Verizon

Microsoft's new "strategic partnership" with Nokia is not its first. For a decade the software company has courted and consummated relationships with a variety of companies in mobile and telecom. Here are the ones I can remember:

• LG. In February 2009 Microsoft Corp. signed a multiyear agreement for Windows Mobile to be included on devices from LG Electronics Inc. LG would use Windows Mobile as its "primary platform" for smartphones and produce about 50 models running the software.

What happened? LG made a few Windows Mobile devices but with WinMo uncompetitive, they abandoned the platform and moved to Android losing years of market presence and all their profits.

• Motorola. In September 2003, Motorola  and Microsoft announced an alliance. "Starting with the introduction of the new Motorola MPx200 mobile phone with Microsoft Windows Mobile software, the companies will collaborate on a series of Smartphone and Pocket PC wireless devices designed to create a virtual "remote control" for the Web-centric, work-centric, always-on-the-go mobile professional." In addition, the alliance includes cooperation on joint marketing and wireless developer programs.

What happened? Motorola launched a series of Windows Mobile phones culminating in the Motorola Q "Blackberry killer". As Motorola hit the rocks in profitability new management reached for the Android liferaft. The company now relies exclusively on the Droid franchise.

• Palm. In September 2005 Palm and Microsoft announced a strategic alliance to "accelerate the Smartphone market segment with a new device for mobile professionals and businesses. Palm has licensed the Microsoft Windows Mobile operating system for an expanded line of Treo Smartphones, the first of which will be available on Verizon Wireless’ national wireless broadband network."

What happened? Palm shipped a few Windows Mobile, famously dismissing Apple's potential entry as something "PC guys" could never achieve. A new CEO, a private placement and an acquisition later the company is a division of HP making its own operating system.

• Nortel. When Steve Ballmer was famously laughing at the iPhone and saying that he likes the Windows Mobile strategy "a lot" he was sitting next to the then-CEO of Nortel (Mike Zafirovski formerly of Motorola) with whom the company had just closed a strategic deal.  "an alliance between Microsoft and Nortel announced in July 2006 ...  includes three new joint solutions to dramatically improve business communications by breaking down the barriers between voice, e-mail, instant messaging, multimedia conferencing and other forms of communication".

What happened? Nortel declared bankruptcy two years later.

• Verizon. In January 2009 "Verizon Wireless has selected Microsoft Corp. to provide portal, local and Internet search as well as mobile advertising services to customers on its devices. The five-year agreement will go into effect in the first half of 2009 when Microsoft Live Search is targeted to be available on new Verizon Wireless feature phones and smartphones." The deal would ensure Bing distribution to all of Verizon's smartphone customers.

What happened? Bing did ship on some devices but in October 2009 Droid came to Verizon.

• Ericsson. In September 2000, "Ericsson and Microsoft Corp. today launched Ericsson Microsoft Mobile Venture AB. This previously announced joint company will drive the mobile Internet by developing and marketing mobile e-mail solutions for operators. The first solutions are expected to be on the market by the end of the year. The company is part of a broader strategic alliance between Ericsson and Microsoft"

What happened? Ericsson divested itself of the mobile division forming a joint venture which would go on and make more strategic alliances with Microsoft over Windows Mobile culminating in a loss of profits and eventual flight to Android.

• Sendo. In February 2001, Microsoft announced a partnership, in which Microsoft bought $12m of Sendo shares and a seat on the board. Sendo was to be Microsoft's "go to market partner" for the Stinger smartphone platform that would become Smartphone 2002.

What happened? Sendo after litigating IP issues with Microsoft went bankrupt in 2005.

And finally,

• Nokia. No, not this OS deal, but in August 2009 "The worldwide leader in software and the world’s largest smartphone manufacturer have entered into an alliance that is set to deliver a groundbreaking, enterprise-grade solution for mobile productivity. Today, Microsoft Business Division President Stephen Elop and Nokia’s Executive Vice President for Devices Kai Öistämö announced the agreement, outlining a shared vision for the future of mobile productivity. This is the first time that either company has embarked on an alliance of this scope and nature."

The plan was to bring "Microsoft Office Mobile and Microsoft business communications, collaboration and device management software to Nokia’s Symbian devices."

What happened? One and a half years later the same Stephen Elop announced that Symbian will be deprecated.

A month ago I wrote an exposé on the problems I felt Verizon was facing with their smartphone strategy: Verizon Strikes Out in Smartphones [Updated]

Given new information on subscriber growth and the relationship between Verizon and Apple, it's time to look back and assess how the conclusions are standing up.

The conclusions I drew were that Verizon had three strikes against them:

1. The iPhone has stolen their growth
2. They are facing the prospect of a single OS platform supplier
3. Android is not competitive vs. iOS

Did iPhone really hurt Verizon?

I pointed out that based on retail sampling data from ITG and what we know from AT&T own sales data, that iPhone at AT&T was outselling Android at Verizon by a ratio of 2.5 to 1.

The latest comScore data closely matches the assumed units of Android shipped by Verizon. Here's why: The comScore data shows the number of active users of each platform. So, for example, as the number of Android users at Verizon grew, it follows that the new users had to buy new Android phones. However, you can also sell more phones than just those for new users. Some phones are going to go to replace those of existing users.

When it comes to Android however, all the Verizon Android devices are pretty new, having been purchased less than a year ago. Replacements would only be sold for damaged or lost devices not covered by warranty.

So from comScore the change in subs at Verizon comes out to about 2.2 million and my original estimate was about 2 million. That's pretty close.

On the other hand, if you look at the chart, you'll notice that the number of iPhone users at AT&T grew by a similar amount (about 2 million). However, AT&T activated over 5 million. That means that about 3 million devices were upgrades. This makes a lot of sense since we know that iPhone is the bulk of AT&T smartphone users.

This is highly supportive evidence that iPhone at AT&T did indeed outsell Verizon Android by at least a factor of 2. Each of those phones came with a 2 year lock-in so indeed AT&T did manage to "steal" growth from Verizon.

Another data point in support of this conclusion was provided by Turley Muller in a comment.  AT&T smartphones make up a significantly higher proportion of contract subs at 44% vs Verizon at 23%. Effectively, as a result of their sweetheart deal with Apple, AT&T got double the penetration of smartphones than Verizon since these devices are targeted only to contract subscribers. Those are high ARPU customers that either moved from regular voice plans or switched from other carriers.

So far, the first conclusion seems to be holding up pretty well.

Was Android a strategic constraint to Verizon?

Verizon revealed that they had been negotiating with Apple at least since 2008 and that they were testing the phone for a year. This is not as big a surprise as it may seem. Deals of this kind easily gestate for years. The commitment may not be made until the last minute.

Nevertheless, my point was about the fact that Android was making up to 75% of Verizon's smartphone volume in Q3. This might be a strategic constraint. But "so what?" you may say: AT&T's dependance on iPhone was even greater.

That's precisely my point though. As we've seen with the shift by Apple to multi-carrier distribution, AT&T is now facing serious constraints on growth and the share price is suffering. Although Verizon did not deal with Google as a direct supplier, they were at risk of having much of the IP on their network at least orchestrated by a company that was not always aligned with their strategic goals. Much the same predicament AT&T is facing now.

The tale of AT&T and iPhone does lend support to the premise that Verizon felt a bit too constrained by Android hegemony on its network.

Is Android Competitive with iOS?

This last point was supported by the data showing a widening higher sell-through rate for iOS vs. Android on comparable addressable markets. Although the data has been confirmed with survey data, there are issues with this interpretation. First, because the addressable base for iPhone is higher at AT&T with the post-paid contracts being more popular there, iPhone had an easier time getting sold. Second, because 3/5 of the phones were upgrades.

The jury is still out but the apparent pent-up demand (admittedly anecdotal) for iPhone on Verizon does seem to show that given similar pricing, and a similar demographic/geographic addressable market, people do prefer the iPhone.

The following chart uses comScore data to show the relative consumption of Android vs. iOS by the subscribers of the four major US operators. I modified an original chart published by Silicon Alley Insider.

A few observations:

• As of November, the ratio of iOS to Android users was more than 15 to 1 at AT&T.
• iOS at AT&T has twice the users as Android at Verizon
• Although T-Mobile had the Android franchise to itself for all of 2009, it was overtaken by Verizon within four months
• T-Mobile Android consumption has also been nearly matched by Sprint within a year

The rapid eclipse of T-Mobile smartphone penetration makes one wonder how effective Android is as a differentiator for carrier and device vendor alike. It also explains their new pricing model.

The data also gives clues to how iOS at Verizon will grow.

Since Verizon and AT&T have nearly the same number of subscribers, excluding RIM ,which is common to both, AT&T has a far larger penetration of smartphones (16.5 million vs. 7 million.) Is the cause iOS itself or the delay with the timing of Android launch at Verizon?

Other data from comScore shows that much of the gains for Android at Verizon have been at the cost of RIM, so Android has not been entirely additive. Will there be a similar platform switching going on or will iOS be additive to the Android base?

On one hand, the potential exists for a similar number of touch smartphone users at Verizon as at AT&T (15 million as of November). On the other, Verizon is "half-penetrated" with Android. How many will switch (as they did with RIM) and how many will be new users?

I'm not going to make any predictions yet but I would not be surprised if Android at Verizon will flatline if not drop while iOS at Verizon will jump quickly to make the sum of both equal to AT&T iOS in about twelve months. That would imply about 10 million new Verizon iOS users by 2012.

If Verizon users start to switch from Android to iOS, iOS could add as much as 15 million users. It seems that 10 to 13 is a reasonable estimate.

Chief Executive Philipp Humm said in an interview that many of his smartphones will eventually be made up of Google-powered phones costing less than $100, half as much as the smartphones typically available at U.S. carriers. In October, to lower the cost of monthly bills, Mr. Humm introduced a limited data plan that costs $10.

via T-Mobile Smartphones to Head Down Market - WSJ.com.

T-Mobile seems to be attempting to differentiate on price. In a regular market reaching saturation that might be a viable strategy. However the market is neither regular not saturated. T-Mobile's chances of gaining large share are limited.

Churn, or the chance that a user will switch networks is still very low. If anything, AT&T and Verizon are more sticky and lose fewer customers than T-Mobile and Sprint.

Mobile computing saturation (25% to 30% penetration) is also not nearly at a point where competition on price leads adoption.

Lastly, the $100 price point is being put against the standard $200 price point which itself is an illusion for the user. The drop in smartphone entry price is not as powerful going from $200 to $100 as it is from $300 to $200. Psychologically, $200 is an inflection point. Apple's $100 3GS pricing (now $49) is defensive and probably effective.

In short, the market for telecom services is not very "liquid" and users are quite trapped in their carrier contracts, pricing is not yet a basis for competition and pricing illusions persist.

In conclusion:

Mr. Humm, in an interview at the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas, acknowledged that the likelihood Verizon Wireless getting the iPhone as well could affect his subscriber numbers.

[Updated]

[ITG sent an explanation of their methodology and there is no indication that the data represents inside information.]

ITG Investment Research analyst Matthew Goodman is forecasting monthly sales record for all of Verizon's devices "based largely on our proprietary daily point-of-sale data from thousands of independent wireless retailers across the US."

Assuming the data is accurate, we are going to dive into it but I will state up-front that without confirmation, the conclusions below should be taken with a grain of salt. All statements should be read with a preceding "if the data is accurate..."

So, if the data is accurate, here is what I conclude [1]:

Verizon Has three strikes against them:

1. The iPhone has stolen their growth
2. They are facing the prospect of a single OS platform supplier
3. Android is not competitive vs. iOS

The iPhone has stolen Verizon's growth

The chart below shows the performance of all of Verizon's smartphones vs. the iPhone at AT&T. The area chart shows how Verizon's volumes grew from 2.7 million in Q1 to 3.3 million in Q3. Not a bad story in itself. However, the iPhone at AT&T went from 2.7 million to 5.3 million in the same time frame. Relative to just the iPhone, Verizon has been underperforming over the last quarter.

Those additional 2.4 million iPhone/AT&T activations in Q3 could be due to replacements but the same could be said for Verizon's volumes. The fact remains that iPhone alone is nearly twice the volume of all of Verizon's smartphone activations.

Just to be clear, this is a direct, apples-to-apples comparison. AT&T and Verizon smartphone performance figures are highly comparable. The two operators are highly representative of the US market. AT&T and Verizon Wireless raked in 75% of all mobile data revenue in Q2 of 2010 and account for 62% of the U.S. wireless customer base.

In addition, Verizon enjoys a larger customer base (has 92.1 million subs vs. AT&T's 90.1 million.)  Over the time frame of the data the overall market did not increase dramatically therefore the conclusion that AT&T's win is Verizon's loss is plausible.

I used quarterly data so that iPhone at AT&T could be compared. But if we look at monthly data, the story gets worse:

These are absolute volume figures. You can see how RIM's fade was replaced to some degree by new vendors. However, growth hit a wall in August. Following widespread iPhone 4 availability, sales dropped. Coincidence? Perhaps, but the drop happened even with the addition of Samsung volumes.

That's strike one.

Verizon is facing diminished degrees of strategic freedom

The other notable is that even though Verizon doubled the number of vendors selling smartphones, it seems they are growing their smartphone base slower than the overall market.

Consider each vendor's share is shown below:

From three vendors to six. Shares are roughly evenly split (except for Palm) but none of these vendors are able to drive volume growth.

Consider that Motorola Droid is outselling RIM. This should be rightly noted as amazing. It plainly shows the power of Android. However that power is not something Verizon will benefit from. Quite the opposite.

Consider the share map by units and share of each OS:

Android (and WM, though that's likely to be a very tiny part of the green area) made up 75% of all smartphones sold in October. It's possible that the share could grow to 90% as RIM continues to fade.

For Verizon this would be a serious problem. Although Verizon used to have a disproportionate share of RIM's products, that OS was not enabling an ecosystem like Google's. It was a product narrowly defined around messaging. Verizon is facing the prospect of a single OS supplier who may or may not maintain alignment with Verizon's core profit algorithm. If they diverge, Verizon's bargaining power will be strictly limited.

Strike two against Verizon.

Android is barely enough to keep the battle with AT&T from becoming a rout.

In an apples-to-apples comparison, in Q3 the iPhone at AT&T outsold Android at Verizon (remember, same addressable market) by a factor of 2.5. This is with a variety of devices and vendors thrown in the market. We hardly ever get to see this finely grained a comparison when looking at platforms.

I wrote this up as a lack of competitiveness. It may seem provocative, but I define competitiveness narrowly: the competition is for a purchase decision on equal terms. These purchase decisions are fiendishly complex to predict, but the data speaks: whether it's due to brand, visibility or performance and in spite of "antennagate" the iPhone is cleaning up.

That's strike three.

The devil they know

By 2009, Verizon was probably optimistic that they could head off AT&T (and Apple) at the pass. With the vast array of vendor Android roadmaps laid out in front of them they saw a way to stem the flood of defections. I think that optimism dissipated sometime this year and was replaced by a more dreadful prospect than what iPhone presented in 2007.

It is perhaps coincidental that the rumors of a Verizon deal with Apple seem to have started in earnest right after August. It's thin, circumstantial evidence, but the only evidence we have to corroborate the data above is that Verizon has been signaling more desperation.

Reading further into the data, I would say Verizon faced these problems and decided that they had to throw in the towel. Apple may be the devil, but so could be Google. Apple was predictably evil. But Google? The devil you know is perhaps better than the one you can't predict.

What's more, the devil Apple seems to be helping your worst enemy way too much and the unpredictable one does not seem to help all that much.

Final question: how many iPhones will Verizon sell

I think this data shows that Verizon has another reason to sell the iPhone. The underperformance of their smartphone franchise is not the only determinant, but it is perhaps another straw on the camel's back.

What would happen if (or more likely when) Verizon sells the iPhone? I believe they will sell them at the same rate as AT&T does.

The data shows that Verizon sold, on average, about 3 million smartphones per quarter during the first nine months. That's about 1 million a month. That was based on three platforms, six vendors and widespread promotion.

The iPhone sold almost 4 million a quarter over the same time period.

Verizon users bought smartphones at a lower rate than AT&T users bought iPhones. This is even though the two carriers have approximately the same subs base which churns very slowly. Since a mass-market product will appeal equally to statistically equivalent populations the product should be taken-up with similar vigor.

So the question is not whether Verizon can sell iPhones at the rate of 4 million a quarter. The question is only whether these 4 million will be in addition to the 3 million that are currently buying non-iPhones.

My guess is that the 3 million run rate for non-iPhones will drop, but not to zero.

The impact on the other vendors supplying Verizon may be strongly negative depending on the level of promotion Verizon puts on the product. That promotion budget is usually fixed as a percent of sales. What Verizon applies to iPhone will be taken out of what is spends on Droid. I have always said that operators will be motivated to balance their supplier power. The promotion budget is the primary instrument to meet that end.

On the other hand, the overall market will grow so 2010's 3 million/Q will be 2011's 6 million/Q. There is plenty of room for multiple platforms.

So my conclusion remains that iPhone will find at least 8 million new users with Verizon. The analysis above give me confidence to increase the upper bound to possibly 12 million.

Verizon striking out means they need to change the way they play. The iPhone is a new ball game.

------

[1] To assemble this discussion I used only the data provided in the article linked above and the officially published iPhone activation numbers from AT&T. Obtaining specific smartphone vendor volumes is a matter of reverse engineering the share chart and cross-referencing it to the table of vendor sales.

James Allworth, a Fellow at the Forum for Growth and Innovation at Harvard Business School writes:

Baidu,... has taken an even bolder approach. It's reportedly in negotiations with a number of smartphone manufacturers to remove all references to Google, and replace them with Baidu.

... Microsoft recently negotiated with Verizon that some of the Android phones that ship to Verizon customers will have Microsoft's Bing, not Google, as the default search engine. And the manufacturers are getting in on the act too: Motorola recently released a new phone, the Citrus, based on Android, but shipping with Bing.

Yes, it's Google's operating system. In both these instances, it counts as a "win" in the handset volume war against Apple, Microsoft, Nokia and RIM. But Google will not make a cent on this handset, despite having enabled its creation with Android. All the search revenue will flow to Microsoft.

via Did Google Arm Its Own Enemies With Android? - James Allworth - The Conversation - Harvard Business Review.

Readers of this blog might find these arguments familiar.

Since February this year, I wrote four articles under the headline "Google vs. Android" documenting these contradictions in Google's strategy. There have been numerous other opinion pieces that described how Google's approach was not consistent with an innovation-based disruption.

I've also argued that there is strategic incoherence in building systems software and hardware while selling web services.

Android is powerful, but as Google is finding out, power can be very dangerous without control.

Google has created a partial list of phones that run Google services.

Google Phone Gallery.

I notice with interest that it's called a Google Phone Gallery not an Android Phone Gallery.

What's more, there is a distinction of All Phones and Phones "with Google". Of course that implies that we can get a list of Google Phones "without Google" (or maybe more accurately, "with partial Google").

To clarify, according to Google there are three categories of Android Phones:

• Google Phones "with Google" have been optimized for use of Google Mobile Services, providing easy access to Search, Voice Search, Google Talk, Google Maps, Gmail, Sync, YouTube and Android Market (where available).
• Google Phones "without Google" list includes Android phones that have the Android market, Search, Maps and Gmail. You can get this list by subtracting the Google Phones "with Google" from all the Google Phones.
• Non-Google phones. Android phones that have no Android market or any Google services. You can get this list by taking a list of all Android phones (e.g. from pdadb.net) and subtracting all Google Phones.

I would also add a fourth category of Google phones:

• Non-Android phones that serve up Google services just fine.

Since the list is not complete, I won't tally it here, but it suggests a large number of Non-Google phones is possible.

[I drew the following Venn diagram to help explain the situation. The shaded areas are those which generate revenue for Google. The interesting struggle (marked with arrows) is between the non-Android Phones with some Google and the Android Phones without any Google.]

Now the question that needs to be asked is: How many of the Non-Google Android phones are built to compete with Google (e.g. on Search, Voice, Maps, Media and App sales)? And a second question: How are the Non-Android phones "with some Google" competing with the Non-Google Android phones.

In other words, from Google's point of view: how successful are companies other than Google at delivering Google services in spite of competition from companies with Android phones delivering services that compete with Google?

The classic example being: how effective are iPhones with Google services at competing with Verizon Droid Android phones that deliver Microsoft services? In this scenario Apple is delivering value to Google shareholders while Verizon (using Android) is taking it away.

Is this trade-off a net positive?

In other words, is Google's income from the iPhone offsetting its losses from Android?

That means no seamless integration with Gmail. No Google Latitude. No multitouch in the map app, either. And in place of the free and fantastic turn-by-turn Google Navigator app, Verizon installed its VZ Navigator service -- a feature which costs $10 a month to use.

It would be one thing for Verizon to set the default search and map app to Bing with the option to switch back to Google. But it's utterly inexcusable for Verizon to destroy the possibility of a switch without the user having to root the device and, under Verizon's company policies, void their warranty. And on top of that, repeatedly charge you for a sub-par service instead of keeping the gold standard of navigation apps for free.

And as bad as that is, there's now a rumor that Verizon will be doing this again. On every single one of its Android devices.

After speaking with a Verizon representative about the Bing debacle on the Fascinate -- who also lied about the existence of a search alternative -- The Droid Guy contacted two Verizon tipsters who told him that the carrier "is dropping the Google Search from all future Android Devices and offering Bing in it's [sic] place."

via Verizon Rumored To Replace Google With Bing On All Android Devices | Markets | Minyanville.com.

Lots more in the linked article.

This story just keeps getting better and better.

Regardless of motivations, the restriction if broadly applied would have Verizon reneging on its pledge to support the openness of Android and reflects a wider trend of the OS being artificially restricted by carriers. Most US providers are disabling Android 2.2's tethering support in favor of their own, and AT&T has banned non-Market Android apps under the pretext of security. The moves paradoxically leave Apple's iPhone more open in some areas, as its users can choose Google, Bing or Yahoo for search and don't have first-party apps deliberately hidden or broken.

Read more: Electronista

Verizon, unfortunately, is also what ruins the phone. Or, rather, what it’s forced Samsung to do to the phone, which you could sum up in a word: Bing. Bing is the default—and only—search engine on the Fascinate. A Google Android phone. In the search widget, in the browser, when you press the search button. Bing. No, you can’t change it. There’s no setting for it, and the Google Search widget that you can snag from the Market is blocked (or at least very carefully hidden). Being unwittingly forced into Verizon and Bing’s conjugal relationship is infuriating on its own, but the implementation also feels like the sloppy hack that it is.

via Daring Fireball Linked List: Matt Buchanan on Verizon's Samsung Fascinate Lightning.

John Gruber astutely adds:

Android is “open”, but who it’s open for, primarily, are the carriers. (Somehow I doubt we’ll see any Windows Phone 7 devices where Google is the one and only search option.)

The primary defense of Google's Android strategy is that it's beneficial in driving traffic to Google's services/properties. This is by no means a certainty. To the contrary, it seems likely that the Android experience will be defined by operator back-room deals.

See also: asymco | Android vs. Google Part II

Coupling a lack of control over the platform, the revenue streams, the user experience, the potential banishment of AdMob from iOS and an attack on Google's brand, Android is currently winning the war with Google.

However, my money long term remains with Google. They can and will eventually beat Android. Perhaps with Chrome.

[Footnote: if anyone wonders why Verizon, Google's best friend in mobile, is gutting Android, you need to remember an exclusive five-year deal Microsoft struck with the carrier to provide search and advertising services on the phone. Microsoft was rumored to pay $500 million for the opportunity.]

"We wont be selling a Nexus One with Verizon and this is a reflection of the amazing innovation happening across the open Android ecosystem," Google said in an emailed statement.

via UPDATE 1-Google smartphone coming to stores, no Verizon| Reuters.

Come again?

The breakdown of the deal signals Verizon may view Google as a competitor rather than a partner when it comes to Nexus One sales, which are probably at less than half a million since the phone’s January debut, said BGC Partners’s Colin Gillis. 'It’s really a flop for Google,' said the New York-based analyst."

See also: Bloomberg.

Goldman Sachs: “Evidence that the structural competitive issues are starting to weigh on its growth prospects. We estimate that RIM’s U.S. business declined 15% [quarter-on-quarter]—the second q-o-q decline in a row, and the first [year-over-year] decline. While RIM attributed that to an inventory reduction at a North America customer, we think the magnitude of the decline points more to lower demand at Verizon as a result of its endorsement of Android; our checks showed a dramatic reduction in the number of RIM [models] at Verizon last quarter and better sales for Motorola’s DROID than for RIM at many Verizon stores.”

via RIM Reactions: Goldman Downgrades to 'Sell' - MarketBeat - WSJ.

RIM remains the best feature phone company out there.  Too bad that feature phones are not going to survive against mobile computers.