Market

Charles Arthur of The Guardian writes that PC sales "may have passed their peak".  That's a powerful, concise statement. It's backed up by a quote from Gartner's Mikako Kitagawa:

"This was the third consecutive quarter of mobile PC shipment declines in the US"

IDC even lays part of the blame to something called "media tablets"[1]:

"While it's tempting to blame [PC] decline completely on the growth of media tablets we believe other factors [...] played equally significant roles."

But there are several problems with both IDC and Gartner's analysis of the market. It's hard to make out causality from their data. There is separation by vendor but not by operating system and there is exclusion of devices hired to do the same jobs as PCs.

For this reason, I need to do my own analysis. I retrieved Gartner's public statements on the overall market and layered actual Mac and iPad units sold. I also added my estimates for the Q1 2011 quarter just ended to complete the picture.

We can now get an understanding of how the industry behaves with and without various platforms. The chart at the left gives the various growth rates of the market with platforms isolated from each other. I apologize for the shape of the chart but the scale does not permit a concise visual.

Including the iPad, the total PC growth is shown by the blue line. It shows that the market peaked during the recovery but is now slowing considerably.

The green line shows the PC industry excluding both the Mac and the iPad. Although it might include Linux or computers sold without an OS, the label "Windows PC" is a fairly close approximation. It shows that the market excluding Apple entered contraction this quarter and is out of sync with overall economic recovery and growth.

The red line shows the behavior of the Mac franchise. It's well ahead of the overall market with 2x to 3x the growth. This has been a pattern for over 18 quarters.  I had some thoughts on this in a November 2010 hypothesis.

But the most telling line is the orange line which includes both the Mac and the iPad. In an industry where growth is usually measured in single digits, the iPad business brings growth in three digits.

This near tripling of unit sales is symptomatic of fundamental change that cannot be ignored. Although some analysts contend that the iPad is not causal to the decline in other PC sales, teasing out platforms data seems to show a divergent view.

The bottom line is that Windows-only computer units are down 2.0% while OSX-based computer units are up 272% (this excludes both the iPhone and iPod touch).

Correlation is not causation but tests or surveys where substitution can be proven do exist. For example, a recent survey shows that 77% of users reported that their PC usage decreased after getting a tablet. It also showed that 28% considered their iPad as their primary computer.

So coupling the sales data with the usage data does point an accusatory finger for the decline on the iPad.

In addition, some vendors are being hit harder than others which also hints at where substitution is happening. For example, IDC reports that Acer US unit shipments fell 42% in the first quarter and 16% globally (Gartner's numbers are less dramatic but in the same direction). Since Acer is known for its netbook computers it's another telling sign of possible substitution (Acer's own management has indicated as much.)

So the weight of evidence is beginning to be conclusive: the iPad is the new PC. It should be clear by now that the iPad moves computing into new contexts so it does not yet substitute the PC market but extends it and increases consumption. Substitution is happening in low-end grazing type of usage, a place where the PC was ill-fitting anyway. Incumbent vendors might actually be relieved that the lower margin netbook is finally being supplanted and they can concentrate on the higher end.

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Notes:

1. Analysts like to call the iPad a "media tablet" but the same AdMob survey shows media consumption to be one of its least popular uses.

HTC's market cap has just overtaken Nokia's. While market capitalization is a fickle thing, shifting with sentiment, this is still a remarkable feat. Nokia's market capitalization has almost halved in the space of a year while HTC has more than tripled from $10 billion to over $33 billion.

If you roll back to 2007 and the start of the modern era of smartphones, you can see how the two companies stocks traded places:

(source: Google finance)

The recession was hard on everybody but HTC soared during 2010 while Nokia never recovered. Markets reward unforeseen growth and typically that means above-market growth.

That's reflected in the following chart (admittedly units and not profits, but pricing and margins for both have remained relatively steady.)

As Nokia's growth lagged the market the stock was punished. As HTC's growth exceeded the market's growth, the stock was rewarded.

But there are a few more observations to make:

• HTC's smartphone business was under-performing the market for most of 2009. In fact, it was even in negative growth for three quarters.
• The surge in growth coincided with HTC adding Android to its portfolio and given no other changes, seems to be causal.
• Although not within the time range of the charts above, HTC had another period of rapid growth in the mid 2000s.

A year ago HTC was making excuses and apologizing. Today they are more valuable than the largest phone vendors. All thanks to Android.

But why no thanks to Microsoft?

HTC was the primary Windows Mobile vendor a few years ago. They claimed at one point to have shipped over 80% of all Windows Mobile devices. They were also the leader in the Pocket PC franchise as they were the ODM behind the iPaq brand from HP/Compaq. HTC would not exist today were it not for Microsoft.

The relationship is such that HTC is paying Microsoft for protection from (potential) Android IP infringements. HTC has also licensed Windows Phone though the relationship between Nokia and Microsoft must give them pause.

But that's the whole problem. Those who live by the sword shall die by it. HTC was a Microsoft dependent and now they're a Google dependent. As the basis of innovation shifted, HTC was agile enough to make the transition. Perhaps they can execute a portfolio switch yet again as their upstream suppliers change whims or business models.

But then again, as we saw with Windows Phone, perhaps not.

If HTC wants to control its destiny it needs to control its suppliers. Now that its power and brand have grown, it needs software because in their market software is self-determination.

When tallying up the race to a billion users, I noted that both iOS and Android seem to have the potential to reach that size of user base. However, that raises the question of where those users will come from. We have to note the fact that there aren't a billion users to be captured today.

If not today, then how soon, and where are they?

The first question is who is addressable. If we stick with mobile cellular subscribers, there seem to be plenty of users (at least 5.3 billion as of October 2010 according to the ITU). However, the number of "mobile broadband" (i.e. 3+G network subs) is about 940 million. The chart to the left shows the difference and adds the subdivision between developed and developing economies.

Over half (51.1%) of developed nations' populations have signed up for mobile broadband while only 5.4% of developing country populations are on 3G. And whereas developing countries have added 2.6 billion mobile subs in 5 years, they added only 293 million mobile broadband (MB) subs. Developed nations added 574 million MBs in the same time frame.

As a result, two thirds of mobile broadband subscribers reside in developed nations as of 2010. This number will decrease rapidly as MB penetration reaches saturation in developed countries, however the race to a billion is being run in these markets first.

Which leads back to the question of platform potential. Platforms that target developing nations have the challenge of low broadband availability in the near term in addition to the challenge of device pricing. There are still 800 million developed country subscribers who have yet to upgrade to mobile broadband.

At the time these statistics and knowing the platform sales histories, my estimate is that only 18% of mobile broadband subscribers were using either iOS or Android. 25% were not even using a smartphone and 29% were using Symbian. (See pie chart).

But existing smartphone users are not the most attractive market to target with a new platform device.

A new smartphone user could come from the following groups of users:

1. Existing smartphone users:  700 million. This is tough head-to-head competition for every new user.
2. Existing mobile broadband users who are not smartphone users: 240 million. The easiest group to switch to using smartphones.
3. Developed nation mobile subs who don't have mobile broadband or smartphones: 800 million. This seems very attractive since they can be mostly upgraded using subsidized phones into an available 3G network.
4. Developing nation mobile subs who don't have mobile broadband or smartphones: 3.5 billion. This is a very tough market because the availability of 3G will take time and until it appears, the buyers are unlikely to adopt devices that are useful only though a 3G data plan. They are also a difficult market to target with high ARPU phones/plans.

To assess the timing, one could assign some probability weights to these categories to create various scenarios for adoption. My own guess is that the next 500 million smartphone users are easily within reach in the next two years without a significant amount of inter-platform rivalry (See stacked bar chart to the left).

Only after two years will existing smartphone users become attractive for poaching and even that assumes that developing nation networks will still be largely unaddressable.

I was only half-joking when, on first sight, I tweeted that I will buy a new iPad 2 to go with my new Smart Cover. The new iPad cover is enchanting.

It also seems to be enchanting to many.

I'm estimating that at least 60% of iPad buyers will get one. Based on an estimate of 36 million iPads sold in 2011 and an average price of $48 (70% polyurethane and 30% leather mix), the total revenue for Smart Covers will top $1 billion this year.

I further estimate that with a very modest gross margin of 75% (average cost to produce of $12), the Smart Cover could contribute $777 million to Apple's gross margins.

The iPad by itself should generate $23 billion in revenue and a contribution of $7.7 billion. That means that the Smart Cover will add 4% to sales and 9% to gross profits. If taken as a bundle, the iPad+SC will increase gross margin over the iPad alone by nearly 200 basis points (taking it from 33% to 35%).

It will be interesting to compare the Smart Cover business with competitor tablet businesses.

I last looked at the race to a billion in September 2010. I've now added a few more data points to the tracked platforms and also added points for the major console game platforms and Symbian.

The chart shows the cumulative number of users (approximated by units sold) for 11 platforms indexed to the same starting date. The horizontal axis is the number of quarters since a platform launched. Every fourth quarter is numbered so each number on the axis represents a new year. The last number on the axis represents 10 years.

The vertical axis is the cumulative number of users on a logarithmic scale. Each number of the vertical axis is 10x more users than the previous number. The top of the graph represents a billion users.

The overall chart shows how quickly a platform has grown and is bounded by a billion users and a decade of usage.

When judging the performance of a platform, the adoption slope and sustainability over time is perhaps the most interesting measure.

One can see how many platforms slow down before reaching 100 million and so far none have hit the billion mark (Windows has but not in the 10 year time frame of this chart.) Looking at game consoles also shows the limits of a narrowly focused platform. They performed better than i-Mode and Netscape but not as well as iTunes or iPod which themselves have growth limits.

If you're looking for the "fastest growing" title, it's a toss-up. Both iOS and Android are following almost identical trajectories.[see Notes]

The absolute highest cumulative sales total is Symbian, though now that it's been deprecated, it's set to be bypassed.

It does appear that Android and iOS each have the potential to reach a billion users in less than a decade. Perhaps Android will do so faster but the mobile computing platform race will not play out as the personal computing platform race did.

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Notes:

1. For Android I used my own summary data for historic performance except for the last estimate and forecast which came from IMS Research.
2. iOS forecasts are my own.
3. Symbian data comes from VisionMobile. Forecast is based on Nokia's 150 million additional sales prediction.
4. Game console data is current as of end of 2010 via Wikipedia.
5. Other data sourced from Morgan Stanley.

As iPad shipment volumes increase and as the iPod touch becomes the de-facto iPod, it's time to look at the overall split between iOS devices.

I will focus the discussion between iPhone and iOS "others" because I believe the two categories differ greatly in terms of their positioning and market strategy due to the different channels.

The company does not provide iPod touch units shipment data but it can be estimated that, based on overall iOS numbers released in September, iPod touch represents approximately 50% of iPod units sold.

If we put all we know together about volumes, we have the following chart:

Note that iPod touch has, occasionally outsold the iPhone. The pattern of approximately equal volumes for the two types of products is likely to continue depending greatly on the growth rates.

Next, I turn the spotlight on revenues.

 

Over $10 billion flowed in from Operators, and a bit under $8 billion from other channels.

Note that I labeled the iPod touch and iPad as non-operator channel (Consumer electronics) distribution. Although this is not entirely true (and conversely iPhones are often sold through Apple stores) this gives a rough indication of split.

The iPhone business is staying ahead of the other iOS businesses but the gap is narrowing.

As previously noted, the iPhone is a unique product in Apple's portfolio. It depends on a distribution channel that no other product was designed around. This has advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is a high margin due to service revenue sharing but the disadvantage of network incompatibilities, politics and a range of telecom-related regulations.

What I believe is that the non-operator channel will grow as a proportion of iOS revenues. This is both as iPad grows to disrupt personal computing and as the iPad emerges as a communications tool.

As time passes, I believe Apple is motivated to also move revenues to its traditional channels. Whether, or to what extent, cellular phones will move in that direction remains to be estimated.

The last time I took a snapshot of the iPad death watch it was March 9th, 2010. Almost a year ago. The now-classic quotes are reproduced here.  Last May I wrote:

Apple keeps a tight lid on new products so that competitors don’t get a head-start on copying, but in the case of the iPad, advance knowledge would not have had any impact. Competitors look at the iPad and see nothing.  They’ll only react once the market explodes and they start to feel belated pain.

I thought that would be that. As the success of the product would become self-evident, predictions of imminent demise would trail off. The pain of share loss would prompt a wave of challenger copycats. Imitation would be the the best form of flattery.

But no.

Critics were not silenced. One year, 15 million units, and $9.2 billion later I went back to the source of the quotes and found the following (published quotes dated after March 9th 2010). (Cited from aaplinvestors.net with some editing for brevity and relevance):

“Problematically, the Android competition is just as expensive as the iPad lineup, so Apple obviously feels free to continue gouging consumers on iPad pricing.” Paul Thurrott, Windows IT Pro, 3 March 2011

“Apple’s iPad 2 might be ‘magical’ but it still should’ve been better ... It needs more G’s. It’s still just a toy” Zach Epstein, Boy Genius 2 March 2011

“11 reasons NOT to buy an iPad 2 ... Reason 5: Competition David Gewirtz, ZDNet, 23 February 2011

“Given what I’ve seen of Honeycomb and Motorola’s excellent tablet, Cupertino will have some serious catching up to do with their iPad 2.” J.P. Mangalindan, Fortune, 4 February 2011

“We very carefully chose our tablet processor, the Nvidia Tegra 2, and to really compete it will take [Apple] some time. You know, [Nvidia] is well known for graphics.” Jonney Shih, Asustek Computer, 3 February 2011

“If you were to ask me in two years time, will Apple have less than 50 percent of the global tablet market, I think that’s a certainty. Neil Mawston, Strategy Analytics, 31 January 2011

“We have an extreme focus on the innovation of LePad and LePhone because these products will dominate the future market. Though Apple is winning a significant share in the Chinese market, it has not gained a clearly leading position yet. Our advantage is we know this market better.” Liu Chuanzhi, Lenovo, 27 January 2011

“The iPad may still be the lone leader, but with 100+ competitors on the way, it won’t likely keep its majority market share unless the pending next generation iPad really addresses all the complaints about the current version, like a missing camera and a lack of a USB port, and the company has to add those features without a major price increase - a tall order, to be sure.” James Brumley, Investopedia, 13 January 2011

“Hands-on PlayBook demonstrations at CES showed its differentiation in multitasking and performance, which may be difficult for Apple/Android to rival.” Mike Abramsky, Royal Bank of Canada Analyst, 11 January 2011

“Apple Inc.’s popular iPad is getting its strongest competition thus far as consumer-electronics manufacturers unveil tablet computers with bigger screens, front-facing cameras for video chatting and more.” Rachel Metz, AP Technology Writer, 3 January 2011

Apple may be simply trying to get in ahead of Research in Motion’s aggressively priced PlayBook or combat the early success of Samsung’s Galaxy Tab.” Rick Aristotle Munarriz, The Street, 29 December 2010

4. Competitors are coming. Brett Arends, Wall Street Journal, 22 December 2010

Reason 6: WiFi is still unreliable David Gewirtz, ZDNet, 16 December 2010

“I can’t imagine anyone under the age of 30 wanting an iPad. A PS3, Wii, GameBoy, or even a useful laptop maybe, but an iPad? Furthermore, I do not recall ever seeing anyone under 30 actually using an iPad.” John C. Dvorak, PC Mag, 13 December 2010

“We hope our tablet PCs can reach a global market share of 10-20% initially, and become the market leader in two to three years.” Gianfranco Lanci, CEO and President, Acer, 26 November 2010

“It’s a nice-to-have product, for those of us who don’t have a budget, but is it a must-have product? I don’t think so.” Ashok Kumar, Analyst, Rodman & Renshaw LLC, 12 November 2010

“Steve Jobs never says anything without thinking through it carefully. But I think in this case he may be a little afraid of this category. And he’s finding whatever he can to attack because he sees [seven-inch tablets] as a challenge to the dominance of the iPad.” Adam Hanin, VP Marketing, Viewsonic, 1 November 2010

“There could literally be millions of first-generation iPads gathering dust in people’s home offices already. This product is the tech industry’s biggest MacGuffin yet.” Paul Thurrott, Windows IT Pro, 23 October 2010

“I cannot see a need for the thing.”John Dvorak, MarketWatch, 22 October 2010

”For those of us who live outside of Apple’s distortion field, we know that 7″ tablets will actually be a big portion of the market and we know that Adobe Flash support actually matters to customers who want a real web experience.” Jim Balsillie, Research In Motion, 20 October 2010

“iPhone and iPad have been amazing products that have opened new markets. But I do not think they will own either market in a few years. Android will.” Fred Wilson, AVC.com, 18 October 2010

“The constant search for an ‘iPad killer’ and the sheer multitude of tablet computers launching in the next 18 months should make Apple aware that its competition is fierce and will only become tougher.” Barbara E. Hernandez, PCWorld, 5 October 2010

“HP’s New Tablet Could Be an iPad Spoiler HP’s decision to bundle a tablet computer with its new $399 printer could make trouble for competitors.” Cliff Edwards and Aaron Ricadela, Bloomberg Businessweek, 23 September 2010

“Our tablet will be better than the iPad.” Chang Ma, VP Marketing, LG, 20 August 2010

“Not only is Apple typically lost in the enterprise, but it focuses very little of its time there. And with a new, potentially more compelling tablet coming — the Cisco Cius — the iPad’s success in the corporate world could be short-lived. Here’s why:... 10 The power of Windows” Don Reisinger, Channel Insider, 5 August 2010

“I don’t think there is one size that fits all…I’ve been to too many meetings with journalists who spent the first 10 minutes of the meeting setting up iPad to look like a laptop.” Steve Ballmer, Microsoft, 29 July 2010

“ [...] It still isn’t the device that I’d take to a meeting because it has no input.” Bill Gates, Microsoft, 2 June 2010

“Which means I end up on the iPad — and tablets more generally — where I started. Tablets will not create a new category, but will supplant (or merge with) one or more of the current substitutes: smartphones or netbooks.Here I am less optimistic about the iPhone and webOS than I am about Android. ” Joel West, professor of Innovation & Entrepreneurship, College of Business at San José State University, 30 May 2010

“The iPad is useless. Beautiful, but useless. The iPad is too heavy. It’s awkward to hold and view in public. It’s fragile. It requires expensive accessories to protect it and extract more functionality. ”Josh Belzman, MSNBC.com, 20 May 2010

“Mum, the iPad is not ‘amazing.’ It’s just marketed very well, both by Apple and its culpable partners in mainstream media. ” Paul Thurrott (in response to comment by Mum), Paul Thurrott’s Super Site for Windows, 26 April 2010

“In short, I don’t get the ‘magical and revolutionary’ vibe that Apple chief executive Steve Jobs touted at the iPad’s January unveiling.” Rob Pegoraro, Washington Post, 9 April 2010

“The first troubling sign is the fact that you can still get an iPad today. They didn’t sell out. The pure slate form factor has failed all these years because, other than for vertical applications, people want and/or need a keyboard for regular use. The fact of the matter is that a touch screen or bluetooth keyboard just doesn’t compensate.” Jonathan Yarmis, Ovum, part of Datamonitor Group, 6 April 2010

“I don’t get it. It costs $500 for the basic model, when you could get a laptop with a lot more functionality for about the same price. The iPad hype machine has been in full effect this week, and I still think it’s just that—hype. ” Alex Cook, Frontier Outlook, 3 April 2010

“As far as what this means to Apple, one thing to keep in mind: Even if the iPad sells more than the iPhone did in its first year, it’s still only around 5% of the company’s revenue. So it’s a very small slice. From there, it probably doesn’t grow as large as the smartphone market. So, if you’re buying under rumors, keep perspective in mind. The iPad’s a great product, but it’s probably not a game-changer.” Eric Bleeker, Analyst, Fool.com, 31 March 2010

“The iPad will remain an expensive, niche device compared to all-purpose netbooks.I think that one of the iPad’s most important uses will be for reading ebooks and publications. Even so, though, when it comes to the marketplace, netbooks will sales still far outstrip those of the iPad.” Preston Gralla, PC World, 30 March 2010

“Don’t Believe the iPad Hype. Apple has sold out pre-orders of the forthcoming device, but it could all be a marketing tactic. By not manufacturing enough iPads for the initial launch date, is this a case of Apple shooting itself in the foot?” Mike Schuster, Minyanville.com, 29 March 2010

“‘iPad Killer’ May be Palm’s Last Hope”Tom Bradley, PC World, 20 March 2010

“Even if your company has relented and now supports the iPhone, as growing numbers of businesses do (70% of the Fortune 100 are at least testing it, says Apple) you’ll want to say “No” to the iPad and other tablets. Here’s why: 8. Speaking of money, there is no money in the company budget to pay for iPads. 9. Not supporting iPad will be the enterprise norm. Robert McGarvey, CIO Update, 16 March 2010

“This morning, the fool’s parade gets started. Apple is taking online “pre-orders” for its iPad tablet, which is supposed to begin shipping on April 3. Buying a new kind of product sight unseen is foolish. Especially given how mysterious Apple has been on what the iPad can do and what restrictions on capabilities and media access it will place on users and content providers.” Galen Gruman, InfoWorld, 12 March 2010

“The recent launch of Apple, the iPad tablet, has won the award for the second edition of Fiasco Awards delivered this Thursday in Barcelona. From the more than 7,000 people who voted via the website www.fiascoawards.com, 4,325 have considered it the fiasco of the year. Fiasco Awards, 2010, 11 March 2010

“I think I’ve mentioned this once or twice before, but it bears repeating until it sinks in: the Apple iPad is not unique, nor necessarily the best of breed in the media tablet sector it is spearheading. And it ain’t gonna help Apple shareholders any.’” Anders Bylund (TMF Zahrim), 11 March 2010

From this critical review, it looks like 2011 will indeed be the year of the iPad 2.

“It doesn’t matter how good or bad the product is, the fact is that people don’t read anymore,” he said. “Forty percent of the people in the U.S. read one book or less last year. The whole conception is flawed at the top because people don’t read anymore.”

The Passion of Steve Jobs - NYTimes.com

It was almost exactly three years ago that Steve Jobs dismissed the Kindle reader as a futile attempt to change user behavior.

Yesterday, Steve Jobs announced that the iBooks store served 100 million ebooks in its first 11 months of operations.

So do we have another example of Steve's classic misdirection where he dismisses a category only to enter and dominate it at some later time?

Let's look at the data. The chart below shows the sales ramp of three media types served by Apple: songs, apps and books.

At the same point in time (11 months post-launch) there were five times as many songs downloaded and 15 times as many apps downloaded as ebooks. You can see the relationship between different media consumption more clearly on a log chart:

The conclusion that can be drawn so far is that apps/songs show an order of magnitude more popularity than ebooks. Perhaps Kindle ebooks outsell Amazon music downloads, but we don't have comparable data from Amazon and it would be a challenge to compare the two Amazon media as they are packaged and dlievered in different ways (Amazon's digital music is not an integrated offering while their ebooks are.)

Books are a 400 year old medium. Songs only 100 years old and apps a mere 10. For three centuries, the book medium had a monopoly on solitary entertainment. The download data shows how quickly new media displace the old. Therefore, in this context, it's perhaps fair to say that Steve was right three years ago when he said "People don't read anymore."

Today he could add that people use apps instead. Many of the apps available are hired to do the same job for users: solitary, immersive entertainment.

On the eve of iPad 2.0, it's time to think again about this curious new computer. My intuition tells me that this product category will behave very differently from the iPhone and will not be subject to the same sales ramp.

The iPad has been on the market for less than a year but it's still a puzzle for many. It's a product that's often seen as an iPhone product line extension. From a hardware point of view, it certainly seems to be. It has an almost identical internal architecture and uses almost the same software. An engineer would look at it and reasonably say it's the same thing.

However, from the way it's used and the way it's sold, it has very little in common with its smaller cousin. There are plenty of experts who can detail how the products are used differently, but I would highlight the portability of the iPhone makes it suitable for a completely different set of tasks than the less portable but more immersive iPad.

But what I want to dwell on here is how differently the products are sold.

I'll build the case from evidence that Apple provides. The most important observation is that the iPad is an unlocked product. Although you can hire an operator to provide you with data services for it, the product is designed not to rely on that. As a result the product is effectively "divorced" from the operator channel. This means it does not typically benefit (or suffer) from subsidy.

This may seem an interesting side-note to the iPad story, but I think this is a central pillar of the market strategy. The iPhone was designed around a high-ARPU data plan. I've even suggested that the iPhone is nothing more than a data plan wrapped in glass and polished metal. Because it was designed to enable migration of cellular voice users to data plans, it's priced to skim profits from the migration. At some future point in time when a skimming strategy is no longer optimal, the iPhone might be re-positioned for penetration, but that time is not now.

As part of a skimming strategy, the iPhone has a limited distribution channel. It's only sold through special agreement with selected operators. Again, timing is crucial. That channel is expanding, but for nearly four years the product has not been positioned for sale through any channel other than Apple retail and Operator retail.

On the other hand, the iPad is marketed for penetration. It had a low price and an unlimited distribution strategy. It could be sold through any consumer electronics product point of sale. And then some. It could conceivably be sold through as many if not more points of sale as the iPod (i.e. tens of thousands.)

It can be sold in any country, can be distributed through middlemen and can be priced arbitrarily [1]. It can be bought in bulk by companies or schools or hospitals. It can be re-sold in a secondary market. It is essentially a perfectly liquid commodity.

Now we can step back and ask why and what are the implications for competitors.

The reason the iPad was positioned asymmetrically to the iPhone is, I believe, because it could be. I believe that the iPhone is sold the way it is (through operators) because that's the only way it could be sold effectively. Cellular products have always come with lots of fine print, footnotes and asterisks rooted in the regulatory environment that underlies the industry.

The iPad is a product built and sold along the lines of the Mac and the iPod--unrestricted by orifices and aligned with the unregulated environment that computers have always enjoyed. Essentially, for the iPhone, Apple chose to go along with the telecom industry's rules but as soon as it had a product that did not need to comply to those rules, it ran back to its comfort zone: control.

If we take this to be the cause, the implications for competitors become clearer. Apple is more in its element selling the iPad than it is in selling the iPhone. Other tablet contenders however are in an opposite strategic stance. Almost all the credible tablet alternatives rely on the telecom channel for distribution. The rush to build iPad alternatives is as predictable as the derision that was poured on the product when it was launched.

But the alternative products are positioned in different ways. They are positioned as big phones.

Which brings me to my final point: selling big phones is hard.

These products are not compliant with what users expect from an operator: a service plan. As a result they are also not competitively priced with the iPad. Apple engineered a price for the iPad that makes comparisons extremely favorable. Buyers know the thing they are buying is not a phone so they look at the price carefully.

But the most crucial weakness of alternative vendors is the fact that operators don't know how to sell tablets. Tablets are small computers. They are bought in the same way that buyers buy laptops: in-store testing. Notice that except for the iPhone operators only provide phone mockups in their stores. This is because they want buyers to discuss their purchase with a sales rep. This is not the way laptop hunters shop. Another tell-tale sign of a disconnect between operators and tablets is that operator shops are physically tiny. PCs (and tablets) need large tables for users to look, touch, heft and fondle. Just on square feet alone, operators and tablets are not a good match.

If you need any more evidence, consider the plight of operator-subsidized netbooks.

 

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Notes:

1. I realize that this is not currently true and the distribution is limited but that's only a matter of supply constraints. There is no theoretical positioning limitation.

 

In the quarterly smartphone summary published here, I noted the significant acceleration of Android sales at the expense of "other" and Windows Mobile/Phone. Some share was also lost to Symbian. This might be seen as justification for the "platform jump" that Nokia undertook.

In a second discussion, I published the history and life cycles of the smartphone platforms, identifying 10 platforms (out of 16) still in the market. This challenged the view that it was a two horse race today and that it will become no more than a three horse race in the future.

Questions came up about the "quality" of these platforms. Clearly some are barely viable while some are thriving. To explain the value of a platform, one metric we can use is the cumulative sales which allows us to derive the installed base.

The following charts do just that.

This first chart shows the cumulative total of units sold since Q2 2007. This is the sum of all smartphones sold in the last 3.5 years. There are some interesting patterns here, but right now we want to focus on the installed base.

3.5 years of cumulative sales is an upper bound on the installed base. We can get a better estimate the phones in use by subtracting from the base phones older than 2.5 years. This is shown in the second chart below:

As of the last quarter, Nokia's Symbian is likely to have 200 million in use. Apple may have about 85 million iPhones in use (this excludes iPod touch and iPads) and Android about 75 million. RIM is around 95 million and Windows Mobile less than 40 million.

What's interesting is that of these installed bases, the largest is the one that's just been abandoned, and the smallest was chosen as its replacement. Even that's not quite fair since Windows Mobile is not a valid replacement. It's Windows Phone that was chosen and that probably has an installed base of about 1 million [Unlike the measurement of units shipped, Microsoft reported two million licenses were sold to OEMs who had to build those into phones which would be shipped to carriers and distributors. One million may be a generous estimate.]

The bottom line is that there are about 5 Windows Phone users for every 1000 Symbian users. In other words, Nokia jumped from the "burning" 200 million user Symbian platform to the "ice cold" 1 million user Windows Phone platform.

The disposal of such a large installed base must count among the largest divestitures in technology history and, when coupled with the adoption of the least-tested alternative as a replacement, elevates platform risk-taking to a new level. It may seem bold, but there is a fine line between courage and recklessness.

I'll do my own "dive" into the possible justification for this in a future posting.

Predictions on Nokia’s new platform strategy: new OS for the US | asymco.

Here are my predictions from January 27 for the February 11 Nokia strategy announcement followed by the actual quotes from Nokia's press release:

• Prediction: There will be a multiple OS strategy.

Actual: The following sub-units [make up] Smart Devices: Symbian Smartphones, MeeGo Computers, Strategic Business Operations. To support the planned new partnership with Microsoft, Smart Devices will be responsible for creating a winning Windows Phone portfolio.

• Prediction: The US market will be the first to see a new non-Nokia OS. I would guess Windows Phone with AT&T.

Actual: "Plans for a broad strategic partnership with Microsoft to build a new global mobile ecosystem; Windows Phone would serve as Nokia's primary smartphone platform"

• Low end devices will remain with Symbian due to price considerations for the chipsets, components.

Actual: "Symbian becomes a franchise platform, leveraging previous investments to harvest additional value. This strategy recognizes the opportunity to retain and transition the installed base of 200 million Symbian owners. Nokia expects to sell approximately 150 million more Symbian devices in the years to come."

• Prediction: MeeGo will be phased out in phone products but development will continue for tablets

Actual: Under the new strategy, MeeGo becomes an open-source, mobile operating system project. MeeGo will place increased emphasis on longer-term market exploration of next-generation devices, platforms and user experiences

More details to follow, but so far it looks like there are no surprises.