Mac

Gartner has published preliminary PC unit sales for Q2. The data from Apple's Mac sales has not been published yet but based on some estimates, we can draw a partial picture of the personal computer market.

 

My estimate is that the Windows PC market fell by 1% while the Mac market grew by 15%. Gartner reports an overall flat market. I'll leave out the iPad for the time being, and show the growth of the Mac vs. Windows:

 

In terms of individual vendors vs. each other, the patterns are as follows:

It's perhaps a bit early to tell, but if the Windows PC market continues to slow or contract, it may be possible that HP and Dell will cede their market share leadership positions to Lenovo and Acer. Already "Others" account for as many units as HP and Dell put together.

If we are to believe the analyst community reflects consensus, the industry, in the aggregate, continues to treat the potential for disruption from devices as unlikely. There always seems to be a wrinkle, a quirk, or an exceptional circumstance that is to blame. I won't get into all the excuses given by analysts for the slowing of PC sales but will point out that there's been a series of initiatives put forward by the industry to act as "catalysts" for growth. So far they have not worked. The current expectation is that Windows 8 will reverse this trend.

Perhaps. But perhaps the relief, if it comes at all, will be temporary.

[UPDATE: Due to a data error, the drop in Windows was overstated in the initial version of this post as 10%. It's been corrected to a drop of 1%]

When the Macintosh was launched in 1984, computers running the MS-DOS operating system were nearing a dominant position in the market. Having launched in 1981 as the IBM PC, they were quickly cloned and four years later "PCs" were selling at the rate of 2 million/yr.  The Mac only managed 372k units in its first year.

In other words, PC was outselling the Mac by a factor of nearly 6. It turned out to be a high point. The ratio by which the PC outsold the Mac only increased from there.

When Windows 95 launched in 1995 it negated most of the advantages of the ease of use of the Macintosh and the PC market took off. The ratio reached 56 in 2004 when 182.5 million PCs were sold vs. 3.25 million Macs.

During the second half of the 90s it was already clear that Windows won the PC platform war. Windows had an  advantage that seemed unsurmountable.

I should point out that this ratio between platforms is not just an exercise in arithmetic. It's a measure of leverage. The advantage of dominance is realized in an ecosystem which creates lock-in and additional economies in marketing. Ecosystems become self-perpetuating and there is a tendency toward monopoly. The stronger you are, the stronger you get.

 Then, in 2004, something happened.

Although PC volumes continued to grow, they did so more slowly and the Mac grew faster. What coincided with this was the emergence of portable computing. The MacBook became easily differentiable as a "better" laptop. It was not faster, did not have more storage or any key metrics being used to sell PCs. It was just better as an integrated product. The integration manifested itself through a sense of quality and robustness as well as intangibles like aesthetics and "feel". I wrote about this a few years ago.

As a result the Mac began to whittle down the advantage Windows had. The ratio  of Windows to Mac units shipped fell to below 20, a level that was last reached before Windows 95 launched. It's as if the Mac reversed the Windows advantage. This was an amazing turnaround for the Mac.

But the story does not end there.

If we consider all the devices Apple sells, the whittling becomes even more significant and the multiple drops to below 2. Seen this way, Post-PC devices wiped out of leverage faster than it was originally built. They not only reversed the advantage but cancelled it altogether.

Considering the near future, it's safe to expect a "parity" of iOS+OS X vs. Windows within one or two years. The install base may remain larger for some time longer but the sales rate of alternatives will swamp it in due course.

The consequences are dire for Microsoft. The wiping out of any platform advantage around Windows will render it vulnerable to direct competition. This is not something it had to worry about before. Windows will have to compete not only for users, but for developer talent, investment by enterprises and the implicit goodwill it has had for more than a decade.

It will, most importantly, have a psychological effect. Realizing that Windows is not a hegemony will unleash market forces that nobody can predict.

I analyze my performance every quarter to see if there is any pattern of error in my analysis. I devised a scoring method analogous to the grade point average system used in most US schools. You can read about the fourth quarter here.

This quarter I made one public release of data here and a semi-public update on the iPhone shipments here.

The resulting scores for both early and late estimates are shown in the table below:

 

Overall performance improved with the later estimates but not enough to move the letter grade. In fact, the letter grade of B+ is the same as it was for the fourth quarter.

The best performance was in (late) iPhone prediction and the worst performance was in Mac prediction. The Mac error was due to the relatively strong quarter the year before (which grew over 30%) and the lack of new product introductions. I did not think enough about these two conditions.

iPod error was in the direction of underestimation. The iPod grew better than expected through the average price seems to have dropped.

iPad error was quite modest at 3.4%. We found out after earnings that Apple was supply constrained. They indicated that they will sort out the supply/demand balance in the current quarter.

Gross margin also came in well above estimates, reaching a record high. This is difficult to predict as many factors come into play.

Overall the average error was less than 6% across all categories (late error). This means there was little wrong with the process of prediction. The seasonally adjusted growth for the iPhone and iPad remained consistent. Next, I will look at the scores for all the other public forecasts.

For Apple 2012 started with almost the same growth as 2011 started. Q1 2011 saw earnings growth of 92% and Q1 2012 saw growth of 94%. As the following revenue growth table shows, the pattern for the last twelve months has been very consistent:

Here are some notes:

• The iPad is growing at a faster rate than the iPhone and has achieved in two years what the iPhone took four.
• The iPhone grew units at nearly 90% and revenues at 85%. This is slightly below the quarterly average over the last two years of 99%
• The Mac showed significant weakness though the previous year's Q1 had exceptionally high growth of 32%. The Mac still grew faster than the market and therefore gained share
• The iPod is declining consistently. Units showed a lesser decline than revenues as the average price dropped from $164 to $157.
• The iTunes store continues to grow very rapidly, reaching a new record level above $2.1 billion revenues
• Peripherals were weak with 11% growth but that may have something to do with lowered Mac sales
• Software had good quarter though not exceptional
• The top line grew at nearly 60% which is not exceptional but the bottom line grew at 94% which is above average

Overall, the company had a very good quarter and showed consistency, which, incidentally, implies predictability. The following graph shows the top and bottom lines in historical context with color coding matching the table above.

 

I truly believe, and many others in the company believe, that there will come a day that the tablet market in units is larger than the PC market.

Tim Cook Discusses Q1 2012 Results - Earnings Call Transcript - Seeking Alpha

Question is when?

I began by projecting growth rates of various market participants including the leading Windows PC makers (HP, Acer, Dell, Lenovo and Asus), the combined "others" and the Mac. I also added the iPad, Samsung's tablets, other Google sanctioned Android tablets and Amazon. I also projected a split between traditional and tablet Windows shipments.

The underlying assumptions are:

1. Mac growth continues at 25% as it has on average for a few years
2. Windows grows slightly in 2012 with the introduction of Windows 8 late in the year. However I anticipate Windows 8, including tablet versions, to mostly be upgrades with slow enterprise take-up within this time frame.
3. The tablet versions of Windows begin shipping in Q4 2012 with 7% of total Windows shipped. The ratio reaches 20% by end of 2013.
4. iPad growth will flatten for '12 and '13 at 100%, similar to iPhone's historic performance.
5. Android tablet growth will be significant in the current year and follow iPad growth pattern though settling at 80% during '13.
6. Amazon growth will be approximately 80%.

Building the platforms combined growth bottom-up gives the following forecast for the next two years (and historic growth shown for perspective.)

[FF = form factor]

Given these assumptions, the day when the tablet market (by units) will exceed that of traditional PCs will come sometime in the fall of 2013.

As yesterday's post noted, the tablet market will be additive. This can be seen in the vendor shipments forecast that accompanies the model:

In January I noted that there were more iPads sold by Apple than PCs from HP, the largest PC vendor in the fourth quarter. Including all tablets, this is the distribution of market shares by units shipped.

Note the different color palettes for Windows and non-Windows.

By the metric of tablets+PC's Apple appears to be the leading vendor. However, if we consider only the Mac, Apple is still well behind. The historic unit volumes of the two is shown below:

Although Apple has nearly doubled its shipment volumes since 2008, it's still only one third that of HP. In addition to comparing volumes, we can also measure profitability. In this case HP's PSG (Personal Systems Group) reports operating profits and we can estimate the same from Apple based on a gross margin estimate and an operating expense estimate (as percent of sales).

The comparison looks like this:

The operating profit for Apple is 2.7 times higher from a third the units. This gap is a result of a vast difference in profitability. HP's operating margin for PCs is 5% while Apple's is 21%.

A few days ago I highlighted that Apple's iPhone yields disproportionate profits because of the way it performs the jobs its hired to do by consumers and operators.

With the Mac the story is that Apple's OS X is primarily responsible for delivering quadruple hardware margins vis-a-vis the most successful PC vendor.

Both iPhones and Macs are sold as hardware products and the entire econometric analysis of Apple depends on hardware cost structures. This is because hardware lends itself to easy measurement. However, a casual observer would be stumped by a comparison with competitors which cannot come near the profitability Apple enjoys. How can the same bundle of components (admittedly mostly off-the-shelf) be sold at triple the margins?

It comes down to software. Apple has a monopoly on iOS and OS X and charges for it through its hardware. That's a very valuable monopoly. It's worth at least $1 billion per quarter.

Tim Cook on the 55 million iPads sold to date:

This 55 is something no one would have guessed. Including us. To put it in context, it took us 22 years to sell 55 million Macs. It took us about 5 years to sell 22 million iPods, and it took us about 3 years to sell that many iPhones. And so, this thing is, as you said, it's on a trajectory that's off the charts.

via Transcript: Apple CEO Tim Cook at Goldman Sachs - Apple 2.0 - Fortune Tech.

That gave me an idea. Here is a plot of each major computing product Apple sold throughout its history shown as a cumulative total since product launch.

The iOS platform as a whole reached 316 million cumulative units at the end of last year. The iOS platform overtook the OS X platform in under four years and more iOS devices were sold in 2011 (156 million) than all the Macs ever sold (122 million).

Q: 37 million units of iPhones shipped. When do we run into the Law of Large Numbers? What are the growth opportunities coming up?

A: 37 million is a big number. It was a decent quarter. It was 37 million -- more than we'd ever done before. We were pretty happy with that, but let me give you the way I look at the numbers. As I see it, that 37 million for last quarter represented 24% of the smartphone market. There's 3 out of 4 people buying something else. 9 out of 10 phone buyers are buying something else.

Handset market is projected to go from 1.5 to 2 billion units. Take it in the context of these numbers, the truth is that this is a jaw-dropping industry with enormous opportunity. Up against those numbers, the numbers don't seem so large anymore. What seems so large to me is the opportunity.

What we're focusing on is the same thing we've always focused on. Making the world's best products.

We think if we stay laser-focused on that, and continue to develop the ecosystem around the iPhone, that we have a pretty good opportunity to take advantage of this enormous market.

Q: The biggest opportunity is the emerging markets. Large portion of that is the prepaid market. Apple has done very well but the wholesale iPhone price point is nowhere near what we would expect in the prepaid market. How do you make it more affordable to those markets?

A: Those markets are critical. The smartphone market is projected to be 1 billion units in 2015, 3 years from now. 25% of that is projected to come from China and Brazil. Just two of those markets -- 25% -- obviously those are very critical markets, but there are others as well.

We've been very focused on China. We've had incredible success with iPhone -- we've gone from a few hundred million in revenue to last year with $13 billion. We've been really focused on trying to understand the market there and taking those learnings to other markets. As it turns out, not very many people agree with me on this, probably.

What I see is that there is a lot of commonality in what people around the world want. Everyone in every country wants the best product as it turns out. They're not looking for a cheap version of the best product -- they're looking for the best product.

In the emerging markets there are very big differences in go-to-market. In most of the developed market, the carrier owns most of the distribution. In emerging markets, the retailer has most of the distribution. The whole go-to-market has to be changed significantly. Last year, we covered price points in the subsidized markets from $0 on up. That doesn't translate to zero in the prepaid market, but we're covering more price points there.

The paramount thing is the product. It is the focus. Of course distribution, we've recognized the difference there and in purchasing power. Unlike many people, I don't subscribe to the premise that prepay is prepay is prepay. We convinced China Unicom to try to postpay. It wasn't big there but they tried it and it's working really well. It's great for everyone because customer gets cheaper phone and carrier locks in a customer. It's a different way to look at the issue and it's been successful in China.

When Apple introduced the iPod in 2001, when we launched the iTunes Music Store and launched that on Windows, the iPod created a halo for the Mac. For 23 straight quarters we've outgrown the market on the Mac.

The halo that was created by iPod for the Mac, was created in developed markets. It was created in the US, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, Canada. It didn't work nearly to the same level in Eastern Europe, Middle East, Africa, China, Latin America. People were already getting music from their phones. The world changed for us when the iPhone was launched.

The iPhone introduced Apple to millions of people -- our brand -- to people who had never met Apple before. Now, it's interesting to look -- take China as an example -- last year the Macintosh grew more than 100% in China, year-over-year. Not on a big base, but 100% is pretty good. The market grew 10%, so we outgrew the market 10x.

The iPhone is creating a halo for the Macintosh. iPhone has also created a halo for iPad. You can definitely see the synergistic effect of these products, not only in developed markets, but also in emerging markets where Apple wasn't resonant for most of its life.

Via: Apple CEO Tim Cook Speaks at Goldman Sachs Technology Conference - Mac Rumors

After the transitional third quarter, Apple's earnings growth returned to an exceptional level. As the following chart shows, earnings growth has maintained above 50% growth since 2009.

Q3 turned out to be a transitional quarter with 52% growth but Q4 proved to be  "exceptional" with growth above 100%.  This is the third highest rate of growth in the five year span shown. Sales growth was also very near the top of the range, coming in fourth historically.

When looking at the components making up sales, we can see each product line's revenue growth in the following table: 

The growth leaders were also the largest product lines in terms of revenue. iPhone and iPad had triple digit growth rates and that translated into the bottom line growth.

Music related products and services which Includes revenue from sales from the iTunes Store, App Store, and iBookstore in addition to sales of iPod services and Apple-branded and third-party iPod accessories grew at 42%. This is the highest rate during the time frame shown.

Peripherals which Includes revenue from sales of displays, networking products, and Apple TV was next with 29% revenue growth.

The Mac line followed with 22% growth and Software which includes sales of Apple-branded and third-party Mac software, and services through the Mac App Store grew at 7%.

The iPod line continued to shrink with -26% decline.

I used color coding in the table to show the patterns of change and what I note is that the iPhone and iPad lines continue to be exceptionally fast growing businesses. The duration and amplitude of these streaks of growth should be a clear signal about the dynamics of these markets and Apple's role within. Too often, I find, these signals are ignored.

The iPad and Mac businesses both grew well in the last quarter. Tim Cook said they are observing some cannibalization of Mac from the iPad but much more switching to iPad is coming from the Windows PC market.

The evidence is still hard to pin down directly but the fact that PC sales (excluding the Mac) are down gives credence to the claim. Mac growth, in contrast, is largely unaffected. The following chart shows the the iPad volumes vis-a-vis Mac volumes and the Mac growth through recent history.

The iPad has out-sold the Mac since inception and is now about three times the volume. However, the growth rate in the Mac has not changed much.

The impact on the PC market has been discussed recently and the data in the following chart is an update given more precision on the units from Apple:

The new data shows that the iPad alone would be the largest PC vendor and Apple with iPad and Mac combined is selling 5 million more units (or 30%) than the top PC vendor.

The impact of the iPad is not specific to any single vendor (Apple included). It competes for time and purchase decisions across all computing alternatives and though many times it's additive, it is also substitutive and will become increasingly so.

Tim Cook mentioned on the earnings conference call that Apple sees the iPad as addressing a market larger that the PC market:

I truly believe, and many others in the company believe, that there will come a day that the tablet market in units is larger than the PC market. In fact, it's interesting to note that in the U.S., it's clear from the IDC's recent data on desktop PCs in the U.S., that tablets exceeded desktop PC sales last quarter in the U.S.

 

Apple's products are often seen as being priced "at a premium". This is mostly a matter of perception, but in certain categories Apple's products are priced above the industry average (though probably still affordable to sufficiently large populations). As a result, when competitors launch lower-priced products there is a tendency to expect Apple to react and reduce its prices to compete.

This expectation was evident when AT&T had an exclusive on the iPhone. The assumption among many (expressed in comments here as well as elsewhere) was that a switch to multi-carrier distribution would result in a price reduction and consequently a reduction in margins.

It was evident in the iPod and the Mac businesses over the years as prices for competing products collapsed.

It is also evident with respect to the iPad where expectations are that the Kindle will cause a reduction in the iPad price (and presumably in the margin).

However, the data we have from Apple on their pricing shows no concessions to competitive price pressure. The following chart shows the historic prices that Apple was able to obtain for its main product lines:

Over the time span shown (six years) the Mac and iPod saw modest price erosion as would be expected from declines in component costs but there is little evidence that Apple altered fundamental price points (note that these values represent pricing to the channel not to consumers who pay for retail mark-up or discounting/subsidy/taxation).

Similarly, both the iPhone and iPad have held prices very consistently. There is some seasonality as products are launched and there were a few quarters where the original iPhone was priced differently, with operator service revenue sharing lowering the up-front price. But there is a consistency to these products that speaks of a strategy that avoids price-based competition.

In the latest quarter Apple launched a few new price points for the iPhone. With the 3GS and the iPhone 4 and 4S available, Apple had the closest it ever came to a phone portfolio. There was some anticipation that the 3GS price point ($375) would impact the average selling price. However Tim Cook stated that the 4S was the most popular product. Furthermore, the 4S introduced a higher capacity (64GB) which offered a new, higher price point.

As a result, the ASP for the iPhone actually increased to about $660 in Q4. During the launch quarter the iPhone ASP does tend to be higher but history shows that the variance is small. Gifting seasons also affect pricing where the mix shifts to lower priced variants as seen with the iPad and iPod, but again, these are not great changes and entirely due to mix shift. There is no discounting.

The evidence I see is that Apple does not change pricing but rather stakes out a specific price point as resonating with consumers given their positioning. They then doggedly stick to it. Competitors tend to exploit open price points or try to position with specs on the same spots Apple occupies. That's not a game I observe being played by Apple.