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Asymmetric Intelligence

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  1. How iPad Educates

    Research · 20 comments

    The fact that the iPhone is contributing over 90% of the operating profits in mobile phone sales has penetrated even as far as the Wall Street Journal. However, it's not yet commonly known that the Mac captures a majority of personal computer operating profits, at least when considering the sale of hardware.

    My calculations suggest at least 60% of operating margin in personal computing hardware is captured by Apple. This is mainly due to the fact that the average Mac sells for more than $1200 while the average PC sells for less than $450.That is equivalent to $1.5 billion per quarter for Apple vs. $930 million for all the other PC makers combined.

    Screen Shot 2015-07-17 at 12.16.27 PM

    If we are to consider the iPad as a "PC equivalent" computer ((for a substantial minority of tasks)) then another $billion/quarter is contributed to the profit pool. It increases Apple's share of profits to 73%. As a result, Apple absolutely dominates computing profits.

    But, as we know, computing, even on handheld devices, is enabled by a multitude of business models. Selling hardware is one thing, but Microsoft showed that one could sweep up profits in the industry by selling enabling software. It's much harder to assign a share of profits if we try to consider all the business models associated with computing and all the form factors that computing has taken shape in.

    The problem can be acutely observed with the iPad alone. It's sold with a decent margin ((my estimate is a gross margin of around 27%)), though not one which approaches that of the iPhone ((my estimate of the iPhone gross margin is near to 48%)). It also enables an ecosystem with thousands of collaborating firms and users.

    Consider the uses of the iPad in education. 15 million iPads were sold to educational institutions. An unknown number of millions have been hired for education uses by end-users or teachers. The result is over 100,000 education apps are available in the App Store.

    The education sector's "jobs-to-be-done" has led to the product being associated with entire new processes for education. Education is not a product but a process and therefore any technologies must be hired as part of the process. In the App Store you can see the “Apps in the Classroom” guides along with impressively powerful apps being used in education. These are educator-created guides designed for other educators.

    There is no way to measure the "profit" in this endeavor.

    Nor is there a way to capture the "profit" in people engaging in exercise because they wear an Apple Watch.

    Nor is there a way to track the operating profit of HealthKit which has enabled 1000 apps to help people manage their health.

    These education and health efforts are not designed to be profitable. And yet Apple is very profitable. That is because creating valuable things generally leads to value being accrued by their creator. How that happens is not very important. Indeed, focusing of the how is actually often self-defeating. What matters is the why and the what is done.

    Understanding this leads us to understand the foundation of any great organization, not just Apple.

     

  2. Apple management answers questions on the market performance of Apple Watch

    Research · 10 comments

    Katy Huberty (Analyst - Morgan Stanley): You've said in the past that the watch may take longer to ramp given the new category and new interface to customers. Is that, in fact, playing out? Is the watch ramping slower than past product categories?

    Tim Cook (CEO): Katy, when you use the word ramp, do you mean from a -- I assume you're talking about supply?

    Katy Huberty (Analyst - Morgan Stanley): Yes. Pre-orders and first week in sales and any other data points that you track in terms of interest versus, say, when the iPad launched in 2010?

    Tim Cook (CEO): Let me talk about supply and demand and sort of separate those two. Right now demand is greater than supply. And so we are working hard to remedy that. ((This is still true today, three months later))

    We've made progress over the last week or so and we're able to deliver more customers an Apple Watch over the weekend than we had initially anticipated. We're going to keep doing that. […] So I'm generally happy that the -- that we're moving on with the ramp.

    It is a new product for us, and with any kind of new product, you wind up taking some time to fully ramp.

    Having said that, I think we're in a good position. And by some time in late June, we currently anticipate being in a position that we could begin to sell the Apple Watch in additional countries. And so that's our current plan. ((This has been achieved according to plan.))

    From a demand point of view, it's hard to gauge when you don't have product in stores and so forth. And so we're filling orders completely online at the moment.

    The customer response from people that have gotten theirs over the weekend have been overwhelmingly positive. And we're far ahead of where we expected to be from an application point of view.

    To give you a comparison, when we launched the iPhone we had about 500 apps that were ready. When we launched iPad, we had about 1,000. And so our internal goal was to be able to beat the 1,000 level and we felt -- we thought it would be great if we were able to do that by a little bit.

    And as I've mentioned before, we now have over 3,500 apps in the App Store for the Watch. And so we couldn't be happier about how things are going from that point of view.

    We are learning quickly about customer preferences between the different configurations. There's a much larger breadth of possibilities here for customers than in our other products. And in some cases, we called that well and some cases we're making adjustments to get in line with demand.

    But I'm really confident that this is something we really understand how to do and will do. And so I'm really happy where we are currently and happy enough that we're looking forward to expanding into more countries in late June.

    […]

    Gene Munster (Analyst - Piper Jaffray and Co.):  …question for Luca, in terms of any thoughts on what the margin impact from the Watch as that ramps over the next couple of years?

    Luca Maestri (CFO): Apple Watch is, not only a new product, but it's a brand new category with a lot of new features, a lot of new innovative technologies. And Apple Watch margins will be lower than the Company average.

    […]

    Toni Sacconaghi (Analyst - Bernstein): I just wanted to revisit the watch.

    Tim, I think you said when you were talking about your new products, you said we're, quote, very happy with the reception. And in response to a previous answer you said, relative to demand, it's hard to gauge with no product in the stores.

    I would say relative to other product launches where your commentary around demand was characterized by superlative after superlative, that assessment feels very modest. And part of the reason that I ask is, A, are we reading you right in terms of that? But if we look at consensus, consensus is expecting that Apple will ship more watches in its first two quarters than it did iPads, despite, as you said, very limited distribution in terms of only selling through your stores.

    So I'm wondering if you can talk a little bit about putting those demand comments in context, given that they do seem different from how you've characterized product demand for other products. And how, if at all, we should think about the modeling demand in the context perhaps of the iPad, which was your most recent significant new category? And then I have a follow-up, please.

    Tim Cook (CEO): I'm thrilled with it, Toni. So I don't want you to read anything I'm saying any way other than that. So I'm not sure how to say that any clearer than that.

    And in any situation, whether it's the watch or in the past on iPad or on iPhone, when demand is much greater than supply, it's difficult to gauge exactly what it is. And so, as you know, we don't make long term forecasts on here. We maybe forecasts for the current quarter. And so I don't want to make any comment about the consensus numbers.

    Honestly, I haven't even studied those. We've got enough to think about here.

    I feel really great about it. The customer response, literally from what I've seen, is close to 100% positive. And so it's hard to imagine it being better.

    -------

    Excerpts from Apple Earnings Report: Q2 2015 Conference Call Transcript, April 27, 2015.

  3. Where are Maps going?

    Research · 311 comments

    At the 2015 WWDC Apple stated that it receives 5 billion requests per week for its maps service. It also said that Apple maps is used 3.5 times more frequently than "the next leading maps app."

    These two data points are the total number of data points we have about the global maps market. Neither Google nor Nokia provide usage or share or performance data. Regardless, commentary on the usage, share and performance of Apple Maps has been abundant for the three years since its inception.

    The data presented allows us to make a few estimates for the first time and we can hope that additional data can allow a picture to emerge of where maps are going.

    With these first two data points we can finally make some estimates. But some assumptions are still needed: We need to assume that the "next leading maps app" is Google Maps. Although there are other maps apps on the iOS platform they are probably insignificant and it's a two-horse race between Google and Apple on iOS.

    This means that the 3.5:1 split in usage results in a 78% share for Apple Maps and a 22% share for Google. If we assume that there are about 400 million iOS users of maps ((Note that not all iOS users are maps users. Maps are not used by all users)), it leads to about 90 million Google Maps users on iOS and about 310 million Apple Maps users on iOS.  This includes iPad. ((We are excluding OS X use of Maps.))

    Given that Google also reported 1 billion downloads in 2014 ((though not necessarily all of these downloads lead to active use, obviously)) we can assume between 25% to 33% Apple Maps "market share" of usage.

    At the minimum, 25% share is not insignificant and it's easily sustainable. To understand why, we should note that there is one more data point. In December 2012 I posted an analysis on the the cost of maps. It showed that maintaining maps requires an investment of between $1 billion and $2 billion/yr. With the addition of new features such as 3-D mapping, transit maps and thousands of new cities, the cost is likely to have increased. $2 billion/yr is probably the norm today.

    Apple then could be seen as spending about $6.5/user/yr on maps and Google could be spending about $2/user/yr. To be profitable Google would need to find ad revenues of $2/user/yr and Apple would need to find $6 of profit on each phone/yr. Clearly, each of these targets is achievable.

    In contrast we can see why Nokia's HERE Maps business is now worth a lot less than it was in 2007. The asset has been for sale for some time and the latest bid  has been for $3 billion, making the $5 billion lost in market value and $7 billion of investment since seem like a catastrophe. Without a business model the data is worthless--with only 30 million users the cost per user reaches $66/yr. A buyer needs to find an appropriate model for sustaining a $2 billion/yr burn rate.

    So the question of where maps are going depends on the business model for maps. In a world where maps are sustained by device value, 300 million users makes it sustainable. In a world where maps are sustained by advertising, 1 billion users makes it sustainable. What else is there?

    How about a world where maps are sustained by transportation services?

    Uber's and other auto makers' interest in HERE shows a third business model. Accurate maps are a key to making vehicles autonomous. More so even than the value of the algorithms, precise imaging of roadways enables vehicle autonomy and the value of location gathering systems should grow to meet that future.

    It's highly likely that Google's maps efforts are going to continue because they are fueled by a business model. That is also true for Apple's maps efforts, though they are fueled by an entirely different business model. Each of these business models fuels the improvement of the maps product but also of the maps gathering process. As these processes are expensive and licensing options are few there is little incentive to share the data. As a result the processes remain integral to the businesses.

    This integrated-while-fueled nature means that maps makers will find it compelling to pursue adjacent business models, i.e. transportation services. It's not a matter of whether they will or won't. It's only a matter of when and where.

  4. Bigger than Hollywood

    Research · 72 comments

    Apple paid $10 billion to developers in calendar 2014. Additional statistics for the App store are:

    • $500 million spent on iOS apps in first week of January 2015
    • Billings for apps increased 50% in 2014
    • Cumulative developer revenues were $25 billion (making 2014 revenues 40% of all app sales since store opened in 2008)
    • 627,000 jobs created in the US
    • 1.4 million iOS apps catalog is sold in 155 countries

    Putting these data points together with others from previous releases results in a fairly clear picture of the iTunes/Software/Services ((soon to be renamed Services and encompass everything under the heading of iTunes software and services today including content, apps, licensing and other services and beginning Q4 2014 it will also include Apple Pay.))

    Screen Shot 2015-01-22 at 1-22-10.38.39 AM

    The App ecosystem billings (what consumers actually pay) is shown in the red area above. 70% of those payments are transferred directly to developers and Apple reports the 30% remaining as part of its revenues. This view of the iTunes ecosystem shows the impact of Apps relative to the other media types. When we measure the payments to the content owners we can see that Apps also dominate: 

    Screen Shot 2015-01-22 at 1-22-10.44.16 AM

    The red area above adds up to the approximately $25 billion total paid to developers. This view of the payments to ecosystem contributors shows how apps are now a bigger digital content business than music (( Music payments due to iTunes Radio streams are not shown as part of Music cost of sales. Streaming revenues are included in the services/licensing income and payments come out that cost structure.)) and TV programs and Movie rentals and purchases put together.

    This is quite a story.

    Put another way, in 2014 iOS app developers earned more than Hollywood did from box office in the US.

     

    Although the totals for Domestic (US) Box Office are not the complete Hollywood revenues picture, Apple's App Store billings is not the complete App revenue picture either. The Apps economy includes Android and ads and service businesses and custom development.  Including all revenues, apps are still likely to be bigger than Hollywood.

    But there's more to the story. It's also likely that the App industry is healthier. On an individual level, some App developers earn more than Hollywood stars ((so do YouTube stars, but that's another story.)) and I would guess that the median income of app developers is higher than the median income of actors. ((A large majority of actors earn less than $1,000 a year from acting jobs)) The app economy sustains more jobs (627,000 iOS jobs in the US vs. 374,000 in Hollywood) and is easier to enter and has wider reach. As the graph below shows It's also growing far more rapidly.

    Screen Shot 2015-01-22 at 1-22-11.30.06 AM

    The curious thing is that even though the medium of apps is swamping other forms of entertainment in all measurable ways, comprehension of the phenomenon is lagging.

    Information asymmetry is a wonderful thing.

  5. Biggest news of 2014

    Research · 72 comments

    As corporate romances go, IBM and Apple's must rank among the most unexpected. As I wrote on the date they changed their Facebook status, the two companies were antagonists for the better part of twenty years and their rapprochement was met with a shrug mostly because yet more decades passed since.

    Screen Shot 2014-12-26 at 11.28.03 AM

    Nostalgia aside, this new union is profoundly important. It indicates and evidences change on a vast scale. The companies' antagonism was due to being once aimed at the same business: computing. Since the early 1980s, "computing" came to be modularized into hundreds, perhaps thousands of business models. It is no longer as simple as selling beige boxes. IBM was forced out of building computers and into services and consulting while Apple moved to make devices and the software and services which make its hardware valuable.

    The convergence of interests which was consummated into a deal this year stems from the migration of computing around what has come to be called "mobile". Apple intends to accelerate the adoption of its mobile platforms among the remaining non-adopters: enterprises–a group which, by now, qualifies as laggards. ((There was a time–when Apple was young–when enterprises were the innovators, early adopters. That role ended approximately in the year 2000)) Simultaneously IBM intends to connect data warehouses at those same enterprises to their employed users.

    Both can achieve their goals better if they join forces: Apple offers assistance and expertise while obtaining access and lubrication for orifice entry. IBM offers modularized access to databases through its own APIs and obtains credible client experiences. The combination increases adoption of mobile (i.e. intuitive) solutions and an increase in productivity, benefiting the buyer.

    The recent apps release showed just how transformative this relationship could be. We were witnesses to apps which appeared to be designed for users[!] They were not designed for committees that prepare checklists of requirements.

    We must applaud IBM for having the courage to resist the featuritis which plagues enterprise software design. This resistance requires saying No to those who specify and are thus authorized to purchase software and hardware. IBM has had to essentially say no to those who buy and yes to those who are paid to use. The quality of the experience is evident at first sight. The number of user actions, the number of screens to wade through have been ruthlessly culled. These are concepts and ideas which now permeate app design best practices. Yet they are practices which still elude the spec-driven enterprise software wastelands.

    Simultaneously we must applaud Apple for accepting that there are throngs of unwashed masses laboring in cubicles which deserve to be served. They may be employed by laggards but they are people too. Apple management has made clear that they are being more inclusive and open minded. Extending that open hand to the downtrodden salaried masses must surely bring a tear to one's eye.

    Being unexpected and yet explanatory of the state of technology today, the partnership between IBM and Apple is, in my opinion, the most significant technology news of 2014.

    As a romance, it is at least as newsworthy as the divorce of Wintel was in 2012.

  6. How big is iCloud?

    Research · 24 comments

    Apple has declared that what used to be "Other Music Related Products and Services" ((Includes revenue from sales from the iTunes Store, App Store and iBookstore in addition to sales of iPod services and Apple-branded and third-party iPod accessories.)) plus "Software, Service and Other Sales" ((Includes revenue from sales of Apple-branded and third-party Mac software, and services.)) which was formerly known as "iTunes/Software/Services" ((Includes revenue from sales on the iTunes Store, the App Store, the Mac App Store, and the iBooks Store, and revenue from sales of AppleCare, licensing and other services)) is about to become "Services".

    "We'll also have a category that we refer to as services and this will encompass everything we report under the heading of iTunes software and services today including content, apps, licensing and other services and beginning this month it will also include Apple Pay."

    "Services" will therefore encompass a massive amount of revenue. The reported revenues for the fiscal 2014 were $18 billion. Including all billings, the turnover in sales is over $28 billion. For next year, assuming that Apple Pay, which is just getting started, is unlikely to contribute greatly to revenues, Services turnover will top over $35 billion. That figure would make Apple Services alone one of the top 90 companies in the Fortune 500.

    Screen Shot 2014-11-14 at 5.11.47 PM

    Regardless, as a component of overall sales, the group formerly known as iTunes/Software/Services (shown in red above) was a modest 7% of total sales in the last quarter. Using all available information regarding downloads, payouts and reported financials, an estimate can be obtained on how this 7% is itself divisible into nine sub-segments:

    Screen Shot 2014-11-14 at 5.15.08 PM
    • Pro Apps
    • Music
    • Video
    • Apps
    • Books
    • OS X
    • iWork
    • iOS Apps
    • Licensing and other income

    These are shown above as either contributing to statement of operations (i.e. as reported, on right) or using billings (or the actual "cash register takings", on left). ((The primary distinction is in Apps billings where the 70% paid to developers is not shown as revenue.))

    What would be ideal in understanding this Services segment would be to break the "Licensing and other income" into its component parts. Namely:

    • Licensing revenues including Google's payments for traffic acquisition (TAC)
    • AppleCare
    • iTunes Match
    • iTunes Radio
    • iAd
    • iCloud
    • (and soon, Apple Pay)

    In particular, it would be very interesting to know exactly how much revenue could be coming from iCloud. We have not heard from Apple on iCloud user numbers since mid-2013 and this was the data at the time:

    Screen Shot 2014-11-14 at 5.30.27 PM

    Couple that to "Licensing and Other Income" as deduced from Services accounting yields the following picture:

    Screen Shot 2014-11-14 at 5.38.30 PM

    It would appear that iCloud accounts are growing in proportion to "Licensing and Other Income". Note that at the point that iCloud accounts were zero, revenues from Licensing were about $225 million/quarter and growing slowly. The real growth kicked in when iCloud accounts started ramping up. Since revenues from iCloud has to be in the "other income" and since no then it is, I believe, reasonable to assume that the iCloud user base growth is a principal driver of growth ((Of course, AppleCare could also be a driver but AppleCare should follow overall device sales patterns and this is not clearly evident in the Licensing/Other curve))

    Also, bursts in the Licensing and other income line occurred after several iCloud-specific marketing events:

    Mobile Me migration started in October 2011 and on September 30, 2013 the complimentary iCloud storage plans expired and were automatically adjusted to the free 5 GB plan (with an offer to upgrade to a paid plan). Correspondingly, Q1 2012 and Q1 2014 showed the largest increases in Licensing and Other Income.

    This is a multiplication of many assumptions, but there is some intuitive logic. The only place iCloud can be found seems to be growing in proportion to iCloud users and plan marketing.

    So how much does iCloud contribute to Apple's sales? My guess would be about $1 billion per quarter. That would be spread over 500 million iCloud accounts and therefore an average revenue per account of $2/user/quarter or $8/user/yr.

    The lowest non-free iCloud pricing is about $12/yr (5GB plan is free). This would imply that two thirds of iCloud users are paying users (and one third are opting for the 5G plan).

    I realize that this attach rate to a paid service is astronomical. Anything over 10% is unheard of. I would say the error in my estimates could be 20% but that still leaves a huge gap to what seems reasonable.

    [Put another way, if the attach rate were only 10% then iCloud revenues would have to be in the $600 million range and thus only about 10% of what Licensing and Other income seems to be. This would force the question of what could be generating the remaining $5.6 billion/yr.]

  7. Tentpoles

    Research · 126 comments

    When the iPhone launched, Steve Jobs introduced it as being three products in one:

    • A wide-screen iPod
    • A phone
    • A breakthrough internet communicator
    Screen Shot 2014-09-11 at 2.40.54 PM

     

    When the Apple Watch launched, Tim Cook introduced it as being three things:

    • A precise timepiece
    • A new, intimate way to communicate
    • A comprehensive health and fitness device.
    Screen Shot 2014-09-11 at 2.37.52 PM

    As in the Revolutionary User Interface story,  the symmetry in approach to the launch is telling, but what I want to note is that the three things which the iPhone was defined as being are no longer things that it is most used for.

    Yes, the iPhone is still a wide-screen iPod which gets plenty of use but I don't think anyone thinks that is a defining feature. It's also a phone, but the Phone is just an app which, for me at least, is not frequently used. I communicate with my iPhone but the go-to app is iMessage or FaceTime or Skype or maybe Email or Twitter. Phone is something I use so rarely that the interface sometimes baffles me. And yes, it's an Internet appliance. Browsing is something I do quite a bit but many of the browsing jobs-to-be-done are done better by apps. News, shopping Facebook and maps are "things which were once done in a browser."

    So I wonder whether the tentpole product-defining anchors used to introduce the Apple Watch will be faintly amusing a few years from now.

    Of course, the reason iPhone outgrew its tentpoles is because of the app economy. 1.3 million apps does that to a product. When it becomes a platform a product invites collaboration on the problem of innovation. Collaborative innovation explodes the opportunity to discover new needs and uses. How, when and why people use the product changes beyond anyone's imagination.

    But this does not mean that the tentpoles used at launch are in any way in error. They are necessary to explain the value of a new category. The audience can't be told "wait and see all the cool stuff you'll be able to do with it". They need to be told why it's useful today. They speak in the language the audience can understand today. Steve Jobs could not talk in the language of apps and services in 2007. The unforeseen became the inevitable.

    Tentpoles therefore don't define the product but do provide the starting blocks from which the initial buyers make a cognition leap. And once they're off, the others will know where to go.

     

     

     

  8. How big is Apple's Ecosystem?

    Research · 38 comments

    iTunes/Software/Services revenues grew at 12%. This was the second fastest segment growth last quarter, with the Mac growing at a slightly faster 13% rate. Apple mentioned in the quarterly earnings conference call the for the first nine months of its fiscal year (i.e. since September) the line item iTunes/Software/Services has been the fastest growing part of the business. The following graph shows the growth scorecard for Apple's line items and it shows how the iTunes store is the only line that has been consistently green (growing above 10% for at least seven years.

    Screen Shot 2014-07-29 at 8.58.53 PM

    In addition to its revenues, iTunes can also be measured in terms of billings (or gross revenues). The billings growth rate is even higher at more than 25%. This is mostly to the more rapid growth of apps relative to a decline in music. As Apple only records the 30% it keeps as "revenue" for apps the overall growth in apps is less visible in its accounts.

    The relative performance of billings vs. reported revenues is shown in the following graphs:

    Screen Shot 2014-07-29 at 9.02.13 PM

    Note the estimated split between media types and software and services. The software and services portion of the business had sales of $1.9 billion while the revenues from third party content/apps sales reached $2.6 billion.

    The value of this data is that it encompasses an almost complete view of the Apple ecosystem. As almost all content and transactions are tracked and reported and one can get a very precise view of the economic value of the ecosystem. ((In addition to iTunes/Software/Services Accessories could also be considered as part of the ecosystem. The value of Accessories and licensing as Apple reports it adds another $6 billion to iTunes/S/S)) (( What is missing are ad revenues through apps which don't use iAd )) (( What is also worth asking is what is the size of alternate ecosystems such as those of Microsoft, Google etc. ))

    From the launch of the iPhone the value of Apple's ecosystem has grown more than 600% which is faster than overall sales growth (approximately 400%). If ecosystem value grows more rapidly than underlying hardware sales the question that emerges is when would the ecosystem transaction value exceed that of the business is supposedly supports.

    Today the iTunes/S/S ecosystem is about $20 billion/yr. iPod, iPhone, iPad and Mac sales are about $150 billion/yr. It does not seem likely that the former will overtake the latter. If that were the case then one wonders why build a business entirely predicated on retailing and services without the support of hardware revenues. Something along the lines of Amazon.

  9. The Disruption FAQ

    Research · 28 comments

    Q1. What is disruption?

    Disruption happens when the strong are defeated by the weak. More precisely it’s when those with unconstrained access to resources have them taken away by those with minimal or no resources. It's a phenomenon that is in contrast to sustaining competition where the strong get stronger.

    Q2. How can disruption happen? Don’t the strong always have an advantage over the weak?

    The strong can be defeated when the fight is unfair. More precisely, "strength" is only a perception based on convention or historic precedent. The entrant may be weak in resources but may be strong in a way that is not seen as conventionally useful or valuable such as agility or a willingness to learn.

    Q3. What makes a fight unfair?

    A fight is unfair if the opponents fight according to different rules. This is also called asymmetric competition. Asymmetry is an important concept in game theory, economics and military science.

    Q4: Is there a way to know disruption is about to happen?

    Disruption theory is an attempt to reliably identify winning challenges. It includes a method of analysis of "the setting" of the fight and "the weighing” of the fighters. In other words, it measures whether the challenger is sufficiently asymmetric and whether the incumbent is flexible enough in their likely response. If there is insufficient asymmetry the theory would suggest the challenger will lose, and vice versa.

    Q5: How often does it happen?

    In some industries it happens quickly and in some industries slowly and in some never at all. Determining the cause of the rate of disruption is an important research topic. We can hypothesize that industries which show frequent disruption also show a high degree of wealth creation. The inverse is also true: industries that don't get disrupted don't create much wealth.

    Q6. How do incumbents react to asymmetric challenges?

    This quote (mistakenly attributed to Gandhi) describes it best: "First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win." The main test of asymmetry is to ask whether a challenger’s entry is ignored (or welcomed) by the incumbents. Most asymmetric challenges are not taken seriously because they initially benefit the incumbent. The side-effect is that it lulls them into a sense of security resulting in a lack of response. Challengers have the child-like advantage of rapid growth and learning while incumbents are encumbered by their size and lack of flexibility.

    Q7: Why don’t challengers respond in kind?

    Mainly because they don’t feel that they need to. The newcomer is either not seen as a threat or welcomed because the customers they obtain that are not seen as valuable. In some cases the business model of the entrant is contrary to that of the incumbent. In other words, the challenger makes money in a way that would cause the incumbent to lose money. Often the challenger is actually invisible because she misdirects attention. They may be seen as competing in one market with a certain set of competitors but their effect is in another market which never had to deal with a challenger.

    Q8: If there are different ways disruption can be observed, doesn’t that mean there are different types of disruptions?

    Yes. When a competitor challenges with a cheaper product that seems to perform poorly and has low margins and the incumbent accepts the entry because it allows them to concentrate on more profitable customers then this is called a “low-end disruption”. Here the asymmetry is in cost structure. The entrant has lower costs and accepts lower profit margins and may “make money” in new or different ways.

    When a competitor misdirects attention by selling a product that draws usage from existing customers and adds non-consuming new customers because it enables new uses, then the incumbent feels no pain from the entry because they don’t sense a reduction in customers. We call this a "new market disruption". The challenger gains a foothold and grows/evolves, eventually capturing customers exclusively. Here the asymmetry is in the basis of competition and measurement of "performance". The new product does not actually do the same thing as the incumbent product or does a subset of valuable tasks poorly while excelling at menial tasks. The entrant may be highly profitable but they are not taking profits away from incumbents because they "grow the pie", capturing value by fulfilling unmet needs.

    Disruption can also happen to professions and institutions when less skilled individuals are enabled to perform complex jobs or when professionals can establish good enough services that used to take institutional support. This is called professional services disruption.

    Technological change is often (but not always) the core enabler in creating disruptions. The analogy is that technology is a weapon that allows asymmetric combat but the combatant is the disruptor, not the weapon ((See David vs. Goliath: using a projectile allowed David to overcome Goliath but only when wielded skillfully)).

    Q9: It sounds like the trick to spotting disruption is in perceiving when the fight becomes “unfair” and an outsider advantage is gained. Does the theory make this easy?

    It makes it possible but not easy. Understanding when a basis of competition changes and where competition is shifting is still very difficult. It is notoriously difficult to sense when it’s happening to you because you are working toward a strategy with assumptions that have been tested and proven to be correct. In other words, you, your colleagues, your competitors and everyone you’ve ever met knows the rules of the fight. Insider status makes you an expert, your knowledge is far beyond a lay person’s and you have a track record of winning. Hubris and pride makes it difficult to accept a challenge from an ignorant outsider.

    Furthermore, an outside analyst who is not suffering from these psychological weaknesses may not have the means to measure change because they don’t have access to market metrics. So you can’t typically hire a consultant to help you spot it. This is where the theory helps. If you are a practitioner then you can use the theory as a lens to see the patterns in the operating data.

    The proper application of the theory requires domain knowledge or deep reading of weak signals. It’s best employed by incumbent operating managers analyzing their own industry. It’s a tool that can be used to overcome the perception of incumbent invulnerability. It is not a tool that can be used by armchair generals. They can pick up the lens but, not having any data to look at, they have have no patterns to recognize. (This last point is disputed. See comment.)

    By the way, entrants don’t benefit much from it either because they act disruptively by instinct. They enjoy the freedom of having nothing to lose.

    Q10: How long does this take? Isn’t a shift in competition natural over a few decades?

    The speed of disruption is changing rapidly. It used to take decades but now it takes years and in some software industries it could be happening in less than one year. When it used to take decades it did not matter much because the “victims” of a disruption usually could spend a career in the firm being disrupted and would not have to adjust their behavior or assumptions. The consequences would have been felt by future generations. The rate of disruption today is so rapid that many careers and lives and families are having to deal with the consequences, sometimes more than once. Estimating the acceleration and scope of disruptive change is a great research topic.

    Q11: Is the theory complete? Can't we just write an app for it?

    It’s not complete. It cannot be encoded as a deterministic algorithm. It’s not even likely that expert systems or neural networks or machine learning can help. This is because perception of change in competition is a skill informed as much by intuition as by data and rules. If the theory is developed further, through a process of theory building, then it might become an app.

    Q12: If the theory is not complete, then isn't it useless?

    A theory is not useless if it's imprecise or difficult to use. Data that would make conclusions precise is often missing or unavailable. The theory relies on weak signals and explains what used to be unexplainable. Many sciences developed from empirical analysis similar to where we are with disruption theory. Theories benefit from development.

    Q13: Is the theory being developed further?

    Yes. There is a process for theory building which has been ongoing for over a decade where many researchers, students of disruption and practitioners are contributing.

    Q14: Can the theory be applied outside of business competition?

    Yes, institutions can be disrupted as can individuals. Possibly even economies and states. This is because a growing technological base and communications enable asymmetries of ever-greater scope and speed. The research needed to establish how this happens is under way. However it's important to know the limits of the phenomenon. Incumbents are getting wiser as they wield the theory and some "settings" show resistance to change and thus prohibit technological cores to be utilized disruptively. The study of these anomalies is essential to the process of theory building.

    Q15: Is disruption a force of nature? Has it always existed? Will it never end?

    Oral traditions suggest that people have been aware of disruptive forces for all of history. We feel it in the school playground and in many personal relationships. It's in the Bible and the classics that predate it. It's visible in all cultures. Disruption theory as applied to business and government is only an extension of this causal individual behavior into complex systems. It’s possible that awareness of it might cause the behavior to change, or, put another way, that if you observe and understand the phenomenon, that knowledge could cause it to stop happening. But the systems involved are vast and learning curves are long. Enlightenment may take a few lifespans.

    Update:

    Here are questions which have been added based on reader feedback. Please feel free to suggest others in the comments.

    Q16: Isn't Disruption just evolution of business models?

    Business models evolve, but if the evolution sustains an existing incumbent then it's not a disruption. If an evolution is  adopted by an entrant who then proceeds to strip the assets and profits from an incumbent then it's a disruptive change. The key question is why do some changes get adopted and not others.

    Q18: What have been the major improvements in the theory since its introduction in 1997's The Innovator's Dilemma?

    From Clay Christensen's work alone: New Market Disruptions, Professional Disruption, Value Chain Evolution Theory, Jobs to be Done Theory. The Innovator's Solution including how to respond with autonomous self-disruption, the role of acquisitions, the study of Healthcare and Education as targets of (and anomalies to) disruptive change. The process of theory building. The Capitalist's Dilemma and how economies create incentives and disincentives to disruptive innovations.  Many other contributions from researchers too numerous to cite here.

    Q19: What industries cannot be disrupted

    Industries which experience no disruptions are "anomalous" in that the theory suggests that technological progress forces change and technologies have proliferated in almost all industries..  Industries or institutions which have remained largely undisrupted include Energy, Education, Government, Healthcare, Airlines and Hotels. The study of these anomalies continues and explanations identify conditions that prevent growth. Dependencies on regulation, infrastructure, and absence of technological core enablers caused some of the atrophy to date. However signals of change are appearing in all these industries and paths to disruption are clearly possible.

    Q20: How is it possible that companies which were claimed to be disrupted are still around and some which are claimed to be disruptors have vanished?

    Being disrupted does not mean ceasing to exist. Being disrupted is a loss of a specific encounter, but not necessarily a terminal loss. Being a disruptor is a win in a specific encounter and not a guarantee of immortality. Indeed many disruptors come to be disrupted and the theory suggests sustainable growth requires self-disruption. Also a disrupted company can be re-configured post-disruption into another entity or can muddle along with limited value indefinitely. Sometimes they can rise up and become disruptors again.

  10. Twenty Questions from Catalin Stelian Andrei

    Research · 17 comments

    Catalin Stelian Andrei, Editor of The Day, INTERNET PROTV asked me twenty questions:

    1. What phone do you have in your pocket right now? Why that model?

    I carry the iPhone 5. The last iPhone I bought was an iPhone 5C which I gave to a family member.

    2. Apple is going to launch, form all we know, an iPhone with a bigger screen, long after their market rivals. Is Apple one step behind, being forced to take this road in the fight with Android and Windows Phone devices? Because many smartphone users were hoping that an big screen iPhone, a redesigned model, will be lauched long time ago, and that didn’t happen.

    Making bigger phones is easier than making smaller phones. First because miniaturization has always been the most difficult engineering challenge, and second, because a smaller phone has a smaller battery making efficiency much more important. The larger the phone, the simpler it is. The third reason smaller is more valuable is that it’s easier to carry and use. The largest phones cannot be put in pockets and cannot be used with one hand. In the history of consumer, electronics size reduction has been the most consistent measure of performance, and the most rewarding. Usually the most exceptional reductions in dimensions create the highest price and profit bands. There have been niches for larger portable devices but they are consistently a small part of the overall market. If Apple were to introduce a larger device I hope they will be able to solve usability problems and make the category attractive to a larger audience.

    3. What do you expect from the new iPhone 6?

    I expect it to run the latest version of iOS and, with the new apps developers will ship, that should make the most impact in people’s lives. I imagine health maintenance and home automation will become valuable new franchises. Of course iOS 8 will also run on older iPhones, but I suspect the newest iPhone will somehow run the new software better and have smoother integration with services.

    4. What’s the “not to do” lesson that Apple needs to learn for the now iPhone from it’s own past experience or their competitors?

    The biggest challenge is to move rapidly with scale. The company has managed to grow from zero phones a year to hundreds of millions. That’s great but it’s still frustrating to wait one year for major improvements. The “cycle time” of innovation for Apple remains one year. I wish it could be faster but perhaps this is also too fast for some. In some services like maps and iCloud and iWork, which are independent of hardware (mostly,) speed is of the essence.

    5. The iPhone is the most expensive smartphone on the market right now. In Romania, it certainly is. But where does Apple gains it’s most money from, selling products to users or selling services, like iTunes, App Store? And having that in mind, what will be their next step: better – breakthrough products or bigger, more complete services?

    The answer to where a company “gets its profits” is best answered by asking where a buyer “gets his value” from the product. For instance you might answer the question of where a car company gets its value by saying that it’s from making people be in more than one place in a day. So the “differentiation” of a car is in answering the question slightly differently. If it’s hard to see a difference to this answer between cars then it’s hard for any one company to make a profit. For a company like Apple, we need to ask what its users value about the experience and why they are willing to pay for that. My hypothesis is that the brand's value is in making life a little bit easier. That’s what Apple competes on. Of course, some people are not willing to pay to have an easier life and some even want to make their lives more complicated so Apple’s proposal to make life easier, for a price, is not accepted by everybody—which is ok by them. But for many, paying for comfort, productivity and ease of mind is worth quite a bit. The reason Apple is able to gain a premium over the competition is that this value proposal (of paying for simplification) is either weak or non-existent for competitors. Indeed, many competitors compete on the basis of making life more complicated.

    6. What does innovation means for Apple right now? What are their options for assuring a next decade of success? A new Steve Jobs person or a Steve Jobs tipe of group thinking. How hard is that to achieve?

    Innovation is meaningful invention—bringing useful creations to a large number of people who then make use of that creation. The interesting aspect of making money from innovation is that it’s a rare phenomenon, requiring many disciplines to work together. It’s like a big movie that somehow works and becomes widely popular but costs little to make. Many movies are made, few are successful and very few of those which are successful are built at low cost. What we know about technology innovation is that it’s a combination that comes together under strong leadership but that leadership alone is not sufficient. The myth of Steve Jobs is that he was both necessary and sufficient to success. The truth is that he was necessary but not sufficient. To make successful innovations requires strong leadership and teamwork and a process of incentives and passion that is hard to create a formula for. How this works at Apple is its biggest secret.

    7. Who are the key Apple employees right now? Do they need another Jobs or do they already have him?

    All Apple employees are key. I would say that’s the magic formula. There is no chief magical officer (and there never was.)

    8. What will be the next best thing for Apple? […]

    I don’t know. It’s probably not knowable.

    … Are they capable of another breakthrough in the market?

    Yes. This is almost certainly knowable.

    9. Is the smart-home project something that will really happen in the next, let’s say, two decades?

    If the project requires replacement of existing infrastructure, it will not happen. If the project allows adding new items to existing infrastructure, it will almost certainly happen.

    10. Growth comes from the middle and low-end smartphones, according to IDC. Would or would not be a good idea for Apple to release a handset cheaper than the 5c?

    If Apple were concerned with growth then they should. But we have to ask why they avoided doing this six years ago. Not only was it obvious to do so but a portfolio strategy was the modus operandi for every competitor and had been for decades. The question isn’t why Apple does not broaden its line-up but why do the others diffuse their efforts and have such poor focus.

    11. What feature or software you think would be the main battleground in the future, in the smartphone market? Apps? Battery? Camera?

    Integration of all the above. When new experiences and services emerge those who are able to make them usable succeed. Usability requires integration.

    12. Who puts more pressure on Apple: Apple itself, Samsung, LG, HTC, Microsoft and Nokia? And how.

    I suspect competition is part of motivation but it’s not the entire story. Let’s not forget that Apple is considered to suffer from competitor pressure from software companies, services companies, media companies, hardware companies and everything in between. For instance, Apple is in competition with Microsoft, Amazon, Google and Samsung but the competition is not transitive. In other words Amazon is not perceived as being in competition with Samsung and neither is Google competing with Nokia. So somehow Apple should be sensitive to every perceived alternative to every aspect of its products. This quickly becomes an absurd idea. Apple is a system of things and systems can’t be compared with components.

    13. What is Apple’s sensitive spot today. What do you believe Apple fears the most?

    Losing people. The problem of retaining talented people is the most difficult challenge, especially when they become very wealthy due to the success of the firm.

    14. In 2012, you described the fall of Nokia in competition with Samsung at the Guardian Mobile Business Summit due to the disruption theory: the launch of the smartphone. Is Apple in danger of becoming a victim of the same story in the near future? What technology could replace the smartphone and when?

    Yes, every company is vulnerable to disruption. The defense is not to protect against it but to self-disrupt or enable self-destruction. Self-preservation is an instinct in humans so this is psychologically very difficult. The crisis comes not from a technology change but a business model change and that implies a cultural change. Companies embrace any and all technologies which sustain their business models and reject, resist and ignore any and all technologies which disrupt their business models. Changing business models is like a brain transplant; it happens so rarely that we can count it on one hand. By the way, because it’s so rare is why companies who attempt it are discounted by the market.

    15. You've been a Nokia executive. From this perspective, how do you see the deal with Microsoft and the future of Windows Phone and the Lumia brand?

    This is a long story. I can’t really do it justice now but I will say that it seems that Microsoft understands that they need to become an integrated systems company and not a component supplier. The same became evident to Nokia so they needed to merge.

    16. You've also worked with people from RIM. Do the have the capacity to innovate?

    Perhaps but scale also matters. RIM and HTC may not have the time to grow.

    17. Let’s imagine that no big company owns my personal information. If I wanted to sell that to someone, what would be the right price to ask? How valuable are individuals in the war for gaining personal information?

    The price of your personal information will be set by auction. It’s up to you to decide if you want to create a reserve price or to let the highest bidder win. As of today most people would trade all their personal information for almost zero price. This will not last and consumers will find out their value over time. I can’t predict how it will change but it will be a combination of offers being made and personal data catastrophes which will act as warnings.

    18. Do you believe in phoneblocks project from Motorola?

    Only people who want more complicated lives will want to build their own products. There are some such people (for example children) but they are not willing to spend a lot for that complication so the overall market for increasing complexity is small.

    19. The last question. What could trigger an Apple fall and when?

    The most common trigger for failure is success. To continue succeeding is very hard because motivation disappears. What can cause a crisis of motivation would be that there is a loss of belief that there are problems left to solve.