Horace Dediu

People throw around the idea of things being or becoming "commodities" but there is little clarity about what "commodity" status implies.

If you look up the word, it has nothing to do with technology or innovation. In economics, a commodity is something that is substitutable (fungible) and roughly equal to competing versions of the same thing. A mineral good (oil) or agricultural product (pork bellies) is roughly of equal value regardless of where it comes from or who produces it. Commodities also have very liquid markets and are therefore easily priced according to demand.

Commodities have a "fixed" quality which cannot be and most likely never was improved. It's a product that is essentially frozen in terms of innovation.

But in technology and especially in terms of complex, rapidly improving and evolving products with uneven distribution a commodity is not easy to identify and there can be a lot of arguing about what is and isn't.

So here is another way to define it:

In terms of innovation, a product can be defined as a commodity if it reaches a point where improvements do not create additional value. As the product gets better, it reaches a point where customers can no longer absorb the improvements and therefore they become unwilling to pay for them. Thus the price of the product cannot be increased or maintained in the face of competition.

In other words, you can't get a premium price for a better product.

If you can't improve the product, one consequence is that you can no longer differentiate it. Becoming commoditized is a natural result of the improvement of a product beyond the customer's ability to utilize that progress.

So we're back to the debate about whether a product is good enough. You can argue that commodity status is that point where it over-shoots the market. Before that point is reached the product can obtain a price premium for technology innovation. After that point, the product becomes a "commodity".

How does this relate to the mobile market today? Again, it's important to ask what is the basis of competition. Is hardware not good enough? Is software? Or is the whole widget?

For those who say that smartphones are commodities, they have to also account for the inevitable consequence: that improvements will not be valued and hence will not be implemented. It also means that profits will evaporate from the current incumbents to new models of profit capture.

This is the essential argument for Android. But I'm still struggling with what the argument implies. That the product as it exists today is all that will ever exist.

I updated to Basic Maths theme v. 1.1. I am trying a new, "native" theme iPhone users. Please let me know if there are problems with it in the comments below.

When I applied the modularity dichotomy to smartphone operating system there were several implications that came to light. One was the question of whether the market has reached the point where products were "good enough" and the speed of innovation became less important than price. Another was: will integrated vendors be able to hold on to a healthy share of growth against non-consumption?

Now I bring up another implication of modularity: the concept of "law of conservation of modularity".

Clayton Christensen illustrated this as follows[1]:

If you are writing a software application to run on top of a platform, are you permitted to modify the platform to make your application run better?

If the platform is interdependent, changing it could cause unintended side-effects and you will not be allowed to make them. If the platform is modular, changes are possible and you will have access to the code.

The reason is not not political. It's that in the case of interdependence, the application has to be suboptimized and conform itself to the platform so that the platform could remain optimized (to its goals). The platform needs to remain optimized is because it needs to keep improving (since it's not good enough).

In the case of modularity, the application can be optimized and the platform can conform itself to the application because the application needs to keep improving while the platform is good enough and does not.

Conformability is what constrains up-market progress.

This also holds in hardware architecture. This was plainly evident in the WinTel era. During that time the microprocessor and the operating systems had a proprietary and interdependent architecture even while Dell’s product has a modular architecture.

So the microprocessor wasn’t good enough. That meant that the desktop computer had to have a modular architecture to conform itself in order to allow this to be optimized because the line widths on the circuit were not good enough.

This is what is meant by conservation of modularity: one side or the other of an value chain boundary needs to be modular and conformable to allow what’s not good enough to be optimized. The key question is what's not good enough: the device or the platform (the whole or part?)

How does this apply today in the post-PC era?

If you think about it in a hardware context, because historically the microprocessor had not been good enough, then its architecture inside was proprietary and optimized and that meant that the computer's architecture had to be modular and conformable to allow the microprocessor to be optimized. But in a little mobile computer like the smartphone, it’s the device itself that’s not good enough, and you therefore cannot have a one-size-fits-all Intel processor inside of a BlackBerry or iPhone, but instead, the processor itself has to be modular and conformable so that it has on it only the functionality that the BlackBerry needs and none of the functionality that it doesn't need (hence the ARM modular architecture is dominant). So again, one side or the other needs to be modular and conformable to optimize what’s not good enough.

Now today (and, I believe for some time to come) in smartphones, or in any situation where logic gets embedded in a system it’s the device itself that is not yet good enough and, therefore, you cannot back off the frontier of what’s technologically possible. It has to be optimized with a proprietary interdependent architecture. That means that the processor and the operating system inside of a Smartphone has to be modular and conformable to allow that to be optimized.

In order for you to believe otherwise you have to convince yourself that smartphones, as a system, have reached the limit of what is technologically possible.

[1] The source is a presentation by Clayton Christensen at  Open Source Business Conference in 2004

When I wrote about the absence of copyright enforcement on the Android marketplace, I was trying to point out that Google did not have the interests of copyright owners at heart. This attitutde is also apparent in many ways from the absence of desktop sync for Android (and hence the absence of discovery or acquisition of commercial media) to the absence of protection for the app developer.

Moreover, recently Google TV was blocked from all major US TV content and Google faced litigation from copyright holders in print publications and before that for YouTube infringements and before that from newspaper publishers for Google News' unlicensed reuse of their content.

Therefore it should not come as a surprise the following revelation that Android lacks any common DRM framework.

The hurdle has been the lack of a generic and complete platform security and content protection mechanism available for Android. The same security issues that have led to piracy concerns on the Android platform have made it difficult for us to secure a common Digital Rights Management (DRM) system on these devices.

Setting aside the debate around the value of content protection and DRM, they are requirements we must fulfill in order to obtain content from major studios for our subscribers to enjoy. Although we don’t have a common platform security mechanism and DRM, we are able to work with individual handset manufacturers to add content protection to their devices.

Unfortunately, this is a much slower approach and leads to a fragmented experience on Android, in which some handsets will have access to Netflix and others won’t.

via Netflix blog.

But the absence is not just oversight. DRM is, by its nature, proprietary and, by necessity, "closed". DRM ultimately includes "secrets" which would always be revealed in open source. If Android is to be open source, then it cannot include a DRM framework.

This leaves the problem of content protection up to the device vendors who must license schemes from various third parties.

The upshot is more fragmentation.

As John Gruber points out,

More and more, I’m convinced that Android isn’t a single platform. It’s a meta-platform upon which handset makers build their own platforms.

In other words, Android fragmentation seems to be not only impossible to rein in, but it may actually be by design. Google is doing nothing to stop the centrifugal force that is building up in its ecosystem. They have neither the means nor the incentives to control the spiraling.

When mobile platforms are discussed, the conversation frequently turns to market share battles between Android and iOS. I've pointed out before that the problem with this reasoning is that market share in a market that's growing at 90% is a false measure of performance.

The more important measure is how much of the non-smartphone market is being taken by smartphones and how fast the whole phone market is growing. Competition with non-consumption is very different from platform warfare.

But even when discussing the rivalry between current platforms, the Blackberry and Symbian are often overlooked as contenders. Windows Phone and iOS come in and out of discussion only on the basis of press releases. The truth is however that Symbian, Windows, Blackberry are not going to disappear anytime soon.  Why is that?

The reason is that when you stop framing the market as rivalry between platforms, you see that many buying decisions are driven by specific device value propositions or jobs that the products are hired to do. For many years smartphones were purchased because they had the best cameras or the best keyboards and users never downloaded any apps or even used data plans.

Later, smartphones were purchased because they allowed for browsing and gameplay. Very rarely did buyers opt for "iOS" or "Symbian". Most buyers don't even know what these words mean. Phones are rarely advertised according to their platforms. (As an aside, the mention of Windows in a PC ad is made possible by Microsoft funding, the same as "Intel Inside." So for platform recognition, someone needs to fund the promotion and that implies some revenue to justify it.)

To illustrate, consider the Blackberry: A product that continues to grow despite a completely different basis of competition from the large screen touch competitors. It comes down to being good at some very specific jobs. RIM continues to grow in certain markets like Latin America and the Middle East on the basis of BBM (RIM’s sales outside the U.S. climbed 94 percent last quarter from a year earlier.)

“A 15-year-old boy who likes a 15-year-old girl, sends her a BBM and he’s able to measure how important he is to her based on the speed of response after the letter turns to an R,” meaning it’s been read, he says. “No one else runs an end-to- end service plan like we do. That’s killer and is why it’s almost a social phenomenon.”

or

BBM is also popular in socially conservative Saudi Arabia where its speed -- messages are typically sent in less than two seconds, according to Morgan Keegan -- has made it a way for teenagers to communicate in a country where religious police bar unmarried couples from meeting in public.

You could argue that the other platforms also allow for free messaging (through free texting apps) but the combination of a low cost device, a data plan and attention to detail (like Message Read notification) gives the Blackberry an edge.

The general purpose smartphone that Google and Microsoft and Apple promote is still not the prevailing view of mobile usage for most buyers. One could also argue that many if not most Nokia smartphones are still being "hired" to do feature phone jobs.

The fact that all these devices are classified as smart and therefore competing misses the point that they are hired for different things.

Google Nexus S is real, gets leaked by Best Buy [U] | Electronista.

Can you imagine Microsoft launching a Microsoft branded phone to compete with its Windows Phone licensees? When Microsoft launched the Zune, their licensing model (PlaysForSure) was quietly folded up.

A Google phone makes little sense, but then again Google does not seem to care much about its ecosystem or relationships with Android device vendors. They even claim that they have no idea how many phones are being built using Android and, except for activations, have no way of measuring the number sold.

From their point of view, if Motorola feels it's unfair to have to compete with a Google branded Samsung (or HTC) designed phone then too bad. There's lots of white label vendors lined up to make these with or without anyone's blessing.

In fact, the biggest opportunity for Android growth seems to be the large unlicensed (and illegal) grey market which seems to be rapidly expanding.

The latest mobile phone estimates from Gartner made a startling claim that "Others" vendors increased share from 16% a year ago to 33%. Doubling share in a year is possible if you're at 1% share but to double from a base of 16% is sounding improbable. They allege that the "Others" now sell more phones than Nokia. And Others don't even include ZTE and Huawei, the prototypical low end challengers.

They emphasize this point in their discussion and state that the incumbent vendors are being pressured by these low end entrants. They go on to explain that the same set of vendors will probably use Android to enter the smartphone space.

To illustrate, the growth of individual companies is shown here (all phones).

Also puzzling is that ZTE and Huawei did not share in this boom. They barely beat market growth and were growing at half of "Others". Until recently ZTE and Huawei were themselves Others, so the new vendors are truly unbranded "white box" vendors.

To put it in perspective, their year-on-year growth is astronomical: 176%, selling 87 million more phones this third quarter than last year's. This is equivalent to saying that a new company was born in the last year and has already become the second largest in the world. The growth in volumes is higher than the total units Samsung sold!

Mind the gap

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Can we check what other analysts estimated and do some form of validation of the claims?

Yes we can.

IDC reports the same data and they only reported 340.5 million phones sold (vs. Gartner's 417 million). Excluding ZTE and Huawei the total share for "Others" in IDC would be about 20%.

20% share vs. 33% share is a big gap.

IDC and Gartner both agree on smartphones, so the difference is even more glaring when you consider the "non-smart" comparisons:

Non-smart phones:

For added emphasis, I added a comparison of last year's quarter. Last year the Gartner total estimate was about 10% higher than IDC. This year they are 30% higher.

How could the difference in the total phones sold be so big: 77 million phones?

If Gartner is right, how could IDC miss 77 million phones. If IDC is right how did Gartner conjure up 77 million phones in one quarter? That number is nearly as big as all the smartphones sold (81 million). This is not within any margin of error for whatever sampling method they use.

Perhaps they need to clarify this because until they do, neither is credible.

--

Note: My own models are built from individual company public reports. The only data I depend on from IDC and/or Gartner is this total market size which allows me to back out what the "Others" are doing. If the total market estimates disagree so much, I'll be forced to throw out the "Others" all together.

None of this should come as major surprises, but Gartner's data allows for a bit more granular detail in the overall view of the market. Here are new points derived from Gartner's sell-through data:

• The smartphone market is growing at nearly 100% (96%).

• The overall market is growing at 35%.
• The non-smartphone market is growing at 25%.
• Android grew at 1,340% y/y. iOS grew at 92%, Symbian at 61% and RIM at 40%.
• Platform market shares (below) shows a more even distribution of platform volumes between four main platforms:

• Non-branded mobile phones grew to 33% of the market, with 141% unit growth. This is an alarming figure for the low-end of the market. The unbranded market excludes ZTE and Hauwei which grew below the overall market growth (9.8%, 27% respectively). The implications were most dire for Motorola (-36% units growth), Sony Ericsson (-23%) and LG (-14%). Nokia grew but, at 3.5%, well below market growth.
• In 3Q 2009 41 million smartphones were sold. In 3Q 2010 80.5 million were sold. If we were to split the growth among platforms, nearly half the growth was Android. 27% of the additions were Symbian and 16% were iOS. Only 8.3% of the growth was RIM devices.
• Windows Mobile and Linux were the only smartphone platforms to shrink volumes. However, even though the platform is deprecated, 2.2 million Windows Mobile devices were still sold last quarter -- more than Android sold a year earlier.

Gartner released sell-through data for the handset market. In the release appears an estimate of total Android 3Q Smartphone sales (20.5 million). Combining this with what some of the vendors have reported in terms of units sold, we can estimate the share of Android by vendors.

Note that this is a rough estimate. We don't have data on Sony Ericsson's smartphone units sold and we don't know the mix of HTC's Windows Mobile vs. Android.  I'm also assuming LG as part of Others. The data from Gartner is claimed to be sell-through whereas vendors report sell-in so there is more roughness about each vendor.

Regardless of these potential sources of error, it's a very safe bet that Samsung and HTC are the largest Android vendors by a fairly large margin.

It's perhaps noteworthy that both are also committed Windows Phone vendors. According to pdadb.net here is the count of Windows Phone SKUs by vendor:

• HTC 12
• LG 5
• Samsung 2
• Dell 2
• Toshiba 1

Motorola is keeping its Windows Phone options open, leaving "Others" as the only likely exclusive Android vendors.

Several readers pointed out that in my discussion on the market share of modular vs. inter-dependent market shares for smartphones, Nokia was incorrectly classified as having an inter-dependent software architecture since the Symbian platform is/was a modular component.

The problem is that the relationship between Symbian and Nokia is not that of independent modules. Nominally, the two are independent and mutually exclusive, but, in practice, Symbian has always been so heavily dependent and influenced by Nokia that it's never been possible to declare its governance fully independent.

I won't describe the full history since there are many other sources (good example here.) But I will point out that since Nokia licensed Symbian exclusively and Symbian obtained the vast bulk of license fees from Nokia, the relationship was one similar to a bilateral monopoly.

Nokia's bargaining power over Symbian was always high enough to affect its operations. "Ownership" does not only infer a formal control over equity, and many would agree that Nokia "owned" Symbian even when it held less than 50% of the equity. The relationship was so tight, that even though there were other members of the consortium with board seats, the licensing by Nokia's competitors was always very limited. The only significant non-Nokia revenue for Symbian came from Japan where Nokia did not have a presence.

After Symbian was effectively acquired by Nokia, the ownership became both de jure and de facto. The open sourcing of the Symbian code made it no less a Nokia operation than the open sourcing of Android makes it no less a Google operation.

So for all intents and purposes, the relationship between Symbian and Nokia makes Nokia's smartphone hardware inter-dependent on Symbian's software.

Now, given that the way the products are built in practice may be far from integrated, it would seem that Nokia's management captured the worst of both worlds: Modular implementation of an inter-dependent business. Nokia captured all the downside of modularity (poor integration and polish) without any of the benefits (e.g. flexible supply chain or lower R&D.)

Belfiore wasn’t shy about criticizing Google’s Android OS. Even though Google currently dominates the mobile OS market, its strategy of licensing the Android OS to manufacturers is similar to Microsoft’s previous approach with Windows Mobile: It’s open-ended, and there are few restrictions on how manufacturers can use or modify the OS.

As a result, Android is suffering from some of the same issues as Windows Mobile did: Android works better on some phones than others, manufacturers are shipping different versions of the OS on different phones, some Android phones are shipping with bloatware made by carriers, and some app developers complain that it’s difficult to make software because of the hardware and OS fragmentation.

via How Microsoft Hit CTRL+ALT+DEL on Windows Phone | Gadget Lab | Wired.com.

Android was initially an attempt to commoditize Windows Mobile with a symmetric but "free" alternative. The idea was to conform to OEMs and operator business models. This was directly copied from Microsoft's early 2000's playbook for entry into mobile.

Trouble is that Microsoft realized their purely modular, operator and OEM centric approach was failing to be competitive on the user experience and decided to move into a more integrated approach, closer to Apple's integrated model.

But while Microsoft dropped their vision, Android was still patterned after their approach.