Asymco

Asymmetric Intelligence

Android

  1. Third to a billion

    Research · 168 comments

    Android is the third platform to reach a billion users ((Although activations are not users, I'm assuming that usage is not far behind and the cumulative sales figures I gather are roughly comparable.)) .  The first was Windows and the second was Facebook. Apple sold around 650 to 700 million iOS and is expected to be the fourth to a billion sometime next year. ((Separately, iTunes reports 575 million account holders.))

    If we define the Race To a Billion to be bounded by a time limit of 10 years, then Windows does not qualify and Android is actually second. The race is shown in the following graphs (the one on the left is logarithmic scaled, the one to the right includes only a few contenders for illustrative reasons).

    Screen Shot 2013-09-06 at 9-6-4.06.29 PM

    Android's activations as reported are shown in the following graph:

    Screen Shot 2013-09-04 at 9-4-1.15.38 PM

    Without qualification, Android has been a viral success story. It reached one billion activations in about five years, almost half the time it took FaceBook and far faster than Windows.

    However, Android growth can be qualified. I added another set of data which is the number of US Android phone users as deduced from measurements by ComScore. ((ComScore surveys users on their primary phone. Survey includes only those aged over 13 years and excludes phones issued by businesses.))

    One way to read the two graphs is: Between March and August, of the 250 million Android devices activated, 4 million were to new Android consumers in the US. In other words, In the last six months, 1.6% of Android activations went toward new usage in the US. The equivalent figure for iOS is about 6%. Note that these are new users, not included are upgrades. It's likely that more of the US buying goes toward upgrades because iOS has been in use longer.

    So whereas Android is growing very rapidly, there is a question of reliability of that audience. Engagement is one thing, but in the market which shows highest penetration (and deepest distribution of an alternative) Android is peaking.

     

  2. Signs of US Android net user decline

    Research · 257 comments

    ComScore's latest survey  for US smartphone users showed that Android had 52% share of about 142 million users. That amounts to 73.84 million Android devices in use.

    ComScore's previous such survey showed that Android had 52.4% of about 141 million users. This amounts to 73.88 million Android devices in use. It also means that Android usage in the US went down for the first time.

    Screen Shot 2013-08-08 at 8-8-10.10.39 AM

    The difference is surely within a margin of error so it's not something to declare definitively, but the pattern of Android "peaking" has been evident for some time.

    Screen Shot 2013-08-08 at 8-8-10.11.44 AM

    Even though share stopped growing about a year ago, Android continued to gain users as overall smartphone consumption increased. The last few months however have shown a slowing of new smartphone users and therefore we have this first instance of Android appearing to lose usage.

    Screen Shot 2013-08-08 at 8-8-10.12.35 AM

    Note that this has not been the case for iPhone as usage over the last six months is up by 11 million users vs. 6.6 million for Android.

    Screen Shot 2013-08-08 at 8-8-10.13.07 AM

    Indeed, iPhone gained more users than Android for the last 6 out of 8 months.

    Screen Shot 2013-08-08 at 8-8-10.16.36 AM
  3. Switcher

    Research · 91 comments

    Nokia's Windows (Smart)Phone performance was drowned out last week by Microsoft's big announcement of the Surface inventory write-off. They are pieces of the same puzzle however.

    First, a look at Nokia.

    There were 7.4 million Lumia phones sold in Q2 with 0.5 million sold in the US. Although Windows Phones grew sequentially from 5.6 million the previous quarter, and up from 4.0 million in the same quarter last year, total smartphones are down y/y and nearly flat over the last four quarters. This is of course because Symbian phones have finally disappeared from volume shipments. The following graph shows the history of Nokia's smartphone shipments.

    Although it's tempting to compare Lumia to iPhone (given the premium positioning in the US) the average price of €157 or $206 shows that Lumia is more adequately compared to Android. This is about a third of what Apple gets for its iPhones.

    That's not necessarily a bad thing. Nokia's always had a knack for mass-market phones and certainly that was one reason Microsoft was attracted to them. Presumably, the promise of the relationship was to insert Windows Phone into the Nokia development and distribution pipeline, squeezing out costs and filling up channels.

    Screen Shot 2013-07-22 at 7-22-3.24.21 PM

    The problem for the brand has been that although priced at Android levels, volumes are nowhere near and the gap is widening. At current activation rates, Android is selling 16.5x faster than Windows Phone (assuming 90% of Windows Phones are Lumia).

    So Nokia's problems become Microsoft's problems. As bad as Nokia seems to be doing with Lumia, it's doing a lot better than Microsoft with hardware. Here the story of the great Surface write-off should give pause. Microsoft announced that it would write off $900 million of Surface.  In terms of write-offs this is pretty significant. Compare it with the debacle of the PlayBook write-off when BlackBerry (then known as RIM) wrote off $485 million for tablets it could not sell. Or with Microsoft's own write-off for the Kin which took $240 million out of its shareholder's pockets. The only charge for hardware that I found higher was Microsoft's own Xbox 360 which cost it $1 billion for the "red ring of death".

    But this is not an unusual situation at Microsoft. Besides Xbox, Kin and Surface, Microsoft also declared victory in (read: shut down) SPOT watches, the Smart Display, Tablet PCs and the Zune. This is why when I heard about the Surface I asked who would be Microsoft's Tim Cook.

    By the way, $900 million write-off could amount to over 3 million devices, more if Microsoft is assuming some residual value in the inventory. Misjudging demand to such a degree that more units are disposed of than sold implies a basic failure of understanding of hardware businesses.

    Which brings up the question of what Microsoft will do. They are likely to double down on hardware (also signaled by their re-org) simply because in a device world (read: post-PC) the economics of licensing Windows and Office are evaporating. The price points of EULAs simply don't hold and there are good enough alternatives in use by the hundreds of millions of iOS and Android devices out there already. By withholding Office from iOS and Android, Microsoft has shown a billion people that they can live without it and they already knew they could live without Windows.

    So rather than fight, Microsoft chose to switch. Switching from software to hardware, however, is proving very hard. I'm sure quite a bit harder than management  thought.

  4. What's an Android user worth?

    Research · 130 comments

    Excluding Motorola, Google's gross margins have dropped for six out of the last nine quarters. They peaked at 65.8% in early 2011 but have now dropped to 60.4%. Including the drag from Motorola they are down to 57%.

    Screen Shot 2013-07-20 at 7-20-9.52.38 AM

    Gross margins include the effect of price, volume and direct costs of sales. Although sales have grown (see graph below), the pricing Google has been able to obtain (CPC) has fallen. The cause is unknown but there is a strong correlation between the growth in their mobile channel. For their part, management cites mobile as having an effect in reducing CPC though they caution that it's one of many factors.

    Screen Shot 2013-07-19 at 7-19-8.52.10 AM

     

    The elephant in the room is indeed the effect of 900 million activated Android devices (with 1.5 million added each day.) These nominal billion devices are a new channel that could be said to have doubled Google's addressable market in only the last three years. The effect of this doubling is perhaps partly underlying the top line growth shown above.

    How can we test this?

    I placed Google's performance alongside Microsoft's for a reason. Since Microsoft has had precisely zero benefit from any new mobile channels, and since its software is broadly tied to business spending (as is Google's), we can consider Microsoft as a control in what baseline non-mobile growth could be. From Q2 2010 to the present (the Android epoch), Microsoft's consolidated revenues grew by 24% (31% if we exclude Windows).  In contrast, Google's advertising revenues (excluding Motorola and licensing) have increased by a more robust 83%.

    So it's possible that mobile contributed to top line growth. The effect could be 50% over three years. The downside is of course that this comes from a doubling of the channel. The new channel is therefore half as engaging. In terms for bottom line, the effect would be seen as more subdued growth. Overall, income increased 32% for a nominal doubling of usage.

    Not that there's anything wrong with that.

    Expansion of user base usually comes with lower engagement and margins. I demonstrated the same effect with the vast expansion of iTunes customers.

    The only difference seems to be that markets reward Google's margin dilution but punish Apple's.

    Put another way, hypothetically, as she spends slightly less, the market value for an Apple user is disappearing while as he spends a lot less, the value placed on a Google user is increasing.

  5. The PC Calamity

    Research · 70 comments

    As Intel has improved its products, their demand has decreased. Enormous efforts put into improvements are neither valued nor absorbed. The problem is not with the processors themselves but with the systems within which they are built:

    Screen Shot 2013-07-18 at 7-18-11.16.38 AM

    PC sales fell again last quarter and the contraction is likely to continue. We received affirmation of this as Intel cut sales and earnings forecasts and the crucial capital spending that creates supply in the longer term.[1]

    At the same time, computing device sales have soared.

    Screen Shot 2013-07-18 at 7-18-5.07.35 PM

    Even excluding Android devices which don't register with Google's Play Store (and excluding Windows Phone devices), mobile ARM devices are selling at 2.6 times the rate of Intel-powered devices. Put another way, since the birth of Android nearly as many iOS and Android devices have been sold as PCs.

    In terms of install base, a computing category that did not exist six years ago has come to overtake one that has been around for 38 years.

    The calamity for Intel has been that they have had no part to play in the new category. Perhaps that is because they had every part to play in the old category.

    --

    Notes:

    1. Intel said it was cutting 2013 capital spending to $11 billion. The cut follows a reduction from $13 billion to $12 billion in April. Apple's budgeted capital spending for fiscal 2013 (ending September) was set at $10 billion.
  6. Measuring US Mobile Platform Shares: Kantar vs. comScore

    Research · 34 comments

    The latest comScore US smartphone install base data is in and there are few surprises. iPhone has reached a new record high penetration (39.2%) and user base (54.3 million). Android has reached a new high in user base (72 million) but share at 52% is below the peak reached in November 2012.

    Screen Shot 2013-06-05 at 6-5-3.48.35 PM

    This pattern of gradual iPhone share gain in the US has been consistent for over two years even while Android has catapulted into an overall lead. The surprising thing is how Android seems to have peaked in share. There are still 95 million non-smartphone users and there seems to be headroom for growth even though the other platforms have been tapped out. But it does not seem that Android phones have any particular advantage over iPhone. My hypothesis remains that as price is taken out as a differentiation, the adoption of iOS is slightly higher than Android.

    Another measure of market performance is the implied net platform user gains which is shown below:

    Screen Shot 2013-06-05 at 6-5-3.23.55 PM

    It shows that iOS added more users in the last few months than Android.

    The problem is that Kantar Worldpanel measures shipments and their share data shows a seemingly different picture.

    Screen Shot 2013-06-05 at 6-5-3.22.23 PM

    In their data Android is shown as selling more units during January through April while Apple sold more during October through December. Of course we don't have the absolute number of units so can't see the effect of higher holiday overall sales volume. Nevertheless, the balance of growth seems to be disproportionately in favor of Android relative to the data from comScore.

    To look at the situation more closely I measured the differential in user adds for comScore and the differential in market share for Kantar's data. Then I overlaid the two differentials so that months are matching, as shown below:

    Screen Shot 2013-06-05 at 6-5-3.51.57 PM

    There is a similarity to the frequency of oscillation with comScore data showing a delay (as would be expected since their data is sampling over a three month period). However, we are still facing a vertical offset where there is apparently more growth bias for iPhone in the comScore data.

    Possible factors which might be explanatory:

    • Methodologies used. comScore data excludes ages below 13 and non-personal devices (business expensed phones.) 
    • Replacement sales are invisible in comScore data since the user base does not change when phones are replaced (and old ones are discarded.)
    • Missing data from Kantar. Given their survey methods it's possible that their panels miss some market segments.
  7. 100 billion App downloads

    Research · 38 comments

    By the end of May there will be 100 billion mobile apps installed on iOS and Android devices.

    Screen Shot 2013-05-31 at 5-31-9.45.21 PM

     

    Not bad for a five year old medium.

    With respect to attach rate, the total downloads/install base are currently 83 apps per iOS device sold and 53 apps per Android device activation. The history of this is shown below:

    Screen Shot 2013-05-31 at 5-31-10.18.03 PM

    The sheer weight of Android units will generate more downloads but on a per device basis the iOS devices do seem to consume more apps and the gap is not narrowing. What would be valuable would be the revenue per app on Play (the figure for iOS is about $0.23). That, as far as I know, remains unknown.

  8. Measuring Platform Churn

    Research · 33 comments

    The latest comScore data shows consistent growth in US smartphone penetration. The rate is now 58.4% of adult consumers who own phones. This is up from 20% only three years ago. The rate of growth remains a remarkable 1.2% per month. That's 700,000 new-to-smartphone users every week. The historic average over 3 years has been 1.07%/month This after having crossed over 50% on schedule in August 2012. There appears to be no slowing.

    Screen Shot 2013-05-06 at 5-6-5.42.50 AM

    The next milestone I have pencilled in is the 80% mark which I extrapolate to be achieved by October 2014. 80% could be considered "saturation" which would signify a rapid slowing of new user addition. However, that might still not happen until 100%, depending on the availability (or lack thereof) of non-smartphones to buy.

    This time frame is important because it would imply that essentially all mobile users in the US (some 234 million) would be a part of one ecosystem in about 2 more years. That's less than the life cycle of the typical mobile contract (and thus the life of one phone). Put another way, by the time a new buyer today is ready to buy the replacement to their phone the market will be saturated.

    This implies the mode of competition will be changing to smartphone replacement rather than smartphone adoption. To some degree this is already happening but as the net user gains data shows only BlackBerry and Windows platforms have had any net user declines in the last two years. "Platform churn" is still a relatively rare phenomenon.

    How that will change post-saturation will be a crucial determinant to platform growth. The data today points to a higher degree of loyalty for iOS users and potential erosion in the Android user base as a result. There are ways of forecasting this on the basis of survey data as Carl Howe did. However, the data from comScore has already begun to show that Android may have peaked around 54% share. Android share is now at the same level it was in July while iPhone share has grown by more than 6 points since then.

    Screen Shot 2013-05-06 at 5-6-5.40.28 AM

    There is a pattern of higher growth into the end of the year and an iPhone plateau into the first quarter, undoubtedly due to holiday buying favoring the iPhone. I don't want to discount the possibility of some change in this pattern but so far there seems to be a plausible reason for it: with iPhone pricing and availability in the US offering no advantages to alternatives, Apple's product is the most popular. Nearly more popular even than all the other competitors combined.

  9. The job the iPhone is hired to do, part II

    Research · 52 comments

    I repeat what I’ve mentioned before: The iPhone is primarily hired as a premium network service salesman. It receives a “commission” for selling a premium service in the form of a premium price. Because it’s so good at it, the premium is quite high.

    The job the iPhone is hired to do 

    The original post on the hiring of the iPhone by operators was anchored in data about the revenue per unit (or price) that the product was able to obtain. The remarkable resilience in the exceptionally high average price showed that the iPhone was still getting a premium for moving users to higher levels of spending on network services.

    The evidence was circumstantial however: By knowing the price and knowing it was far higher than competing products and knowing that much of it was paid by the operator and not the consumer (at least not up-front) implied that it was the iPhone, and only the iPhone, that was hired as a network service sales tool.

    Now we have more evidence thanks to Ben Thompson (@monkbent). I illustrate the data here as an x-y scatterplot.

    Screen Shot 2013-04-23 at 4-23-11.21.37 AM

    The data consists of ARPU (Average Revenue per User) ITU data from 2010 for 60 countries combined with browser share data on a country-level from the current period (sourced from StatCounter).

    The first observation is that there is a modest correlation between iOS usage and ARPU. It may not be particularly interesting by itself but it is interesting when compared with the lack of correlation between Android usage and ARPU.

    The presumption behind smartphone usage is that it leads to more browsing which leads to more network usage which in turn, leads to more network revenues and, finally, more network investment. If there is no additional browsing then there is a far smaller economic incentive to network operators to invest in infrastructure. It is this link between usage and revenues which I hypothesize drives operators to carry, subsidize and promote the iPhone. And the resilience of this link indicates that it still works.

    The ASP data seems to support this hypothesis and so does the ARPU data. The more iOS is in relative use, the higher the network revenue per user. Correlation is not causation, but when combined with data about Android, we can also say that the presence of the primary iOS alternative does not lead to more revenue. In other words, if a lot of iOS is present then revenues are higher and if there is little iOS present then revenues are not higher.

    I'm not suggesting that Android users use less bandwidth—the share data is after all relative—but rather that Android use itself does not seem coupled to paying more (or less) for service.

    If there is something to be concluded it's that not all usage is created equal. The data regarding how apps and ads are consumed is consistent with a qualitative difference between iOS and Android. This data is more of the same.

    It's something of a cliché to say that audiences vary in terms of quality, but that does not make it less true. Indeed, network operators depend on it being true.  And so does Apple.

     

  10. Making rain

    Podcast · 72 comments

    The following is a slightly edited transcript of a portion of the Critical Path podcast #79. I am reproducing it here for the sake of brevity and focus of discussion.

    ---

    I'm going to try to put together an analogy together here that maybe will help us think through the Facebook Home and the Google Fiber issue.

    I've been thinking a lot about how to illustrate Google's business model. The problem is that discussion has been polarized: Two camps have formed. One camp suggests that Google is a benevolent entity that does great things and only asks that we indulge their hobby of a business model called advertising. Fundamentally they are about pushing the envelope on technology, making wonderful things happen.

    That is one camp. I call them the utopians. It may not be a nice thing to call them but I frame it as being exceedingly idealistic.

    The anti-utopian camp is one that suggests that Google is an advertising company primarily, and fundamentally and overwhelmingly. And anything they do technologically is in support of that. The implication is that Google is sinister and manipulative, bent on getting away with as much privacy extraction as possible.

    I believe that the anti-utopians dismissing Google as an advertising company sounds a bit incomplete. It's not incorrect. It's not erroneous. It's just not a complete story.

    And also the utopian view that they do everything for us out of the goodness of their hearts and that advertising is something that they are reluctant to do, saying in effect, "We only do it because it earns us enough money so that we can do good deeds." That too is not an accurate picture. Google is a business and its business management team is hard nosed and knows what they're doing and they are not purely idealistic in that sense.

    And so the question could be where across this spectrum does Google lie? Possibly it moves around between these points. Where they are becomes a question of motivation and what they want to become.

    But this is only one dimension. It does not help us answer the question of Home, or Fiber or Reader or Blink. Their actions seem contradictory. Holistic or selfless in one case, greedy and capricious in another.

    Let's step out of this spectrum and try to think of different ways which can describe the situation.

    I propose a way to think about it as: Google tries to make a business succeed through having a huge amount of _flow_ in terms of data, traffic, queries and information that is indexed. So think about this idea of them tapping into a vast stream. The more volume that is flowing through the system the more revenue they generate.

    As so given this very rough analogy I try to sharpen it up by saying: imagine it more as a river. And even more than a river, as a watershed, a river basin. Perhaps a giant basin the size of a continent. The business is, let's say, capturing fish at the mouth of the biggest river, before it exits into the ocean at its delta.

    And so your job (as Google) is to catch fish mostly at one point. It's the most efficient way to catch fish because you have the most flow of water at that point and building nets is not trivial.

    But in order for you to improve your business, to create more opportunity, presumably, you want to essentially have more water flowing.

    And so how would you do that? Think of the Mississippi river. If you've got a net down at the bottom of the river, the question is how would you engineer, through civil engineering, or shaping the earth itself, a way of catching more fish.

    The answer I think, in terms of the way Google might be thinking, is that they want to create more sources of water. So they would look to connect tributaries and lakes. "How about having another river join our river?" Let's make sure that we have "everything east of the Rockies" flow into our river system.

    Now, think of it this way: After you've gotten all the tributaries, what are the remaining sources?

    First, you'll want to make sure that no-one can dam or stop the flow of water into your main channels. And so you become extremely anxious about people building dams. That's the number one concern.

    So your strategy becomes one of "how do we avoid dam building"?

    That's one part of your strategy.

    The other thing you could do to improve your business would be to make it rain more. So there's the question in your mind of: If we had more rainfall, then everything will flow more rapidly and we'll get many more tiny rivers forming and joining together into our main river.

    Android and the Fiber business and even Facebook fit into this analogy rather well. In this context more rainfall means more people using the Internet. If you have more people you'll have more rivers and you'll have more water and hopefully more fish. Fiber means the water will flow more rapidly: you're essentially dredging the riverbed.

    But the two are very disconnected (rain, dredging and fish). So your strategy amounts to not really worrying about the ratio. You don't create incentives to people who make rain in the form of fish catch quotas next quarter.

    In other words, your performance as a manager of cloud seeding efforts should not be measured in fish.

    Leadership should instead simply put out the mandate of "Go out and make it rain".

    So that's the notion of Google going out on these projects and doing all these "great things" for us. They make it rain. The Internet expands. There is minimal censorship.

    By the way, censorship is a dam. Being blocked out of a country is a huge dam. It's actually more like building a mountain range that diverts water flow away from your watershed.

    And so they have these notions of how to prevent these things from happening.

    So it sounds like they are doing good things. It sounds like asking for it to rain; they want to make sure that people don't divert resources; they want to make sure that there are no barriers between the raindrop and getting access to the channel to the ocean.

    So it sounds like they're doing all the good things like a good civil engineer. Like the US Army Corps of Engineers who developed the irrigation, flood control, energy generation and waterway transportation of the United States.

    Google seems to be the world's "internet civil engineer". They are building all these things to make sure that we have good water (i.e internet) supply. That we have plenty of navigable channels. That's the analogy.

    But let's not forget that the only reasons those things are happening is because they are catching fish at some point down the Mississippi.

    From that point of view you have to ask yourself: do they deserve this concession? Because they are ultimately affecting the environment to such a degree; and the environment is the internet; and the whole scope is how the world operates.

    That is where people have to step back and ask themselves: Even a group of civil engineers that have all the best intentions may realize that they didn't think of all the consequences of their actions. A lot of the criticisms may come decades later. From people who'll note an effect on the environment. Dams get silted, a lack of floods reduces nutrients to crops which then need fertilizer, which has a whole other set of problems.

    That is when you have to reflect more deeply on what is right and what is wrong. So saying, as the City Council of Austin might: thank you for coming and paying for installing broadband for us. Fine, but we just don't know what the unintended consequences might be. It all _sounds_ good but we don't know if it _is_ good.

    And similarly, in the case of Facebook, there is a subtle hijacking going on where Android creates more rain, and Facebook and Amazon are essentially putting down nets and catching fish upstream. They're not damming the tributaries. They're not putting up mountain ranges and saying they'll make sure the water flows away from the Mississippi. But rather they are putting nets and saying "Thanks for the rain". They took advantage of what amounts to a public resource. Here the failure of anticipating consequences falls on Google. But they could not have possibly foreseen all that? Or could they?

    Then there is the question of measuring success. It's complicated and hard to measure performance. Even Google's own performance. We don't really know if the cloud projects work. We don't get to run this as an experiment that can be tweaked as data comes in.

    Google does not report performance. When they go off on these rain making projects, it's natural to ask how many fish were caught as a result. Is that incremental new rainfall causing more fish to get caught. And Google won't say anything about the profitability of rain making. They will never give you a profit and loss statement for all these projects: the dam eradication project, the project dredge a channel, the project to seed clouds. They will say that these are projects that will result in only one thing, which we do measure, which is the number of fish we catch in the delta of the Mississippi down by New Orleans. But so far although rainfall seems to be increasing exponentially there are not that many new fish.

    So that's where we struggle as analysts: is rainmaking good? Is the dam destruction process working? We can't answer these question. And we don't even know if Google themselves can. They might think of it as a strategic thing: it's always better to have more rain than less and more water flowing. End of discussion.

    To borrow a phrase from Zuckerberg, it's above my pay grade to know what all the consequences are. I have opinions as environmentalists have opinions and sometimes they have some data to back up those opinions. For instance whether a dam project is a good thing on balance. But they are bound to have partial answers because the cost/benefit analysis is definitely missing a lot of the costs and missing a lot of the benefits as well. You can't put a number on a lot of these things.

    That's where we are today. Google and Android are forces which are are very powerful but which are, to a large degree, uncontrolled, even by their own managers.

     

  11. Samsung vs. Google: an Interview with Rafael Barbosa Barifouse of Redacao Epoca

    Research · 60 comments

    On Mar 18, 2013, Rafael Barbosa Barifouse - Redacao Epoca - Editora Globo asked (and I answered):

    Q: Why is Samsung creating Tizen?

    A: I believe they are collaborating on Tizen development because they want an alternative to Android and because Bada was not good enough to meet that goal. Tizen's roots include contributions from Intel, Nokia and several Japanese companies so it's not Samsung's OS per se. Historically it was the "open" alternative operating system for embedded and mobile systems. See https://github.com/kumadasu/tizen-history/blob/master/tizen-history.pdf for a historic perspective.

    In some ways Tizen seems to be a blend of several pieces of code including proprietary Samsung user interfaces. Samsung is presumably interested in having a unique, differentiated experience. This is something every device maker seeks. Put another way, if they did not seek this then it's unlikely that they would be profitable which would also imply that they would not invest in marketing and development of products. As Samsung invests both in marketing and development it can be concluded that they seek to offer a unique value proposition and, in today's market, that means a unique experience.

    Does it make sense to create a new mobile OS when it has had so much success with Android?

    Samsung would argue that the success it's had is not due to Android but to its products. Arguably they are right because if Android were the valuable component in a phone then buyers would buy the absolute cheapest device that runs Android regardless of brand. That is not the case. People still seek out a particular brand of phone because of the promise it offers. Consumers have been buying more Galaxies than no-name Android phones.

    Why is Samsung the most successful company between the Android devices makers?

    In my opinion it's due to three reasons:

    1. Distribution. Success in the phone business depends in having a relationship with a large number of operators. Samsung had these relationships prior to becoming a smartphone vendor [because it sold all other kinds of phones]. Few alternative Android vendors have the level of distribution Samsung has. For comparison Apple has less than half the distribution level of Samsung and most other vendors have less than Apple.
    2. Marketing and promotion. Samsung Electronics spent nearly $12 billion in 2012 on marketing expenses of which $4 billion (est.) was on advertising. Few Android vendors (or any other company) has the resources to match this level of marketing. For comparison, Apple's 2012 advertising spending was one quarter of Samsung's.
    3. Supply chain. Samsung can supply the market in large quantities. This is partly due to having their own semiconductor production facilities. Those facilities were in a large part built using Apple contract revenues over the years they supplied iPhone, iPad and iPod components. No Android competitors (except for LG perhaps) had either the capacity to produce components or the signal well in advance to enter the market in volume as Samsung did by being an iPhone supplier.

    Tizen was being treated as an OS for low and mid level devices, but recently Samsung said that it will launch a high-end device with Tizen on Q3, an area where it's very successful with Android. What has changed? What does this announcement mean?

    Planning for these product launches is done a few years prior to launch. I believe alternatives to the Android line (i.e. Galaxy) have been planned for a long time. Note that Samsung also has a line of Windows Phones and historically has supported Bada, Windows Mobile, Symbian, PalmOS and LiMo smartphone platforms. Samsung's involvement with Android is only about three years old, and arguably only enjoyed two years of prominent growth. That's less than one product launch cycle and far less than a platform or OS development cycle.

    I believe the company has a long term perspective and that includes a time span beyond the likely lifetime of Android [Note that platforms do have finite lives]. Keep in mind that phones last less than two years. If users are not loyal to a platform then they will very quickly move on. The "stickyness" of a platform depends on media or software consumption by the user. That level of consumption is not particularly high for most Android users. The same phenomenon happened with Symbian and BlackBerry and Windows Mobile users. Hundreds of millions switched or will switch out of those platforms. This happens far less with iOS, Mac OS X and Windows because of the significant investments users make in the ecosystems above the OS.

    Is Google dependent on Samsung's sucess with Android? Or Samsung is more dependent on Android since its the most popular mobile OS nowadays?

    Google is not dependent on Samsung because it's not dependent on Android. Samsung is not dependent on Google because Samsung is not dependent on Android. Android is valuable in theory but in practice its value is hard to identify. Historically it was planned as a defense against the hegemony of Windows, BlackBerry and iOS. In that respect it has succeeded. But playing defense is not enough to win a game. For Google to truly succeed in mobile it needs to define a better business model.

    So far its profitability from mobile is very weak and has not shown up in the bottom line. Furthermore, it's probable that Google has 'control' over only about 40% of Android devices in use. Control here means a guarantee that users will use those devices for the benefit of Google, and, more importantly, not for the benefit of its competitors.

    You can also think of it this way: If they "divorced" there would be minimal to no impact to their fortunes in the foreseeable future. Buyers of Samsung phones will still buy Samsung phones because they will look and feel very similar and Google services will still be available through browsers or apps (e.g. Google maps on iOS). Conversely, users of Google services will continue to use them because they will be available on Samsung devices, no matter what OS is running. The services Google offers are independent of Android and are cross-platform. They will make sure they are available on all major platforms (as they were before and during Android). Google is far more loyal to Search and Maps and Gmail and YouTube than they are to Android.

    Do you think Google is going to merge Android with Chrome OS?

    Google's chairman said they would so I assume they will.

    If so, how this could make an impact on Samsung?

    It depends on how the new OS would enforce licensing terms. If the result would be a restriction on Samsung services like S Pen, AdHub, Samsung Wallet, SmartTV, ChatON etc. then Samsung might reject the OS and either fork Android or move to Tizen more broadly.