shareholder

Google's acquisition of Motorola is clearly designed to be an acquisition of Intellectual Property rather than an entry of Google into the phone business, but the impact on the business will be felt in many ways.

It is surely going to send some Android vendors scrambling. The situation is not without precedent however. The history of governance and ownership of Symbian shows how the licensing of platforms by licensor competitors leads to unintended consequences.

Symbian was formed to be governed in a way very similar to the original Android via the Open Handset Alliance. The company was owned by a consortium of phone vendors.[1] The shares were not equally distributed however with Nokia holding a larger share (though not a majority).

Although nominally involved in decision making, the smaller shareholders never felt entirely comfortable with the arrangement and over time some sold their shares and left the group even though they continued to license the OS.

Eventually Nokia ended up acquiring the company outright and open sourced the code. However, by then the product was obsolete and the only licensee was Nokia itself.

The lesson (and warning) was that a licensor that is also a licensee makes other licensees uncomfortable. The supplier is also a competitor. This is classic channel conflict and never ends well.

Open or not, with or without equity, these arrangements are always unworkable.

So Google's promise that

"This acquisition will not change our commitment to run Android as an open platform. Motorola will remain a licensee of Android and Android will remain open. We will run Motorola as a separate business. Many hardware partners have contributed to Android’s success and we look forward to continuing to work with all of them to deliver outstanding user experiences."

seems naive at best.

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Notes:

1. Before its outright purchase by Nokia in December 2008, Symbian Ltd. was owned by Nokia (56.3%), Ericsson (15.6%), Sony Ericsson (13.1%), Matsushita (10.5%), and Samsung (4.5%). The company's founder shareholders were Psion, Nokia, Ericsson, Panasonic/ Matsushita and Motorola. Motorola sold its stake in the company to Psion and Nokia in September 2003. Psion's stake was bought by Nokia, Matsushita, Siemens AG and Sony Ericsson in July 2004.

Yesterday I wrote about the growth in Android vs. iOS. The two platforms' can be said to be enjoying healthy growth, though in markedly different patterns.

The consequences of this growth are being felt across the telecom and computing industries. There are almost 300 million platform devices in use today that were not even dreamed of three years ago. Operators are transporting petabytes more data and dozens of phone vendors are scrambling to meet demand. There are tens of billions of app downloads and hundreds of thousands of apps being sold by tens of thousands of new app publishers. There is a lot of hay being made while the sun shines.

But what about the poor saps that are funding the development? What about the shareholders of the companies behind these platforms. Are they being rewarded or punished?

The following charts tell the story:

I took the platform growth data published yesterday and overlaid it on the share price data (source: Google finance). Each plot begins at the point in time when the respective platform was available in the market and ends today. There are two vertical axes: the left side axis shows "activations" or units sold and corresponds to the thick blue line; the right side axis shows share price and corresponds to the area chart. Overall date range and growth in share price is shown in the upper left corner.

What can we interpret from this superimposition?

1. Both Apple and Google shareholders saw share price appreciation during the two platforms' histories. Apple shareholders benefited more (+172% vs. +41%)
2. Apple's share price appreciation seems highly correlated to iOS growth but Google's doesn't. Google share price had dramatic growth during 2009 while Android was moribund and was flat to down during 2010 when Android growth was explosive.
3. We can also interpret the difference as Google's fortunes being far less dependent on mobile platforms than Apple's. Google has been subject to selling pressure this year due to corroding cost structures irrespective to platforms growth. Conversely, Google may not benefit from mobile computing as handsomely as Apple.

Correlation is not causation and clearly there are many factors at work in share price changes but I think it's fair to say that Apple is obtaining fuel for growth with iOS while Google is in a more precarious situation with mobility--partly benefiting but partly threatened. The market behaves in bizarre ways in the short term but in the long term one can see logic and reason.

One of the most hotly debated subjects in the mobile phone business is the importance of market share. It's also a topic of lore in the PC industry. Briefly the two arguments are:

• Market share matters more because it drives network effects which ultimately drive competition out of the market, creating the opportunity for monopoly rents.
• Profit share matters more because profit is the only fuel that can drive innovation. Any macro downturn or shift in strategy can cause a company to cease investing in unprofitable projects.

The old disruptor's adage: "Be hungry for profits and patient for growth" is challenged by the equally disruptive: "Grow share with lower prices in exchange for new revenue sources."

There are many rich anecdotes to support each strategy, but how about some data? Fortunately we have some: the market and profit shares for vendors covering 80% of the world's largest technology market over a three year period. The vendors are a good proxy for the market, the time frame is long enough to cover seasonality and anomalies and the market is very big (over 1.2 billion devices) and very broad (world-wide).

The only question is how to measure success. One measure is how various strategies benefit the asset owners, i.e. the share holders. Benefit to society, employees and consumers are very difficult to measure. But share holder benefit is easily obtained by measuring change in share prices.

So, here are two charts:

1. The percent change in market share vs. percent change in share price for the top mobile phone vendors.
2. The percent change in profit share vs. percent change in share price for the same vendors. (see note 1 for time frame discussion).

I showed the R-squared value of the correlations. (See note 2 regarding LG and Samsung). At r-squared of 0.36 share price is not well correlated to market share while at 0.76 it is rather well correlated to profit share. To a financial analyst this would seem obvious. After all, share price reflects the present value of future cash flows which are clearly coupled to profit and hence to profit share growth. However, as many technology observers would point out, market share determined the success of Microsoft and Google, and to some degree Nokia.

High market share can cause competitors to be starved of components or ecosystem developers. At the same time, high profit share can cause competitors to be starved of capital.

What does this analysis add to the argument? Note that this data covers a hardware business. Is hardware relevant? It does not scale as rapidly and has a short shelf life. It's also notoriously difficult to distribute. However, outside of the service revenues for cellular voice and data, device hardware is the only pool of money that has any material dimension in the industry. It's also the pool of money with the highest margin in the industry. For the time being and the foreseeable future, hardware is the only business model worth anything in mobile computing.

The data shows that in this particular but substantial market profit share is closely correlated to shareholder value creation. It also shows that profit loss is closely correlated with shareholder destruction. The dominant data comes from Apple and Nokia, which appear to be polar opposites in performance on both measures.

In other articles I've shown how profits have shifted from incumbents to entrants in the smartphone disruption. This shift has resulted in direct benefit and loss to the owners of the two asset classes. To suggest that market share alone is a determinant of "success" in the device market must exclude the effect on shareholders and, ultimately, the management and employees of the companies concerned. The virtuous/vicious cycles will be fed by the profit variable more than any other.

I don't think the market share argument holds water in this market and this data supports my belief. It may be that as value shifts over time away from hardware the benefit will shift as well, but business models alternatives to hardware have not emerged after ten years of experimentation. If anything, the idea of selling hardware as a way of capturing service revenue was pioneered by RIM and perfected by Apple. Nothing I've seen so far is challenging this model. Whoever attempts to siphon the device pool of money (which has remained fairly constant over the smartphone disruption) needs to solve system-wide problems like the dependence on the network and the life-cycle of portable electronics.

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Notes:

1. The dates when performance was sampled are are July 1 2007 to July 1 2010. The latest quarter (3Q10) has not been included in this data as it has not been fully reported. The data will be updated with the latest quarter as soon as it's possible.
2. For many competitors the share price is dependent on more than performance in the mobile phone market. In particular, LG, Samsung, Motorola and Apple have diversified product lines which affect their share prices. Two of those companies (LG and Samsung) are conglomerates and their share performance is dominated by businesses other than mobile so I did not include their data in the correlation measure (though their place on the chart is shown). Motorola and Apple's stock prices were, to a very large extent, driven by their mobile phone performance over the same period so their data is included in the correlation analysis. The other vendors have been primarily focused on mobile phones.

The mobile phone market is intertwined with the telecommunications industry which is vast and there are numerous competitors which are much more dynamic and better capitalized than the moribund PC or music player vendors. It’s also a regulated and fragmented global market with 1.2 billion units and 5 billion consumers—far greater than any of the markets Apple played in for its first 30 years.

Nevertheless, the iPhone has had a huge impact on the industry. To show just how much of an impact, I dove in and pulled over 500 data points on three years’ financial performance of seven competitors responsible for 80 percent of units being shipped today. The time frame covers the iPhone’s participation in the market so it allows for “before-and-after” comparisons.

I divided the findings into five articles:

1. Unit Volumes. The evolution of market share.
2. Revenues. The shift in where dollars are spent.
3. Selling prices. The tale of ASP erosion.
4. Operating margin. Profitability ratios over time.

Now I turn my attention to draw a bottom line from all the data above, namely the operating earnings (EBIT or Earnings before Interest and Taxation).

The first chart shows the EBIT from the top seven vendors of mobile phones since the quarter when the iPhone launched. I annotated Nokia and Apple's bars to give perspective.

The total available profits in the industry dipped to a bit under $4 billion at the trough of the recession, and have recovered to nearly $6 billion in the holiday quarter last year. However, not all vendors are profitable. As you might expect from looking at the operating margins, Motorola and Sony Ericsson have been generating losses for most of this time period. They have both reached profitability in the last quarter, though at very low levels and after having lost a large part of their sales. LG has turned negative this past quarter after being a modest earner for some time. Samsung has maintained a fairly even consistency in its profit capture, though with its expanding market share, it seems to have come at the cost of pricing.

Finally, looking at the pure smartphone vendors RIM and Apple, the picture is nothing short of astonishing. This before-and-after share-of-available-profit chart shows that the two entrants went from about 7% profit share to 65% in three years.

Apple in particular is capturing about half of the available profits with three percent of the units. It dwarfs all the other vendors, more than double the nearest (Nokia). All that in three years and with the added burdens of only three models, a recession and limited distribution.

What does it all mean?

Here are my conclusions, enumerated:

1. The lack of a real response. The recurring theme in this series of articles has been that giant multinational incumbents in a vast and rapidly growing industry, enjoying all the advantages that size and incumbency, have had their profits taken from them. And they don't seem to have put up much of a fight.
2. It's all wealth transfer. Note the total amount of profit available has not increased markedly; this is not about incumbents growing the pie. Two thirds of what should have rightly been theirs moved from the incumbent shareholders to the entrant shareholders.
3. Speed. This shift of profit occurred over an unprecedentedly short period of time.  Three years is no more than two product cycles in the industry and it's an order of magnitude faster than what happened historically to other industries.
4. Disruption is the diagnosis here. The incumbents were caught in the headlights. Disruptive innovation leads to asymmetric competition and this is what we just witnessed. History has shown that the shift of profits is usually the last stage of disruption and is usually irreversible because the change in business models cannot happen at the rate of change of profit transfer.

Which leads me to one final point.

When analyzing the potential for challengers to the new winners, the most cited is Android. Can Android affect this redistribution of profit once again? And to whom?

If Android is to become the dominant platform, does it depend on the success of its licensees? Who are these licensees and what are the chances that they will be able to align their businesses to what Android offers (a new revenue model based on services and advertising).

One problem I see is that Google is making a bet on those same vendors who are now squeezed in the middle of that last pie chart: Samsung, LG, Motorola and Sony Ericsson. Nokia, Apple and RIM will certainly not take the OS over what they already have as it dilutes their differentiation and margins. That means Android is aligned with the biggest losers in the industry.

So how likely are these disrupted ex-giants to recover and take Android forward? My bet: slim to none. Android does not offer more than a lifeline. It is not a foundation for long-term profitability as it presumes the profits accrue to the network and possibly to Google. Profit evaporation out of devices to Google may be a possibility at some time in the future, but only if the devices don't need too much attention to remain competitive. But because they're still not good enough (and they won't be for years to come), it's certain that attention to detail is what will be most important to stay abreast of Apple.[1]

So here we have the real challenge to Android:  partnership with defeated incumbents whose ability to build profitable and differentiated products is hamstrung by the licensing model and whose incentives to move up the steep trajectory of necessary improvements are limited.

In other words, Android's licensees won't have the profits or the motivation to spend on R&D so as to make exceptionally competitive products at a time when being competitive is what matters most.

[1]: I would argue the same lack of symmetry with licensed software vendor Microsoft is what led the the failure of the same incumbents to make a dent in the industry with Windows Mobile [2003 to 2010].