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In a previous series of articles we discussed the capital Apple expends on equipment, real estate, leasehold improvements and data centers. Cost structure analysis reveals subtle shifts in strategy and the CapEx analysis demonstrates Apple's increasing integration into its supplier network and integration into the distribution and service infrastructure that sustains its ecosystems.

Another form of investing (spending now, reaping benefits later) is the spending on research and development (R&D). Let’s have a look at Apple’s R&D expenses by quarter since Q1/2006.

Apples R&D expenses as percentage of sales have been declining from almost 4% to close to 2% in the last six years as shown in the following chart:

While Apple's absolute R&D expenses have grown at an annual rate of 33% they have not kept up with the far higher sales growth rate. Apple's current rate of R&D expenditure is compared to a peer group [1] below.

Apple's R&D/sales ratio is between Dell and HP, companies which do not develop their own software or hardware.

Beside the absolute, relative to sales and relative to peers, another perspective is to measure relative growth. The following chart represents shows the 5 year average growth of R&D expenses and on the y-axis the size of last 12 months R&D expenses as a multiple of Apple's R&D costs [2].

Acer's R&D expenses for example are almost non-existent compared to Apple, but have grown almost 100% per year while Microsoft’s last 12 months R&D expenses are almost 4x that of Apple's and have only grown slightly over the past five years. Google's R&D costs have grown at a similar rate compared to Apple, but remained double those of Apple’s throughout the last five years.

Finally, we should look at the payoff from R&D spending over the last five years.  R&D growth should result in margin improvement, but does it? The following chart shows the relationship between spending (size of bubble), margin improvement (x-axis) and sales growth (y-axis).

Of our sample, only three companies have achieved sales growth AND simultaneous margin improvement over the last five years. But while Microsoft and Dell have achieved sales growth and margin improvement slightly above zero, Apple has improved its bottom line by 13 percentage points and its top line by an average rate of 45%.

In spite of Microsoft's, Google and Nokia's massive R&D growth, their returns from that investment have been meagre to negative in terms of margin and only Google showed appreciable sales growth.

Discussion

R&D expenditures on a stand-alone basis, in absolute or relative terms, do not correlate with disruptive growth. Essentially, you cannot buy innovation.

In fact, sometimes it's nearly free. Most startups spend less on R&D than large companies do on stationery and yet the bulk of wealth creation has come from these tiny companies. The challenge is, in fact, that if you have resources you find ways of spending them (the quaint American cliche of 'cash burning a hole in your pocket'). The temptation is always there to fund a new initiative which bright people can always envision.

Leadership in innovation is not the courage to spend but the courage to focus.

“Focus is about saying 'No'. And the result of that focus is going to be some really great products where the total is much greater than the sum of the parts.”, Steve Jobs (1997)

[1] Our set of peer companies as shown in previous posts but excluding LG, Lenovo and Motorola Mobility due to lack of data, but including Sony Ericsson and Nokia’s mobile phone division Devices & Services.

[2] In this post “year” and “last 12 months” refers to the time frame from Q4/(year-1) year to Q3/year due to lack of published data regarding Q4/2011. Five year data runs from Q3/2006-Q3/2011.

[3] A note on capitalized R&D: Most of the companies analyzed do not have capitalized R&D costs. Some have small capitalization, but so small that the inclusion would not change the decimal points of percentages. The only significant amount of capitalized R&D appeared in Amazon's earnings releases: capitalized R&D cost were USD 100 million in Q3/2011. The amortization of theses costs in included in Amazon's EBIT (Operating imcome).

The following chart shows the reported (circled points) and estimated (lines) for Android activations. The resolution of the sampling is every seven days.

If we take these estimates and then compile a cumulative total of activations we get the green line in the chart below.

The wrinkle in the picture is that Google also occasionally reports cumulative estimates of total Android shipped. They are shown as the blue circles in the chart above. There is some room for error as the cumulative totals may not be reported the same day they happen and the assumptions in the activation rates may not be reflecting occasional slowing.

However that leads to a problem. By adjusting for the reported totals we get the orange line. The trouble with it is that it has these improbable "kinks" where the total is adjusted down, something that is not happening in reality. It's a kludge we need to make estimates fit reality. Normally, this is something we can sweep under the carpet, but with the size of the market, the errors creep up to tens of millions of unitis.

The first downward adjustment would have been 19 million in May. Today, the difference between the green line and the orange is about 25 million.

So the best we can say right now is that there have been between 224 and 253 million Android devices activated to date. Why Google does not report this data regularly and consistently remains a mystery.

Update: The data used in the charts above is available as a Google Docs spreadsheet here.

Here are the highlights from RIM's latest quarter:

• 14.1 million BlackBerry smartphones shipped, 13 million sold through
• 150k PlayBook shipped with sell-through slightly higher. 800k PlayBooks shipped so far.
• BlackBerry subscriber base up to 75 million
• High growth cited for U.K., France, South Africa, Mexico and Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. RIM is the #1 smartphone vendor in the Latin America and Caribbean region. Sales outside the US, UK and Canada were 61% of revenues. US is now 20% of sales, UK 11%.
• Hardware growth outside the US was 56%
• There are 630 carriers
• 50k apps in App World with 5 million downloads per day
• Forecasting 11 to 12 million smartphones next quarter

Given the channel fill with a new product, the device business was marginal at best. The company obtained -1% growth y/y in units but 31% sequential growth from a transitional quarter. The average selling price (inclusive of service revenues) is $354 and about $280 excluding service revenues. I estimate that operating margins have dropped to about 11%. Not a good story, but one we have been warned to expect.

But a crucial new twist to the story is that RIM announced that they don't expect new BlackBerry 10 devices until late next year. That came as a surprise and the stock sold off significantly, valuing the company at well below book value.

Stepping back, the biggest surprise is that the company seems to have had no plan for sustaining itself.

Let me explain.

If you go back to 2005 or so the world of smartphones was a mix of modular OSs and integrated platforms, much as it is today.  Not unlike Android today, Windows Mobile was successful in licensing to dozens of vendors who in turn released hundreds of products. Symbian also was licensed but most volumes came from Nokia and they held the lion's share. Then there was the BlackBerry integrated solution which worked smoothly and had devoted fans who upgraded every chance they had and operators who were joyous at the new ARPU. There was also PalmOS as offered by PalmSource trying to be a "third horse" and unseat stodgy old Microsoft.

It was into that fray that both Apple and Google jumped. Google acquired Android in 2005 and Apple was busy polishing a version of OS X that would became iOS. In three and two years respectively these platforms would be in the market.

Regardless of the actions of rivals, all competitors must have faced the same questions in 2005: As technology was changing rapidly and as they all had access to component roadmaps, what is the best technology approach to this market? Should they embrace certain innovations to sustain their business trajectory? RIM had a tightly integrated software, hardware and service offering. What could make it better? Nokia was also basing its products on a more loosely integrated offering (nominally it was modular, but only just). It saw the writing on the wall and began developing a Linux variant (Maemo) as a potential candidate to replace Symbian. Microsoft was basing its solution of a modular approach. Windows CE was ok as a kernel but they had layers on top which were optimized around stylus-based user experiences (analogous to mouse actions). Could it take on a rich computing experience?

There were many experience candidates. Stylus, keypad, keyboard all had adherents. There was a lot of hesitation. After the iPhone launched with capacitive (finger) touch, resetting user expectations, it still took a year for many of the vendors to re-consider their technology plans. The weakest changed first.

Microsoft felt the pain quickest. They also had the least to lose since revenues from Windows Mobile were paltry. By 2008 internally they turned 90 degrees. They embarked on re-building their user experience and orphaning the Windows Mobile ecosystem and many of the vendor relationships they had built. Palm dropped PalmOS and built WebOS internally quite quickly. They licensed Windows Mobile as a stop-gap. Around the same time Nokia doubled down on Maemo and joined with Intel to form MeeGo. They did not orphan Symbian though and kept trying to adapt it to the new experiences and input methods.

But RIM did nothing. Almost nothing. They were the healthiest competitor. They felt no pain from iPhone's entry. The platform they had built was still growing and they were tweaking it constantly. There were always improvements to point to but fundamentally the code was limited. It was very difficult to adapt it to touch input and the first attempts at a touch UI were embarrassing. But there were no signs of a new platform that reflected the Unix-like competition.

As I pointed out in an earlier post, Unix-like operating systems were having their revenge. To a computer scientist the future of mobile computing would mirror that of personal computing in terms of architecture. The foundations of the early smartphones were built on constraints that were disappearing while being unable to accommodate new input methods. In other words, the early efforts were optimized around those constraints and sub-optimal for rich user experiences. They had to be. There were limited processors, memories and screens and battery life.

It turned out that all the early mobile operating systems were unsuitable for the advances in technology that came after 2007. Companies which were able to adapt or embrace Unix-like operating systems in a mobile context gained the ability to grow with the new input methods. The sooner they "pulled the trigger" on the shift, the better off they were. This is in fact what enabled entrants to gain footholds. Entrants entered with Unix-like OSs straight away while incumbents had to justify changing and the more successful they were the harder it was to justify changing.

RIM had trouble justifying this change. It waited until 2010 to finally acquire the QNX asset that would offer them a stronger software foundation.  It still had to adapt this acquisition and it looks like it won't be done until at least 2012, seven years after they should have started. And this should be seen as a sustaining technological change. A new OS is not a disruptive technology to what is already a mobile computer.

However, delays like these can be fatal. We see the impact on Microsoft who was earliest to push the reset button in 2008. It still took two years to rebuild Windows Mobile into Windows Phone and is now still struggling to regain lost share (less than 2% today). We see the impact on Nokia which was unable to affect a transition to MeeGo due to a litany of issues and had to throw in the towel on self-determination. We see the impact on Palm which lost its independence as WebOS was a bit too little too late.

These companies had the right technical strategies but suffered from execution and business architecture issues. RIM is years late in embracing what appears to be a sustaining improvement.

But whenever you see what appears to be a coordinated effort by companies to fail simultaneously you have to ask if the change they struggle with is really sustaining or disruptive. The pattern makes me suspicious that what RIM, Microsoft, Palm and Nokia faced was more than a failure to embrace a sustaining improvement. I suspect that the failure is evidence of tectonic shifting of business models.

In last week's discussion of Apple's (historically low) valuation, comments arose that perhaps the company's discount is not unique. Can we look at comparable companies and determine whether the relationship between growth, size and valuation are consistent?

The challenge is in finding "comparable" companies. Apple is characterized by being large in terms of market capitalization, highly profitable, in the technology sector and growing relatively quickly. One can find a cohort of companies with each of these characteristics but not all.

Here is an attempt at looking at the largest companies by Market Capitalization (the so-called Mega-caps) to spot patterns of valuation. Some of the companies in the top 20 mega-caps were technology companies so I thought I'd highlight them. I then also added a few of the top 20 technology companies by capitalization to create a larger sample.

The group I settled on is shown in the list below ranked by market cap.

Companies below $130 Billion in market cap (i.e. below Novartis) are in the top 20 technology list but not in the top 20 overall list.

I then plotted the P/E rate vs. 5 year Growth Rate for these companies, separating the tech sector by color (Red):

The pattern is not encouraging. It appears that there is no correlation. Perhaps the technology companies are, as a group, further up and to the right, but overall they are equally unobservant of growth.

For example, SAP has grown less than 5% in five years and yet enjoys a P/E of 20 whereas Microsoft has grown 18% and has a P/E of less than 10. The non-technology sector companies are similarly broken. Berkshire Hathaway, a conglomerate, is rewarded for slow growth and China Mobile is punished for relative high growth.

But you'll notice that some companies are not on this chart. That's because they are outliers. Their growth or P/E are so far out of this cluster that the would make it impossible to discern individual performance. The complete "top 20" picture is shown in the following chart which will require either a large display or a lot of scrolling (1300x1364 pixels):

With this level of detail, we can see how distinct some companies are. Not only from a correlation point of view but from a cluster of peers. The outliers are Amazon, Baidu, VMware, Google and Apple.

These outliers can be seen also in ranking of P/E and Growth:

Baidu has grown earnings by 132 percent while creating a market cap of $47 billion and has a P/E of 52. Amazon has grown by 26% while having a total value of $90 billion and a P/E of 104. VMware is "only" a $40 billion market cap company with a 5yr EPS growth of 33% and a P/E of 64. Finally, Google has returned a 39% growth rate, a market cap of about $200 billion and a P/E of 21 and Apple brings up the rear of P/E with 14 but with the second largest market cap of $360 billion and the second largest growth of 65%.

What this analysis shows is that the market does not have any "rule" of rewarding growth with a high P/E. If anything, the outlier analysis shows that there are significant anomalous valuations that cannot be explained by growth data.

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Note: I've also tried to observe correlation between recent share price change and growth and recent price growth and long-term earnings growth.

Similar anomalies and lack of correlation can be observed.

The last time I did this comparison (Apple could buy the mobile phone industry | asymco) was in June after the end of the second quarter. The following chart is an updated look.

 

Here is a discussion of the changes since the last analysis:

• Sony Ericsson was valued through its acquisition by Sony. We did not have a way to value the enterprise before as it was not traded independently. Last June I estimated a 14x multiple on its trailing twelve months' profits and got $3.0 billion. Since then half the company changed hands for about €1.05 thus yielding a total company value of $2.8 billion. The enterprise value should be therefore slightly lower but I'll stick with the current transaction value as the EV.
• Motorola Mobility has entered into an agreement to be acquired by Google for $12.5 billion by Google. The company's enterprise value jumped as a result to about $8.6 billion.
• RIM's share price collapsed and it's now also trading at an EV of about 7.3 billion (Yahoo finance).
• Nokia's price has also dropped and it now has an EV of about $13 billion (Yahoo finance).
• HTC recently dropped significantly in price and is now worth about $15 billion EV. (Note that pricing of its equities is subject to suspended trading due to drop limits).
• LG's phone business is still losing money and it's still difficult to value. In November it was revealed that the company was seeking to raise $890 million in capital to fund new initiatives including smartphones. The share price fell by 14%. In June I suggested a nominal value for the phone business of $10 billion. I think that's very generous and with recent events I would place that value at $9 billion today.
• Samsung's fortunes have increased. In June I applied a 14x multiple to their trailing 12 months' operating earnings. Given overall discounting of the sector I applied a multiple of 13 today. That yields a business value of $78 billion. Interestingly, that is larger than the value of all other competitors apart from Apple. That also makes it six times more valuable than Nokia.
• Apple's cash and cash equivalents and investments grew by about $12 billion and were worth about $82 billion as of October.

In summary, in June Apple's cash was about 53% of the sum of competing phone vendor enterprise values. Today it's about 61%. Excluding Samsung, Apple could buy the industry and still have $25 billion left over. This makes the claim that "Apple could buy the industry" even more believable.

This analysis is mainly academic. It does not imply that any such transaction will take place. As the purchase of Motorola shows, control has a premium and individual buyers may be less "rational" than markets. What it does show however is that the entire industry is in a state of crisis. Valuations for phone companies are collapsing and two major brands (Motorola and Sony Ericsson) are being absorbed and could disappear.

At the same time entrants are arriving with completely different business models. Amazon, Facebook, Baidu, Alibaba are intent on selling phones or platforms to be valued as enablers for asymmetric business models rather than as phones. One could argue that what Apple itself sells is more than hardware and that its value-add "on top" of hardware is increasing. This is a sign of commoditization. Certainly the voice business is well beyond that point but it now appears that even the smartphone business is already in an advanced state of value compression.

All the while the overall market is growing. I had separately looked at the profit pool and concluded that the brands are suffering. Summing up the votes from stock markets, the sentiment is even worse. 2012 is looking more and more as a year of inevitable and dramatic industry change.

On October 27th, Nintendo published half year results for the fiscal year ending in March 2012. Management stated that the company lost over $900 million with a negative outlook. Nintendo cited weaker than expected sales of Nintendo DS hardware and 3DS software and Yen appreciation as the main reasons for the miss. Is this the end of Nintendo?

Before we look more closely, here is a quick summary: The company is exclusively involved in selling game hardware and software. Their console platform is the Nintendo Wii, which will be followed by the Wii U late in 2012. The Nintendo DS and Nintendo 3DS are the company’s portable game consoles. The Wii and the DS are nearing the end of their product cycles. On the software side, the company is known for gaming titles such as Super Mario and Zelda. Nintendo also pioneered the licensing model to allow third-party developers to produce games for its hardware products.

A closer look

The good news for analysts is that Nintendo publishes their estimates for hardware and software unit sales. This allows us to measure management predictive accuracy. The red line (management forecast) should be as close as possible to the dark green pillars (realized unit sales in the fiscal year).

Until CQ1 2009 devices sales grew in excess of forecasts. A similar pattern can be found for consoles and game titles. After Q1 2009 forecasts have been always higher than results, and more worryingly, the deviation between forecast and sales is widening. Management missed and lowered forecasts for two consecutive years. Management's hope for an increase on the back of initial 3DS sales in the launch quarter (CQ1 2011) did not come to pass and they subsequently lowered forecasts again in the following two quarters.

Looking at all categories, management lowered forecasts almost continuously. The deviation remains the largest in the portable hardware business segment indicating that management was largely surprised about the development.

What caused this reversal of fortune?

Two years earlier the iPhone had launched and by CQ1 2009 iOS reached an installed base of about 38 million, half the number of Nintendo portables in the same period. Furthermore, in CQ1 2009 Android phones came to the market. Smartphones (light blue area of the chart below) sold before (and after) the debut of iOS, but the iPhone redefined the category and an avalanche of smarter phones running iOS and Android followed (blue and orange area). Portable gaming devices from Nintendo and Sony declined ever since: 17% in 2009, 31% in 2010 and already 16% in the last twelve months.

How do the game players stack up?

We already looked at the installed base in the chart above. iOS and Android have outsold Nintendo portable units by a factor of 2.1x and 1.6x. Furthermore, we can see (in the charts below) that the two main mobile platforms have 14 to 26 times more game (and entertainment) titles available. Nintendo and Sony also publish unit sales of directly sold software titles. For Android and iOS we know the cumulative app download statistics. By taking the share of Septembers’ paid and free app downloads as a proxy, we can conclude that also by this measure Android and iOS dwarf Nintendo and Sony [1]. The reach of iOS and Android is further underlined by the more than 500 million downloads of Angry Bird game titles - first released only two years ago - for any platform having sold more than twice the amount of Sony’s cumulative portable game titles and almost as many as Nintendo’s cumulative games titles since Q2/2007.

 

Who else has skin in the game?

Besides Nintendo, Sony, Apple and Google, who else is making a push into mobile gaming? Before investigating, let’s first have a closer look at Sony. Sony, just like Nintendo, is also active in stationary gaming segment with the PlayStation franchise. The Sony group also has access to entertainment most notable through Sony Pictures Entertainment and Sony Music Entertainment. Furthermore, Sony recently decided to buy Ericsson’s stake in the mobile phone joint-venture Sony Ericsson and is making a push with Android to bring its gaming titles as a differentiator for its own products to the platform. And the other major suspects? Microsoft, also active in the stationary gaming segment with its Xbox franchise, is pushing to bring the Xbox experience to mobile phones with Windows Phone. Amazon has retailed software and games for years and has started to distribute software and games via direct download on its own Kindle devices but also for the Mac. On the Kindle, Amazon is relying on a forked Android version on which it leverages its eBook and other entertainment assets. And then there is Facebook, a social network that wants to be on any platform or device. Out of 800 million users, 350 million access Facebook via a mobile device. Around 50% of Facebook members play games on the desktop. With Project Spartan, Facebook is aiming to bring the desktop experience to the mobile device including a stronger focus on gaming and video.

The competition between Apple and Google is already asymmetrical. Including the other contestants in the competitive landscape reveals Nintendo’s key weaknesses in the portable gaming market: attraction as a platform for developers in terms of ease and reach, pricing of hardware competing with operator-subsidized mobile phones and the jobs-to-be-done or value preposition. The new generation of mobile devices is standing against Nintendo’s dedicated approach. Although slowly adding features such as a browser and “app store” to its portables, Nintendo devices fall short in the variety of jobs-to-be-done compared to smartphones, let alone making a call.

Average selling prices and financial impact

With this market pressure one would imagine that average selling prices decreased for Nintendo portables. But for the last three fiscal years average selling prices for portables have increased, all things equal, mainly due to new product launches. Game title’s average selling prices have remained relatively flat. Note that these are wholesales prices for hardware and a mix of retail and wholesale prices for games. In 2011, for which we do not have data yet, the price of the newest portable, Nintendo 3DS, was lowered from its U.S. debut of 320 250$ in February to 170$ in July which will have a negative impact on ASP going forward.

The effects of Nintendo’s rigid strategy and the fast changing competitive landscape are manifested in the devastating financial performance over the recent quarters with LTM sales, gross margins and EBIT margins declining starting from CQ4 2008 and even accelerating to decline after CQ3 2010.

Furthermore, even though the company has recognized its own difficulties, Nintendo has no intention of adjusting its strategy:

CEO Iwata on the question of whether Nintendo plans to bring its game library to other platforms:

This is absolutely not under consideration. If we did this, Nintendo would cease to be Nintendo. Having a hardware development team in-house is a major strength. It’s the duty of management to make use of those strengths. It’s probably the correct decision in the sense that the moment we started to release games on smartphones we’d make profits. However, I believe my responsibility is not to short term profits, but to Nintendo’s mid and long term competitive strength.

Although realized and obvious, the disruption’s invisibility is often manifested in the paralysis of the incumbent.

Conclusion

According to Isaacson, Steve Jobs apparently always worried who could eat Apple's lunch. The lunch of the iPod, he concluded, was ripe for mobile phones. Subsequently, Apple entered the mobile phone space. Google followed. Since then more powerful mobile phones have eaten the lunch of the dedicated gaming device. The jobs-to-be-done and their priorities in people’s life have not changed, but the tools people use to get them done have. Permanently.

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Notes:

1. Estimated by multiplying total cumulative app downloads with September’s share of game downloads: For iOS ranging from 72-80% based on Top 150 free and paid app downloads, for Android ranging  from 38-47% respectively. This is a very crude estimation, but the gist of it is that 4% for iOS and 11% for Android game downloads as percentage of cumulative app downloads would outsell Nintendo.

Analysts have to count things in order to measure value. It sounds easy but it can be tricky. As I pointed out with PCs vs. iPads, if you count an iPad as a PC you can get into a lot of trouble with your clients. But if you don't you end up directing them away from confronting an existential threat. Only very rarely is a market report published in contradiction to widely held sustaining beliefs. More often than not analysts bow to the source of their paychecks and in so doing show their rear end to the truth.

This comes up again now with respect to how to count tablets. Consider that there is little difference in architecture, software or design between an iPhone and an iPad. They run the same OS, use the same microprocessors and have similar communication methods, inputs and sensors. However they are considered completely different products and counted as part of separate markets. The only physical attribute that differs is the screen size. So we have to conclude that the size of the screen is a huge determinant factor in deciding whether a product is a tablet but not a smartphone (or music player).

But what about tablets themselves? Their screen sizes vary widely. A 10" screen is certainly a tablet device, but a 4" screen certainly isn't. Where is the boundary exactly? It seems that a 7" device is still a tablet but a 5" may not be. The Dell Streak 5 device is presumably not a tablet. The arguments then descend into an arbitrary definition of tablet based on whether it fits in one hand or in a bag of a certain size.

This begins to sound academic. Why should it matter what size is or isn't a valid tablet? Buyers are not in the market for screen sizes. They are in the market for products that can be hired to do jobs or address pain in their lives. So as far as consumers are concerned, these categories are meaningless. If you want to design something you'd better segment according to jobs to be done.

However, buyers are not the target audience for the analyst. Nor are product designers (hopefully anyway.) Part of the reasoning of offering market research is that it presumably helps ecosystem participants (vendors, developers, retailers, etc.) decide where to invest their time and money. They are the target audience. They don't spend their lives reading tech blogs. For them it's important to understand "which way the wind is blowing" and that's where an analyst should be helpful with data.

But then if we are to measure ecosystems, we have more difficulties.

The iOS ecosystem is pretty well understood. Apple publishes the number of devices it sells and the number of apps on its store and downloads, etc. We can assume Microsoft will do the same with Windows 8 as they do already for Windows in general.

For Android, it's a challenge. Google measures activations, but that may not cover the actual units sold. Google admits that it does not know how many Android devices are sold or even how many are for sale. It's in the nature of open source that it's not controlled and hence not measurable.

But analysts still try. Consider the estimate that about 27% of all "tablets" shipped are Android. That's not something Google helped with. Google can report the number of activations of a certain version of the OS, but they themselves don't know what the device looks like or what size screen it has. A device vendor can put any version of Android on a device of any size. To find out how many tablets run Android, you need to try to estimate "bottom up" by adding the output from various vendors.

However, it's clear that a large number of these devices are not exactly Android. Consider what  Kevin C. Tofel writes for GigaOm:

I asked Strategy Analytics to clarify both of those points and received the following email response from Neil Mawston, the analyst who wrote the report: ”Yes, the press release refers to shipments, not sales. All sub-versions of Android are included. Yes, the B&N Nook Color tablet is included in the tablet figures.”

So the B&N Nook is counted as an Android tablet and part of the 27% share of Android. But Google itself does not count the B&N Nook as an Android tablet. It's not something that can even use the Android brand. From Google's own documentation:

We define an "Android compatible" device as one that can run any application written by third-party developers using the Android SDK and NDK. We use this as a filter to separate devices that can participate in the Android app ecosystem, and those that cannot. Devices that are properly compatible can seek approval to use the Android trademark. Devices that are not compatible are merely derived from the Android source code and may not use the Android trademark.

In other words, compatibility is a prerequisite to participate in the Android apps ecosystem. Anyone is welcome to use the Android source code, but if the device isn't compatible, it's not considered part of the Android ecosystem.

So to summarize, whereas the Nook is counted as an "Android tablet" it...

• cannot be called an Android device without violating the trademark
• may or may not compatible with Android Apps
• does not include Google Services like Google Maps
• cannot license the Android Market client software or brand
• is not considered to be a part of the Android ecosystem by Google

All this is also true for the Amazon Kindle Fire and whatever Baidu, Alibaba and other Google competitors will be selling. Furthermore, Google can define compatibility and therefore what "being Android" means arbitrarily and can change that definition at will. It can even withdraw compatibility on the basis of business priorities.

It matters because these devices might end up very popular (see Amazon's reporting of Fire's pre-orders in its quarterly earnings call) and in aggregate could even be the majority of "Android tablets".

The result is that most analysis of the Android ecosystem (and by comparison, all mobile ecosystems) depends on classifying as Android devices those that compete with Google, and indeed, with Android. For the purpose of assessing value, growth and opportunity for third parties such reports fall short.

So what should be done?

The solution is simple: Count as Android devices those that are allowed to be called Android as per Google's own definition. It makes clear that developers can reliably sell their software through the Android Market. It makes clear that those devices are designed to use Google services and it makes clear that those devices are not designed to compete with Google.

Those devices which are using "derived" Android source code and are not compatible (as per Google's definition) and are not allowed to be called Android by their vendor should be called something else. Maybe "Android-like" or "Android derivative" or "Non-Google Android" or just "Other".

In his recent posts Horace took a look at Apple’s fixed assets and their development over the recent years. He also tested the hypotheses that Apple is making investments into machinery & equipment on which iOS devices are produced by overlaying iOS volumes with preceding changes in property, plant and equipment (PP&E).

The question that has arisen is: Are Apple’s investments in PP&E extraordinary?

To answer, I have compiled the capital expenditures (CapEx) for our previously established peer group [1].

But first we need to clarify what CapEx include and not include. CapEx includes investment into property, plants, equipment, office furniture, larger IT hardware and in some cases patents; CapEx do not include investment into long-term marketable securities or other long-term financial instruments, acquisitions or capitalized R&D. Furthermore, CapEx are gross values and are not net of any sold equipment [2]. CapEx are largely depending on a company’s business model and strategy. For example if you are a manufacturer you need equipment to operate, if you are a software company or a retailer, your business will not be capital intensive.

As the second calendar quarter of 2011 is the latest quarter for which all companies have reported figures, we will take a look at last twelve months’ (LTM) figures from Q2/2011 backwards. The following stacked bar chart shows the combined CapEx of our peer group:

 

The combined capital expenditures of our peer group for the LTM CQ2/2011 have outpaced even pre-crisis levels of investments and, combined, account for $34.7 billion. Samsung, a diversified manufacturer of IT hardware and other equipment, has invested more than $11.6bn with Google ($5.1bn), HP ($4.4bn) and Apple with $3.4bn following in line. While Google’s CapEx mostly account for its infrastructure of server farms and other IT hardware, HP’s CapEx mostly account for IT hardware it leases to its customers [3]. In absolute terms, Apple takes fourth place in CapEx spending for the last twelve months ending in CQ2.

Since the business model and sales magnitude varies largely in our peer group, we can also take a look at a common measure to compare CapEx intensity by dividing CapEx by sales achieved in the same period. For the last twelve months we can depict the following chart:

 

The average of the peer group accounts for 4.4% of CapEx over sales. Samsung’s and Google’s business model are clearly more capital intensive, while Apple’s CapEx ratio of 3.4% is below the peer group average but above some of its peers like Nokia, Dell, LG, HTC or Motorola Mobility. Interestingly, capital intensity of HP, Apple, Sony, Microsoft and Amazon is at a comparable level of around 3.4%.

As noted before, business models and strategies are significantly different among companies in our peer group. However, while Apple’s CapEx intensity is not extraordinary, Apple’s CapEx in absolute terms are among the largest in it this peer group and have grown constantly throughout a five year period.

Is this a good thing and why does it matter?

CapEx by itself does not tell us much. We still do not know in what companies specifically invest as financial regulations do not require detailed CapEx accounts. We know that even if a company is not growing assets they need to be maintained, upgraded and replaced – this spending is also called "Maintenance CapEx". Everything else can be called "Expansion CapEx" associated with new product launches, entry to new business area or geographies or expansion of (manufacturing) capacity.

Therefore, Expansion CapEx is closely linked to expected organic sales growth in the future. So let’s go ahead and link CapEx ratio of the previous years with the sales growth of the following year. The following chart shows the cumulative average growth rate (CAGR) over the last four years versus the average of CapEx/sales ratio of the four last preceding years:

 

We can see that high CapEx efficiency has been achieved by Amazon, Apple and HTC with sales growth rates of 33-47%. RIM reached similar revenue growth but with higher CapEx intensity. Google and Samsung with high CapEx intensity have only reached modest growth rates. Dell, HP, Microsoft and Sony have not grown significantly but have close to average CapEx intensity.

We cannot state that CapEx in absolute terms have been extraordinary for Apple, but we can witness that with below average CapEx/sales ratio Apple outgrew in absolute terms Dell, LG, Microsoft, Nokia and Sony and has grown close to the revenue size of Samsung and HP in the last four years.

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Notes:

1. Excluding Lenovo (not reported) and Acer (extra-ordinary low numbers reported, to be investigated), Motorola Mobility figures only available for the last six quarters
2. Minor differences may occur due to local Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
3. HP assumes ownership of these assets and rents them to the customers who in turn have a smaller balance sheet and can run IT hardware CapEx through the income statement as lease expenses

After processing more than 1500 data points on the performance of thirteen technology companies, patterns are beginning to emerge. The steps so far:

• Visualizing P/E and Growth as time series centered on a point of crisis.
• Plotting P/E vs. Growth with an eye toward any clustering/correlations for the cohort.
• Detecting and measuring any change in the relationship between P/E and Growth before and after the point of crisis.

The final step is to plot the changes in the relationship between pre- and post-crisis for the set of companies normalized to the same starting point and then classifying them: 

The chart shows how the "average P/Es" changed after 9/30/2008 vs. how the companies performed during those periods. An evocative categorization is suggested for the four quadrants.

One way to read the data would be as a degree of effect of the crisis. For example, in the case of HP, its P/E dropped by about 6.5 while its average growth decreased by 41 basis points giving an average of 0.16 drop in P/E for every basis point reduction in growth. That would be a fairly modest impact. In the case of HTC, the impact would be even less. The effect on P/E was zero even though growth dropped by about 78 basis points. At the same time the impact on Microsoft was severe with the P/E dropping as much as for HP even though its growth only moderated by 5 basis points.

Therefore the "slope" (or angle in vector parlance) of each of the lines in the chart above may be interpreted as the severity of discount in value that the crisis invoked. Those values are shown the following chart:

A strong bar on the right half of the chart implies severe impact, a bar around the middle implies minimal impact and a bar in the left represents an inverse relationship where the market priced in opposition to performance[1]. What should be considered along with this chart is the quality of earnings and consistency of performance (which are shown in the posts linked above.)

Discussion

As noted in a previous article, there are really only six companies which had strong separation between pre- and post-crisis valuations: Apple, HP, RIM, HTC, Microsoft and Google. They are also the companies which had strong P/E drops (except for HTC). As a group they are also the companies with the best growth stories historically. This is perhaps the reason for the drop. Basically, because these were strong companies they "had the most to lose". The market "punished" them more severely than the weaker companies because the weak had already been discounted.

The other observation is that Apple and RIM are not treated particularly differently. The drops in P/E are at about 1 for every basis point drop in growth. This means that the the degree of value lost is about the same as a function of growth loss. Microsoft seems to have been the most affected. We can argue that it is perhaps weaker than the others strategically so this is reflected here, but I doubt it's weaker than RIM. Microsoft is also in contrast with Google which seems to have been given a lot of benefit of the doubt.

Nonetheless, this framework offers some hints on how technology companies have been treated after the crisis. There is no rightness or wrongness about this treatment but it may indicate potential for significant reaction in the opposite direction if and when macroeconomic conditions improve. These vectors are, in a way, proxies for volatility or "beta" in terms of correlation to the overall market. The greater the beta, the more amplification to market movement; the greater the slope value

As always, Apple is the canary in the coal mine as far as sentiment is concerned. What should be watched is the pricing reaction as Apple moves from a net reduction in growth to a net increase in growth. How will P/E react? The argument on this site so far has been that growth is exceptionally strong for Apple and it's not being reflected in the price. However, in this analysis we've stretched the time frame and did a longer retrospective. On this new time scale growth is not yet at the levels Apple enjoyed in the heady days of 2005/6. Perhaps this growth will return and when it does we'll get to see which way Apple's vector moves.

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Notes:

1. An inverse relationship with value can happen for various logical reasons, for example that a company has volatile performance which is depending on anomalous events.

While some mobile platforms are being withdrawn from the market, others are being introduced. The net is that there are more mobile platforms announced for 2012 than ever before. The following chart shows the lifespan of the platforms that I can recall.[1]

Amazon's entry is only rumored but I think the description of it is detailed enough to be credible. The day after the scoop with Amazon, Baidu announced the Yi platform. Baidu is the sixth most visited site in the world, so it's not a bit player and it makes as much sense for Baidu to have a mobile platform as it does for Google.

Aliyun is Alibaba's latest and it, like Amazon's, is positioned on commerce and shopping. I also included the platform underlying Barnes & Noble's Nook for consistency.

Many of the newcomers are Android-like or Android-derived platforms but cannot be rightly called Android as they are not licensing the Android trademark nor any of the proprietary part of Android. They may run some subset of Android apps but that is not guaranteed to continue.

It's also worth noting that many of the newer Android-derived platforms are being launched by Google's competitors and indeed seem to be designed to take value away from Google.

The epic struggle Android vs. Google is sure to continue.

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Notes:

1. The lifespan is bounded by the dates of public announcements of start and end of development efforts by the platform owner. It does not include times when products are still in the market or the platform is still supported.

Every few months rumors emerge of another technology company attempting to create a new product centered around the TV. Apple's name comes up, of course, but so does Google. And Microsoft has been experimenting with no lesser degrees of vigor than the others. They all seem to be trying to make TV smarter, somehow.

But I would argue that these efforts are misguided. Television is more than the TV set or a set-top box, or any box. It's more than channels or broadcasters or producers or aggregators or distributors. It's all of these things; plus more. It's a value network of great breadth and complexity. It's a highly modularized industry with well-defined business model boundaries and inter-dependencies. I would argue that its very breadth is what has kept it rigid and immune from disruptive change.

If you look at each technological experiment to move to a new business model, they can all be reduced to the offer of an additional or substitutive module. There is no assumption made that the content being served will change. To put it in the context of mobile computing, it's like trying to introduce a smartphone in a world without data networks--where the only service to be served is person-to-person calling. Unlike the Smartphone which could only have emerged to leverage the Internet, TV has no "smart content" to leverage. The "smartness" has to be not in the box but in the programming.

Of course, I don't mean there's a lack of good programming. What I mean is that there is no innovation in what a program is--the job it's hired to do. The way it and its distribution fits into a person's life. TV programs have not changed for half a century. They feature the same genres, the same duration, the same business model, the same series, format and scheduling and the same value chains as when "I Love Lucy" premiered in 1951. They assume people watch TV during the same time each day (while doing nothing else.) They also assume people are equally influenced by brand advertising and that audiences are largely homogeneous.

Contrast that with other media. The song, the book, the game, the newspaper even the movie have gone through consumption changes which have been supported by disruptive innovations. The portable music player, the ebook reader, the console and the mobile phone and the internet in general have all allowed consumption to conform to new usage patterns. The jobs that music is hired to do has changed dramatically. These re-definitions of what media is used for caused dramatic changes in both the production and distribution and hence the way value is captured in media.

TV, it seems, stands alone and immune.

So it's not hard to understand why technology solutions have largely failed. Every attempt to make a change in a part of the value network has affected another part, which has led to resistance and reversal. Even Hulu, an innovative distribution method for content, owned by a group of incumbents, has had to scale back ambitions as the incumbents throttled it. Apple TV faces a stone wall of restrictions on distribution due to the inter-locking contracts content is bound by. Google TV has been largely shut out for the same reasons.

And I won't delve deeply into the fact that TV is intensely parochial. There are few if any global brands, programs or regulations. Every country, region, city and town feels a need to localize its content and offer obstacles to external sourcing. Governments engaged with the industry so long ago that they've become co-dependent.

Only one experiment is entirely independent of the current network: YouTube. YouTube does not rely on current programming. It has allowed a new set of producers and new form factors to emerge. It's still very rough and incomplete as a solution but it may get better. The growth is phenomenal and the business model is sustainable[2].

It's hard to provide an illustration of how important this separate network effect becomes, and how long the time frame can be. The only proxy I can draw on is the story of how Voice over IP has grown in comparison to voice traffic over the switched network. The following chart shows how three types of traffic have grown in the US between 1997 and 2015 (est.): Interstate and Intrastate Voice (left column) vs. Internet traffic (right column) with IP voice inset inside Internet Traffic (areas represent relative traffic measured in Terabytes/month)[1].

The estimate for 2015 shows that Voice over IP will reach 23,000 terabytes/mo. while PSTN voice will consume only 26,000 TB/mo. A negligible difference and one which will likely be in favor of IP over a global scale. The tail indeed does wag the dog.

The only numerate conclusion that can be drawn is that the growth of internet consumption is so vast that it swamps other forms of media, even if within the internet, media itself is a minor component.

So as far as having a vision of tele-vision, the answer is not to graft technology onto an archaic value network, but to build a new value network around new technology.

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Notes:

1. Source: Lampert, O'Connor & Johnston, P.C. June 16, 2011 Ex Parte via ... The Tail Wagging the Dog--A comparison of PSTN and IP traffic from 1997 to 2015.
2. I note with some dismay that Google feels it needs to dabble in the current value networks. Nurturing YouTube is a far better use of its resources.