analyst

Apple's second fiscal quarter has just ended. Time for analysts to put forward their predictions for the quarter's report (due in about 3 weeks.) If history is a guide, the estimates will range quite widely and accuracy will be determined mostly by the ability of an analyst to predict iOS device sales (and iPhone most of all).

How hard can it be?

It depends on what you choose to prioritize as the proxy for sales. In competitive markets there is usually a constraint on demand and rivalry among suppliers. If that's your assumption you might want to use samples from the sales channel as a proxy. That means sampling distribution channels and sales through to end users at retail. You might even watch competitors and index them to each other using historic market shares.

In markets where demand outstrips supply, the best method would be to determine the constraints to production and measure those.

In Apple's case we know from company statements that Apple faces more demand than it can supply. That makes things easier for the amateur because she can just figure out production. In other words, the logical way to forecast Apple's iPhone sales is to guess how many they can make.

That is not trivial since production data is not public. However, we have historic sales data. We also can make assumptions about how much inventory is carried (some data is actually available here as well.)

Combining these public data sets we can build up a model of production ramps and look for patterns of growth.

So here are the patterns of sales for the four versions of iPhone sold to date with some production ramps overlaid. The monthly sales are approximations based on actual quarterly sales divided over the months according to the number of days available.

The assumptions are:

1. Inventory during any one month has to be greater than zero.
2. Inventory must be minimized. Ideally it should not exceed 2 million units and preferably should be around 1 million units at any given time.
3. There is a limited amount of overlap between production of various generations. I.e. once a new version is launched, the older product should end production. Continuing sales of older model should be made available from inventory.

The following chart shows the ramps for the various versions of iPhone that satisfy these assumptions and are shown relative to the same time frame (each line shows the number of units produced per month for each generation of iPhone):

I need to stress that this is just my estimate. It's an approximation and not reality. What it does is give reasonably accurate predictions for units sold.

What I've always assumed is that each new version of the iPhone sells twice as many units as the last. This is roughly translated into: each ramp is roughly double the previous ramp (at least on average). The data bears this out. Apple has been very considerate in keeping products on similar cycle times so that we can see this pattern emerge.

Once you build these models, forecasts are not that hard to make:

• The current generation will probably sell around 60 to 65 million units.
• The product will still sell for at least one more quarter (CQ2, FQ3)
• We know how many have been sold so far, so we can be pretty sure what will happen in the quarter just ended and the one just starting.
• Looking at the pattern between generations, we can guess what the iPhone 5 curve will look like and build up the units forecast by month and quarter.

You can sanity-check the forecast by looking at overall market shares for Apple and overall market growth. If share moves too far up or down it might makes sense to revisit the data.

Apple is having difficulty meeting demand for the iPhone and the iPad. It is growing both businesses at more than 100% and they make up about 65% of revenues, and 71% of profits. The Mac business is also growing at 2x to 3x the PC industry.

Being supply constrained makes it therefore a great challenge to forecast future growth for the company. Supply issues and ramp rates are needful of an operational expertise few possess outside of the industry. But many take up this challenge, myself included. We put up our numbers every quarter and get scrutinized and challenged for our failures.

So it's always exciting to see how others are looking at the big picture. Sadly, with the growth data being what it is, there seems to be a great deal of pessimism around the company's prospects. The P/E ratio has remained at despondent levels for over two years, barely tracking with the P/E of the S&P 500 and not reflecting the company's historic or current growth.

The logical explanation is that pricing reflects a consensus that growth will fall off a cliff. Indeed this can be confirmed. Bloomberg surveyed analysts and they say:

Apple’s sales may climb 54 percent to $100.3 billion this fiscal year, which ends in September, the average prediction of analysts surveyed by Bloomberg. Growth may slow to 18 percent the following year.

Fifty percent growth this year and 18 percent next year is indeed catastrophic. Consider the company's recent history as shown in the following chart:

The company has been growing earnings around 70% a year since 2007 at least. The exception being 2009 when in the middle of the worst recession for a century the growth dropped to 34%.

I took the liberty of adding the estimates cited above to the chart (in orange) while putting forward my estimates for the same time frame.

I am, I believe, conservative in my estimates (for example, my estimates do not take into account any new product categories Apple may launch). But the prospect of 18% growth for the fiscal year beginning this October is quite hard to justify knowing what I know about the markets Apple competes in. As I've amply described in this blog, the mobile computing (aka post-PC) shift is underway and Apple is leading the charge. The prospect of billions of unserved customers beckons and Apple is crushed with demand.

But let's not quibble about billions of desperately underserved consumers. The thing that sticks out from the chart is that analysts are forecasting growth about half of what Apple was able to achieve in 2009--a time when consumer spending practically stopped world-wide and there was talk of another depression.

Either they're in agreement that we're in for something resembling a global plague starting in six months or they believe Apple is singularly positioned to drop the ball.

I would love to hear some these scenarios defended because I see no evidence for either.

The last time I took a snapshot of the iPad death watch it was March 9th, 2010. Almost a year ago. The now-classic quotes are reproduced here.  Last May I wrote:

Apple keeps a tight lid on new products so that competitors don’t get a head-start on copying, but in the case of the iPad, advance knowledge would not have had any impact. Competitors look at the iPad and see nothing.  They’ll only react once the market explodes and they start to feel belated pain.

I thought that would be that. As the success of the product would become self-evident, predictions of imminent demise would trail off. The pain of share loss would prompt a wave of challenger copycats. Imitation would be the the best form of flattery.

But no.

Critics were not silenced. One year, 15 million units, and $9.2 billion later I went back to the source of the quotes and found the following (published quotes dated after March 9th 2010). (Cited from aaplinvestors.net with some editing for brevity and relevance):

“Problematically, the Android competition is just as expensive as the iPad lineup, so Apple obviously feels free to continue gouging consumers on iPad pricing.” Paul Thurrott, Windows IT Pro, 3 March 2011

“Apple’s iPad 2 might be ‘magical’ but it still should’ve been better ... It needs more G’s. It’s still just a toy” Zach Epstein, Boy Genius 2 March 2011

“11 reasons NOT to buy an iPad 2 ... Reason 5: Competition David Gewirtz, ZDNet, 23 February 2011

“Given what I’ve seen of Honeycomb and Motorola’s excellent tablet, Cupertino will have some serious catching up to do with their iPad 2.” J.P. Mangalindan, Fortune, 4 February 2011

“We very carefully chose our tablet processor, the Nvidia Tegra 2, and to really compete it will take [Apple] some time. You know, [Nvidia] is well known for graphics.” Jonney Shih, Asustek Computer, 3 February 2011

“If you were to ask me in two years time, will Apple have less than 50 percent of the global tablet market, I think that’s a certainty. Neil Mawston, Strategy Analytics, 31 January 2011

“We have an extreme focus on the innovation of LePad and LePhone because these products will dominate the future market. Though Apple is winning a significant share in the Chinese market, it has not gained a clearly leading position yet. Our advantage is we know this market better.” Liu Chuanzhi, Lenovo, 27 January 2011

“The iPad may still be the lone leader, but with 100+ competitors on the way, it won’t likely keep its majority market share unless the pending next generation iPad really addresses all the complaints about the current version, like a missing camera and a lack of a USB port, and the company has to add those features without a major price increase - a tall order, to be sure.” James Brumley, Investopedia, 13 January 2011

“Hands-on PlayBook demonstrations at CES showed its differentiation in multitasking and performance, which may be difficult for Apple/Android to rival.” Mike Abramsky, Royal Bank of Canada Analyst, 11 January 2011

“Apple Inc.’s popular iPad is getting its strongest competition thus far as consumer-electronics manufacturers unveil tablet computers with bigger screens, front-facing cameras for video chatting and more.” Rachel Metz, AP Technology Writer, 3 January 2011

Apple may be simply trying to get in ahead of Research in Motion’s aggressively priced PlayBook or combat the early success of Samsung’s Galaxy Tab.” Rick Aristotle Munarriz, The Street, 29 December 2010

4. Competitors are coming. Brett Arends, Wall Street Journal, 22 December 2010

Reason 6: WiFi is still unreliable David Gewirtz, ZDNet, 16 December 2010

“I can’t imagine anyone under the age of 30 wanting an iPad. A PS3, Wii, GameBoy, or even a useful laptop maybe, but an iPad? Furthermore, I do not recall ever seeing anyone under 30 actually using an iPad.” John C. Dvorak, PC Mag, 13 December 2010

“We hope our tablet PCs can reach a global market share of 10-20% initially, and become the market leader in two to three years.” Gianfranco Lanci, CEO and President, Acer, 26 November 2010

“It’s a nice-to-have product, for those of us who don’t have a budget, but is it a must-have product? I don’t think so.” Ashok Kumar, Analyst, Rodman & Renshaw LLC, 12 November 2010

“Steve Jobs never says anything without thinking through it carefully. But I think in this case he may be a little afraid of this category. And he’s finding whatever he can to attack because he sees [seven-inch tablets] as a challenge to the dominance of the iPad.” Adam Hanin, VP Marketing, Viewsonic, 1 November 2010

“There could literally be millions of first-generation iPads gathering dust in people’s home offices already. This product is the tech industry’s biggest MacGuffin yet.” Paul Thurrott, Windows IT Pro, 23 October 2010

“I cannot see a need for the thing.”John Dvorak, MarketWatch, 22 October 2010

”For those of us who live outside of Apple’s distortion field, we know that 7″ tablets will actually be a big portion of the market and we know that Adobe Flash support actually matters to customers who want a real web experience.” Jim Balsillie, Research In Motion, 20 October 2010

“iPhone and iPad have been amazing products that have opened new markets. But I do not think they will own either market in a few years. Android will.” Fred Wilson, AVC.com, 18 October 2010

“The constant search for an ‘iPad killer’ and the sheer multitude of tablet computers launching in the next 18 months should make Apple aware that its competition is fierce and will only become tougher.” Barbara E. Hernandez, PCWorld, 5 October 2010

“HP’s New Tablet Could Be an iPad Spoiler HP’s decision to bundle a tablet computer with its new $399 printer could make trouble for competitors.” Cliff Edwards and Aaron Ricadela, Bloomberg Businessweek, 23 September 2010

“Our tablet will be better than the iPad.” Chang Ma, VP Marketing, LG, 20 August 2010

“Not only is Apple typically lost in the enterprise, but it focuses very little of its time there. And with a new, potentially more compelling tablet coming — the Cisco Cius — the iPad’s success in the corporate world could be short-lived. Here’s why:... 10 The power of Windows” Don Reisinger, Channel Insider, 5 August 2010

“I don’t think there is one size that fits all…I’ve been to too many meetings with journalists who spent the first 10 minutes of the meeting setting up iPad to look like a laptop.” Steve Ballmer, Microsoft, 29 July 2010

“ [...] It still isn’t the device that I’d take to a meeting because it has no input.” Bill Gates, Microsoft, 2 June 2010

“Which means I end up on the iPad — and tablets more generally — where I started. Tablets will not create a new category, but will supplant (or merge with) one or more of the current substitutes: smartphones or netbooks.Here I am less optimistic about the iPhone and webOS than I am about Android. ” Joel West, professor of Innovation & Entrepreneurship, College of Business at San José State University, 30 May 2010

“The iPad is useless. Beautiful, but useless. The iPad is too heavy. It’s awkward to hold and view in public. It’s fragile. It requires expensive accessories to protect it and extract more functionality. ”Josh Belzman, MSNBC.com, 20 May 2010

“Mum, the iPad is not ‘amazing.’ It’s just marketed very well, both by Apple and its culpable partners in mainstream media. ” Paul Thurrott (in response to comment by Mum), Paul Thurrott’s Super Site for Windows, 26 April 2010

“In short, I don’t get the ‘magical and revolutionary’ vibe that Apple chief executive Steve Jobs touted at the iPad’s January unveiling.” Rob Pegoraro, Washington Post, 9 April 2010

“The first troubling sign is the fact that you can still get an iPad today. They didn’t sell out. The pure slate form factor has failed all these years because, other than for vertical applications, people want and/or need a keyboard for regular use. The fact of the matter is that a touch screen or bluetooth keyboard just doesn’t compensate.” Jonathan Yarmis, Ovum, part of Datamonitor Group, 6 April 2010

“I don’t get it. It costs $500 for the basic model, when you could get a laptop with a lot more functionality for about the same price. The iPad hype machine has been in full effect this week, and I still think it’s just that—hype. ” Alex Cook, Frontier Outlook, 3 April 2010

“As far as what this means to Apple, one thing to keep in mind: Even if the iPad sells more than the iPhone did in its first year, it’s still only around 5% of the company’s revenue. So it’s a very small slice. From there, it probably doesn’t grow as large as the smartphone market. So, if you’re buying under rumors, keep perspective in mind. The iPad’s a great product, but it’s probably not a game-changer.” Eric Bleeker, Analyst, Fool.com, 31 March 2010

“The iPad will remain an expensive, niche device compared to all-purpose netbooks.I think that one of the iPad’s most important uses will be for reading ebooks and publications. Even so, though, when it comes to the marketplace, netbooks will sales still far outstrip those of the iPad.” Preston Gralla, PC World, 30 March 2010

“Don’t Believe the iPad Hype. Apple has sold out pre-orders of the forthcoming device, but it could all be a marketing tactic. By not manufacturing enough iPads for the initial launch date, is this a case of Apple shooting itself in the foot?” Mike Schuster, Minyanville.com, 29 March 2010

“‘iPad Killer’ May be Palm’s Last Hope”Tom Bradley, PC World, 20 March 2010

“Even if your company has relented and now supports the iPhone, as growing numbers of businesses do (70% of the Fortune 100 are at least testing it, says Apple) you’ll want to say “No” to the iPad and other tablets. Here’s why: 8. Speaking of money, there is no money in the company budget to pay for iPads. 9. Not supporting iPad will be the enterprise norm. Robert McGarvey, CIO Update, 16 March 2010

“This morning, the fool’s parade gets started. Apple is taking online “pre-orders” for its iPad tablet, which is supposed to begin shipping on April 3. Buying a new kind of product sight unseen is foolish. Especially given how mysterious Apple has been on what the iPad can do and what restrictions on capabilities and media access it will place on users and content providers.” Galen Gruman, InfoWorld, 12 March 2010

“The recent launch of Apple, the iPad tablet, has won the award for the second edition of Fiasco Awards delivered this Thursday in Barcelona. From the more than 7,000 people who voted via the website www.fiascoawards.com, 4,325 have considered it the fiasco of the year. Fiasco Awards, 2010, 11 March 2010

“I think I’ve mentioned this once or twice before, but it bears repeating until it sinks in: the Apple iPad is not unique, nor necessarily the best of breed in the media tablet sector it is spearheading. And it ain’t gonna help Apple shareholders any.’” Anders Bylund (TMF Zahrim), 11 March 2010

From this critical review, it looks like 2011 will indeed be the year of the iPad 2.

Ever since I started publishing this blog there have been requests for access to the underlying data sets. That's not an easy thing to do. Spreadsheets are not "productized". It's very hard to explain how to use one and even harder for charts. Having been an user of commercial spreadsheet models, I know that it's a massive undertaking to produce and support them. Many large companies can afford this but few individuals would be willing to pay $15,000 for an analyst's data.

In many cases even at large companies professional information services staff are employed to master the data sets and answer questions for the general user. The complexity and cost of comprehensive market research is a huge burden for innovation in analysis.

As an independent analyst, I've struggled with the question of how to provide this access to a large audience on any device.

Fortunately, modern browsers have the capability to allow interaction with rich charts. Inspired companies are taking advantage of this and implementing data viewers which extend the way users can visualize complex data. Timetric is one such company.

Over the past few months we've worked together to find a way to deliver Asymco charts and data as an interactive and downloadable product.

Our first result is this report: Mobile Phone Market Overview: Q4 2010

The video below highlights the main features of the Asymco Interactive report:

httpv://www.youtube.com/watch?v=maNxiXmKVTA

As shown in the Apple growth scorecard, the company's earnings growth is continuing at 75% with the top line increasing at the annual rate of 70%.

The $59 billion of cash on the balance sheet has reached the equivalent of $64 per share yielding an enterprise value of $263 per share based on closing price of January 21st.

The stock price has been rising but not outside a narrow P/E band. The following chart shows the stock price and the 15 P/E and 25 P/E bands that have bounded it for nearly three years.

As previously observed, this overall share appreciation is not accounting for the growth in earnings.

The trailing twelve months' earnings were $17.91 per share. Therefore the P/E ratio is now 18.2. Excluding cash, the P/E is at 14.7. However, that's based on 2010 levels of earnings. Those earnings are increasing very quickly.

To account for earnings and their growth, I developed the following chart which shows the P/E and P/E/trailing-Growth for the stock.

The P/E is fluctuating on either side of 20 but when considering trailing growth, comparable companies, the macroeconomic conditions and guidance the value of the company is reaching new lows.

P/E/tG nearing recession lows

Earnings were 75% higher in 2010 than the year before. So based on the growth, the rule-of-thumb ratio P/E/trailing Growth (P/E/tG) is 0.24. This ratio (where 1.0 is seen as "fair value") is the lowest since July 2009, during the first months of recession recovery. The trend for this ratio is down (see the burnt orange line in the chart above). It's not far from hitting the lowest point during the recession at 0.17.

Now I'd like to reminisce a bit about that point in time. The stock had bottomed at $78/share[1]. It was trading at barely 3x cash and a P/E of 11 but growing 3x that level (32% in the slowest recession quarter but averaging much higher).

So today we are at a similar point in valuation. The cash is at $64/share, shares are priced 5x that amount and the growth is 4x P/E[2]. Although analyst targets are less comical, there is still the sense of extreme despondency when looking at the valuation ratios.

Guidance, Comparables and Macroeconomics

Unlike two years ago there aren't the same dark clouds on the macro horizon. The company is also not as cautious on its guidance (guiding 63% EPS growth must be a new record for a post-holiday quarter) and there is talk of bubble in valuation for comparable companies. Netflix, Amazon, and ARM have eye-watering valuations relative to growth.

A discount to the S&P 500

And to round out the tragic tale, Apple's P/E is, once again, at a discount to the S&P 500 P/E (14.7 vs. 16.57 respectively).

Given the new low in valuation contrasted with optimism on behalf of many (including management), on some forums there is discussion about Apple becoming the target for a take-over.

There is some perverse merit to this logic. With $64 in cash, $25/yr in earnings and 75% growth it's so cheap that if credit were available, it would make a tempting candidate. Private equity could take it private and use the gigantic cash flow to pay off debt (in about four years). In bygone days, this would have been an easy pitch.

Alas, the capital markets may not have liquidity for the size of the market cap Apple holds and I don't see any competitors able to get the leverage for an acquisition either. Or can they?

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Notes:

1. In early summer 2009 some analysts put 12 month targets for the stock at $70, so their predictions were within $6/share to today's book value.
2. A buyer of shares two years ago would only have to wait two years to have 80% of their investment sitting in retained earnings.  An investor who read the data from Apple and knew that the iPhone existed could not fail but be amazed.

The story of amateur out-performance has been getting more attention lately and that's a good thing. Success emboldens more amateurs to try their hand at financial analysis. Transparency of methods and data demystifies a practice that is not as complex, and a skill that is not as hard to obtain, as it's often assumed.

While, quarter after quarter, the gap between the two cohorts is calibrated, what we haven't heard much of is a defense from the professionals.

That's a bit strange given the negative impact some of the attention must be having on their reputations. This is why I was glad to see that Adam Satariano's well-written piece finally got some reactions from the professionals.

Professional analysts tend to be more conservative. That’s partly because they’re closely monitored and regulated, said Shaw Wu, an Apple analyst at Kaufman Brothers LP in San Francisco. He and his colleagues must pass a series of tests administered by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority before becoming certified.

“I have to be careful of everything that I do because it’s scrutinized,” said Wu, who has recommended buying Apple shares since joining Kaufman in 2008.

Alexander Peterc, an analyst for Exane-BNP, said professionals are “very wary” of putting out aggressive estimates because of institutional memory of past technology booms and potential backlash from clients if they’re wrong.

“They got it right on the way up, but we’ll see what happens after that,” Peterc said. “Often bloggers and amateur investors are very good in bull markets, but get lost in bear markets. If some of these guys call the moment at which Apple’s fortunes begin to turn I will be impressed.”

via Apple's `Underdog' Analysts Outperform Wall Street From Helsinki, Caracas - Bloomberg.

However, neither answer satisfies.

Wu cites regulation and scrutiny but that does not prevent one from being intellectually honest. What matters is not avoidance of conservatism or exuberance. What matters is rigor; being impartial to everything but the data. One must keep one's convictions in proportion to one's valid evidence not to regulatory oversight (which is there to prevent abuse, not balance).

Peterc cites pressure from clients (hence the obligations of employment). That implies that professionals are under pressure to say something other than what they believe, which is a sinister form of self-censorship. Not only is that less valuable as an opinion, but it's likely to be less accurate as well.

But more fundamentally, the issue for the pros is that the institution of analysis risks becoming de-professionalized. In the same way many jobs that took specialized skills became commoditized by the use of new tools or access to information, the era of DIY financial analysis is dawning.

The difference between professionalism and amateurism isn't whether one is well paid or not or whether one is anointed with credentials. It's whether one is consistently out-performing randomness (note emphasis on the consistency).

Amateurs can get lucky and pros can get unlucky. But in the end it's about hitting that home run over and over again.

So the question remains why, in bull markets or bear markets, the professionals are consistently wrong on Apple. The evidence has always been anecdotal and data was fragmented, but now the data is being diligently compiled and it will serve as testament to a shift that I think will be permanent.

Stay tuned.

Professional analysts' first year iPad unit forecasts (sourced from TMO Finance Board)

• Brian Marshall, Broadpoint AmTech   7.0
• David Bailey, Goldman Sachs           6.2
• Kathryn Huberty, Morgan Stanley     6.0
• Shaw Wu, Kauffman Bros.              5.0
• Mike Abramsky, RBC Capital Markets   5.0
• Gene Munster, Piper Jaffray           3.5
• Ben Reitzes, Barclays Capital           2.9
• Keith Bachman, BMO Capital         2.5
• Jeff Fidacaro, Susquehanna           2.1
• Chris Whitmore, Deutsche Bank       2.0
• Scott Craig, Merrill Lynch               1.2
• Peter Misek, Canaccord Adams       1.2
• Doug Reid, Thomas Weisel             1.1
• Yair Reiner, Oppenheimer             1.1

Here are the predictions from Tech Bloggers:

• Clayton Morris: 9
• John Gruber: 8
• Horace Dediu: 6
• Natali Del Conte: 5
• Ross Rubin: 5
• Mike Rose: 4.5-5
• Jason Snell: 3
• Andy Ihnatko: 3

Apple sold 14.8 million iPads in 2010.

I sometimes use the phrase "unforeseeable growth" to describe the kind of growth that not even the most knowledgeable observers of a market can predict. It's usually an indicator that fundamentally transformational change is taking place.

It's not a sufficient condition, but it's clear that "nobody saw it coming" is a common refrain when disruptions are seen in the rear-view mirror.

If analysts, to a man, fail, you can be sure that competitors are no wiser. This collective shrug amounts to the greatest competitive advantage any entrant could ever hope to obtain.

In a recent but recurring lament I asked why Apple shareholders are not being rewarded for the company's growth. I pointed out that there is no fundamental reason why the company should receive such a low P/E multiple (about 18 ex-cash trailing and 10x forward while maintaining 70% earnings growth for over a year).

There were many objections in the comments. Most of them dealt with recent reasons why doubts might have arisen among investors: Android hegemony or some perceived lack of competitiveness leading to margin compression or some macro hangover from the recession.

In this article I argue that none of these objections hold water. My argument hinges on the fact that there is a precise date when Apple ceased being seen as an exceptionally valuable company and that date precedes any of the causes being suggested.

The day of disillusionment was almost exactly three years ago: January 14th, 2008.

How to pin down the date of disillusionment

Consider the following chart.

The blue area represents either a premium (above 0) or a deficit (below 0) of Apple's P/E (ex-cash) relative to the S&P 500 P/E. This is a re-imaging of a chart, first introduced in June 2010 when I first pointed out that Apple was being discounted relative to the S&P 500.

By measuring P/E I am focusing not on the stock price, which has grown nicely, but the ratio of the price relative to earnings, which hasn't (see the next chart below). P/E is a fundamental measure of potential (its reciprocal is the stock's earnings yield.) It is usually highly correlated to the company's growth. If that P/E is uncorrelated to past growth, there is some significant discounting of future growth. It's the most significant (and simplest) measure of "faith" in a company.

By measuring the company's P/E relative to an index of other large companies (S&P 500 P/E) we can assess whether the company's potential is being valued as extraordinary or whether it's being valued as ordinary. In other words we are measuring whether a company is "special".

The chart shows that until January 14th, 2008 the company was valued at a significant earnings premium--a P/E consistently 50% higher than the norm.[1]

Following the collapse (about 40% drop in share price but 100% drop in P/E premium), there was a small recovery followed by a huge trough in valuation. During the recession quarters Q308 to Q309 S&P earnings fell to zero or below. As a result of S&P earnings collapse the S&P P/E shot up astronomically (as E approaches zero, P/E approaches infinity). Apple's earnings dropped as well but remained positive throughout that period bottoming at 37% growth(!) in Q408. As a consequence Apple's P/E fell as low as 11 while the market's went well above 100 (122.41 peak). The P/E deficit for Apple went 80%: Apple was valued as basically worthless (3x cash).

After the earnings recession, the S&P P/E recovered close to historic levels but Apple's P/E did not. It's in-line with the S&P but does not obtain the 50% premium preceding the recession.

So we can establish that the day that Apple's potential was discounted was nearly six months before the onset of recession.

What other discounting factors can we discard?

How about earnings growth itself? Did the collapse foretell an earnings collapse?

The chart above shows the P/E premium vs. earnings growth (in red). Although earnings growth began to slow soon after the 14th (earnings for CQ407 were not yet announced at that point), growth recovered six months later after the launch of the iPhone 3G[2]. Growth continued throughout 2009 and 2010 reaching new heights last year of 86%.

Still, the company received no premium to the S&P 500 P/E. Companies in the index averaged, at best, a quarter of Apple's growth in earnings.

What about Android? The first Android device did not ship until October 2008 (HTC Dream or T-Mobile G1). There were no appreciable Android volumes until 2009, one year after the drop in relative value and no talk of a threat until 18 months later.

The last objection to be put aside is that of margin compression.

This last chart shows how margins (in brown) behaved during the same time period. They went up. The only slight decline took place during the last few quarters, after the launch of the iPad, long after the collapse.

Regardless of the adjustments with product launches, Apple's GM is the envy of the world and is not at all correlated with the loss of faith in the company.

So What happened on January 14, 2008?

Having led you this far in the story, I'm afraid I'm going to let you down at the end: The cause for the loss of faith is a mystery to me.

There is only one noteworthy event that took place on that date: Macworld 2008 (January 14-18). During the keynote, Steve Jobs introduced the Macbook Air (and Time Capsule and Leopard and pre-announced the iPhone SDK which, six months later led to the app supernova). I remember that day and I remember that the stock began selling off exactly at the point when the Air was mentioned. It has never been the same since.

Obviously, correlation is not causation. The Macbook Air need not be the cause for the loss of faith in Apple as an investment. Or can it? I'm hoping someone can explain this because to me it makes no sense. The product was not a home run but it did not do badly either and its current incarnation seems to be a hit. Whatever sins the original Air may have had have surely been expurgated by now.

Regardless the cause, the bottom line is that, in the eyes of investors, Apple stopped being "special" that day. Its valuation dropped to in-line the S&P and, given its growth, well below what a large growth company should be worth. The company's shares went into the bargain bin and are still there today.

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[1] I should point out that the P/E ratio is based on post 2009 re-stated earnings. The restatement changed the P/E as the "E" changed. This was based on the abolition of subscription accounting for the iPhone. Although it may seem unfair to hold the market to this standard, restatement did not actually change cash flows which were transparent and visible to all, even to amateurs such as myself and the other unaffiliated analysts that published throughout this period. Earnings may be an opinion but cash flow is a fact. Valuation on the basis of cash flow should have yielded the same results as shown above.

[2] That quarter showed a y/y growth of 150% while the stock was in freefall. In fact, it was during that earnings day that Steve Jobs came on the conference call and pointed out the astronomic iPhone cash flow to an audience of analysts more concerned about their own jobs.

[Wedge Partners analyst Brian Blair] also contends that Apple’s production forecasts suggest the company thinks it can sell 100 million iPhones next year. “While a staggering number any way you look at it, our checks reflect full calendar 2010 builds in the 48-50 million unit range,” he writes. “While this number can change and adjust downward or upward  based on demand, we believe it is incredibly bullish that Apple feels it is possible that they could see nearly 100% year over year growth for iPhone in 2011 as this would mean that exiting 2011, Apple would have approximately 10% share in the global handset market.”

via Apple Can Sell 100M iPhones, 48M iPads in 2011, Analyst Says - Tech Trader Daily - Barrons.com.

Apple is, in my estimate, likely to sell at least 47 million iPhones in calendar 2010. (16 million in the current quarter, or 85% y/y growth).

The 100 million in 2011 estimate assumes 100% growth on average. Is it really "staggering" to forecast another year of triple digit growth?

The history of growth is one indicator. There the news is good: the product has been able to sustain that level of growth for three years.

The second indicator is room to grow. Apple largest competitor is smartphone non-consumption. This competitor holds 76% share, but is rapidly losing share. Consider the the following chart:

I've heard the mantra that smartphones are not for everybody and that the vast bulk of consumers will opt for voice-oriented phones indefinitely, especially in low-GPD/capita countries.

To this I point out that there are no technical obstacles to implementing smartphone technology in all price points nor that there are any constraints on distribution, network technology rollouts or shortage of capacity to produce these products for all current mobile users (5 billion at last count). I also believe that user demand for this level of product utility will shift rather more quickly than supply.

So, in my mind, the headroom looks pretty good as well.

Lastly there is the question of alternative platforms. I'll get to that shortly.

The new king of Apple analysts - Apple 2.0 - Fortune Tech.

My thanks to Philip Elmer-DeWitt but I think he is not right in proclaiming a King. Credit is due to all the other blogger analysts who inspire and push analysis forward.

The  lines were nothing but a commercial advertisement, but they very well describe this group that opened the eyes of the world:

Here's to the crazy ones,

the misfits,
the rebels,
the troublemakers.
The round pegs in the square holes.
The ones who see things differently.

They're not fond of rules
and they have no respect for the status quo.

You can quote them,
disagree with them,
glorify or vilify them.
About the only thing you can't do
is ignore them,
because they change things.
They push the human race forward.

And while some may see them as the crazy ones, we see genius.

Because the people who are crazy enough to think they can change the world
are the ones who do.

"Crazy Ones", directed by Chiat/Day's Jennifer Golub who also shared the art director credit with Jessica Schulman and Yvonne Smith. The familiar voiceover was by Richard Dreyfuss. See the video here.

The iPad was announced to a loud chorus of disapproval and disdain. It's easy to forget the overwhelming scorn and insult poured on the product for months before and after sales start. Analyst forecasts were comical. At this time it looks like all 12 month iPad unit forecasts will have missed by more than 100% (mine included).

As data on iPad performance was published for the first quarter's sales, the mood swung from ridicule to ridiculous.

Without regard to the growth of comparable products, analysts seem to have latched on to production figures which are notoriously inaccurate. The problem with production numbers is that they are only very loosely coupled with shipment numbers to customers. There are questions of work in progress inventory, finished inventory and the actual accuracy of reports. Production also follows a ramp and is not constant over time.

Another way to analyze a new product is to think about the distribution. Although late in the quarter some large distribution deals were made public, the channel did not have much time to be filled before the end of the quarter. Not only that but there is easily obtainable evidence that the iPad did not reach most international markets. Apple announced how they were rolling out a few countries every few months.

This trickle of international sales indicated to me that the iPad sales pump was not yet fully primed. My initial estimate was for in-line sales of 3.3 million which I aggressively increased to 5 based on some of the production numbers being mentioned.

This figure turned out to be 22% too high, but not as big an error as some of the other analysts.

Another way to look at it is through comparable products. The nearest comparable product to the iPad is actually the iPhone. It was a similarly "revolutionary and magical" product launched with a similar constraint on production and distribution. It was also built and marketed by the same people. They've been down this road before and have honed the process from the iPod through the iPhone over a decade.

If we look at the iPhone and compare it with the iPad, we see just how popular the iPad really is. It may not follow the same seasonal pattern as the iPhone, but it will probably ramp in a similar way. In the following chart I also show the iPhone Growth rate (right scale).

The iPhone has been able to maintain over 100% y/y growth on average. I don't see a reason why the iPad can't repeat this pattern over the next three years.