WebOS

LG Electronics has acquired HP's WebOS for an undisclosed amount. When last it changed hands WebOS was part of Palm which was purchased for $1.2 billion in 2010.

Palm has thus been effectively divided into several smaller pieces distributed as follows:

HP will own:

• Support of existing Palm users
• Palm back-end assets including source code, infrastructure and talent
• webOS patents

LG will own:

• Stewardship of the Open WebOS and Enyo open-source projects where the source code resides
• Associated talent
• WebOS websites
• License for IP related to webOS

LG announced that it plans to offer an "intuitive user experience an Internet services across a range of consumer electronics devices." In an interview, the CTO of LG said that given the current situation with Android, LG does not plan on making smartphones running webOS but will use it in televisions and other devices such as cars, signage and appliances where there are no embedded OS's. "We'd like to secure a software platform across all devices."

Most commentary regarding the deal focused on the use of the platform for TVs but management seems to consider all devices, perhaps even phones, at some future date, to be webOS targets.

The TV however seems to be low hanging fruit today. The TV as an app platform will be the new ecosystem war and no platform today has a lock on the developers or users. The way this rivalry will shape up will not mirror other device classes for the same reason that current device classes are platform silos.

PCs, music players, tablets and phones all have different super-majority platform leaders. The association of a platform with a device class depends first on the distribution model, which favors a specific business model which favors a specific vendor which favors a specific platform. As each device is distributed differently, a different platform takes precedence.

Consider that the PC has historically been purchased by IT departments which led to a monoculture of Windows which led to a persistent leadership for Microsoft.

The music player created dominance around iTunes mostly because the distribution model for music labels was baked-in. With network effects, the iPod quickly gained and perpetually retained market share leadership.

The smartphone business initially favored Symbian and BlackBerry because they had the market access through operators. After the touch UI became dominant (and incumbents failed to respond in a timely manner), Apple and Google took leadership as soon as they accepted the operator distribution model. Android in particular is especially resonant with operators and has been developed with their requirements in mind.

The tablet business is more like the PC business but without enterprise requirements or patterns of purchase. This has meant that app/content ecosystems and retail distribution were the key gating factors. The story is still unfolding but so far Microsoft has not found a foothold while iOS and Android and Amazon have.

That leads to the question of how will smart TVs be sold and which business model (or go-to-market strategy) will succeed. Steve Jobs pointed out the difficulty in trying to deliver innovation into a value chain dominated by cable companies which can effectively block it. A TV which is an application execution device rather than a content terminal will require a re-definition of the category. That will require a re-positioining of this product. Few companies are able to do that. [See also my post Tele Vision from mid-2011].

Which brings us back to the question of webOS. As long as LG sells TVs as content terminals they might not obtain much value from webOS. If, on the other hand, LG were to use webOS to re-define their televisions to be something else entirely, namely software execution devices, sold differently and hired to do a different job than a TV, then webOS becomes not only necessary but potentially a source of great prosperity.

Here are the highlights from RIM's latest quarter:

• 14.1 million BlackBerry smartphones shipped, 13 million sold through
• 150k PlayBook shipped with sell-through slightly higher. 800k PlayBooks shipped so far.
• BlackBerry subscriber base up to 75 million
• High growth cited for U.K., France, South Africa, Mexico and Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. RIM is the #1 smartphone vendor in the Latin America and Caribbean region. Sales outside the US, UK and Canada were 61% of revenues. US is now 20% of sales, UK 11%.
• Hardware growth outside the US was 56%
• There are 630 carriers
• 50k apps in App World with 5 million downloads per day
• Forecasting 11 to 12 million smartphones next quarter

Given the channel fill with a new product, the device business was marginal at best. The company obtained -1% growth y/y in units but 31% sequential growth from a transitional quarter. The average selling price (inclusive of service revenues) is $354 and about $280 excluding service revenues. I estimate that operating margins have dropped to about 11%. Not a good story, but one we have been warned to expect.

But a crucial new twist to the story is that RIM announced that they don't expect new BlackBerry 10 devices until late next year. That came as a surprise and the stock sold off significantly, valuing the company at well below book value.

Stepping back, the biggest surprise is that the company seems to have had no plan for sustaining itself.

Let me explain.

If you go back to 2005 or so the world of smartphones was a mix of modular OSs and integrated platforms, much as it is today.  Not unlike Android today, Windows Mobile was successful in licensing to dozens of vendors who in turn released hundreds of products. Symbian also was licensed but most volumes came from Nokia and they held the lion's share. Then there was the BlackBerry integrated solution which worked smoothly and had devoted fans who upgraded every chance they had and operators who were joyous at the new ARPU. There was also PalmOS as offered by PalmSource trying to be a "third horse" and unseat stodgy old Microsoft.

It was into that fray that both Apple and Google jumped. Google acquired Android in 2005 and Apple was busy polishing a version of OS X that would became iOS. In three and two years respectively these platforms would be in the market.

Regardless of the actions of rivals, all competitors must have faced the same questions in 2005: As technology was changing rapidly and as they all had access to component roadmaps, what is the best technology approach to this market? Should they embrace certain innovations to sustain their business trajectory? RIM had a tightly integrated software, hardware and service offering. What could make it better? Nokia was also basing its products on a more loosely integrated offering (nominally it was modular, but only just). It saw the writing on the wall and began developing a Linux variant (Maemo) as a potential candidate to replace Symbian. Microsoft was basing its solution of a modular approach. Windows CE was ok as a kernel but they had layers on top which were optimized around stylus-based user experiences (analogous to mouse actions). Could it take on a rich computing experience?

There were many experience candidates. Stylus, keypad, keyboard all had adherents. There was a lot of hesitation. After the iPhone launched with capacitive (finger) touch, resetting user expectations, it still took a year for many of the vendors to re-consider their technology plans. The weakest changed first.

Microsoft felt the pain quickest. They also had the least to lose since revenues from Windows Mobile were paltry. By 2008 internally they turned 90 degrees. They embarked on re-building their user experience and orphaning the Windows Mobile ecosystem and many of the vendor relationships they had built. Palm dropped PalmOS and built WebOS internally quite quickly. They licensed Windows Mobile as a stop-gap. Around the same time Nokia doubled down on Maemo and joined with Intel to form MeeGo. They did not orphan Symbian though and kept trying to adapt it to the new experiences and input methods.

But RIM did nothing. Almost nothing. They were the healthiest competitor. They felt no pain from iPhone's entry. The platform they had built was still growing and they were tweaking it constantly. There were always improvements to point to but fundamentally the code was limited. It was very difficult to adapt it to touch input and the first attempts at a touch UI were embarrassing. But there were no signs of a new platform that reflected the Unix-like competition.

As I pointed out in an earlier post, Unix-like operating systems were having their revenge. To a computer scientist the future of mobile computing would mirror that of personal computing in terms of architecture. The foundations of the early smartphones were built on constraints that were disappearing while being unable to accommodate new input methods. In other words, the early efforts were optimized around those constraints and sub-optimal for rich user experiences. They had to be. There were limited processors, memories and screens and battery life.

It turned out that all the early mobile operating systems were unsuitable for the advances in technology that came after 2007. Companies which were able to adapt or embrace Unix-like operating systems in a mobile context gained the ability to grow with the new input methods. The sooner they "pulled the trigger" on the shift, the better off they were. This is in fact what enabled entrants to gain footholds. Entrants entered with Unix-like OSs straight away while incumbents had to justify changing and the more successful they were the harder it was to justify changing.

RIM had trouble justifying this change. It waited until 2010 to finally acquire the QNX asset that would offer them a stronger software foundation.  It still had to adapt this acquisition and it looks like it won't be done until at least 2012, seven years after they should have started. And this should be seen as a sustaining technological change. A new OS is not a disruptive technology to what is already a mobile computer.

However, delays like these can be fatal. We see the impact on Microsoft who was earliest to push the reset button in 2008. It still took two years to rebuild Windows Mobile into Windows Phone and is now still struggling to regain lost share (less than 2% today). We see the impact on Nokia which was unable to affect a transition to MeeGo due to a litany of issues and had to throw in the towel on self-determination. We see the impact on Palm which lost its independence as WebOS was a bit too little too late.

These companies had the right technical strategies but suffered from execution and business architecture issues. RIM is years late in embracing what appears to be a sustaining improvement.

But whenever you see what appears to be a coordinated effort by companies to fail simultaneously you have to ask if the change they struggle with is really sustaining or disruptive. The pattern makes me suspicious that what RIM, Microsoft, Palm and Nokia faced was more than a failure to embrace a sustaining improvement. I suspect that the failure is evidence of tectonic shifting of business models.

WebOS: HP, and HP Only.

With the launch of RIM's tablet computer based on QNX and HP's confirmation that WebOS will not be licensed, we have

• Apple the largest tablet and music player company,
• HP the largest PC company,
• RIM the largest smartphone company in the US, and
• Nokia largest smartphone company in the world

avoiding Android.

These are the companies which today are profitable and enjoy large market shares. Why did they choose integrated (aka "closed") software with their hardware vs. the modular (aka "open") approach offered by Google and Microsoft?

See also: asymco | Android’s Pursuit of the Biggest Losers

"During a conference call about HP's acquisition of Palm Wednesday, Todd Bradley, executive VP of HP's Personal Systems Group, said that there are "a lot of opportunities" with the purchase. Namely, he said, HP could use the WebOS mobile operating system as a touchscreen interface for new hardware such as a tablet or netbook.

Palm CEO Jon Rubinstein and Brian Humphries, HP's senior VP of Strategy and Corporate Development revealed that HP plans to "double down on WebOS," which is considered the "prized asset" of the acquisition. The two reportedly mentioned the scalability of WebOS, implying that HP plans to bring the platform to multiple hardware form factors. HP even said it has already tested WebOS for its scalability."

http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/10/04/28/hps_purchase_of_palm_could_lead_to_webos_tablets_netbooks.html

Oh, and someone from HP also said they will still do business with Microsoft.

Let's see...HP is adding its own mobile OS, HTC was hunting for its own mobile OS but is living on skinning, Palm made its own mobile OS and managed to escape oblivion, Samsung launched its own mobile OS, Apple has its own mobile OS, RIM has its own mobile OS and bought the kernel of another, Microsoft has its own mobile OS--really more than one, Nokia has its own mobile OS(s), and Google has its own mobile OS (plus Chrome). Chances are that Amazon is building its own OS as well.

Only Microsoft and Google are still betting that licensing is going to be the way forward but each is hedging its bets: Microsoft with Kin and Google with Nexus One.

Can anyone seriously suggest that the mobile computing industry is rapidly moving toward horizontal modularity or even consolidating like the Operators are hoping?

Before you answer, consider also other horizontal players that are no longer with us: PalmSource, Symbian (and, give it a year, Windows Mobile).

Smart phones sold to retail customers totaled 408,000 units, down 15% from a year earlier and 29% sequentially

By some estimates, Apple pre-sold more iPads online in one week than Palm sold smartphones through Sprint and Verizon stores in 3 months.  What's more remarkable is that year-on-year decline implies Palm sold more Windows Mobile devices than WebOS which was not on the market a year ago.

link: Palm Narrows Loss but Retail Sales Decline - WSJ.com

• The company said there are over 2,000 apps in the Palm App Catalog.
• ASP was $367, down from $375.
• Almost all volume was from WebOS products (Windows Mobile devices are gone)
• For Q4, the company expects revenue to be less than $150 million.
• Q4 gross margin likely in the mid-teens.
• Guidance for $150 million in revenue, down 57% sequentially.

After hours market cap for Palm is about $833 million down 13%.  Expected revenue and ASP imply about 410k units will be sold into the channel in the following quarter.

Admob did an interest survey. Although limited by its methodology (see below) the data is incrementally interesting as it also relates to the ChangeWave survey.

ChangeWave suggested that 13% of early adopters claim they are likely to buy an iPad. Admob suggests that 16% of existing iPhone users would be likely to purchase an iPad in the next 6 months.

This is interesting because we know roughly how many iPhones there are.

If we assume 45 million iPhone users by time of launch (42 million units have been sold as of end of December) and 15% would buy iPads it would therefore not be unreasonable to assume about 7 million iPads will go to iPhone users alone.

Being conservative, let's round that down to 5 million. This does seem quite a bit more than the 2 million most analysts are forecasting. I'm partial to 5 million but I might now be inclined to increase that to maybe 7 to account for a portion of 33 million iPod touch users.

The aggressive scenario would see 16% of the 75 million iPhone + iPod touch installed base buying an iPad--resulting in 12 million units.

Admob survey and report: http://metrics.admob.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/AdMob-Mobile-Metrics-Jan-10.pdf

Methodology

All data in the feature section is based on an opt-in survey taken by users on their mobile device.

Respondents were sourced by responding to mobile ads throughout AdMob's iPhone OS, Android and webOS networks. There was no incentive offered to participate in the survey.

There were 963 total respondents: 318 Android, 244 iPhone, 356 iPod touch and 45 webOS. The survey was run from February 5th - February 16th.

The geographic representation of the respondents was designed to approximate the distribution of users in the AdMob network. The respondents were sourced from English-speaking countries in the AdMob network.