Asymco

Asymmetric Intelligence

Android

  1. Reasons for iOS outperformance in the US

    Research · 147 comments

    The comScore mobiLens survey for the US ending February 2013 shows continuing rapid expansion of smartphone usage in the US. Even though the 50% penetration threshold was passed seven months earlier, the rate of new smartphone users was second highest ever recorded with over 1 million new-to-smartphones users every week during February.

    Screen Shot 2013-04-05 at 4-5-4.15.52 PM

    Overall penetration increased to 57% with nearly 2% of the population switching in one month. Using the average growth rate for the last six periods, the US could see 80% penetration in another 19 months or by Q3/Q4 2014.

    It remains to be seen if the consistency of growth which was preserved from 20% to 60% is maintained between 60% and 80%, but all indications so far are that it will be.

    The growth in smartphones has been driven by the two dominant platforms: iPhone (iOS) and Android. Together they now make up 91% of the user base with about 40% for iPhone and 51% for Android.

    Screen Shot 2013-04-05 at 4-5-4.19.14 PM

    Android alone gained 17 million users in the last 12 months while iPhone gained 21 million users.

    Screen Shot 2013-04-05 at 4-5-4.20.02 PM

    iOS user gains have out-paced Android for the last four periods which resulted in a decrease in Android share of users. A reduction in Android share was also visible in the spring of last year but the current decline is not only longer but more pronounced.

    Screen Shot 2013-04-05 at 4-5-4.22.13 PM

    The reason iOS is growing more rapidly may be due to three factors:

    1. Broader distribution with three out of four major operators carrying the phone
    2. Availability of three product variants with $0 starting prices.
    3. Increasing awareness and use of apps and content ecosystems due to network effects.

    As distribution is about to increase with T-Mobile being added to the carrier list the growth in iOS share is likely to continue even as the market expands.

  2. An update on Android activations

    Research · 51 comments

    Two days after I posted a reminder that Google had not updated their Android activations for five months, Google updated their Android activations.

    The new total is 750 million. My expectation (based on a rate of activation acceleration of 30,000 activations/day/week) was 800 million. Google did not update their download rate but it can be derived. Between September and March the average has been about 1.4 million/day. I had previously estimated that the rate of activation was 2 million/day.

    This is a modest increase from the 1.3 million/day that was reported in September implying that activation acceleration has slowed.

    After resetting the acceleration to 5,000 activations/day/week my new forecast for 1 billion activations moves to the end of August.

    Coincident with this update on activations, Google reported that Andy Rubin has stepped aside as the head of Android and that Android and Chrome would be under the same management.

    Putting aside the exit of the founder, the implications of the merger with Chrome will need significant contemplation.

  3. Where are the Android users?

    Research · 172 comments

    Google occasionally reports data regarding Android. Very occasionally. The last time we had some data was in September 2012 when we learned that activations were running at 1.3 million per day and that a total of 500 million total activations had taken place.

    As of today, being March 2013, the time between updates has reached five months. It's the longest gap so far. Benedict Evans also notes that it's been five months since the data regarding screen size stats has been updated on the Android developer site.

    But we have to live with what we get and, in the absence of an update, the pattern of growth in Android, if sustained, looks like this:

    Screen Shot 2013-03-10 at 3-10-11.05.14 PM

    It implies that 800 million Android activations have taken place to date and the rate is about 2 million per day. One billion activations could thus happen by June.

    There is however another set of data regarding Android which is updated more frequently. The comScore mobiLens survey covers the US and provides updates on a monthly basis. That data shows that Android users in the US reached about 68 million as of the end of January. See the updated data below:

    Screen Shot 2013-03-11 at 3-11-10.26.01 AM

    I included the install base and share of total users as reported. Combining the comScore data with Google's activations gives the following picture of US as a percent of global Android (orange circles represent US base and blue circles the precent of total activations that the US might represent)[1].

    Screen Shot 2013-03-10 at 3-10-11.44.34 PM

    The data implies about 9% of Android usage is in the US. The more startling thing is the difference in growth: it implies that with a US growth rate of only about 13.3k/day, global growth is 150 times faster than US growth. In other words, that 0.6% of new users are in the US and that 99.4% of Android growth is outside the US.

    That's an interesting story. But it's even more interesting that this is not the case with the iPhone. The iPhone is growing considerably faster in the US than Android. One can see this more easily with a graph of the US mobile platform net user gain rate as shown below:

    Screen Shot 2013-03-11 at 3-11-10.32.23 AM

     

    Looking at the the same contrast between global and US, from Apple's financial reports, in the fourth quarter the global "activation rate" (i.e. sales rate) for iPhone was 525k/day (nearly one quarter of the extrapolated Android rate). The comScore data suggests the US gains are running at 106k/day. Therefore we can calculate that about 20% of iPhone growth is in the US and 80% is outside the US.

    Even accounting for some potential error in the Android estimates, the contrast is quite stunning: 1% vs. 20% share of growth suggests something is very different about the US with respect to the two platforms.

    My suspicion is that it has something to do with the fact that the US is one of the few (but largest) market where the iPhone is available as a "low end" offering. At a minimum price of $0 (with a contract) many consumers are finding the iPhone attractive relative to a $0 (with a contract) Android phone. This price parity (illusory as it may be) allows iPhone to grow even faster than Android in this particular market.

    One wonders what would happen if such price parity were present globally.

    ---

    Notes:

    1. Android activation data as reported by Google includes tablets but excludes many unofficial Android builds e.g. Amazon Kindle and many Chinese phones and tablets that don't register with Google services. comScore data includes only primary devices used by consumers and excludes corporate purchases and devices whose primary users are younger than 13 years.
  4. LG's new Tele-vision

    Research · 17 comments

    LG Electronics has acquired HP's WebOS for an undisclosed amount. When last it changed hands WebOS was part of Palm which was purchased for $1.2 billion in 2010.

    Palm has thus been effectively divided into several smaller pieces distributed as follows:

    HP will own:

    • Support of existing Palm users
    • Palm back-end assets including source code, infrastructure and talent
    • webOS patents

    LG will own:

    • Stewardship of the Open WebOS and Enyo open-source projects where the source code resides
    • Associated talent
    • WebOS websites
    • License for IP related to webOS

    LG announced that it plans to offer an "intuitive user experience an Internet services across a range of consumer electronics devices." In an interview, the CTO of LG said that given the current situation with Android, LG does not plan on making smartphones running webOS but will use it in televisions and other devices such as cars, signage and appliances where there are no embedded OS's. "We'd like to secure a software platform across all devices."

    Most commentary regarding the deal focused on the use of the platform for TVs but management seems to consider all devices, perhaps even phones, at some future date, to be webOS targets.

    The TV however seems to be low hanging fruit today. The TV as an app platform will be the new ecosystem war and no platform today has a lock on the developers or users. The way this rivalry will shape up will not mirror other device classes for the same reason that current device classes are platform silos.

    PCs, music players, tablets and phones all have different super-majority platform leaders. The association of a platform with a device class depends first on the distribution model, which favors a specific business model which favors a specific vendor which favors a specific platform. As each device is distributed differently, a different platform takes precedence.

    Consider that the PC has historically been purchased by IT departments which led to a monoculture of Windows which led to a persistent leadership for Microsoft.

    The music player created dominance around iTunes mostly because the distribution model for music labels was baked-in. With network effects, the iPod quickly gained and perpetually retained market share leadership.

    The smartphone business initially favored Symbian and BlackBerry because they had the market access through operators. After the touch UI became dominant (and incumbents failed to respond in a timely manner), Apple and Google took leadership as soon as they accepted the operator distribution model. Android in particular is especially resonant with operators and has been developed with their requirements in mind.

    The tablet business is more like the PC business but without enterprise requirements or patterns of purchase. This has meant that app/content ecosystems and retail distribution were the key gating factors. The story is still unfolding but so far Microsoft has not found a foothold while iOS and Android and Amazon have.

    That leads to the question of how will smart TVs be sold and which business model (or go-to-market strategy) will succeed. Steve Jobs pointed out the difficulty in trying to deliver innovation into a value chain dominated by cable companies which can effectively block it. A TV which is an application execution device rather than a content terminal will require a re-definition of the category. That will require a re-positioining of this product. Few companies are able to do that. [See also my post Tele Vision from mid-2011].

    Which brings us back to the question of webOS. As long as LG sells TVs as content terminals they might not obtain much value from webOS. If, on the other hand, LG were to use webOS to re-define their televisions to be something else entirely, namely software execution devices, sold differently and hired to do a different job than a TV, then webOS becomes not only necessary but potentially a source of great prosperity.

  5. The race to a billion—2012 Update

    Research · 66 comments

    I last looked at the race to a billion in March 2011. Since then, I've been updating and adding data to the set giving a broader selection of platforms to compare.

    Before we dive in, an explanation: the initial review excluded Windows (PC) and Facebook mainly because (a)  the ramp scale I'm using is about a decade in duration and (b) I was reluctant to compare platforms that require payment to join to those that don't. The (DOS/Windows) PC ramped over several decades (starting in 1981) and Facebook is a service that costs nothing to join. There was much gnashing of teeth and shaking of fists as a result.

    Therefore, in the interest of inclusion, I added both to the data set and let the chips fall where they may.

    The data is shown below.

    Screen Shot 2013-01-16 at 1-16-2.11.50 PM

    I kept the scale to about a decade so that individual lines can be resolved. As a result, you'll note that although Windows reached one billion first it did so slowly enough to be off the scale shown. Indeed, the "race to a billion" should be titled  "The race to one billion users in less than a decade".

    In such a competition, the winner would be Facebook which, in October 2012, 35 quarters after launch, reached the finish line. The second looks to be Android (probably this year) and the third iOS (sometime next year.)

    That may sound like the end of it, but what the graph also shows are the more subtle trends:

    • Game consoles seem to saturate at below 100 million total. One can see the difference in ramps between recent mobile platforms and consoles in the second chart. There might be implications for which platforms will end up dominating the entertainment industry. There should also be some explanations of why consoles are so limited.
    • iTunes accelerated with iOS and left the iPod behind. This is unsurprising but it shows that a content platform can be more flexible than one attached to any particular device or architecture. An important lesson perhaps for those in the content businesses.
    • Early mobile platforms like Nokia's Symbian, RIM BlackBerry and Windows Mobile have faded indicating that there was no early-mover advantage in platforms. The same can be said for early PC platforms.
    • Windows Phone began by tracking the Android/iOS ramps but seems not to be accelerating into its second year in a way that implies potential parity.
    • Although Facebook did reach 1 billion rather quickly the slopes of Android and iOS indicate that they may overtake it in overall ecosystem size.

    One billion is significant in several ways: First, because it is the "high-water mark" set by Windows and signifies what a global platform needs to become to be essentially "universal". Second, because it implies sustainability. A threshold perhaps from which network effects are sufficient to sustain (assuming some switching costs and an ability and willingness to adapt e.g. software, content or time investments from users.) Third, because it implies sufficient value to the ecosystem (assuming a monetization mechanism exists e.g. Windows software developers and IT managers.)

    Looking beyond this milestone however, there is no reason why it should be thought of as a barrier. Mobile connections number over 5 billion and computing is likely to reach most of them. Therefore one billion may turn out to be only 20% penetration. In fact, I expect this series of posts will need to be updated in 2013 as "The race to two billion."

  6. The real threat that Samsung poses to Apple

    Podcast · 430 comments

    [The following is a post written by James Allworth.

    James is the co-author of How Will You Measure Your Life?. He has worked as a Fellow at the Forum for Growth and Innovation at Harvard Business School, at Apple, and Booz & Company. It follows and builds on a discussion we had on the 56th Critical Path podcast.

    You can connect directly with James on Twitter at @jamesallworth -ed]

    A lot of ink has been spilled in the wake of the recent Apple Samsung patent disputes, and the legal wars see no sign of abating any time soon. The rise of Samsung's phone business has been meteoric, and Apple is right to be concerned. But the real threat that Samsung poses to Apple has very little to do with the copying (or not) of Apple's designs. The lawsuits have simply been a convenient (if expensive and risky) way to attempt to quash a threat that is of Apple's own making. While there's no doubt that Google has played a key role in Samsung's success by handing out a free mobile operating system to pretty much anyone who wants to build one — it is actually Apple, more than any other company, that is responsible for Samsung's present success.

    How? By outsourcing as much work to Samsung as they have. And it's impossible not to wonder whether Tim Cook's announcement yesterday on bringing back Apple's manufacturing to the USA is the beginnings of an attempt to rectify the problem.

    But first, I want to establish why copying is actually less of a threat to Apple than you might think. Daring Fireball's John Gruber wrote last year on what he termed "The New Apple Advantage". Like most people who appreciate Apple and its products, the starting point for Gruber's appreciation of Apple is its design — he says as much in the article. But the realization that Gruber has in the article on Apple's true competitive advantage is what's really interesting:

    So let’s be lazy for a second here, and attribute all of Apple’s success over the past 15 years to two men: Steve Jobs and Tim Cook. We’ll give Jobs the credit for the adjectives beautiful, elegant, innovative, and fun. We’ll give Cook the credit for the adjectives affordable, reliable, available, and profitable. Jobs designs them, Cook makes them and sells them.

    It’s the Jobs side of the equation that Apple’s rivals — phone, tablet, laptop, whatever — are able to copy. Thus the patents and the lawsuits. Design is copyable. But the Cook side of things — Apple’s economy of scale advantage — cannot be copied by any company with a complex product lineup. How could Dell, for example, possibly copy Apple’s operations when they currently classify “Design & Performance” and “Thin & Powerful” as separate laptop categories?

    This realization sort of snuck up on me. I’ve always been interested in Apple’s products because of their superior design; the business side of the company was never of as much interest. But at this point, it seems clear to me that however superior Apple’s design is, it’s their business and operations strength — the Cook side of the equation — that is furthest ahead of their competition, and the more sustainable advantage. It cannot be copied without going through the same sort of decade-long process that Apple went through.
    (emphasis mine)

    The argument is beautifully made. The design part of Apple's equation is to their ability to redefine new industries as they did with the iPhone. Whether they go after the TV market next, or something else, it's this integrated design component that will be crucial to their initial success. But compared to the business side of Apple, design actually generates much less sustained strategic advantage in any one product category, once performance in that category becomes "good enough". The tech industry has always revolved around copying. Once folks work out how it's done, everyone piles on. And at that point, it becomes much less about design than it does about how you operate your business.

    It is the last part of the Gruber quote that really drives things home. "It cannot be copied without going through the same sort of decade-long process that Apple went through". He's right — it's very hard for a competitor to outright replicate what Apple has achieved without going through all the same steps. But it got me thinking of a concept — and a related story — that I learned from someone I was fortunate enough to have as a teacher: Clayton Christensen. Perhaps a competitor didn't have to copy Apple.

    What happens if Apple had already taught them?

    Christensen first wrote about the dangers of outsourcing in The Innovator's Solution, explaining how seeking to maximize efficiency by employing third party vendors to do the "low value-add" work for you can be a lethal strategy. In the Solution, Christensen and Michael Raynor gave the example of two fictional corporations—"Component Corporation" and "Texas Computer Corporation". I had the good fortune to work with Clay on his most recent book, How Will You Measure Your Life?, and we recount a similar story; only without any of the players being disguised. The story is that of Asus and Dell, and how by outsourcing its work—starting with just basic circuit boards—Dell equipped a competitor:

    Asus came to Dell and said, “We’ve done a good job fabricating these motherboards for you. Why don’t you let us assemble the whole computer for you, too? Assembling those products is not what’s made you successful. We can take all the remaining manufacturing assets off your balance sheet, and we can do it all for 20 percent less.”

    The Dell analysts realized that this, too, was a win- win...

    That process continued as Dell outsourced the management of its supply chain, and then the design of its computers themselves. Dell essentially outsourced everything inside its personal-computer business—everything except its brand— to Asus. Dell’s Return on Net Assets became very high, as it had very few assets left in the consumer part of its business.

    Then, in 2005, Asus announced the creation of its own brand of computers. In this Greek-tragedy tale, Asus had taken everything it had learned from Dell and applied it for itself. It started at the simplest of activities in the value chain, then, decision by decision, every time that Dell outsourced the next lowest-value-adding of the remaining activities in its business, Asus added a higher value-adding activity to its business.

    There are two sides to this story: the part that relates to Dell, and the part that relates to Asus. Dell, in its quest to maximize its financial efficiency, continued to outsource way beyond manufacturing components and assembly. They outsourced a long way up the value chain. But there's also the side of the story that relates to Asus — a small components manufacturer that was, in effect, nursed to success by Dell. The extent of the schooling delivered by Dell to Asus was pretty profound, given how far up the value chain Dell outsourced its operations.

    But here's a question: at what point did Dell seal its fate? When was it that Dell had outsourced enough that Asus, with a desire to simply get out of the low-value work, could have made it all the way to the point that it did? I'm beginning to wonder whether just component development and assembly was enough. In the case of Samsung, it seems that everything else they needed to learn, they did by entering the emerging market, which Apple has largely left alone.

    Now, it's obvious that there are some very clear differences between the decisions that Apple have made in terms of outsourcing, and the decisions Dell have made. Dell outsourced its business all the way up to the design of its products. In many respects, Apple is doing the opposite — going so far as to even bring chip design in house. Horace has done some fantastic work detailing the extensive amount of investment Apple has made in its supply chain and it's clear that they've spent a lot of money investing in equipment used in production.

    But there's also no denying that Apple has begun to rely extensively on a network of suppliers across Asia.

    It's when you start putting the two arguments together that you realize that Apple may have a more serious problem on its hands. I want to again recount the final two lines of Gruber's argument:

    It’s their business and operations strength — the Cook side of the equation — that is furthest ahead of their competition, and the more sustainable advantage. It cannot be copied without going through the same sort of decade-long process that Apple went through.

    He's right — generating that scale requires a long gestation period — one that Apple went through. And it can't be copied without significant time and effort on the part of a competitor. But there's one big implicit assumption here — that suppliers won't turn around and start developing their own offering. Because when Apple went through this transformative process, where the design whittled down the broad range of offerings to just a few, and they generated the scale on the business side that accompanied that — they weren't actually the only one to go through that process. Apple's partners — their suppliers — went through it with them. And they've got very big, and very good at what they do. Samsung, obviously, is among those partners.

    Now, the response I often hear to this line of reasoning is: Apple hasn't outsourced anywhere near as much as Dell has. How are the situations analogous? But I think it's actually the wrong question. Instead, the question is: has Apple already outsourced too much?

    For all intents and purposes, we're at a level of maturity in the smartphone market where I believe design — particularly on the hardware side — has largely become commoditised. Performance is now "good enough". Whereas it was not so long ago that consumers sat on the edge of their seats to find out what the new iPhone had to offer ("please, fix the battery life", or "please, make it faster") the recent release of the iPhone 5 seemed not to generate the same intense reaction. Now, I'm not saying it won't sell well — in fact, it will probably become the best selling phone of all time — but people aren't making these decisions based on huge design differences between the devices. The basis of competition has shifted. HTC recently learned this the hard way when it introduced the One X — a phone that, to the critics, at least, was considered the best Android phone available — "a masterpiece",  "one of the best mobile devices I've ever used". Yet it has been absolutely crushed in the marketplace by Samsung.  How? Well, Samsung used its business scale to, as Horace put it on Twitter, "invite operators to a better party with an eye-watering marketing budget". This has nothing to do with Samsung making a better phone (they probably didn't), or Samsung copying Apple (indeed, HTC may have just done a better job of copying Apple). Instead, it has everything to do with the fact that Samsung has had its business sucked along in Apple's slipstream.

    There's another way of seeing just how deep the problem lies. Jobs promised "thermonuclear war" on the copied devices, and so far, the biggest target of Apple's many legal warheads has undoubtedly been Samsung. Getting a $1 billion judgement certainly proves Apple was serious about it. But doesn't it seem strange to you that the target of such a devastating strategy on the legal side, just so happens to be… one of the most important suppliers for Apple's new phone?

    The problem that Apple is facing right now has nothing to do with their designs being copied. There is a long history of copying in the tech industry; patents being deployed in lawsuits by giants often signify desperation more than anything else. Rather, the problem that Apple faces is that it now is going up against at least one competitor that has been a beneficiary of the scale that Apple has achieved on the business side. Samsung has clearly demonstrated that, like Asus, it was not satisfied being a low-margin ODM — of doing all the menial work while somebody else made the big bucks. Suing Samsung over Android patents isn't going to change that — if Google's operating system gets too expensive to use, there'll be a switch made to Microsoft. Or to another operating system altogether. It doesn't really matter, because design in the smartphone space has been commoditized. It's good enough. Manufacturers are now creating performance that most consumers aren't able to absorb. Instead, as we've moved into a world where performance is now "good enough", the world has flipped into one where it's the business side — operational scale — that matters most.

    Apple have taken steps to minimize the ability of competitors to duplicate their business advantage. There's a great post here on Quora describing how Apple has used its supply chain as a competitive advantage and how competitors end up subsidizing Apple's use of the technology. But the approach of "locking in" key new technology so nobody else can get them works best in a world where consumers need more performance from their devices — a world is rapidly slipping away.

    So, what's Apple got to do? In so much as it is able to trust its suppliers of key components not to become competitors, it can continue to use them. But where it can't, or where those suppliers have already become competitors, it has only one sensible choice — replace them. It has two choices here: the first (and obvious one) is with another supplier. But that risks the same thing happening all over again — Apple nursing another supplier into a competitor. The second choice: for components and services that are critical to maintaining competitive advantage in the markets which Apple plays, Apple needs to build the components themselves.

    Most companies wouldn't be in a position do that. But Apple is almost already there. I also hear that there might be a country out there with relatively high unemployment rate, looking for some jobs to be brought back home. Funnily enough, it seems that's just what Tim Cook is doing right now. This approach might just be a good way of on-shoring some of those untaxed offshore profits (I imagine the tax benefits for building a few factories in the US would be quite high), all the while taking away business from competitors — both current and future.

    But there's one question that still remains. In the instance of the threat that Samsung poses to Apple: is it already too late?

    –

    Looking for more information on the renaissance of production and its effect on the technology industries? Then come to Asymconf and take part in the debate.

     

  7. Validating the Android engagement paradox

    Research · 52 comments

    Following yesterday's IBM data, Monetate released a new study showing similar data related to retail browsing but covering a period of dates from Q3 2011 to Q3 2012.

    This data also shows an acceleration of mobile shopping, from 7.7% of online in Q3 2011 to 18.8% in Q3 2012.

    It also shows tablets growing to take about half of mobile traffic in a very short time frame.

    The data also shows the iPad taking the vast bulk of traffic among tablets (88.9% vs. 88.3% from IBM).

    The data also shows the iPhone taking 61% of phone traffic (67% from IBM) with the rest being Android.

    The data shows the share of iOS being 74% in Q3 while IBM reports 77% for Black Friday.

    The data also shows a very small participation from Kindle and Android tablets.

    Finally, by using the install base data from ComScore, the data shows an absolute and relative decline in Android engagement. Android phones went from 0.47 of iPhone engagement to 0.4 in one year.

    ---

    If you'd like to learn more about the Asymco method, come to Asymconf. The next Asymconf will be at the end of January near San Jose. Not only will you learn about how mobile is disrupting computing, you will also get to hobnob with the likes of Om Malik, Jean-Louis Gassée and Michael Lopp.

     

  8. The Android engagement paradox

    Research · 180 comments

    IBM's Digital Analytics Benchmark reported US Black Friday sales and the news is reasonably good. Overall online sales grew by 17.4% while mobile grew to make up 24% of traffic.

    The data goes further to show the split between device types. I illustrate this split with the following graphs:

    Of the 24% of traffic made up by mobile devices, phones contributed 13% and tablets 11% (or 54% and 46% of mobile respectively). Of the phone traffic, iOS devices were about two thirds of traffic and Android one third. Of tablet traffic, iPad was 88%, Kindle and Nook were 5.5% Galaxy Tab was 1.8% and other tablets were 4.4%.

    Overall, iOS was 77% generated mobile traffic and Android (excl. Kindle, Nook) was 23%.

    That's an interesting snapshot of the consumption of mobile devices, but is there a pattern here? I also took a look at the same data from 2011 and 2010.

    Besides the pattern of significant mobile growth (from 5.2% to 24% of online in two years) there is the curious effect of iOS growth outpacing Android growth. Android went from 1.43% of Black Friday shopping traffic in 2010 to 4.92% in 2012. In same time iOS went from 3.85% to 18.46%. In other words, while Android is up by a factor of 3.4, iOS is up by a factor of 4.8.

    The reason is evident in the graphs above: the iPad is now the predominant mobile shopping device. You can observe the pattern in the following graph:

    Two years ago the iPad was trailing Android usage but this year it was more than twice Android usage. Curiously, the iPhone seems to also be pulling ahead of Android.

    Curiously because the number of Android users in the US has gone the other way. That data is available from ComScore, though only for phones. (ComScore data for periods ending November each year, Nov 2012 is my estimate):

    Having the number of users and the traffic allows us to measure consumption per capita, so to speak. That is, the percent of traffic per device user:

    The ratio shown is basis points of usage (1/100 of 1% of shopping traffic) per million users of smartphones. iPhone users are about three times more engaged in shopping with their devices than Android users. Two years ago the ratio was two to one.

    Overall iPad is changing shopping habits, but it has a near monopoly in its form factor at this point. The bigger question is what is causing phone users to behave differently based on the devices they own. The phone market is more mature and has had several years of competition to be able to discern differences in platforms. The pattern is pretty clear with respect to Android: engagement is down as ownership is up. This pattern has not exhibited itself with iPhone, even though it has had a longer time in market.

    Of course, one would expect that later adopters would engage less, but I find it surprising that US Android users would behave so differently only two years after the platform began to be widely adopted. That pattern is not happening with iOS even after five years and certainly not with the iPad which is about as old as most Android brands.

    This I consider to be a paradox: Why is Android attracting late adopters (or at least late adopter behavior) when the market is still emergent? We've become accustomed to thinking that platforms that look similar are used in a similar fashion. But this is clearly not the case. The shopping data is only one proxy but there are others: developers and publishers have been reporting distinct differences in consumption on iOS vs. Android and, although anecdotal, the examples continue to pile up.

    And engagement is not a frivolous platform attribute. It is highly causal to success because it correlates with all cash flows associated with ecosystem value creation. Especially when a platform like Android depends more on engagement than "monetizing hardware."

    I'm not satisfied with the explanation that Android users are demographically different because the Android user pool is now so vast and because the most popular devices are not exactly cheap. There is something else at play. It might be explained by design considerations or by user experience flaws or integration but something is different.

    ---

    If you'd like to learn more about the Asymco method, come to Asymconf. The next Asymconf will be at the end of January near San Jose. Not only will you learn about how mobile is disrupting computing, you will also get to hobnob with the likes of Om Malik, Jean-Louis Gassée and Michael Lopp.

  9. The iPhone Addressable Market

    Research · 125 comments

    The iPhone is a severely constrained product. We're used to thinking that it's production constrained—and it is, but it's also distribution constrained. It has a business model that is almost completely dependent on operator subsidy. Few end users pay the $650 average price that Apple obtains and that price point has held for a remarkably long time. This price point is largely invisible to the user.

    In this regard it's very different from all the other products Apple sells. Historically, the company has preferred having its customers to also be its users and maintained a direct relationship with them, strengthening that relationship through its own retail channel for the last decade. Pricing is used by Apple as a signal to clearly illustrate value to the user and pricing is part of the communication about the product that Apple makes very explicit. This has been true for the iPod and Mac and is still true of the iPad. But this is not so for the iPhone. The entire marketing strategy for the iPhone (and hence the entire product concept itself) is "off message".

    Why is this?

    Before we get into causes, let's try to measure the distribution channel for the iPhone. Apple occasionally reports the total number of carriers it has relationships with. The last update was in the summer when Peter Oppenheimer, Apple CFO discussed the quarter ending June:

    We added several small regional carriers during the quarter and now have iPhone distribution through over 250 carriers in over 100 countries.…

    We added China Telecom as the second [Chinese] carrier in March…

    We also don’t expect to add any significant new country or carrier additions in the September quarter…

    In addition, Apple publishes the list of operators it sells through on its web site. The last time I counted I got 227 listed operators.

    If we contrast this with the total number of global operators (excluding MVNOs) there might be a way to measure distribution penetration. I compiled a list of all such operators based on information available in Wikipedia. You can browse the list here (Google Docs [1]).

    This global list includes 802 operators. The list is not current, being mostly based on 2009 data but it's pretty close. I've read that a more recent (non-public) estimate is 816.

    By this measure we can say that Apple has distribution through about 30% of the total operators. Consider also that RIM reports that it sells BlackBerry through 565 wireless carriers in over 175 countries. By this metric alone BlackBerry has twice the addressable market of the iPhone.

    But we can do better than counting operators. We should account for the fact that some operators have more subscribers than others.

    Using the same database, I measured the subscriber count of iPhone distributing carriers vs. overall subscriber count. The ratio was about 50%.

    iPhone "addresses" about 2.8 billion connections whereas there are about 5.7 billion available connections. Note that this is not users but subscriptions—essentially SIM cards.

    The ratios vary by region:

    • Middle-east/Africa has 29%
    • Asia/Pacific is at 39%
    • Europe 73%
    • The Americas 83%

     

    We can take it a step further and identify which countries hold the highest opportunity for iPhone distribution. The top 5 are:

    1. India: 658 million
    2. China: 622 million
    3. Pakistan: 116 million
    4. Russia: 102 million
    5. Nigeria: 89 million

    But the opportunity is not only in emerging markets. Japan is a 69 million subs opportunity and even the US has 80 million subs without direct (i.e. subsidized) access to the iPhone.

    So we can now return to the question of why the iPhone is sold the way it is.

    First I should point out that the addressable market of Samsung or Android in general is larger than that of the iPhone. Samsung has relationships with far more operators, at least on the scale of RIM or Nokia, perhaps even more. It might be safe to assume that Android is completely unconstrained in distribution and therefore its addressable market is the entire subscriber space (meaning that Android has twice the addressable market of the iPhone.) For Apple to compete on the basis of volume or market share it would make sense to broaden this network. So what's holding it back?

    I think the answer is the other constraint mentioned: production. The company is still iterating the product on a yearly basis and needs to ramp production to reach all its carrier partners in a timely fashion. The carriers use the iPhone as differentiation and a way to uplift their core business. Therefore they want the latest version as quickly as possible. To satisfy this, Apple needs to manufacture the latest variant very quickly. But that's not easy. Peak production is one thing but getting there quickly is another. This is the problem which Apple's vast capital expenditures is trying to solve.

    So far the production capacity has been increasing at nearly 100% per annum. This is an astonishing achievement but it's still not enough. The product is supply constrained during much of the launch quarter. Therefore, to summarize, the entire business model for the iPhone revolves around this question:

    Can enough units be shipped in a sufficiently short time frame to allow a limited (but large) subset of operators to create competitive advantage which sustains a generous up-front subsidy.

    At this time the answer seems to be that the model can work for about 30% of operators serving 50% of subscribers. The crucial question for the business is how much higher can these numbers get?

    Note that this is not a debate about market share or consumer preference but about delivering a particular value proposition to network operators, (which sustains a premium price point.) The iPhone is built around this business model and to alter it would alter the very essence of what the product is. The addressable market is one piece of the product but it interconnects with the price, margin, design, production and breadth of offering. You cannot change one without changing the others. It's a product whose distribution model is part and parcel of its design.

    I believe that the particular way this product translates into a business is very rigid, which is why it has not changed much during the life of the product. This is in contrast to Apple's other products which exhibit more market flexibility. Inter-dependency is not a new concept for Apple products (e.g. iPod/iTunes, Mac/MacOS) but the iPhone shows a level of inter-dependency with distribution and production the likes of which has never been seen.

    This topic will be further discussed at Asymconf in January as the fourth quarter data will then be available and there will be an opportunity to debate it live with an august audience.

    ---

    Notes:

    1. The database is neither current nor complete. If you would like to help maintain the data based on local (public) information, please get in touch and I can grant access to edit it.
  10. Google vs. Samsung

    Research · 283 comments

    Samsung's recent success in mobile phones has been spectacular. It overtook Nokia for the top spot in overall unit sales. 

    It went from having almost no smartphone sales to selling over 50 million units per quarter in a matter of two years.

    It now accounts for nearly 40% of all industry profits.

    A key decision which made this success possible was to shift its portfolio to smartphones and to offer a large variety of such phones.

    In Q1 2010 only 3% of the phones Samsung sold were smartphones. In the latest quarter the ratio was 54%. 

    As a result the average selling price more than doubled, from $115 to $234.

    Profit margins also soared in proportion: from 12% to 21%.

    All this plus an overall growth in volumes from 64 million to over 100 million per quarter has meant that the company is raking in enormous profits. Not only did it overtake Nokia, the market share leader for 14 years, but is making more profits than Nokia ever did.

    So much profit in fact that it has overtaken Google's decisively.

    The reason I point this out is that Samsung's success is dependent on having ridden on the back of Android. Samsung's ascent can be precisely timed to their adoption of Android. The groundbreaking Samsung Galaxy launch was the Galaxy S which shipped in June 2010.

    Meanwhile, indications are that "mobile" is causing a contraction in Google's margins.

    If nothing else, Android has created a very interesting industry. There are many questions of course: Is Samsung's trajectory sustainable? Why aren't there other vendors successful with Android? Why isn't Google successful with Android? Why isn't Google's Motorola successful with Android? What would happen if Samsung soaks up so much profit from mobile that it's in a position to acquire Google and control the trajectory of their enabling platform?