shipments shrank.
In terms of market share, we'll have to wait for the competitor data over the next six weeks but the market has been growing at an average of 77% for four quarters so any continuation of this trend would imply RIM's share dropping to single digits.
Finally, the biggest shock has been the decline in profitability. It seems that operating margin dropped from 21% to 13%. The company did incur some one-time charges for recent layoffs, but even without that charge, the margins would be around 16%. This is most alarming. The reason for such drops is that as volumes decrease fixed costs don't decrease as rapidly or at all. The company still needs to keep sales, administration and engineering staff around and they become a larger part of the operating expenses (vs. the component costs which vary with volume of goods sold).
This effect is well understood by financial analysts and the stock price shows it with a huge drop.
But stepping back to look at the picture above, there is a clear turning point in the company. You can see the elbow in the curve for volumes whose effect is felt so deeply. What's curious is why the pivot occurred when it did. We can point the finger to competition as the cause. But why was there no effect in the company's fortunes when the competition actually emerged. It's been years since the iPhone and even Android entered the market. Yet we see an impact on Nokia and RIM individually at apparently arbitrary points of time.
This is the lament of the analyst: you can clearly and accurately state what will happen but when remains a mystery. It's the elasticity between obvious causes and their effects that makes this an inexact science or not a science at all. In retrospect, you can say that Nokia's pivot was triggered by its public execution of Symbian, but that assumes that it was preventable--which we know is not the case. But what caused RIM's change of growth, exactly? Why did it happen this past spring? Why didn't the company volumes begin to decline as iPhone and Android boomed in 2009 or 2010? For quite some time RIM seemed immune to competitive pressure. We all were made fools as we called its imminent demise. Then, as Steve Jobs would say, boom!
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Footnote:
Piecing together RIM's performance is becoming more difficult each quarter. The data being presented is increasingly obfuscated by irrelevant detail while major information is omitted. This last management presentation was full of holes, namely:
We have no idea of device pricing. Valiant efforts have to be made to piece together that aspect of the business. Matt Richman does a good job but it still requires some guesswork regarding PlayBook pricing to back out Blackberry pricing.
Management detailed where Blackberries were selling-out but only detailed sell-in for the PlayBook. Obvious spin.
They are cherry picking the data they present and each quarter it's a different story making pattern recognition impossible.
This leads to an erosion of trust. Observers are faced with the problem of increasingly guessing what is happening each quarter. For instance, regarding pricing I prefer to include service revenues in the analysis of device sales because device+service is what is being bought by the user and vendors which can offer services as part of the device get a justifiably higher value for the product--value that I think needs to be considered as advantageous. Nokia and Apple also account for services (though not apps) as part of device sales and it makes it more convenient to compare these businesses.
Given RIM's smokescreen, this quarter I decided to stop trying to guess Blackberry pricing and used Operating Income/Units sold as the average selling price.
