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Asymmetric Intelligence

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  1. Third to a billion

    Research · 166 comments

    Android is the third platform to reach a billion users ((Although activations are not users, I'm assuming that usage is not far behind and the cumulative sales figures I gather are roughly comparable.)) .  The first was Windows and the second was Facebook. Apple sold around 650 to 700 million iOS and is expected to be the fourth to a billion sometime next year. ((Separately, iTunes reports 575 million account holders.))

    If we define the Race To a Billion to be bounded by a time limit of 10 years, then Windows does not qualify and Android is actually second. The race is shown in the following graphs (the one on the left is logarithmic scaled, the one to the right includes only a few contenders for illustrative reasons).

    Screen Shot 2013-09-06 at 9-6-4.06.29 PM

    Android's activations as reported are shown in the following graph:

    Screen Shot 2013-09-04 at 9-4-1.15.38 PM

    Without qualification, Android has been a viral success story. It reached one billion activations in about five years, almost half the time it took FaceBook and far faster than Windows.

    However, Android growth can be qualified. I added another set of data which is the number of US Android phone users as deduced from measurements by ComScore. ((ComScore surveys users on their primary phone. Survey includes only those aged over 13 years and excludes phones issued by businesses.))

    One way to read the two graphs is: Between March and August, of the 250 million Android devices activated, 4 million were to new Android consumers in the US. In other words, In the last six months, 1.6% of Android activations went toward new usage in the US. The equivalent figure for iOS is about 6%. Note that these are new users, not included are upgrades. It's likely that more of the US buying goes toward upgrades because iOS has been in use longer.

    So whereas Android is growing very rapidly, there is a question of reliability of that audience. Engagement is one thing, but in the market which shows highest penetration (and deepest distribution of an alternative) Android is peaking.

     

  2. Who's next?

    Research · 166 comments

    In February I asked Why doesn't anybody copy Apple?

    Put another way: Why is it that everyone wants to copy Apple’s products but nobody wants to copy being Apple?

    Being Apple means, at least:

    • Insourcing all aspects of operations which affect the customer experience. Increasingly that has meant insourcing everything, a toxic idea to every MBA-trained professional since forever.
    • Organizing functionally and having no product level P/L responsibility. That also means removing almost all incentives for employees to climb ladders and thus prove their worth.
    • Developing products using integrated "heroic" efforts which shun  every best (or even adequate) process for product development.

    I asked somewhat rhetorically because it's an open question. Apple's operating model and devotion to integration have been asymmetric to technology dogma for decades. To the casual (read: naïve) observer, pursuing the Apple way seemed also to be tied to one individual. You could not "be Apple" unless you were also Steve Jobs and there was only one of him.

    But it seems I did not give enough credit to other observers.

    According to Microsoft, they began negotiating the buying of Nokia assets in earnest (coincidentally) in February. It has, also since February, been planning a massive re-organization along functional lines. Thus, by owning significant hardware operations and organizing functionally, Microsoft might go about two thirds toward "being Apple-like". The development process is the final hurdle and it may be a bridge too far, but my thesis that nobody wants to copy Apple is now in tatters.

    And it gets worse. We can see a similar, though far weaker, example in Google's approach to integration. Their purchase of Motorola did not result in an integrated business, with Motorola being kept at arm's length and allowed to wither on the vine. Crucially, while Google bought Motorola's IP, Microsoft only licensed Nokia's. Microsoft clearly valued Nokia for something different than  what Google valued Motorola for.

    Nevertheless there is a semblance of similarity. We can generalize enough and say that Apple (iOS), Google (Android/Chrome) and Microsoft (Windows (Phone)) are all becoming near facsimiles of each other. They are all producers of Software, Services and Hardware. Each came from a different basis but expanded into areas which were missing.

    • Google started with a service, expanded into systems software and bought into hardware.
    • Apple started with hardware running its own software, expanded into application software and is developing services.
    • Microsoft started with software, expanded organically into services and bought into hardware.

    All three major platform companies are now racing to offer that which completes them as an integrated producer and eliminates the dependencies on others as a modular producer.

    This is re-integration of the computing industry--a reversal of the dis-integration brought about by the personal computer. Mobility, it turns out, was as important to the evolution of the computing value chain as microprocessors were to the previous era. It just had the opposite effect.

    I should point out that Apple was more lucky than enlightened through this sea change. Having always been integrated, Apple was out of favor during one period of the computing epoch, but, simply by surviving, its model came back into favor in the next. I don't think anybody there foresaw just how dramatic the shift would be and how important their structure was to being successful.

    But there is one company which seems left out of this discussion. Samsung is absorbing a large part of the available profits in computing today and it's not an integrated hardware/software/services player. Does this mean that there is room to be a module in an interdependent world?

    I argue that no, there isn't. Samsung must either stretch into becoming one of the ecosystem contenders or be relegated to a commodity hardware company--a path clearly visible when looking at Chinese entrants. Samsung itself benefited from disrupting from below and should be aware of the threat it faces as it races up-market. More importantly though there is the ability of creating new markets altogether. This new market creation and rapid iteration due to integration is what the Google/Microsoft/Apple trio are seeking.

    Without the components of software (ecosystems included[1]) and services, Samsung will depend on the good graces of suppliers. They may not be as keen to share when profits accrue to the whole rather than the part.

     

    ---

    Note:

    [1] e.g. BlackBerry

  3. Who's buying whom?

    Research · 115 comments

    When a prosperous company buys a struggling company you have to wonder what they're really buying.

    Here's how to think about it. A company is defined as the sum of three values: resources, processes and priorities (RPP). Everything of value can be classified into these three categories.

    When one company buys another it's the equivalent of one set of RPPs trying to engulf or swallow another set of RPPs. The simplest (naïve) interpretation is that an acquisition is the purchase of Resources in terms of customers, sales, profits, etc. It might be of assets like employees, intellectual properties, brand etc. I say this is naïve because Resources are the easiest to value because they can be measured and valuing only what can be measured while ignoring what can't be measured is deeply mis-pricing.

    So most people look for the "R" value or the value of Resources in an acquisition. It's may be naïve but it is what markets typically value because it's what they can price. But what happens when the "R" is flimsy or fleeting?

    The answer has to be that it's  the processes or even priorities which are valued by the acquirer.

    These are difficult to value which, as I've argued in The Innovator's Curse, is why they are not reflected in a share's price. When there is a price paid for these fuzzy assets, they are often interpreted as a "premium" to the market price. But that may not be the way a buyer sees it.

    When buying a set of Processes, a buyer may see a bargain because their costs for building a similar process could be enormous, even infinite. In the case of Nokia, the process of building hardware may be infinitely valuable to Microsoft as they have had dreadful luck doing it themselves. But they're seen as value free to the market because it seems that there are many others who are building hardware.

    The trickiest thing to perceive though is the value of a set of Priorities. Priorities are the answers to the "Why" question as much as Resources are the answers to the "What" and processes are to the "How." If you were to think in terms of software engineering Priorities are the "Specifications" where the Resources are the data and Processes are the algorithms. They determine the direction and reasoning of why a company even exists. If you have bad specs, it never matters whether the algorithm is efficient and you have all the data: you are building the wrong thing.

    Acquiring Priorities is also fundamental in that they are usually exclusive. A company typically only has room for one set. If there are conflicting priorities, they need to be sorted out else the company can end up in a state of internal conflict and dysfunction. So if you're acquiring a set of Priorities, it's likely that you'll have to discard your own. It makes most sense when a company which might otherwise be prosperous needs to change direction.

    So, in a way, an acquisition of Priorities is almost a reverse acquisition. The acquired is actually "buying" the acquirer. The acquired company's Priorities (and hence Processes and Resources) become the guiding principles in the acquirer. It's what happened when Apple bought NeXT and may have happened when Disney bought Pixar.

    Some companies are "Resource-heavy", some are "Process-heavy" and some are "Priority-heavy". Great companies tend to have great sense of priority. They may also have greatness in the other asset classes but it's rare to find a great company without a great sense of purpose.

    So the question for the Microsoft Nokia deal is what is Microsoft buying?

    Resources? Sure, there is IP and a team. But the chances are that not all the team members will be kept on. See what happened to Motorola after it was acquired by Google.

    Processes? Absolutely. Microsoft needs device development processes desperately.  They may seem a commodity but it turns out that running great hardware businesses is hard, very hard.

    Priorities? Here we have to pause. To acquire Nokia's priorities means acquiring its business model; its belief system. Perhaps they will be discarded and they're not valued. Perhaps, as is often the case, the acquirer becomes allergic to the new priorities.

    But Microsoft has made it clear that they are now a "Devices and Services" company. As much as Apple changed its name to exclude "Computer," Microsoft is almost changing its name to exclude "software". It will still make software, to be sure, but for it to get paid it needs to integrate that software into hardware and services.

    My first thought on this is that Nokia's priorities are not sufficient for the company that Microsoft wants and needs to become, but there are some priorities which are necessary and which it values.

    It may be too much to say that with respect to Priorities, Nokia acquired Microsoft, but insofar as Microsoft is having to transform its business model, what Nokia devices brings is an integral component of the new.

     

  4. Unforgiven, Continued

    Research · 5 comments

    In June of 2011 I asked "Does the phone market forgive failure?" Not much time has passed since but the answer still seems to be no. The trigger I was using for this point of no return when the vendor began making losses.

    The list at the time consisted of 13 phone vendors who either merged, were liquidated or acquired after this trigger point was reached. There were no examples of vendors who recovered. Since then two more vendors reached the threshold (Nokia and RIM) and a third will do so this quarter (HTC). One vendor (LG) may be recovering but Nokia has just been acquired and RIM has put itself up for sale. Some Japanese vendors like Panasonic have also called it quits since then. So the score so far is about 18 triggers, 15 exits and three pending.

    Some of this data is summarized in the following graph:

    Screen Shot 2013-09-03 at 9-3-9.19.51 AM

    It shows that post-trauma life expectancy is now running at about 2.5 years. As RIM is only in its second year, one could perhaps expect another 6 to 9 months of independence. HTC could go on until 2015 but the smaller the company, the more vulnerable, so HTC's exit time should be shorter.

    Screen Shot 2013-09-03 at 9-3-9.20.57 AM

    The exception might be LG which seems to be recovering. As a conglomerate, LG is much less vulnerable and might have the resources internally to sustain the phone business indefinitely.

     

  5. The rear view mirror

    Research · 57 comments

    In the Innovator's Curse I reflected on the fact that a serial innovator cannot be efficiently financed or even rewarded for having figured out how to repeatably create. If anything, a serial innovator has to suffer a discount to peers who do not habitually (or ever) innovate. The innovation process is the proverbial goose that lays the golden eggs but is destined to perish due to the lack of faith in its existence.

    So how can I back this up?

    To start, this is partially evidenced in this graph of Apple's price to earnings ratio since 2006 vs. the S&P 500's. The S&P reflects the 500 largest companies in the US and is thus a proxy for the "average" company.

    Screen Shot 2013-08-30 at 8-30-6.36.23 PM

    [I added Apple's P/E excluding cash for additional perspective.]

    The graph shows that during the period of time when iPhone and iPad changed computing and telecommunications, Apple was mostly held in contempt: the profits it was generating were not considered of "sufficient quality" relative to an average company. Since markets look forward, not backward (one assumes), the vote cast is decidedly that success cannot be repeated. Put another way: you can trust that a soft drink maker like Coca Cola (P/E of 19) or a utility like ConEd (P/E of 18) will continue in the manner we've seen them perform in the last year more than Apple (P/E of 12) will.

    I can offer yet another way to consider this curse. Apple's iOS business is designed to capture profits through the sale of hardware. That hardware is manufactured through a process where, while not being the manufacturer, Apple purchases tooling in a capital-intesive strategy to control the means of production.  I've discussed this at length before.

    But Apple's business is more complex than just enabling manufacturing. Tooling allows for production and production allows for supply but supply is nothing without demand. And demand of the product is driven by investments in software and services and design and marketing and countless details.

    In other words, for Apple's modus operandi, if anything should correlate with value it's opex, not capex. It's the investment in the people Apple employs not in the tools it buys.

    And yet consider this graph:

    Screen Shot 2013-08-30 at 8-30-6.50.57 PM

    It shows how the market (though its pricing of Apple shares) values the company overlaid with a Apple's spending on capital equipment (PP&E capex).

    The relationship is uncanny. I'm not suggesting causality—that capex (which is publicly pre-announced) determines the share price level—but I am suggesting that there is a valuing of Apple as a producer of goods (for which tooling is a handy proxy). There is no sophistication to this formula. The more iPhones are built, the more the company is valued. Obvious.[1]

    But it's not obvious that prior to the iPhone there was iPod, which was a different business (and prior to it was the Mac, ditto.) The stock did not reflect the transitions nor does it assume that anything else will follow. It is, in other words, looking backward, not forward.

    --

    Notes:

    1. One could suggest looking at CapEx months in advance and predict the stock price, but who would believe such an absurd idea?
  6. Asymcar 3: Road Trip

    Research · 4 comments

    Horace Dediu and Jim Zellmer discuss the pleasures of traversing continents by road. This leads to a grand tour of powertrains, composites, fuel efficiency, regulation and Tesla’s luxury market entry. Which naturally leads to a conversation on emerging auto modularization, apps and ecosystems and where value will accrue.

    via AsymCAR 3: Road Trip | Asymcar.

  7. Steve Ballmer and The Innovator's Curse

    Research · 207 comments

    The most common, almost universally accepted reason for company failure is "the stupid manager theory". It's the corollary to "the smart manager theory" which is used to describe almost all company successes. The only problem with this theory is that it is usually the same managers who run the company while it's successful as when it's not. Therefore for the theory to be valid then the smart manager must have turned stupid at a specific moment in time, and as most companies in an industry fail in unison, then the stupidity bit must have been flipped in more than one individual at the same time in some massive conspiracy to fail simultaneously.

    So the failures of Microsoft to move beyond the rapidly evaporating Windows business model are attributed to the personal failings of its CEO. The calls for his head have been getting loud and rancorous for years. Taking this theory further, now that he's leaving, the prosperity of the company depends entirely on the choice of a new (smarter) CEO.

    It's all nonsense of course.

    Microsoft is composed of people, processes and priorities. And nothing else. The CEO is but one person, admittedly one with a high degree of authority. However, that authority is not unlimited. A change of leadership in a company may have some impact on a larger set of people, at least in the short term, but the bulk of existing resources, institutionalized processes, and priorities set by customers and cash flows limit what any one person can do.

    What really causes a company to fail is disruption. The business model around which all products, customers and priorities are built; the culture, the skills and "DNA" of the company; is vulnerable. This vulnerability is why companies have considerably shorter lifespans than the people who work there. They are one of the most fragile of organisms: high infant mortality, with short, unpredictable lives.

    Microsoft ascended because it disrupted an incumbent (or two) and is descending because it's being disrupted by an entrant (or two). The Innovator's Dilemma is very clear on the causes of failure: To succeed with a new business model, Microsoft would have had to destroy (by competition) its core business. Doing that would, of course, have gotten Ballmer fired even faster.

    Steve Ballmer's only failing was delivering sustaining growth (from $20 to over $70 billion in sales.) He did exactly what all managers are incentivized to do and avoided all the wasteful cannibalization for which they are punished.

    If anything, Steve Ballmer avoided The Innovator's Curse. Being successful with new market innovations would probably have led to an even shorter tenure. Destroying prematurely the pipeline of Windows in favor for a profit-free mobile future would have been a fireable offense. Where established large companies are concerned, markets punish disruptors and reward sustainers.

    Steve Ballmer will not be remembered as favorably as the man who created Microsoft. But at least he won't be remembered as the fool who killed it. That epitaph is reserved for his successor.

  8. The Innovator's Curse

    Research · 108 comments

    When Clay Christensen discusses innovation (for example his talk at BoxWorks here) he puts forward theories on the causes of success and failure of innovation. Through a repertoire of case studies evoking David vs. Goliath he offers a convincing alternative to the management orthodoxy which prevents innovation, especially the meaningful disruptive kind, in established organizations. More importantly he asserts that innovation is not something that happens randomly or only through the incantations of a Chief Magical Officer. There is a process and even perhaps a repeatable process for successful innovation.

    But one assumption that underlies this narrative is that innovation is good. Or more precisely, that innovation is rewarded--making its goodness desirable through market mechanisms. The happy ending to the story is that the innovator solves the dilemma, delivers the great innovation, perhaps more than once, and then basks in glory.

    But my observation is that the way markets behave often contradicts this measure of worth of innovation.

    Here's the problem: If a company produces a string of successes, the conventional wisdom is that the chances of another success are precisely zero.  A company is valued based on its cash flows and foreseeable improvements to them. What it's not valued on is its innovation flows (and foreseeable improvements to them).

    In other words, if you've succeeded in the past, the only certainty is that you will not be able to succeed again. This assumption exists even if you've succeeded more than once. The wisest will offer as many excuses for being lucky more than once as they will for being lucky once. In fact, just as the illusion of a run of heads means the next coin flip must surely be a tail, a string of random successes is deemed to increase the probability that the next attempt will end in failure.

    This discounting of repeatable success means that the reward for a process of innovation is zero and therefore that innovation itself is a priori value-free.[1]

    This means that an innovator not only has to struggle with getting an organization to create something new (the gist of The Innovator's Solution) but also to do so without the benefit of capital markets. When trying to raise financing for a sustainable innovation engine, the markets speak unanimously: you haven't got a chance.

    Therefore the only way an innovator can finance the next innovation is to use proceeds from a previous innovation, having faith in his engine of creation. Listening to the market would only convince the innovator that the new thing is pointless. In fact, the best idea is to stop trying.[2]

    I call this The Innovator's Curse: that building repeatable innovations provides the innovator no respite. There shall be no basking in glory, only expectations of imminent failure and attribution of success to good fortune.

    When I first realized this I thought I chanced upon a remarkable paradox. That this must be some new insight into human nature. That realizing this will change everything.

    But just like Disruption Theory is beautifully illustrated through the ageless David vs. Goliath parable, The Innovator's Curse is but a retelling of this fable:

    A cottager and his wife had a Goose that laid a golden egg every day. They supposed that the Goose must contain a great lump of gold in its inside, and in order to get the gold they killed it. Having done so, they found to their surprise that the Goose differed in no respect from their other geese.

    Even if the cottagers were naive enough to have faith in the replicating miracle of golden egg laying geese, wise men would quickly advise them to kill it and get the gold more quickly. The Goose is doomed no matter what.

    --

    1. A company will be priced according to products it created in the past, and that price might be significant, but as competitive pressures increase, the value itself is discounted. What is certain to be worthless however is the ability of any company to come up with something new.
    2. When managers give in to the temptation to stop trying they build great sustaining companies which are subject to disruption and invariably fail.

     

  9. The Revenue Table (imperial units edition)

    Research · 40 comments

    Tim Cook famously said:

    We can put all of our products on the table you’re sitting at. Those products together sell $40 billion per year. No other company can make that claim except perhaps an oil company.

    For those of you laughing, that was three years ago. The revenues quadrupled since to a total of $170 for the last four quarters. But the more interesting thought is that the table has not gotten bigger. When Tim spoke the iPad had just been announced but was not yet for sale. So we can't be sure if he thought it should be on the table or not, but it does not take up that much space.

    It would be fun to actually lay out all the Apple products on a table to see how big it would be. The trouble is that there are many things Apple sells which take up no space at all. Things like iTunes content or services and AppleCare.

    So rather than trying to imagine a table full of Apple products (some of which are non-phyisical) I thought a more fitting analogy would be to allocate the revenues from these products to a table and thinking about how much space relative to each other the products would take.

    To make conversion easier, I picked a rather large table; 10 feet long, big enough to fit a small conference room. What would this table covered in product revenue look like?

    My estimate is that it would look like this:

    Screen Shot 2013-08-22 at 8-22-11.50.54 AM

    I color coded the product lines as shown in the legend: Greens for iPhone, Browns for iPad, Blues for Mac, Yellow for iPod, Red/Purples for iTunes and Grey for Accessories.

    At this categorization the table would allocate the following space to each category:

    • iPhone (Greens): 60 inches or about half the table.



















      Product
      Inches
      iPhone 4
      4.7
      iPhone 4S
      11.4
      iPhone 5
      44.5
    • iPad (Browns): 21 inches















      iPad 2
      1.4
      iPad 4
      9.6
      iPad mini
      10.3
    • Macs (Blues): 5 inches











      Desktops
      2.7
      Portable
      13.6
    • iPod (yellows): 2.5 inches











      touch
      1.8
      iPod
      0.7
    • iTunes (reds), software and services: 15.5 inches







































      music
      4.1
      video
      1.6
      Apps
      5.6
      Books
      0.8
      Pro SW
      1.4
      OS X
      0.5
      iWork
      0.5
      iOS Apps
      0.2
      Serv.
      0.9
    • Accessories (Greys): 4 inches.











      Apple TV
      0.3
      Acc
      3.6

    If this colorful table were used to support the actual products, where each product would have to fit within its color band, then the truth of one saying would become apparent: good things come in small packages.