Technology

The iMac launched May 6 1998, exactly 20 years ago. It is not the most significant computer to ever exist. It was a clear descendant of the original Mac which established the "all-in-one" desktop computer category. That category, to which it still belongs, is a modest segment. The last time Apple reported portable sales separately was in late 2012 when the desktops/servers and pro systems combined made up only 20% of all Mac sales by units. If iMac were 10% of Mac sales, it would represent about 2 million units in 2017.

Desktops evolved into laptops and personal computing evolved into pocket  computing. Becoming more personal means more intimacy and this is leading to wearable computing. There is more beyond that to be sure.

But the iMac is a historically significant machine. It allowed Apple to start on a new trajectory. It did this by first offering a financial lifeline. Sales of Macs, which were at the time the only source of revenues for Apple, increased from 2.7 million to 3.8 million a year. This at a time when Windows PCs were shipping about 100 million units. That was enough to ensure survival. Today Mac units are five times higher while Windows PCs are about 2.5 times higher. The following graph shows the impact of iMac on the Mac's trajectory. 

Second, the iMac was the first host of OS X, an operating system built on Unix which made it extremely flexible. iMac gave Apple the space for OS X to be developed and to be optimized for various hardware. The experience with OS X and its inherent scaleability (down as well as up) meant that it could be considered for the post-PC devices of the future.

Lastly, iMac's design screamed "consumer product" which went from signaling inferiority to superiority. It set a standard for novelty, creativity and dynamism in the category that was considered second-rate. In the early 2000s consumers began to lead in the adoption of new technologies. DVD drives, internet connectivity, wifi, instant messaging, media consumption exploded. All the while institutions, hung up on legacy, began to block technologies. At this pivotal moment, the iMac spoke with its looks. It didn't just imply a new order, it stated it.

To me the incredible aspect of the iMac's entry is its uncanny timing. It came not only just in time to save Apple but exactly half-way between the first two ages of computing. In the following graph showing "share of computing" you can see it as launching precisely at "peak Windows".

In retrospect you have to wonder if Apple, with the iMac, was lucky to survive into this next era or if that era would have ever happened without the iMac. It's a question of causality which quickly devolves into an un-winnable argument about stochastic vs. deterministic existence.

Regardless, the result was felt more than seen. The computing industry was pivoting. The results are seen also in the graphs above. The iMac came right in the middle of the "desert" of platform choice of the late 1990s. By the 2000s mobile platforms detonated on the scene. The iPod was Apple's first entry, in 2001, but it was not a computer. It was an appliance. A stepping stone at a time when the early platform contenders Nokia, Palm, Microsoft and BlackBerry surged before realizing that they did not have sound foundations upon which to build ecosystems. Their advances could not be consolidated.

The spoils went to the later entries of iOS and Android. The resulting disruption was shocking and disorienting. Not only did the old order get up-ended but the magnitude of the new was 100x the old. The iMac enabled at least a trillion dollars of value to be created and made Apple the biggest company in the world.

As you would expect, at the time, 20 years ago, none of this change was anticipated. iMac was a 'cute' computer. Toy-like and obviously unprofessional. It attracted and relished contempt.

So now we are at a point where the second era of computing is at its apex. With markets near saturation, the device business is inflecting from growth to possible stagnation if not decline. There are two platforms--though unlike Windows, Android is fragmented and iOS is not just on one form factor. Nevertheless there is stasis. The touch UI which begat nine billion devices is normative. The next interaction metaphor has not emerged as an obvious successor.

The question for today is what is the new iMac? What is the enabler for change? It's not easy to spot. It is not the thing of the future but it points to the future.

You've probably heard of Jony at Apple but probably don't know about Johny.

Jony is a celebrity executive known as the face of Apple Design. Johny is the executive in charge of custom silicon and hardware technologies across Apple’s entire product line.

Under Johny's leadership, Apple has shipped 1.7 billion processors in more than 20 models and 11 generations. Currently Apple ships more microprocessors than Intel. ((Trailing 12 months’ PC shipments 265 million. Equivalent iOS devices 281 million. Not included are Apple processors in Apple TV.))

The Apple A11 Bionic processor has 4.3 billion transistors, six cores and an Apple custom GPU using a 10nm FinFET technology. Its performance appears to be almost double that of competitors and in some benchmarks exceeds the performance of current laptop PCs.

A decade after making the commitment to control its critical subsystems in its (mobile) products, Apple has come to the point where is dominates the processor space. But they have not stopped at processors. The effort now spans all manners of silicon including controllers for displays, storage, sensors and batteries. The S series in the Apple Watch the haptic T series in the MacBook, the wireless W series in AirPods are ongoing efforts. The GPU was conquered in the past year. Litigation with Qualcomm suggests the communications stack is next.

This across-the-board approach to silicon is not easy or fast or cheap. This multi-year, multi-billion dollar commitment is rooted in the Jobsian observation that the existing supplier network is not good enough for what you're driving at. Tiny EarPods, Smart Watches, Augmented Reality, Adaptive Acoustics require wrapping your arms around all parts of the problem. The integration and control it demands are in contrast to the modular approach of assembling off-the-shelf components into a good-enough configuration.

There are times and places where modules are adequate and times and places where they aren't. The decision depends on whether you are creating new experiences or new "measures of performance" vs. optimizing for cost within existing experiences or measures of performance.

The very notion of a microprocessor is a rejection of the discrete component designs that preceded it. Earlier computers had central processors made up of many discrete components. VLSI stands for Very Large Scale Integration with emphasis on Integration. As computing has progressed toward ambience and ubiquity the idea of using discrete components became normative again but that was not considered sufficient by Apple.

So while the "Silicon" in Silicon Valley has come to be seen as an anachronism, silicon development today means competitive advantage. The only problem is that it takes years, decades even to establish competence. The same duration that it took for the building of Apple as a design-centric business fronted by Jony Ive.

Apple also now needs to be understood along the dimension of silicon-centric engineering as led by Johny Srouji.

At the 2015 WWDC Apple stated that it receives 5 billion requests per week for its maps service. It also said that Apple maps is used 3.5 times more frequently than "the next leading maps app."

These two data points are the total number of data points we have about the global maps market. Neither Google nor Nokia provide usage or share or performance data. Regardless, commentary on the usage, share and performance of Apple Maps has been abundant for the three years since its inception.

The data presented allows us to make a few estimates for the first time and we can hope that additional data can allow a picture to emerge of where maps are going.

With these first two data points we can finally make some estimates. But some assumptions are still needed: We need to assume that the "next leading maps app" is Google Maps. Although there are other maps apps on the iOS platform they are probably insignificant and it's a two-horse race between Google and Apple on iOS.

This means that the 3.5:1 split in usage results in a 78% share for Apple Maps and a 22% share for Google. If we assume that there are about 400 million iOS users of maps ((Note that not all iOS users are maps users. Maps are not used by all users)), it leads to about 90 million Google Maps users on iOS and about 310 million Apple Maps users on iOS.  This includes iPad. ((We are excluding OS X use of Maps.))

Given that Google also reported 1 billion downloads in 2014 ((though not necessarily all of these downloads lead to active use, obviously)) we can assume between 25% to 33% Apple Maps "market share" of usage.

At the minimum, 25% share is not insignificant and it's easily sustainable. To understand why, we should note that there is one more data point. In December 2012 I posted an analysis on the the cost of maps. It showed that maintaining maps requires an investment of between $1 billion and $2 billion/yr. With the addition of new features such as 3-D mapping, transit maps and thousands of new cities, the cost is likely to have increased. $2 billion/yr is probably the norm today.

Apple then could be seen as spending about $6.5/user/yr on maps and Google could be spending about $2/user/yr. To be profitable Google would need to find ad revenues of $2/user/yr and Apple would need to find $6 of profit on each phone/yr. Clearly, each of these targets is achievable.

In contrast we can see why Nokia's HERE Maps business is now worth a lot less than it was in 2007. The asset has been for sale for some time and the latest bid  has been for $3 billion, making the $5 billion lost in market value and $7 billion of investment since seem like a catastrophe. Without a business model the data is worthless--with only 30 million users the cost per user reaches $66/yr. A buyer needs to find an appropriate model for sustaining a $2 billion/yr burn rate.

So the question of where maps are going depends on the business model for maps. In a world where maps are sustained by device value, 300 million users makes it sustainable. In a world where maps are sustained by advertising, 1 billion users makes it sustainable. What else is there?

How about a world where maps are sustained by transportation services?

Uber's and other auto makers' interest in HERE shows a third business model. Accurate maps are a key to making vehicles autonomous. More so even than the value of the algorithms, precise imaging of roadways enables vehicle autonomy and the value of location gathering systems should grow to meet that future.

It's highly likely that Google's maps efforts are going to continue because they are fueled by a business model. That is also true for Apple's maps efforts, though they are fueled by an entirely different business model. Each of these business models fuels the improvement of the maps product but also of the maps gathering process. As these processes are expensive and licensing options are few there is little incentive to share the data. As a result the processes remain integral to the businesses.

This integrated-while-fueled nature means that maps makers will find it compelling to pursue adjacent business models, i.e. transportation services. It's not a matter of whether they will or won't. It's only a matter of when and where.

Apple's new watches are priced in a pattern unlike any of the previous pricing models for Apple products.

Previous pricing models for iPhone, iPad, Mac and iPod were typically structured around storage differences. The higher the storage, the higher the price. The Mac had a slight variation where processor and graphics offered some additional configuration options. To illustrate, the graph below shows typical price bands for the iPhone (2011 and 2012)

In contrast, the watches are differentiated by size, materials and bands. There are also a total of 38 watch configurations available at launch (SKUs) and another 38 bands that can be purchased separately.

The bands come in four price points and the watches in 15. Of these 15 watch prices, four are dramatically different. The pricing of the watches is shown in the two graphs below (with and without the Edition).

This mix of product makes average pricing estimation more challenging, but the more pertinent question is what does this new pricing model signify? Is it something that Apple can "pull off"? Can Apple actually price not on functionality (or options thereon) but on materials?

It used to be said that Apple's profit engine was fueled by the ability to price memory at a significant mark-up on its cost. The iPod earned the vast bulk of music player profits by offering additional memory increments at significant price increments. Even today, a 64GB iPod Touch is priced $100 higher than a 16GB version. Sounds reasonable, but a quick check shows that 64GB of Flash memory probably costs about $5. This exploitation of pricing/cost differences at the margin allows for great profitability and is rooted in the ways the buyers contemplate value.

Therefore the difference between memory-based pricing and materials-based pricing is only in the choice of how to attach value in the mind of the buyer. In one case it's having the option on storage, in the other it's having the option, perhaps, of more durability, quality or glamour.

The tricky part is understanding just how much the market will bear. What is the right differential for pricing of steel vs. aluminum? Or what makes gold worth so much more?

The cost of these materials (and the processes needed to manufacture them) is not very important. As with memories, the differences are not that significant. It could even be that the Aluminum process is more expensive than the steel process--it depends also on volume.

What matters most is how to gauge the perception of value.

This is where one can take cues from the existing market. Gold is costlier than steel but the pricing difference is greater still. Multiplying $1000 (cost) by 10 (to get a price) yields far more profit than multiplying $1 by 20. This perception of gold as being worth it is far beyond its utility--a perception which has taken centuries to build. What Apple is doing with Watch pricing is simply leveraging existing perceptions of value for materials and using them to capture profits for an otherwise purely functional product.

But that process of using perception to gain pricing advantage for function is how Prestige branding has always worked. The notion that materials, craftsmanship and attention to detail can be priced at huge multiples of cost is possible only with the right brand. That brand, itself built over decades, even generations, gives assurance of quality, perhaps exclusivity and comforts the purchaser in the moment of decision. It also provides assurance after the purchase and preserves the feeling of value well into the future. So-called Luxury brands are those which can impart these qualities on their products and extract the pricing advantage.

Sounds great, so why doesn't everybody do it? The answer is that it takes time and perseverance, with typically low volumes. This is not something technology brands have been able to do. Mainly because the products are perishable but also because they have not been around for long. With technology, the value is high at purchase on a functional basis but diminishes rapidly afterwards. It's as if, in order to preserve notional brand value, a product needs to be a functional commodity, undifferentiated on what it does but differentiated on the way it does it.

This is the unique value of Apple's brand: among technological brands it can stretch to cover the perception of value for design, materials, craftsmanship and prestige. At the same time it offers new experiences and introduces new products for new jobs to be done.

Dan Niles, a former analyst who is now a portfolio manager, said on a CNBC appearance that the WWDC event actually had nothing of any real meat for investors

From Worldwide Developer's Conference Prompts Analysts to Raise Apple Price Targets - 24/7 Wall St.

The "investors" that Dan Niles refers to are undoubtedly those who invest (or, more accurately, speculate with) money. But the audience for the event was an entirely different set of investors. These investors ((All nine million of them)) invest their passion, intellect and a substantial fraction of their lives with Apple.

For them WWDC had a great deal of meat. Indeed, for them, it was probably the most significant event Apple ever staged.

The path to realizing this is to imagine the world as the "D" in WWDC see it. Developers don't just build. Using an analogy of building or construction, they are architects and designers as well as contractors and craftsmen and artists as well as builders. And not of just of houses but of cities and communities. They see and think through tools and techniques for building and innovations in building materials. Innovations which allow them to imagine first and, later, to build new cities in ways that were never before possible.

We were therefore witnesses to an event which was, in essence, a cement conference. A new building material was introduced along with the methods for using it and the tools for shaping it. Perhaps some observers expected to see skyscrapers and interstate highways presented, and thus were disappointed. But they should not have had such expectations. A cement conference is esoteric. It's about the rudiments which, when combined with imagination, ingenuity and a lot of work, generate livable spaces.

A few spaces go beyond comfort and delight us. Fewer still enlighten and cause the sprit to soar.

And yet it was still a cement conference.

Perhaps the way to understand the show better would be to "play it backwards." Rather than the way it was presented, let us begin with the end:

We were shown a new concrete formulation which when coupled with a new way of mixing, forming and curing can lead to increases in productivity of construction. This is especially true when producing shapes that are complex, intricate and built into modules.

We were then introduced to some pre-formed kits that allow the materials to be combined for new uses such as flexibly shaped hospitals and gyms. And we would have to stretch only slightly to imagine how this might lead to better health and wellbeing.

Then we were shown examples of new ways that this cement was used to create new work environments. We had a preview of "show homes" beautifully architected and designed. And these homes were seamlessly connected through new transportation networks and allowed for easier commutes.  Again, it did not take much to imagine how these workspaces and homes would lead to greater productivity and how other spaces could be built around them that made such a collection of communities a wonderful place to be.

Some saw banks, and some saw art galleries and some saw warehouses, but all who were there were seeing a new world, populated by many loyal citizens.

Perhaps not populated by all. Indeed, such a country is not for everybody, perhaps only a billion people could be resident and it would not be cheap to live there. But still, imagine.

So this was the way I saw WWDC 2014. A cement conference cheered by cement enthusiasts but leaving Architectural Digest writers asking what the fuss was all about.

 

In my essay on Google's absence of profit (or income or business) motives questions were raised on the stated absence of hunger for profits from Apple and what difference there might be from Google's philosophy.

Indeed, Jony Ive stated:

"Our goal isn't to make money. Our goal absolutely at Apple is not to make money. It may sound a little flippant, but it's the truth." ((at the British Embassy's Creative Summing in July 2012)).

He was probably repeating what Jobs had previously stated:

"I remember very clearly Steve announcing that our goal is not just to make money but to make great products" ((Walter Isaacson's Steve Jobs))

However, note that both quotes are qualified. In the case of Jobs, he said "not just to make money". Jobs clearly stated that great products lead to money. That great products are causal to money and therefore that if you make great products you make money. One leads to the other.

Ive also continued in this reasoning:

"Our goal, and what gets us excited, is to try to make great products. We trust that if we are successful people will like them. And if we are operationally competent we will make revenue. But we are very clear about our goal."

I would paraphrase the Apple logic as "Great products are the means by which we sustain our business. By focusing on the product, the customer is satisfied and through that satisfaction we create the free cash flows which can be used to fund more products."

There is a difference between Apple's "indifference to money" and the "indifference to business models" that Google exhibits.

Google steps even further away from cash flows. Its goals are to build great things guided by their vision and patterns in the data they collect. The value is in the data itself rather than in any transaction.

As long as the source of money is unfettered, its provenance is uninteresting. A business model is a profit algorithm. It could be linked to the data but it need not be. Markets are messy and imperfect. Data provides much clearer views into value. You could conclude that value itself cannot be trusted to the judgement of the public. Value is to be determined through the recognition of patterns on data privately collected.

So when I say that Google has disdain for market mechanisms I mean that they believe they can do better. Apple still values the user as the ultimate adjudicator of its actions. Google looks past the user and interprets their intentions.

Google sees markets as ultimately obsolete.

My appearance on Bloomberg West using an iPad to illustrate what it takes to make an iPad.

The Numbers Behind the Apple vs. Samsung Rivalry: Video - Bloomberg.

My thanks to Tania Chen for organizing my appearance on Bloomberg Surveillance in New York on September 26th.

Is Apple Really Dominating the Tablet Wars?: Video - Bloomberg.

Although there isn't much one can cover in 5 minutes, there were some good questions around tablets. The role of Amazon and Microsoft in particular.

Here is an exchange with Robert van Apeldoorn, Journalist with Trends Tendances Magazine in Belgium. (www.trends.be/fr). The exchange took place in early September via e-mail.

Robert: -Information and Communications Technology (ICT) is considered in Europe as a way to push growth, and is a target of national and EU policies (digital growth,etc), but the result seems to be a failure: the European computer industry (hardware) is almost dead (ICL, Siemens computers bought by Fujitsu, Olivetti almost out of computer business, Nixdorf dead) since the 90’, and the telco industry seems to be in crisis. All European companies are out of the handset business (big and fading exception is Nokia, but with  American software), and Alcatel is suffering with telco equipement manufacturing. It seems that at best, Europe can be a good niche player, with companies like ARM (chips). Technology seems to be reduced to localized services (computer services), some software businesses. What do you thing about that point of view? Is it correct or exaggerated ?
What will remain to the European companies ?

The main problem is perphaps the creation of European platform/ecosystems. Almost all are American today: Apple IOS-iTunes, Android, Amazon,…

Why Symbian didn’t succeed as a competitive platform ?

Is it possible to create European platforms? After all, IOS succeed after a short period of time.

What are the European tech companies that could play an important role in the near future ?

My answer: You are correct in this observation. Europe has failed to generate growth on the basis of ICT. The reasons are that the rate of change in ICT is rapid and getting more so. If European businesses require intervention, support or other forms of assistance in terms of policy, the time for that coordination to take effect is longer than the cycle time of disruption.

Almost all growth has come from companies that entered the space. Google, Amazon, Apple and Facebook and even Microsoft came into positions of power from outside the industries they entered. Policy tends to offer means of sustaining incumbents or finding "logical" or defensible entrants. I should mention that the problem of industrial policy failing is not unique to Europe. Japan and to a lesser degree Korea are also facing crises of innovation due to policies designed to sustain rather than disrupt.

It's understandable given the need to justify spending other people's money. No policy maker wants to spend it recklessly. However, the process of unforeseen growth is, well, unforeseeable. It cannot be predicted and it's very likely to come from somewhere other than where you expect it.

This quickly becomes a lengthy discussion, but fundamentally the innovation process is chaotic. It's very similar to the process of artistic creation. The crisis in innovation comes from not having sufficient chaos. If Europe wants to preserve, sustain, nurture, and maintain it will do so at the expense of creative destruction. Nobody likes chaos but everybody wants innovation. Unfortunately they are concurrent things.

thank you very much for these interesting answer. Usually the answer is the lack of venture capital or the compartimented market.

So Nokia was an exception ?

If a lack of venture capital is the problem then what is the cause of a lack of venture capital? There is plenty of capital on the continent. Why should it not be allocated to ventures? Capital markets in Europe are quite free and liquid and capital will find the best opportunities. The problem is that there are few fundable opportunities.

I think Nokia was not an exception in the sense that it was not a "managed" success. The company (and Finland) emerged from a crisis in the early 90s. The crisis forced a re-evaluation of priorities and the success of Nokia could be attributed to a lack of emphasis in what was considered sustaining at the time (consumer electronics, TVs, natural resources, etc.) Entry into mobile phones was not what policy would have suggested was the biggest opportunity at the time. The market for mobile phones was projected to be insignificant in comparison to what was seen as success of the time (Sony, et. al.)

[Addendum: What are policy makers suggesting as the key investment themes? Which projects get funding today and which don't?]

The following interview was conducted by Bruno Ferrari a writer about technology for EPOCA, the weekly magazine of Organizações GLOBO, the largest Brazilian media company on March 30 2011. The article (published in Portuguese here) is an edited subset of the following exchange.

Q: In your analyses, you mention tablets as part of a new era, the “Post PC era”. Why do you think the PCs will be replaced by tablets?

This is not quite correct. Post PC does not mean the end of the microcomputer. The way to think about it is this: The stone age did not end because we stopped using stones. Same with the iron age and the industrial era. The era of jet travel did not end automobile or even ship travel (though that changed to recreation rather than transportation for passengers.) Each phase of technology does not fully replace its predecessor. It offers a new set of solutions and perhaps a slightly different way of solving old problems. We'll still have PCs but we will use a new type of computer, an even more personal computer. The world still uses the microcomputer's technological ancestors.

In terms of what new jobs will we hire the tablets to solve, they will vary greatly from what we used PCs for. Just like we used microcomputers for different things than we used time-shared minicomputers and mainframe computers. I expect social interaction, media consumption and entertainment will move from a PC to a tablet. New uses will emerge from the vast experiment that is the app phenomenon.

Q: What are the new ways to interact with machines? With gestures? How will this change the market?

Each major disruption of computing came from a new generation of input and/or output methods. Terminals (vs. punch cards) enabled minicomputers. The GUI enabled the rise of the microcomputer and touch is enabling the rise of the tablet. Perhaps this era will last decades perhaps only years, but there will be new input and output methods available. The world's research laboratories are filled with ideas from projection screens (from high brightness LEDs) to motion sensing (as implemented partly by Kinect) and even novel voice control methods. I believe that each major innovation will create a new wave of growth and, if coupled with a new business model, a new set of companies and platforms.

Q: What are the main differences between PC and Post PC era?

The main difference will be in the context in which the product will be used. Tablets and smartphones allow "computing" to be done in previously non-consuming contexts: while standing, while in the active company of others, while commuting or while lying back and relaxing. It will also allow more individual use. Like the transistor radio allowed teenagers to listen to rock-and-roll out of hearing range of their parents who had control over the family stereo, a truly personal computer will allow people to "escape" into a world of more intimate consumption and communication.

Q: Do you think physical keyboards and mouse will be extinct?

Even physical keyboards have been evolving dramatically. If you look back to the earliest IBM PC keyboards, they were mechanically complex and had a rich feel. Modern laptop keyboards are flimsy things with barely any feedback. Early PC keyboards were patterned after the needs of professional typists (aka secretaries). Current keyboards are designed around space constraints. Same with mice. They went from two to three to one to no buttons. With laptops we ended up with track balls,  little knobs in the middle of the keyboard or with trackpads. Users adjusted over time.

What changed with tablets is the removal of an on-screen pointer. The pointer was there because the mouse/touchpad was one layer of abstraction for controlling what was on screen. Without a pointer you have direct manipulation. I'm sure many people who never used a mouse would find the direct method more intuitive and in a generation people will wonder how we put up with mice. Conversely, those who are used to a mouse will find it uncomfortable at first. Remember that in the 80s many keyboard experts found mice something that slowed them down.

So I believe that people will adjust to a world without mouse pointers. I suspect children born today will grow up without ever using a mouse (or a phone with a wire permanently attached to the bottom).

Q:  Apple has more than 90% of tablet market worldwide. Do you think Apple will be the leader of technology market in the next few years?

The challenge for Apple is that they cannot serve the whole world. They can only grow so fast. On one hand we have their inability to meet demand and on the other we have alternative products which can. Market leadership may not be sustainable just because the market is so big and no single company can supply it. I do believe that Apple is not sitting on its hands however. Their culture promotes pushing forward.

Q: At smartphone market, do you believe on a risk of a new duopoly, Apple-Google? Some analysis says that they’ll control the channel sales of software, content and hardware. The conclusion is companies like RIM, Nokia and HP (Palm) will not be able to keep up.

Analysts differ in their opinions. IDC just released a forecast that shows Microsoft growing beyond iOS in four years. I don't try to make this type of prediction. At least not to a high degree of precision. I do believe that there will be more than two platforms. This is because the market is so large and so diverse and there are so many ways to reach customers (through operators, through retail stores, through online).

Q: Can we compare the beginning of the tablets with PCs? Apple developed the interface and made ​​the first computers nice and easy to use. But Windows has allowed hardware manufacturers to invade the market, popularizing it. This will be repeated with Android? Or with other systems?

Innovations are always copied. Even when protected by all sorts of laws or patents. What makes a company successful with innovation long term is to always keep innovating. Often coming up with the next big thing means damaging the old thing. That's hard to do for many companies so they don't do it and somebody else does. This is why great companies end up as formerly-great companies. As I pointed out above in the discussion about input methods, innovations are always bubbling up. As long as Apple takes these ideas and polishes them and brings them to market, they'll do all right.

Q; How about Microsoft? Do you think the company will lose the podium in Post PC era?

Microsoft already has lost its position as leader in personal technology. The end actually came in about 2000. Once Windows became "good enough" and did not crash so much, they have had a hard time finding something to improve. If you go back and watch every CES keynote that Microsoft presented since then it's been a litany of dead end ideas.

Every major innovation since 2000 has been in consumer technology and that's never been an attractive business for Microsoft (with the exception of XBox which was really aimed at Sony and Nintendo without the intention of creating a new market.) Microsoft struggles not because they lack talent (engineering or management) but rather because their business model is relatively rigid. They make money through software licensing. You can see how that's a hard thing to sell to consumers ("I'm buying what?") Consumers tend to pay Microsoft through the purchase of another product. If the market demands hardware/software integration (like in a phone or tablet) or making money by giving software away (like Google), they struggle. This business model rigidity is present in almost all companies, so Microsoft is not uniquely troubled.

Q: Most of the tablets will use mobile networks to connect to the internet. Do you think the world is ready with an infrastructure that supports this growth in access via mobile networks?

This is a good question because the growth of mobile broadband is a major enabler (or constraint) on growth. Fortunately, the roll-out of mobile broadband is fairly predictable and it looks good. There are some challenges for operators long term in paying for the infrastructure, but they don't lack for financing today and the business case for more infrastructure seems to be very attractive. It will take time and it won't be even globally, but the incentives are clearly there. A lot of value is being created with mobile computing and much of that value will end up paying for the bandwidth.

Q: How about the App Market. You posted recently a chart showing how fast developers are buying thickets for both Google and Apple developer events. You said that it is one signal of the Post PC Era. What will be the importance of apps on the next years. Do you think Apps market will be more important than hardware, content and OS market?

Developers are one more sign that something big is happening. It's not the only sign and may not be the cause of the change, but it's yet another signal. But apps are a phenomenon that will result in something bigger than we can imagine. The way to think about apps is as a new medium, similar to the emergence of radio, television, cinema and even books. The app is a new art form as well as something that provides functional value. We don't know whether the app phenomenon will be tied to one platform or will evolve to something like HTML5, a common standard. But the value of having an app for everything is plainly evident. The economics, creative energy and dynamism of apps cannot be overestimated. I will write more about this subject as I think it's one of the most important consequences of the post-PC era.

Q: What’s the destiny of the PC? Are they on their last years?

Again, it's not so much that PCs will disappear any more than mainframes or servers have disappeared. What is more likely is that they will be used for isolated, focused jobs. The "end of an era" is the end of growth, not the end of existence. The PC has arguably reached end of growth in most developed markets. There is still strong growth in emerging economies but even there, much of that growth will probably be replaced with smart devices growth.

Q: We had the Mainframe Era, the Terminal Era, the MiniPC Era, The PC Era and now we starting the PostPC Era. Do you imagine what Era we'll se after the tablets? When do you think is it going to happen?

I don't try to be a futurist who can see with clarity technological change. I try to see the patterns of markets through the motivation of companies. With that in mind, my answer will be that large companies will acquire promising new technologies from start-up companies and implement products with global distribution. To see the future you therefore need to look at what small companies are doing today. I note that there is a lot of innovation in new communication methods (social media) and new input methods around gestures and display technology. I am skeptical about the power of voice controls.

I'm most confident that there will be a re-definition of television, a "socialization" of almost all media. So I'll abstain from answering directly what happens after the Tablet Era. Perhaps something more personal and more of a companion than a tool.

And a lot of folks in this tablet market are rushing in and they're looking at this as the next PC. The hardware and the software are done by different companies. And they're talking about speeds and feeds just like they did with PCs

Steve Jobs, iPad 2 launch event March 2011.

I'm not above doing a feeds and speeds comparison.

All the products above have dual core processors, 512 MB of memory. The iPad processor is a bit slower. The iPad also has a slightly smaller resolution screen than a MacBook from mid 2006. However, unlike the others, the iPad has cellular broadband connectivity, loads more sensors, and a battery that will last at least 5 times longer.

It's also a lot cheaper and a lot smaller.

Although five years old, nobody would question that the MacBook or iMacs shown above are still computers. They still run the latest versions of OS X and are probably still in widespread use.

The new iPad is still not considered a computer by the majority of market analysts. One wonders how long this will go on. The specs of the iPad are just going to keep getting better...