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  1. Calibrating launch performance for the iPhone in China

    Research · 59 comments

    When the iPhone 5 launched Apple promised availability in 100 countries before the end of year. This was a very aggressive plan given the gradual release of previous products. Last year the iPhone 4S only arrived in China (along with 21 additional countries) on January 13th. This year it was almost a month earlier.

    Apple also announced for the first time this year first weekend sales for China: 2 million. This is, as far as I know, the first weekend sales data for a single market outside of the US. The time span was three days and therefore the daily sales rate was 2/3 million per day.

    The following chart compares the launch performance for the launches which Apple reported:

    Screen Shot 2012-12-17 at 12-17-2.44.04 PM

    If we normalize by population, the launch performance shows about 1.5 iPhones sold per 1000 inhabitants.

    Screen Shot 2012-12-17 at 12-17-2.47.07 PM

    It's a lot less than what we saw with the iPhone in the US and the first tranche of launch countries. But it's not far from the 2.6 achieved by the iPhone 4. The pricing and 3G penetration in China are far less favorable making this even more impressive.

    According to ISI's Brian Marshall, the iPhone achieved 1.5% penetration of the 3G subscriber base or 15 iPhones per 1000 3G subscribers. If we assumed the same basis (3G subs) that would make the iPhone 5 twice as popular on launch in China than in the US.

  2. Below the Surface

    Research · 83 comments

    Early data shows that the PC market has not experienced a "pop" from Windows 8. Market watchers have been anticipating this pop since every previous version of Windows has led to a surge in shipments. PC vendors have also been hoping for this to lift their volumes. Volumes have been stagnant for a while, as the following chart shows:

    Screen Shot 2012-12-13 at 12-13-3.45.58 PM

    If we combine the traditional PC and tablet markets—what I refer to as "large and medium screen PCs"— there has been growth. However the growth is all due to the tablets. When seen in a share split (blue tablets vs. brown Windows PC's) the shift toward tablet computing is clear.

    The question is whether Microsoft will be successful in shifting to this new computing model? Microsoft's problem is not that it has difficulty offering an operating system for tablets. The problem is that the economics of both systems and application software on tablets is destructive to its margins.

    A PC has for several decades been "taxed"[1] with a Windows and Office license. The exact figure is imprecise because of subscription accounting used by Microsoft, but we can take Microsoft revenues for Windows and Office and divide by PC shipments to get an average.

    Screen Shot 2012-12-13 at 12-13-3.47.14 PM

    This view shows how Windows revenues per PC have held steady for the last three years and Office have moved up slightly. In the latest quarter Windows "captured" $52 per PC shipment and Office "captured" $67.

    The problem for Microsoft is that pricing systems software at $50 and a suite of apps at $67 for a tablet that costs $200 to the end-user is prohibitive.

    Firstly because an OEM could not justify paying $50 to Microsoft while competing with another vendor whose (Android) software license costs nothing. It implies an increase in his bill of materials without the ability to charge more for the product and hence a reduction or elimination of margin.

    Secondly because consumers (or IT buyers) would have a hard time justifying $67 for an Office license for every tablet when most apps are either free or under $10. (Apple charges $9.99 each for iOS versions of Pages, Numbers and Keynote which can be installed on several devices.)

    The economics of tablets imply a "commoditization" of system and application software. So what's Microsoft to do?

    The answer is Surface where the software margin is captured in hardware. This explains the pricing of Surface. The price isn't significantly below what Apple charges because Microsoft wants to capture a comparable (30%+) margin. On a $500 product that amounts to $150. After subtracting hardware operating and distribution costs we can get pretty close to the $120 it currently obtains from a PC.

    This also explains the lack of appetite for "partnerships". OEMs which would normally compete on hardware would have to deal with zero margins (or less) after license fees and would be encouraged to cut corners and shave costs, compromising the experience and causing the platform to suffer.

    Microsoft does not like the phrase "post-PC" because it implies the end of its hegemony. They like to think of the PC becoming a new form factor in which they have the same role they've always had. However, looking beyond the form factor we see that mobility itself is disruptive in the implied modularity of the PC.

    Device economics offer the explanation for an otherwise perplexing Surface strategy. The question remains how many Surface units could Microsoft possibly sell to maintain its revenues.

    --

    1. A "tax" is implied only when purchases are mandatory.
  3. The new age of Capital Intensity

    Research · 117 comments

    In the post reviewing Samsung's Capital Structure I noted that its component divisions have historically taken 90% of capital investments and that the overall capital intensity for Samsung Electronics has increased in proportion to its component revenues.

    In another post regarding the capital structures of other technology companies with different business models I noted that Apple has changed its capital structure to a significant degree over the previous three years.

    In the following graph I combined these observations to show how capital expenditure patterns may be used to discern the underlying business model.

    I would group "cloud" or "platform" based companies like Google, Amazon and Microsoft as a cohort which, although spending significant amounts on capital equipment, do so mainly to support services. Their primary employment of capital is to sustain the infrastructure of data centers necessary to deliver the services underpinning their business models.

    I would group Intel and Samsung as "component" based companies which use capital to build production capacity that delivers, hopefully, a control point in the value chains they participate in. Note that I am assuming that Samsung Electronics' CapEx primarily targets semiconductors and displays as it did during the 2006 and 2007 period when data was available.

    Therefore, given the patterns over the last six years, it might be possible to classify a company's core business by just looking at its CapEx: The services group showing growth but relatively stable patterns and the components group showing more volatility, macroeconomic sensitivity and an overall higher level of spending, especially as a percent of sales.

    The question that pops up then is in what category does Apple fall?

    My observations for over a year have been that Apple is increasing its capital spending to such a degree that it is neither fish nor fowl. It operates data centers but presumably does not operate fabrication plants. And yet it spends more than Intel and Google combined.

    Contrasting Apple and Samsung Electronics tells an even more interesting story. In the following graph I've added two additional items of information: First, although CapEx spending is recorded in the cash flow statement, Apple reported in its yearly (10K) report that it spent an additional $2 billion for equipment which did not pass through cash flow.

    If we were to add $1 billion to each of the previous two quarters, the graph would look like this:

    The second piece of information is that Apple projected its spending for the following fiscal year. I've added that spending in a pattern matching the last fiscal year.

    Apple is still spending less than Samsung. In its fiscal year 2012 Apple spent about $10 billion while during the same time frame Samsung spent nearly $22 billion. However, Apple has begun to bump against Samsung's spending level on a quarterly basis.

    I consider this extraordinary evidence of an extraordinary shift in strategy.

    For a year we've been debating here to what degree Apple has a "capital intensive" business and what exactly could it be spending capital on. One early hypothesis has been that it's on data centers or on real estate for spaceship campuses. These can be easily dismissed on the knowledge that they can't cost that much (and that the spending happens gradually). Another hypothesis is that the tooling for milled aluminum cases and other mechanical components is expensive and Apple has to buy a lot of it. But, again, the level of expenditure is in the league of Intel and Samsung which make vast quantities of semiconductors in very expensive plants. It's hard to imagine milling machines being cost equivalent to chip foundries.

    The comparison with Samsung, whose vast capital commitments are legendary and are its primary strategic asset puts Apple in a new light. Perhaps we can't yet call Apple a semiconductor company or even a fabricator but they are putting their "money where their mouth isn't". We can infer that it's not going where the company currently operates. The capital is being deployed almost silently and, though vast in scale, barely gets a mention from analysts. Not even a single question has been raised at any earnings call about this spending.

    So what tale does this capital tell?

    One interpretation is to apply the value chain disruption theory and ask whether Apple is acting to counter a potential disruption. In other words, that this is a specific threat response from an incumbent. There is some logic to this because  the antagonism between Samsung and Apple is so strong that it might justify a reaction of this kind.

    However, I believe that there is a more measured process at work over a long period of time. The one distinguishing advantage and attribute that Apple has  is its preference for integration. This preference is not a secret and Tim Cook repeats it often. The integration is evident with their move into retail and component design, in other words in both directions along a value chain. So my hypothesis is that this is part and parcel of an ongoing re-alignment of their role in the value chain.

    This second explanation suggests that Apple simply wants to control all the areas which affect the value they produce. First because they feel that there are areas that are not good enough and the product/experience cannot be good enough if its constituent parts are not good enough. Second because without control there are constraints to what it can do strategically.

    Whatever the reason, I read the evidence of increasing commitment and engagement in parts of the value chain as part of a continuous evolution of Apple's role. Furthermore, it's something that should be seen as a signal of a new era in how technology companies operate. We see hints of "vertical integration" with Microsoft building hardware, and Google buying Motorola and Amazon selling devices. Apple did all these things and now it casts an eye over the next frontier: components.

    ---

    If you want to learn more about the future of the technology industries and the evolution of value chains, consider participating in Asymconf.

  4. Samsung's Capital Structure

    Research · 27 comments

    Having described the Revenue, Operating Margin and cost structure for Samsung Electronics it's time to review their investment strategy.

    The Economist summarized it well:

    [Samsung's] businesses look remarkably disparate, but they share a need for big capital investments and the capacity to scale manufacture up very quickly, talents the company has exploited methodically in the past.

    Samsung's successes come from spotting areas that are small but growing fast. Ideally the area should also be capital-intensive, making it harder for rivals to keep up. Samsung tiptoes into the technology to get familiar with it, then waits for its moment. It was when liquid-crystal displays grew to 40 inches in 2001 that Samsung took the dive and turned them into televisions. In flash memory, Samsung piled in when new technology made it possible to put a whole gigabyte on a chip.

    When it pounces, the company floods the sector with cash. Moving into very high volume production as fast as possible not only gives it a price advantage over established firms, but also makes it a key customer for equipment makers. Those relationships help it stay on the leading edge from then on.

    The strategy is shrewd. By buying technology rather than building it, Samsung assumes execution risk not innovation risk. It wins as a “fast follower”, slipstreaming in the wake of pioneers at a much larger scale of production. The heavy investment has in the past played to its ability to tap cheap financing from a banking sector that is friendly to big companies, thanks to implicit government guarantees much complained about by rivals elsewhere.

    Can we find evidence of this capital intensity?

    To answer, I reviewed Samsung Electronics CapEx as reported in their quarterly cash flow statements. The following graph illustrates the data:

    Note that during 2006 and 2007 the company specified expenditures on an operating divisional level. Since 2008 it has reported only a total. For the years where divisional detail is available, the percent split looks as follows.

    If we combine the Semiconductor division (Memory and System LSI) with the LCD group and classify this as "components" the split looks as follows:

    Therefore, for the two years when information was available, the component divisions consumed 91% of expenditures and Consumer Electronics (Digital Media) together with the Telecom (mobile phones, mainly) were a combined 9%. The least capital intensive division was Telecom, the mobile phone group, with only a 2% allocation of capital.

    The other observation is that, after a contraction in the recession years of 2008 and 2009, CapEx expanded greatly in 2010 and 2011. [1]

    Coincident with the growth in CapEx, the company's revenues grew dramatically as well. However, as the graphs below show, the growth has come predominantly from the Telecom division.[2]

    I calculated the correlations between each division's revenues and the growth in CapEx (total) for the time periods 2006 to present and 2008 to present and obtained the same results: The division with closest correlation to CapEx remains the Semiconductor group.

    This stands to reason. Capital expenditures are mainly in the service of semiconductor manufacturing. Semiconductors, or components in general, require more capital than assembly of devices or consumer electronics.

    However, the revenues and operating income for devices have grown far faster. Samsung's investment in capacity would have been largely profit-free had they not also been assembling the devices which capture the margins.

    One might conclude that Samsung would be better off abandoning its capital-intensive components business and focusing on the devices. However, as James Allworth points out if you only do the devices, you may find yourself vulnerable to value chain disruption. Whoever is involved "upstream" in the value chain will inevitably learn the device business from a base of "commodity" manufacturing and pose a threat.

    Now the question poses itself: Which of the usual suspects understands this?

    Stay tuned for evidence of an incumbent response.

     

    If you want to learn more about the future of the technology industries and the evolution of value chains, consider participating in Asymconf.

    ---

    Notes:

    1. Some of this growth is due to a new (K-IFRS) accounting standard in use after 2010, but the expansion was significant regardless.
    2. The revenues data is was reported using three different accounting methods and each is shown with a different line color: Blue is "Parent basis", Green is "Consolidated basis" and Yellow is "K-IFRS".
  5. The real threat that Samsung poses to Apple

    Podcast · 429 comments

    [The following is a post written by James Allworth.

    James is the co-author of How Will You Measure Your Life?. He has worked as a Fellow at the Forum for Growth and Innovation at Harvard Business School, at Apple, and Booz & Company. It follows and builds on a discussion we had on the 56th Critical Path podcast.

    You can connect directly with James on Twitter at @jamesallworth -ed]

    A lot of ink has been spilled in the wake of the recent Apple Samsung patent disputes, and the legal wars see no sign of abating any time soon. The rise of Samsung's phone business has been meteoric, and Apple is right to be concerned. But the real threat that Samsung poses to Apple has very little to do with the copying (or not) of Apple's designs. The lawsuits have simply been a convenient (if expensive and risky) way to attempt to quash a threat that is of Apple's own making. While there's no doubt that Google has played a key role in Samsung's success by handing out a free mobile operating system to pretty much anyone who wants to build one — it is actually Apple, more than any other company, that is responsible for Samsung's present success.

    How? By outsourcing as much work to Samsung as they have. And it's impossible not to wonder whether Tim Cook's announcement yesterday on bringing back Apple's manufacturing to the USA is the beginnings of an attempt to rectify the problem.

    But first, I want to establish why copying is actually less of a threat to Apple than you might think. Daring Fireball's John Gruber wrote last year on what he termed "The New Apple Advantage". Like most people who appreciate Apple and its products, the starting point for Gruber's appreciation of Apple is its design — he says as much in the article. But the realization that Gruber has in the article on Apple's true competitive advantage is what's really interesting:

    So let’s be lazy for a second here, and attribute all of Apple’s success over the past 15 years to two men: Steve Jobs and Tim Cook. We’ll give Jobs the credit for the adjectives beautiful, elegant, innovative, and fun. We’ll give Cook the credit for the adjectives affordable, reliable, available, and profitable. Jobs designs them, Cook makes them and sells them.

    It’s the Jobs side of the equation that Apple’s rivals — phone, tablet, laptop, whatever — are able to copy. Thus the patents and the lawsuits. Design is copyable. But the Cook side of things — Apple’s economy of scale advantage — cannot be copied by any company with a complex product lineup. How could Dell, for example, possibly copy Apple’s operations when they currently classify “Design & Performance” and “Thin & Powerful” as separate laptop categories?

    This realization sort of snuck up on me. I’ve always been interested in Apple’s products because of their superior design; the business side of the company was never of as much interest. But at this point, it seems clear to me that however superior Apple’s design is, it’s their business and operations strength — the Cook side of the equation — that is furthest ahead of their competition, and the more sustainable advantage. It cannot be copied without going through the same sort of decade-long process that Apple went through.
    (emphasis mine)

    The argument is beautifully made. The design part of Apple's equation is to their ability to redefine new industries as they did with the iPhone. Whether they go after the TV market next, or something else, it's this integrated design component that will be crucial to their initial success. But compared to the business side of Apple, design actually generates much less sustained strategic advantage in any one product category, once performance in that category becomes "good enough". The tech industry has always revolved around copying. Once folks work out how it's done, everyone piles on. And at that point, it becomes much less about design than it does about how you operate your business.

    It is the last part of the Gruber quote that really drives things home. "It cannot be copied without going through the same sort of decade-long process that Apple went through". He's right — it's very hard for a competitor to outright replicate what Apple has achieved without going through all the same steps. But it got me thinking of a concept — and a related story — that I learned from someone I was fortunate enough to have as a teacher: Clayton Christensen. Perhaps a competitor didn't have to copy Apple.

    What happens if Apple had already taught them?

    Christensen first wrote about the dangers of outsourcing in The Innovator's Solution, explaining how seeking to maximize efficiency by employing third party vendors to do the "low value-add" work for you can be a lethal strategy. In the Solution, Christensen and Michael Raynor gave the example of two fictional corporations—"Component Corporation" and "Texas Computer Corporation". I had the good fortune to work with Clay on his most recent book, How Will You Measure Your Life?, and we recount a similar story; only without any of the players being disguised. The story is that of Asus and Dell, and how by outsourcing its work—starting with just basic circuit boards—Dell equipped a competitor:

    Asus came to Dell and said, “We’ve done a good job fabricating these motherboards for you. Why don’t you let us assemble the whole computer for you, too? Assembling those products is not what’s made you successful. We can take all the remaining manufacturing assets off your balance sheet, and we can do it all for 20 percent less.”

    The Dell analysts realized that this, too, was a win- win...

    That process continued as Dell outsourced the management of its supply chain, and then the design of its computers themselves. Dell essentially outsourced everything inside its personal-computer business—everything except its brand— to Asus. Dell’s Return on Net Assets became very high, as it had very few assets left in the consumer part of its business.

    Then, in 2005, Asus announced the creation of its own brand of computers. In this Greek-tragedy tale, Asus had taken everything it had learned from Dell and applied it for itself. It started at the simplest of activities in the value chain, then, decision by decision, every time that Dell outsourced the next lowest-value-adding of the remaining activities in its business, Asus added a higher value-adding activity to its business.

    There are two sides to this story: the part that relates to Dell, and the part that relates to Asus. Dell, in its quest to maximize its financial efficiency, continued to outsource way beyond manufacturing components and assembly. They outsourced a long way up the value chain. But there's also the side of the story that relates to Asus — a small components manufacturer that was, in effect, nursed to success by Dell. The extent of the schooling delivered by Dell to Asus was pretty profound, given how far up the value chain Dell outsourced its operations.

    But here's a question: at what point did Dell seal its fate? When was it that Dell had outsourced enough that Asus, with a desire to simply get out of the low-value work, could have made it all the way to the point that it did? I'm beginning to wonder whether just component development and assembly was enough. In the case of Samsung, it seems that everything else they needed to learn, they did by entering the emerging market, which Apple has largely left alone.

    Now, it's obvious that there are some very clear differences between the decisions that Apple have made in terms of outsourcing, and the decisions Dell have made. Dell outsourced its business all the way up to the design of its products. In many respects, Apple is doing the opposite — going so far as to even bring chip design in house. Horace has done some fantastic work detailing the extensive amount of investment Apple has made in its supply chain and it's clear that they've spent a lot of money investing in equipment used in production.

    But there's also no denying that Apple has begun to rely extensively on a network of suppliers across Asia.

    It's when you start putting the two arguments together that you realize that Apple may have a more serious problem on its hands. I want to again recount the final two lines of Gruber's argument:

    It’s their business and operations strength — the Cook side of the equation — that is furthest ahead of their competition, and the more sustainable advantage. It cannot be copied without going through the same sort of decade-long process that Apple went through.

    He's right — generating that scale requires a long gestation period — one that Apple went through. And it can't be copied without significant time and effort on the part of a competitor. But there's one big implicit assumption here — that suppliers won't turn around and start developing their own offering. Because when Apple went through this transformative process, where the design whittled down the broad range of offerings to just a few, and they generated the scale on the business side that accompanied that — they weren't actually the only one to go through that process. Apple's partners — their suppliers — went through it with them. And they've got very big, and very good at what they do. Samsung, obviously, is among those partners.

    Now, the response I often hear to this line of reasoning is: Apple hasn't outsourced anywhere near as much as Dell has. How are the situations analogous? But I think it's actually the wrong question. Instead, the question is: has Apple already outsourced too much?

    For all intents and purposes, we're at a level of maturity in the smartphone market where I believe design — particularly on the hardware side — has largely become commoditised. Performance is now "good enough". Whereas it was not so long ago that consumers sat on the edge of their seats to find out what the new iPhone had to offer ("please, fix the battery life", or "please, make it faster") the recent release of the iPhone 5 seemed not to generate the same intense reaction. Now, I'm not saying it won't sell well — in fact, it will probably become the best selling phone of all time — but people aren't making these decisions based on huge design differences between the devices. The basis of competition has shifted. HTC recently learned this the hard way when it introduced the One X — a phone that, to the critics, at least, was considered the best Android phone available — "a masterpiece",  "one of the best mobile devices I've ever used". Yet it has been absolutely crushed in the marketplace by Samsung.  How? Well, Samsung used its business scale to, as Horace put it on Twitter, "invite operators to a better party with an eye-watering marketing budget". This has nothing to do with Samsung making a better phone (they probably didn't), or Samsung copying Apple (indeed, HTC may have just done a better job of copying Apple). Instead, it has everything to do with the fact that Samsung has had its business sucked along in Apple's slipstream.

    There's another way of seeing just how deep the problem lies. Jobs promised "thermonuclear war" on the copied devices, and so far, the biggest target of Apple's many legal warheads has undoubtedly been Samsung. Getting a $1 billion judgement certainly proves Apple was serious about it. But doesn't it seem strange to you that the target of such a devastating strategy on the legal side, just so happens to be… one of the most important suppliers for Apple's new phone?

    The problem that Apple is facing right now has nothing to do with their designs being copied. There is a long history of copying in the tech industry; patents being deployed in lawsuits by giants often signify desperation more than anything else. Rather, the problem that Apple faces is that it now is going up against at least one competitor that has been a beneficiary of the scale that Apple has achieved on the business side. Samsung has clearly demonstrated that, like Asus, it was not satisfied being a low-margin ODM — of doing all the menial work while somebody else made the big bucks. Suing Samsung over Android patents isn't going to change that — if Google's operating system gets too expensive to use, there'll be a switch made to Microsoft. Or to another operating system altogether. It doesn't really matter, because design in the smartphone space has been commoditized. It's good enough. Manufacturers are now creating performance that most consumers aren't able to absorb. Instead, as we've moved into a world where performance is now "good enough", the world has flipped into one where it's the business side — operational scale — that matters most.

    Apple have taken steps to minimize the ability of competitors to duplicate their business advantage. There's a great post here on Quora describing how Apple has used its supply chain as a competitive advantage and how competitors end up subsidizing Apple's use of the technology. But the approach of "locking in" key new technology so nobody else can get them works best in a world where consumers need more performance from their devices — a world is rapidly slipping away.

    So, what's Apple got to do? In so much as it is able to trust its suppliers of key components not to become competitors, it can continue to use them. But where it can't, or where those suppliers have already become competitors, it has only one sensible choice — replace them. It has two choices here: the first (and obvious one) is with another supplier. But that risks the same thing happening all over again — Apple nursing another supplier into a competitor. The second choice: for components and services that are critical to maintaining competitive advantage in the markets which Apple plays, Apple needs to build the components themselves.

    Most companies wouldn't be in a position do that. But Apple is almost already there. I also hear that there might be a country out there with relatively high unemployment rate, looking for some jobs to be brought back home. Funnily enough, it seems that's just what Tim Cook is doing right now. This approach might just be a good way of on-shoring some of those untaxed offshore profits (I imagine the tax benefits for building a few factories in the US would be quite high), all the while taking away business from competitors — both current and future.

    But there's one question that still remains. In the instance of the threat that Samsung poses to Apple: is it already too late?

    –

    Looking for more information on the renaissance of production and its effect on the technology industries? Then come to Asymconf and take part in the debate.

     

  6. Apple's new factories

    Research · 87 comments

    Two years ago, almost to the day, I wrote a post titled It’s time for Apple to look at owning factories again.

    What I argued then was that of the problems that Apple had the means to fix, production was what most needed fixing.

    Since then we've seen evidence of significant investment in manufacturing tooling, where Apple is effectively purchasing the means of production rather than just renting or contracting it out. This capital equipment investment is the equivalent of owning one of the three asset classes that make up a manufacturing operation:

    1. Tooling or capital equipment. The "Capital" at the root of the concept of "Capitalism".
    2. Skills, talent and knowledge. This is the softer kind of asset that turns out to be harder to replace or buy.
    3. Labor pool. Although considered a commodity even unskilled labor is difficult to obtain if flexible employment is needed in a regulated environment.

    It did not stop there. It has also used capital to ensure capacity through pre-orders thereby allowing the skills and labor to be more predictably applied by its suppliers (and preventing competitors from having sufficient supplies). Apple has also taken control of chip design for the vast majority of its CPUs thus building a more bespoke supplier chain.

    However these are not enough steps to make production "good enough" to meet the demands of a billion customers buying a new product every other year.

    An insidious problem emerges when outsourcing:  suppliers tend to become competitors. It happened in the PC industry with Acer vs. Dell. But it's also happening to Apple. Consider how Samsung's foreknowledge of Apple's orders allowed them to anticipate the demand for large screen smartphones. Receiving orders years in advance for memory, screens and CPUs in the hundreds of millions would be a clear indication of demand. Receiving funds with which to build capacity is an enormous help when turning on production for your own versions of the product.

    With that knowledge and the capacity built to serve Apple, Samsung was able to go from near zero market share in smartphones to being the largest vendor in two years a feat that Apple itself could not accomplish.

    The supplier-turned-competitor is one of the risks of outsourcing production and is at the root of disruption from value chain evolution.

    Hence it's gratifying to see that Apple has committed to "in-sourcing" assembly of at least one product. Tim Cook in an interview with Rock Center:

    And next year we are going to bring some production to the U.S. on the Mac. We’ve been working on this for a long time, and we were getting closer to it. It will happen in 2013. We’re really proud of it. We could have quickly maybe done just assembly, but it’s broader because we wanted to do something more substantial. So we’ll literally invest over $100 million. This doesn’t mean that Apple will do it ourselves, but we’ll be working with people, and we’ll be investing our money.

    For the first time since the 90s, Apple is taking steps to control the last pieces of the value chain it participates in.

    It's a baby step and perhaps it's going to remain symbolic, but one can imagine a trajectory for this effort which will pay off as well as retail has paid off ten years after the first Apple store opened.

    –

    Looking for more information on the renaissance of production and its effect on the technology industries? Then come to Asymconf and take part in the debate.

  7. Does S stand for Spring?

    Podcast · 77 comments

    John Sculley:

    "I think they're going through a very significant change now in terms of product cycles," Sculley explains. "Traditionally Apple introduces products once a year; now it's really introducing products twice a year. The complexity of that from a supply chain is immense, and Apple seems to be doing it well. So, I think that people are underestimating just how well Apple is run, and just how successful the company can be when it gets to that twice-a-year product introduction cycle."

    Former Apple CEO John Sculley: Apple is well-run | TUAW - The Unofficial Apple Weblog

    Suggesting that Apple is moving to a semi-annual cycle is a very provocative thing to say, but it's something I've also speculated is happening during a Critical Path podcast.  Sculley's comments prompted me to weigh the possible evidence that this is happening:

    1. All of the major products which Apple sells have been updated in the Fall. This is unprecedented. Not only were product launches scheduled in the spring, historically they had been spread throughout the year. The odds that they happen to coincide by accident are nil. Not only that but the move of iPad and iPhone and iPod and MacBook and iMac to launch all within Fall (once a year) seems risky because it leaves a vast gap for competitors to fill six months hence. Indeed, given the iPhone's launch predictability, many (most?) competing products already target launching in the Spring.
    2. Launch ramp for iPhone steeper than ever. The number of countries and operators launching the product in the launch quarter is nearly the entire distribution list. This is also the first time this has happened. Not only does it imply a very steep ramp, it indicates no channel fill will be happening past Q1. There will not be incremental sales to unserved customers as the fiscal year wears on. 
    3. Consumer anticipation. This year saw two quarters where sales were soft due to "product transitions" as awareness among the mass market of new product rumors caused growth to dry up. Too many potential buyers are now conditioned to wait for fall to buy iPhones thus sapping demand for half the year. Apple ends up with an inability to meet demand for half the year and a sales lull for the other half. Clearly this is suboptimal.
    4. Hon Hai production has shifted to locations closer to the sources of labor. This may not seem to be relevant but we have to appreciate that Apple makes up nearly half of Hon Hai's sales volume and hence labor demands. Until this shift, Hon Hai's production has depended on migrant labor which is difficult to manage. Moving production so that the labor is local means a steadier workforce with better economies from learning curves. However it also requires a more stable order book. Production for Apple has tended to be "bursty" with breakneck round-the-clock crush followed by periods of idle time and re-tooling. This is not only inefficient but it also creates strain and stress and lowers morale.
    5. Capital Expenditures de-coupled from volumes. This is a weak signal at this time and needs confirmation, but capital expenditures seem to be outpacing production. The recent bursts in CapEx may be transient or may have to do with tooling-up Samsung's replacements but it may also imply a move to a more rapid product cycle. A transition to a new operating model would require significant over-spending in advance of the shift.
    6. Rumors of 5S products in pre-production. This is the least valuable piece of evidence but it might indicate that the "S" variant is targeting spring launch. I should point out that the "facelift" model change is common practice at many phone companies. At Nokia the convention was to launch an "i" variant to a model before a bigger update. Even at Apple, the iPod was going through a re-fresh during February with a "Valentine's Day" variant being released. Then there's the case of the white iPhone 4 which seemed to take forever to launch but finally did so into an April time frame. Finally we just saw the iPad retina product go through a six month cycle.

    Admittedly, these are circumstantial pieces of evidence but they do corroborate Sculley's claim of a six month product cycle.  Put another way, if Apple is not switching to a six month cycle then there seems to be a lot of stress for no benefit.

    I would also add that this change in cycle time is an enormous undertaking. Since Apple is an integrated company, not only production but marketing, design, hardware and software engineering must be re-configured. To put it in perspective, when Ford changed its operating mode from producing one model to a flexible mass production method pioneered by General Motors, the company had to shut down for production for six months.

    The operational aspects are daunting and would affect almost all employees in the company. Therefore if it is happening it's also possible that there is some knowledge of this change dissipating outside the company, perhaps explaining Sculley's confidence in the claim.

    --

    Looking for more information on the renaissance of production and its the effect on the technology industries? Then come to Asymconf and take part in the debate.

  8. The mystery of Samsung Electronics SG&A

    Research · 40 comments

    Samsung Electronics' SG&A expenses are curiously high. Consider the following graph:

    It shows SG&A as reported by Samsung and Apple over the periods 2010, 2011 and the sum of the first three calendar quarters of 2012. Note that Samsung appears to be spending three times as much as Apple on sales and administration.

    The company offers a break-down of these SG&A costs and they are also shown (Apple does not provide a break-down except for advertising in its yearly report). The suspicion that something is not right comes from looking not only at the overall picture but the notion that Transportation, Warranty and "Other" for Samsung are higher than overall SG&A for Apple.

    Note that Apple's SG&A includes the cost to operate its retail stores. This includes the salaries and operating costs of over 300 stores.

    Considering that many of these costs are borne in the sale of products for consumers (and not borne in the sale of components such as semiconductors,)  the percent of sales of some of these expenses are:

    • Advertising: 3% of consumer sales
    • Sales promotion: 5%
    • Transportation: 4%
    • Warranties: 3%
    • Public relations: 0.5%

    Excluding wages and commissions shows a total of 15.5% of consumer sales paid in SG&A expenses. Apple's total cost for SG&A was only 6.5% overall. Advertising was 0.78%.

    I also added to the graph data for 2012 (through first three quarters.) It looks like Samsung SG&A will easily reach $30 billion this year, staying at three times Apple for another year.

    I don't have any explanation for this disparity.

  9. Asymconf Program

    Research · 4 comments

    9:00 to 10:15 Being Back. How California came to disrupt

    The disruptive history of California is remarkable. Whereas few nations can claim credit to one, California is home to at least four major disruptions: Semiconductors, recorded entertainment, venture capital and personal computing. And it did all this in less than one century. If any one place can vie for the title of "serial disruptor" it's California. One success can be seen as luck, but many successes imply a system is at work. In this case session we discuss California's disruptive history and put forward hypotheses on the what causal mechanisms are at work. We ask further whether California can still be the home of future disruptions or whether the system has broken down.

    • The effect of "frontier mentality" on unforeseen growth
    • The effect of migration and diaspora on innovation and counter-effect of the absence of either.
    • Applying these causal themes to the management of innovation in institutions

    10:15 to 10:30 Break

    10:30 to 12:00 Designed in California, Assembled in China

    Geographically and culturally, California is closer to Asia than any other western market. It has always faced west more than it has faced east. Is there a symbiosis between California and Asia? Are its institutions adapting to a new center of economic mass? Is California leading in thinking or culture or is it being disrupted by a new frontier as growth moves east?

    • The growth in Asia and China in particular is in many ways a reflection of rapid industrialization. But it can also be seen as a low-end disruption.
    • What can be learned about business model innovation in the contrast between Californian and Asian approaches to business?
    • Does culture play a part in an innovation mentality?

    12:00 to 1:00 Lunch

    1:00 to 2:15 Guest presentations and Panel session

    Guests are invited to debate or discuss points raised during the morning sessions. A chance for panelists to challenge or refute points made as well as for the provision of anecdotal evidence.

    Potential panelists:

    • Ben Bajarin
    • Michael Lopp (aka @Rands)
    • Jean-Louis Gassée
    • Om Malik
    • Charlie Kindel
    • Dan Benjamin
    • Philip Elmer-DeWitt
    • Tim Bradshaw

    2:15 to 2:30 Break

    2:30 to 4:00 North vs. South

    Does the tension between industries of Northern California and Southern California reflect an opportunity or a crisis? We will re-visit the narrative of what Entertainment is hired to do. We will review the differences and similarities of the technological creative process vs. the artistic creative process. We will see whether industrialized, commercialized art is subject to disruptive forces or whether there is persistent exceptionalism at work.

    • Is the intersection of "liberal arts" and "engineering" more than a metaphor?
    • What can be learned by cross-pollination of the creative processes of engineers and artists.
    • What's the future of technology-based entertainment? Are North and South closer and have more in common than the war talk lets on?

    4:00 to 6:00 Reception

    Please register here.

  10. Samsung Electronics Segment Revenues and Operating Income in Context

    Research · 42 comments

    As first introduced last week, Samsung's revenues have grown primarily due to the expanding volumes of smartphones. In today's post I convert the revenues and operating incomes to US Dollars and compare them to a set of companies.

    First, I should note that Samsung has changed both the designation of its divisions and the way it reports revenue. Broadly speaking, Samsung Electronics has four major divisions:

    1. Semiconductors. This includes memory products as well as systems such as CPUs.
    2. Display products. This used to be called "LCD" but has been re-named Display Products.
    3. Telecom. This is mainly mobile phones but includes additional products and services for telecom operators and PCs. The division has recently been re-named IM (IT and Mobile communications).
    4. Consumer Electronics. This group has changed names from Digital Media and Appliances to CE. The majority of sales value comes from televisions but also includes consumer electronics and appliances.

    The company further combines Semiconductors and Display Products into a group called DS (Device Solutions) and Consumer Electronics and IM into DMC (Digital Media & Communications).

    I tried to reconcile these various nomenclatures with color coding in the following graph. Semiconductors are blue, Display components are red, Consumer Electronics are Yellow and Mobile are grey.

    Each gridline represents $10 billion.

    One more point to note about revenue recognition: Relatively recently the company has switched from reporting consolidated revenues to gross revenues. This means that current sales include inter-segment sales. So, as much as it is possible, the data above shows sales from division to division as well to external customers.

    When it comes to reporting operating income, the company offers four segment values: Consumer Electronics (Appliances, TV, "Digital Media"), IT and Mobile (including mobile phones), Display Panel (formerly LCD), and Semiconductor.

    I used the same color coding to show the income values in the same scale as the graph showing income:

    It's now possible to compare Samsung Electronics with Google, Microsoft and Apple in terms of divisional (as a proxy for product-line) revenue and profitability over a five year period.

    At this time, a portion (majority?) of Samsung's grey area in the operating income graph represents the vast majority of profits obtained from Android across the entire ecosystem.

  11. The cost of selling Galaxies

    Research · 230 comments

    In the post "Google vs. Samsung" I compared the profits of Google and Samsung Electronics' mobile (aka Telecoms) division. It showed how Samsung has grown its mobile business to such a degree that, if sustained, could conceivably influence the way Android is controlled.

    However, we should not analyze Samsung's mobile group in isolation of the entire company. Samsung relies on internal transfer of technology and capacities of production which are quite unique for device vendors today. In other words, Samsung is a relatively integrated enterprise. Understanding the whole is necessary before understanding the part.

    The following graph shows the sales and operating profit for  Samsung Electronics as a composite of its divisions since early 2008.

    As one would expect, the mobile group (Telecom) is the source of both top and bottom line growth. The group has also been leading in terms of margins and increasing those margins steadily. 

    The margins averaged 11% during 2007 and 17% during the trailing four quarters. This 54% increase in margin has been matched by a 55% increase in average selling price (from $151 in 2007 to $234 in the latest quarter).

    One could argue however that a 17% operating margin from a group that is now leading in volume and price is still a bit weak. At its peak Nokia enjoyed a 25% operating margin, RIM 30% and HTC 27%. Apple's iPhone operating margin is around 45%.

    I think a large part of the margin story is a relatively high level of spending on SG&A (Sales, General and Administrative) which includes advertising, sales promotion and commissions. In the case of Samsung Electronics, as sales has grown these expenses have grown in proportion. As a percent of sales SG&A have held relatively steady at around 17%.

    Note that as Apple's sales have grown its SG&A has grown less rapidly resulting in a smaller percent over time. We might see Apple's SG&A drop to 5% during the present quarter, an all-time low.

    So one of the more remarkable aspects of Samsung's success has been their willingness to increase promotional spending. Considering that their other divisions don't require as much "marketing expense" (semiconductors, LCD certainly, and TVs and Appliances to a lesser degree due to a smaller sales growth) we can imagine that the vast majority of this promotional spending has been in support of their mobile brands, Galaxy in particular.

    In fact, we can obtain advertising spend data from annual reports.

    The chart above shows comparable ad spending from a cohort of technology companies as well as Coca Cola and Samsung Electronics.

    It might be surprising to note that Samsung spends considerably more than Apple and Microsoft. But it also spends more than Coca Cola, a company whose primary cost of sales is advertising.

    However, advertising is not the only form of promotional spending. Samsung also pays commissions and "sales promotion". The following chart shows the value of these sales promotions relative to the ad spending budgets above.

     

    We don't have data on the current year since that is released after year's end, but it's interesting to note that promotions cost more than ads, which themselves are substantial relative to other companies.

    The company also reports "Marketing Expenses" every quarter[1]. These figures appear to be the sum of Ad spending, Sales Promotions, Public Relations and a portion of "other" expenses as a part of SG&A.

    When considering all marketing expenses, Samsung Electronics' sales efforts begin to look quite astonishing.

    ---

    Notes:

    1. The data used in the latter three charts are available as a Google spreadsheet here.