iPad

HP's CEO Meg Whitman admitted that, when iPads are included, Apple will overtake HP as the world's leader in computer shipments.

“We need to improve our game and our products to take over the leadership position. Apple could go past HP in 2012. We will try to become the champion in 2013.

When the quarterly shipment data is seen as a chart the doubt of this happening disappears:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Note that the combined iPad+Mac has already overtaken Dell. In fact, the iPad alone overtook Dell in Q3 and might overtake HP in two quarters.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The iPad is growing at an average of 170% y/y (average of two quarters) while the Windows PC market is growing at an average of 1.9% over the same period (source: Gartner, company reports). The

Placing the iPad in the "competitor" category is an important admission for a PC company. Categorization choices make all the difference when thinking about strategy. The new tablet product may not appear at first glance to be competitive with the current definition of a PC (though it might very well be a personal computer.) But definitions tend to evolve. Categories are abstractly defined. The original PC was certainly not competitive with Mainframe computers and perhaps it still isn't. But that does not mean that usage (and hence value capture) did not migrate. Most people today would say a PC is a "real computer" and the Mainframe is simply an old computer.

Whitman notes that the iPad is not the only computer people use and most have a PC as well. That may be true as it was true when the PC was new. Most companies that supplied PCs to workers maintained large computers for "mission critical" applications like accounting and engineering. The two technologies lived side-by-side for many years. In fact, in the beginning there was a thriving market for software and hardware that would allow PCs to be used as terminals to access central computers. It wasn't until PC servers and server software like that from Novell and networking from 3COM became commonplace that mainframes and minis began to fade.

So in practice, there was no big bang start to the post mainframe era. The evolution of the PC went through stages. It was an isolated local computer, a client-server solution and then finally a web-enabled communication product on its way to ubiquity. But the era did change.

So if history serves as a guide, the displacement of the PC won't come from a direct substitution but a more sinister and hard-to-predict subversion through new applications and a re-definition of what a PC is. The driving forces are not just volumes but new input methods, new user interfaces, new jobs to be done, new software and many innovative companies working within an ecosystem.

If there is one difference today it's that things are happening a lot faster. A transition that took a decade is happening in three years today, even though the entire market is orders of magnitude bigger.

When I visualize the cycle time of technology change, I see it as the waveform to the left: as cycle time decreases (i.e. frequency increases), the opportunity (amplitude) also increases.

I began thinking carefully about Apple in 2005 when the stock was priced at around $55/share. I remember that the events which made me consider Apple in a different light were the launch of the iPod shuffle and the launch of the Mac mini. Both moves signaled to me that the company was serious about competing with non-consumption. At that point I thought that the company was a potential opportunity as an investment.

But I also remember that many people at the time thought that the stock price was too expensive. At $50, the company was much more expensive than the year before. The stock started 2004 at about $11/share. The reason it had climbed so much was that the iPod began to be a real world-wide growth phenomenon. Buying Apple was buying into the iPod and many said the price was unsustainable given such a strong dependency on fickle consumer tastes. It was a much riskier proposition than that of competitors like Dell and HP which made product for reliable buyers like enterprises.

Indeed, by 2006, the shine was off. In the first half of 2006 the stock collapsed from $85 a share to $50, a fall of 40%. It was becoming clear that with mobile phones taking on more music playing features, the iPod was not going to be a big story for long. What's more, Apple had just announced that they were switching to Intel for the Mac product line. Investors saw just how vulnerable the company still was and considered that the Mac brand was in jeopardy as it transitioned to becoming a Windows-friendly machine.

However, in 2007 the company's value recovered with the introduction of the iPhone. Suddenly there was a new product to drive sales. Nobody knew by how much or how but there was a sense that the iPhone was enough to keep Apple from oblivion.

Yet, again, in early 2008 the company lost 40% of its valuation. In a rather inexplicable period following the launch of the MacBook Air, the company's shares went into free fall. Inexplicable because the company continued to deliver solid growth with 2008 calendar quarters showing between 32% and 155% EPS growth.

Then the recession came. It caused another 40% share price collapse. Growth slowed to a range of 11% to 61% during 2009. As the marco "headwinds" blew over, by the end of 2009, with the help of a lukewarm response to the iPad, the company's value recovered to its 2007 level. In the mean-time its earnings more than doubled.

It may not appear to be the case, but throughout this volatile period, the investment thesis remained fairly constant: Apple is a rather small collection of product bets. Owning Apple meant riding the iPod or the iPhone or the iPad as waves of growth. As soon as one growth wave was seen to start to fade, investors would say the same thing: Apple is done.

The chart below shows just what that looks like in terms of product contribution to gross margin.

The investment thesis is the same today. I've had dozens of conversations with fund managers and if anything, it's even more about betting on products. The iPhone and the iPad make up such a large part of profits that the company seems to be nothing but those two things. So if there is any hint that those products might slow down, the stock is sold off.

What intrigues me about this investment thesis is not whether the signals of growth are interpreted correctly or not, but rather that an investor in Apple in 2006 was considered perfectly rational valuing Apple as an iPod company as much as an investor today is perfectly rational valuing Apple as an iPhone company. Why would anyone buy Apple for any other reason? There is no evidence that Apple can be anything more. Any fund manager positing a different point of view would surely be limiting her credibility.

The consensus is that the value of future, unknown products is zero. Not only that but the probability that there will be any products at all is equally zero. Not only that but whatever Apple does to create new products is not perceptibly valuable. The company is simply the sum-of-the-product-parts and nothing more. Cash flows from current products can easily be shown to be more than the current valuation so even these products are deeply discounted. If and when a new product shows up, it will be considered and maybe if it shows promise, the stock will reflect that, briefly.

A corollary to this investment thesis therefore is that the process of product development at Apple is worth nothing. It does not matter if the company has shown an ability to disrupt and to create new categories. The past is not a predictor. The value of the company is a discounted cash flow of current products--discounted for the odds of commoditization, which are seen to be quite high. A new hit product is a windfall, a winning lottery ticket. Something that you cannot count on.

Think about that in a different context. That's like valuing Pixar on the box office revenues of its current movie. If Cars 2 is not beating records, Pixar is suddenly nearly worthless. The fact that Pixar repeatably creates blockbusters would be seen as meaningless. The way they built a reliable pipeline with predictable cost structures for movie-making is not interesting.

However, the fact is that Pixar did not get acquired on the basis of the last hit it made. It was acquired for its system of production. This can be confirmed not only by the price paid but by the fact that the organization was not folded into the Disney machine. It stands alone and is given autonomy. So at least in the movie making industry, predictability is seen as valuable.

So why is Apple not valued as a process company?

I think the answer lies in the lack of understanding or belief in a theory that predictable success in product development is possible. Until and unless an explanation is available that persuades a majority that Apple is as much a hit factory as Pixar then Apple without the products will intrinsically be valued at zero.

The premise of the stock market today is therefore that being innovative in technology is meaningless. Innovations are valuable but there is no such thing as an innovation process. If there was such a thing then we could measure it and put a number of its value. Until then innovation is nothing more than a spin of the roulette wheel.

Analysts have to count things in order to measure value. It sounds easy but it can be tricky. As I pointed out with PCs vs. iPads, if you count an iPad as a PC you can get into a lot of trouble with your clients. But if you don't you end up directing them away from confronting an existential threat. Only very rarely is a market report published in contradiction to widely held sustaining beliefs. More often than not analysts bow to the source of their paychecks and in so doing show their rear end to the truth.

This comes up again now with respect to how to count tablets. Consider that there is little difference in architecture, software or design between an iPhone and an iPad. They run the same OS, use the same microprocessors and have similar communication methods, inputs and sensors. However they are considered completely different products and counted as part of separate markets. The only physical attribute that differs is the screen size. So we have to conclude that the size of the screen is a huge determinant factor in deciding whether a product is a tablet but not a smartphone (or music player).

But what about tablets themselves? Their screen sizes vary widely. A 10" screen is certainly a tablet device, but a 4" screen certainly isn't. Where is the boundary exactly? It seems that a 7" device is still a tablet but a 5" may not be. The Dell Streak 5 device is presumably not a tablet. The arguments then descend into an arbitrary definition of tablet based on whether it fits in one hand or in a bag of a certain size.

This begins to sound academic. Why should it matter what size is or isn't a valid tablet? Buyers are not in the market for screen sizes. They are in the market for products that can be hired to do jobs or address pain in their lives. So as far as consumers are concerned, these categories are meaningless. If you want to design something you'd better segment according to jobs to be done.

However, buyers are not the target audience for the analyst. Nor are product designers (hopefully anyway.) Part of the reasoning of offering market research is that it presumably helps ecosystem participants (vendors, developers, retailers, etc.) decide where to invest their time and money. They are the target audience. They don't spend their lives reading tech blogs. For them it's important to understand "which way the wind is blowing" and that's where an analyst should be helpful with data.

But then if we are to measure ecosystems, we have more difficulties.

The iOS ecosystem is pretty well understood. Apple publishes the number of devices it sells and the number of apps on its store and downloads, etc. We can assume Microsoft will do the same with Windows 8 as they do already for Windows in general.

For Android, it's a challenge. Google measures activations, but that may not cover the actual units sold. Google admits that it does not know how many Android devices are sold or even how many are for sale. It's in the nature of open source that it's not controlled and hence not measurable.

But analysts still try. Consider the estimate that about 27% of all "tablets" shipped are Android. That's not something Google helped with. Google can report the number of activations of a certain version of the OS, but they themselves don't know what the device looks like or what size screen it has. A device vendor can put any version of Android on a device of any size. To find out how many tablets run Android, you need to try to estimate "bottom up" by adding the output from various vendors.

However, it's clear that a large number of these devices are not exactly Android. Consider what  Kevin C. Tofel writes for GigaOm:

I asked Strategy Analytics to clarify both of those points and received the following email response from Neil Mawston, the analyst who wrote the report: ”Yes, the press release refers to shipments, not sales. All sub-versions of Android are included. Yes, the B&N Nook Color tablet is included in the tablet figures.”

So the B&N Nook is counted as an Android tablet and part of the 27% share of Android. But Google itself does not count the B&N Nook as an Android tablet. It's not something that can even use the Android brand. From Google's own documentation:

We define an "Android compatible" device as one that can run any application written by third-party developers using the Android SDK and NDK. We use this as a filter to separate devices that can participate in the Android app ecosystem, and those that cannot. Devices that are properly compatible can seek approval to use the Android trademark. Devices that are not compatible are merely derived from the Android source code and may not use the Android trademark.

In other words, compatibility is a prerequisite to participate in the Android apps ecosystem. Anyone is welcome to use the Android source code, but if the device isn't compatible, it's not considered part of the Android ecosystem.

So to summarize, whereas the Nook is counted as an "Android tablet" it...

• cannot be called an Android device without violating the trademark
• may or may not compatible with Android Apps
• does not include Google Services like Google Maps
• cannot license the Android Market client software or brand
• is not considered to be a part of the Android ecosystem by Google

All this is also true for the Amazon Kindle Fire and whatever Baidu, Alibaba and other Google competitors will be selling. Furthermore, Google can define compatibility and therefore what "being Android" means arbitrarily and can change that definition at will. It can even withdraw compatibility on the basis of business priorities.

It matters because these devices might end up very popular (see Amazon's reporting of Fire's pre-orders in its quarterly earnings call) and in aggregate could even be the majority of "Android tablets".

The result is that most analysis of the Android ecosystem (and by comparison, all mobile ecosystems) depends on classifying as Android devices those that compete with Google, and indeed, with Android. For the purpose of assessing value, growth and opportunity for third parties such reports fall short.

So what should be done?

The solution is simple: Count as Android devices those that are allowed to be called Android as per Google's own definition. It makes clear that developers can reliably sell their software through the Android Market. It makes clear that those devices are designed to use Google services and it makes clear that those devices are not designed to compete with Google.

Those devices which are using "derived" Android source code and are not compatible (as per Google's definition) and are not allowed to be called Android by their vendor should be called something else. Maybe "Android-like" or "Android derivative" or "Non-Google Android" or just "Other".

Last quarter the iPad had unit growth of 166% with revenue growth of 146%. The iPad is selling more than twice the (also rapidly growing) Mac. The two product lines are shown below:

A big reason the Mac is still growing is that it now consists of 74% portables and the MacBook Air and Pro products are still largely unmatched and have a near monopoly in their target price.

The Mac's average selling price has remained remarkably steady for three years.

But more importantly the iPad and the Mac both outgrew the PC market. Taken as OS X vs. Windows, the growth rates were 27.7% vs. 2.5%. If iOS is included along OS X, Apple grew its "computer" shipments at a rate of 99%.

The following chart illustrates the growth rates for Windows, Mac and Apple as a combined OS X/iOS.

The Windows platform still ran on 82% of PCs sold in the quarter with iOS taking second with 10.5%, OS X third with 4.7% and Android at about 3%.

Even though Mac OS X grew faster than the overall PC market for 20+ quarters, its market share is still below 5%--lower than what the iPhone has been able to obtain in the far larger mobile phone market.

That share has grown from 3.2% in the same quarter of 2008 but it's still a very slowly changing landscape.

However, if we include the iPad, Apple begins to not only grow very rapidly, it moves up sharply in terms of ranking among PC vendors.

Last quarter's 16 million OS X and iOS tablets brought it into second place behind the 16.6 million PCs that HP sold. That was enough to give Apple 15% share vs. 15.7% for HP. Over the last three years Apple has gained nearly 12 points of percentage of share.

The other vendors mostly lost share but the most affected were the smaller OEMs. HP lost 2.6 points, Acer 3.9 and Dell 3.4. However "Other" lost 10.5 points. Lenovo is the only major vendor to gain share (+4.48 points).

What's interesting about this pattern is that whereas in the phone business "others" is a rapidly growing group of companies, in PCs the smaller vendors seem to be suffering. They still make up about 30% of the market but that's down from about 40% three years ago.

In contrast, "Other" went from 15% to 24% of the phone market in the same time frame. Part of the explanation is that the entry of the iPad took the wind out of the "low end" netbooks and other cheap PCs. Consumers migrated low-end usage to a product re-built around those jobs.

In the mobile phone market, the disruption is in the opposite direction: communication is moving rapidly up-market from real-time voice to latent messaging and from storage consumption to broadband consumption. The companies being rewarded today in the phone business are those who are leading the charge to new markets.

In other words, on the PC, we are witnessing low-end disruption. On the mobile phone we are witnessing new market disruption. The irony is that the low end PC and the high-end mobile are very nearly the same thing but the industries, channels and incumbent business models are very different.

Last quarter I was wrong because I thought Apple would throttle production of the iPhone 4 in the fourth quarter post-launch. "The reason growth would moderate was that Apple slowed production of the old model in order to switch out to the new model--we saw the same thing happen with the slowdown in iPad 1 and transition to iPad 2."

As a result I seriously under-estimated iPhone volumes in the second quarter (FQ3). That failure led me to question whether the theory I was using in forecasting was still valid. When it came time for a new estimate I hesitated.

I had to choose whether to apply the old seasonality theory or to assume that the game had changed and that the product would now grow organically.

The first assumption would put the iPhone growth at 100%+ while the second would place it in the 60% to 80% range. I decided to dial in a figure somewhere in between at 90% but I’m not very confident in this

The result was an over-estimation by almost the same error as that of the previous quarter. Most of the other product lines were accurately predicted, but again, as a always, the whole forecast rides on the iPhone.

So where does that leave the theory?

I now believe that the iPhone behaves far more consistent with the original theory. Namely that...

1. Overall production capacity is increasing at approximately 100%/yr.
2. There is significant seasonality due to production ramps as the product is updated on a yearly cycle. These cycles are tuned to reach maximum throughput during the US holiday period. I discussed this theory here.
3. Demand is practically unlimited and is throttled by both production schedule and distribution agreements

The first point is not controversial. The iPhone continues to grow at triple digits rates. The second quarter's 142% growth and the first quarter's 113% growth more than makes up for the 21% of the third. Fourth quarter promises to be exceptionally strong with management clearly guiding for a blockbuster.

The point of contention was number 2. If we look at the following chart, we can observe that it still holds:

Each new iPhone launch was preceded by a quarter where units went down sequentially. The same has happened with the iPad for the one tradition we've had so far.

Regarding the third point, Balance sheet analysis shows that investment in manufacturing process equipment installation slowed in the March quarter. That was not matched by a decline in the June quarter sell-out however it does correspond with a slowing in the September quarter. Using the PP&E line is something I'm still exploring but it does seem that there is support for the theory.

Mea Culpa

I made an error in abandoning my theory. I thought I had discovered an anomaly that made it invalid. I was wrong. I read too much into the late in cycle boom. I bought into the notion that the product was in a new pattern of behavior--due to expanded channel or broader portfolio. This was a mistake.

Footnote

• There was one other bit of data that was offered to us which we ignored. At the 4S launch Tim Cook gave us a warning. He announced that 250 million iOS units had "just been shipped". After the announcement it turns out that the total was around 254 million. This came up in comments on this blog. I noted that if the number is correct I should shave 13 million off my iPhone number. I even went into my model and adjusted it to see the effect. I did not "correct" my estimate as I felt that this new data could be disguised and not meant to signal to us. This was another error.

In the last two posts (How much does an Apple store cost?, The down payment on iCloud) I discussed two line items in the PP&E asset class on Apple's Balance Sheet. In isolation, the data is interesting as it gives us an idea of the cost structure of stores and facilities being developed to sustain its current business model. In aggregate, it provides insight into Apple's strategic intent.

To complete the picture, I will look at the third asset: "Machinery, equipment and internal use software." It's the yellow line in the chart below:

It's plain to see at first glance that it's the most significant asset. What does it represent and what conclusions can we draw about Apple's strategy?

Before I begin, I should make clear what this asset represents and what it does not represent. These expenditures cover equipment used in production. They do not include components used in the production nor loans to suppliers for purchasing equipment. These are fixed assets that can be depreciated on a schedule and have specific tax treatment as a result. These are, in plain language, instruments used for producing things to be sold. They are things Apple owns.[1]

Using the same method as in the other asset analyses I took a measure of the sequential change in that asset over the time period and tried to see if there is a correlation between that spending and some other measure of output from the company.

Here is the sequential change chart since the end of 2005:

I noted that the pattern seems to relate closely with the increase in shipments of iPhones. More specifically, iOS devices. To test this I overlaid the overall volumes (with estimates of product types) of iOS shipments. This is a modified version of the chart published here.

There is a broad similarity. But again, as in the other analyses, the spending on assets typically predates the "output" from that asset. As we saw in land and buildings, the operational start of a facility may happen many quarters after the purchase is made. Similarly, stores open some time after the spending on fitting them out.

So it is with Machinery and Equipment. If we time-shift the output one quarter to account for spending before production we have a better fit (note the change in the title with "Q-1" indicating that the dates for the iOS shipments are offset by 1 quarter to the left).

We can even take the analysis further by breaking the spending and output into Phases corresponding to specific product cycles and introductions.

Phase 1: The original iPhone

Spending on M&E prior to the iPhone launch began two quarters in advance of sales. The following chart reflects this delay. Note that the M&E payments are marked with quarters ending six months earlier than the shipment schedule. Note also the scale (red denoting the M&E spending and black the units shipped). I also separated the two product types  (iPod touch are my estimates, iPhone numbers are published by Apple).

This Phase corresponds to the first "bump" in the expenditure chart but offers more detail. There is an evident relationship between the "input" expense and the "output" of units shipped.

The cost of Phase I was $408 million.

Phase II: The iPhone 3G series

Phase II covers spending from the quarter ending March '08 to December '09 and production from September '08 to March '10.

For this Phase the time shift is only one quarter but there is a quarter's worth of spending that is initiated prior to any shipments. I chose to demarcate this Phase to cover production for both the 3G and 3GS as they probably shared a lot of common equipment. Some spending on new production lines however still had to happen as volumes increased during 3GS production.

Note the scale change from the first Phase. Whereas the maximum in Phase I spending was around $150 million per quarter, the peak is nearly twice as much in the second Phase. The peak output is 5x higher.

The cost of Phase II was $1 billion.

[I had to guess whether the Sep 09 and Dec 09 M&E spending was for 3GS or whether it was to prepare for the ramps in the new products about to be launched in the third Phase.]

Phase III: The iPhone 4 and the iPad

Phase III begins with spending prior to the launch of the iPad 1 (March '10) to the last quarter (ending June 2011). Coupled to this is production starting in quarter ending June '10 and ending in the last quarter.

Note that due to the time offsetting on production, the output from the spending on the quarter just ended will not be known until Apple publishes their shipments for the June quarter (scheduled for October 18th).

The relationship between pre-dated spending and production one quarter later holds quite well. There is a "surplus" of spending in December 2010 but that could be seen as the ramp being prepared for the second iPad.

Phase III cost is $3.7 billion so far.

Note again the change in scale from the previous two Phases. Peak M&E expenditures are around $900 million per quarter while production peaks at around 35 million units. This is a tripling of spending coupled to about a doubling of output.

Observations

The data suggests spending on equipment is correlated with the volume of production of its iOS devices.  However, Apple is understood to be a company that outsources its production and does not "own" its own factories. Claiming that it keeps equipment used in the production of iOS devices on its books is an extraordinary claim.

I make a further claim that the scope of spending itself is extraordinary.

The following chart shows the three asset classes discussed in the three latest posts relative to each other (quarterly change in asset value).

In How much does an Apple store cost? I noted that the spending on leasehold improvements of $2 billion over a few years is significant and sustaining and largely asymmetric to competitors. You can see that spending in the grey bars above.

In The down payment on iCloud I noted that spending on Land and Buildings is significant and sustaining to iOS but not on a scale many can match. Those costs are shown in the blue bars above.

If, as I claim here, the yellow bars show the spending on Machinery and Equipment used in the production of iOS devices, then the commitment Apple has made to controlling production is even higher. In December 2010, M&E expenses were 50% higher than the spending on the data center and the new Cupertino campus put together.

The M&E assets have cost a total of $6 billion. The Apple stores have cost $2.3 billion and land and buildings $2 billion.  In other words, Apple's machinery and equipment is worth much more than all its buildings and stores put together.

Compared with what Apple spends on other fixed assets, M&E is spectacularly significant.

In the twelve months ended June, Apple will have spent $2.9 billion in M&E to manufacture 118 million iOS devices. To put that in perspective, Nokia, which manufacturers a large (if not majority) of the 340 million phones it sells, expects full year 2011 capital expenditures of $1.1 billion.

Correcting for amortization and depreciation and deducting some spending on Mac M&E, it's very likely that Apple spent twice as much as Nokia on the instruments of production for one third the number of devices.

Conclusions

It may be too early to draw conclusions from this analysis. The claims should be debated and the claims should be tested, but I can suggest some tentative strategic implications.

Last December I wrote that I thought Apple should use its capital to own the means of production for iOS. I reasoned that device supply was its biggest deficiency and that perhaps ownership would allow them to become better at it.

Indeed, Apple has used capital to ensure it has better control over the supply of components and to also perhaps ensure capacity of production of those components.

But this analysis shows that Apple has gone much further toward integrating its value chain. It suggests that a large part of the tooling in its supply chain is owned by Apple. It suggests that those tools are put out of reach of its competitors.

The implications could be profound but given the length of this post, I'll leave that discussion for another day.

---

Notes:

1. Some of the capital expenditures were also allocated to servers or "information systems hardware, software and enhancements." From the Annual Report 2010:
   Capital Assets. The Company anticipates utilizing approximately $4.0 billion for capital expenditures during 2011, including approximately $600 million for retail store facilities and approximately $3.4 billion for product tooling and manufacturing process equipment, and corporate facilities and infrastructure, including information systems hardware, software and enhancements.

The iPad is still only slightly more than a year and a half old. Forecasting unit volumes has proven very difficult. But more than that it's proven very difficult to appreciate the impact on the market it's disrupting, PCs.

For some people this is obvious, but what if you don't live and breathe disruptive theory? What if you don't watch every data source like a hawk for hints of change? What if you are not even a technologist. How would you form an opinion on the effect of the iPad on PCs?

There are many industries and sectors about which I know nothing. If you asked me to analyze a market like industrial lubricants, I'd probably start by reading the consensus opinion put forward by the leading market analyst, an expert in that particular sector. That would form the baseline.

In the PC sector, that opinion is formed by Gartner (and IDC and Forrester perhaps). Gartner will get a lot of citations and its stats and opinion forms the baseline view. It may not be right, but we can expect it to be the "consensus". This is because Gartner surveys a lot of data and interacts with a lot of insiders in the industry. They collect and weigh these inputs and put out what is likely to balance them all.

If Gartner says that the iPad is a "media tablet" that is not a PC they may be wrong. But they are also repeating what the PC industry is saying. So I value Gartner as a reflection of the consensus. If there is a significant gap between Gartner and what I conclude to be reality then there is an interesting opportunity as well as evidence of incumbent ignorance.

Let's then look back on how Gartner has been reporting the iPad's rise and the PC's decline.[1]

Q2 2010

"The consumer PC market registered double-digit shipment growth, but consumer mobile shipment growth slowed. This was due in part to slower growth of mini-notebooks," Ms. Kitagawa said. "Surging popularity of Apple's iPad temporarily cannibalized mini-notebooks, as well as consumer notebook sales to some degree. It is not certain at this stage if the cannibalization will continue with the current price point of media tablets."

Q3 2010

"Media tablet hype around devices such as the iPad has also affected consumer notebook growth by delaying some PC purchases, especially in the U.S. consumer market. Media tablets don't replace primary PCs, but they affect PC purchases in many ways," Ms. Kitagawa said. "At this stage, hype around media tablets has led consumers and the channels to take a 'wait and see' approach to buying a new device."

Q4 2010

“U.S. holiday sales were not fantastic for most PC vendors, but the professional market did show healthy growth during the quarter,” Ms. Kitagawa said. “Media tablets undoubtedly intensified the competition in the consumer market. These devices do not replace primary PCs, but they are viewed as good enough devices for these who want to have a second and third connected device for content consumption usage. Mini-notebook shipments were hit the most by the success of media tablets.”

Q1 2011

"Weak demand for consumer PCs was the biggest inhibitor of growth," said Mikako Kitagawa, principal analyst at Gartner. "Low prices for consumer PCs, which had long stimulated growth, no longer attracted buyers. Instead, consumers turned their attention to media tablets and other consumer electronics. With the launch of the iPad 2 in February, more consumers either switched to buying an alternative device, or simply held back from buying PCs. We're investigating whether this trend is likely to have a long-term effect on the PC market."

Q2 2011

Overall shipments of media tablets took place late this quarter and volumes remained low, minimizing any impact of the media tablets for PC substitutions in the second quarter of 2011

Q3 2011

"The main contributor to the weak consumer PC market in the U.S. was intensified competition for consumers' money," Kitagawa said "Media tablets and smartphones took center stage in the U.S. retail sector, and the expectation is for continuing demand for these devices throughout the holiday season."

I've added emphasis for the key words describing the impact of the iPad (referred to as "media tablets").

Note how the message changed over time. At first the effect was thought to be temporary (presumably due to "hype"). Three months later the "hype" was leading to "hesitation" in the channel. Three more months and there was "a hit" on Mini-notebooks but only for those needing a second or third device for "consumption". In the fourth report it seems that "consumers" (vs. business users) are really interested in this. The fifth report suggests that the effect is "minimal". The latest report suggests that this is a "localized effect".

An external observer (or paying customer) reading this must conclude that five quarters in, these media tablets are having some effect but most probably a transient one. By keeping tablets separate from PC's Gartner is implicitly stating that the two products do not compete. If they have an effect it's on the discretionary spending by consumers. Similar to the effect game consoles or consumer electronics may be having on PCs.

However, if tablets were added to notebook totals the chart for 2011 would look like this:[2]

 

Notes:

1. The quotes are from periodic reports (every quarter) from the same analyst at the same firm using a consistent set of measurements about the market. In order to ensure the same context, I've selected the comments from press releases published using the same template.
2. Source: Digitimes Research, compiled by Digitimes, October 2011

I began comparing Microsoft and Apple's financial performance with a review of "top line" or revenues by product lines over a four year period.

This post is about the "bottom line" for the same companies and products.

Before I jump in I would like to make sure there is no confusion about the terms. I will be comparing "operating income"[1] as a measure of "bottom line". This is a common way to compare the profitability of companies because it excludes taxes and interest income. These non-operating expenses/income can distort a comparison of performance because they can be the result of investment activity or changes in tax law or where the company is domiciled. One should not make judgements of comparative performance on those non-operational bases.[2]

Another challenge is that some companies report operating income by division while others don't. We can usually compare overall operating income but usually not on a division or product-level. This is the challenge I will try to overcome in this analysis between two very different operating models.

The first chart shows Microsoft's Operating Income by Division as reported by the company.

Each area represents a business division. Note some are showing negative income (losses).I've added a line representing consolidated operating income which is the sum of all areas (including the negatives).

The same line from the chart above is super-imposed on the chart below and is comparable to the orange line that represents the operating income that Apple was able to obtain over the same time frame. Note that both axes are using the same scale.

The Blue and Orange lines are indisputable but the allocation of the areas under the orange line may be open to debate.

As Apple does not report a break-down of each product line or division, getting the areas in the Apple chart is a matter of analysis and estimation. The method I used was to estimate gross margins per product (the overall gross margin is known) and assigning a portion of OPEX (also known) in a ratio equal to the sales level of that product. [3][4]

To make the contrast sharper (though more cluttered), I took all operating incomes from all product lines and divisions of both companies and laid them out as time series line charts in the following chart. I allocated Corporate Level Activity as an expense proportionate to each business unit in a ratio proportional to its sales. This allows comparison of product lines individually.

 

Finally, I combined all the iOS product lines (iPhone, iPad and iPod touch est.) as one line and laid it alongside overall Microsoft Operating Income (consolidated).

The second chart in this post showed that Apple has reached higher operational profitability than Microsoft by the end of last year. This fourth chart shows that iOS products combined are more profitable than Microsoft as a whole.

Microsoft invented the software business and built it to become the world's most valuable business by the year 2000. It's still been growing since and after 35 years it is reaching a profit of $27 billion per year. It did this while maintaining enormous margins and a highly disruptive monopoly business model the likes of which the world had never seen before.

It is scarcely believable then that a device business has been created to overtake it in four years.

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Notes:

1. The operating income is almost the same as EBIT  which is explained here: Earnings before interest and taxes - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
2. On the other hand, one should not use Gross Margins alone. The crucial difference between Gross Margin (Sales Revenue - Cost of Goods Sold or COGS) and Operating Income is that fixed costs are also accounted for. These fixed costs are typically Selling, General and Administrative Expenses and Research and Development Expenses (commonly summarized as Operational Expenses or OPEX) which can be allocated to a particular business or division. For different business models, gross margins can be widely different. In the case of Microsoft for example, software has negligible direct variable costs. A CD or download is of tiny cost compared to the price of the license to use it. As a result software often has 80% gross margins. Hardware on the other hand can have very thin margins in single digits (e.g. PCs). Conversely, Microsoft will have very high fixed costs to pay for developers, product management and sales forces. A hardware vendor may have few engineers and sales could be handled through resellers. Thus Microsoft will have very high OPEX and a PC company will have very low OPEX.
3. So, for example, In Q2 '11 the iPad had an estimated gross margin of $2.06 billion (which assumed 34% margin on published revenues of $6.06bn). As it also was 21% of total revenues that quarter, I assigned 21% of OPEX to the iPad. That means 21% of $2.54bn or $540 million was the operational expense allocated to the iPad. This results in operational income estimate of $1.52bn for the iPad in Q2.
4. To summarize, the assumptions this estimate depends on are gross margin estimates and the allocation of OPEX in proportion to sales. Gross margin analysis has been a matter of iteration and peer review for some time and I'm fairly confident in my estimates. The allocation of OPEX is more arbitrary. Chances are that these expenses vary greatly with each quarter where more work is done nearer to launch of a new product and less in late season. If there are better methods available to allocate expenses by product, I'm open to suggestion.

In an Harvard Business Review post Rob Wheeler makes the case for the Kindle Fire as a disruptive innovation. I believe that it is but crucially I disagree that the Kindle Fire is a low end disruption.

My assessment of the Kindle Fire is based on the two attributes which Amazon highlights as the key selling points which offer a basis of differentiation and potential for asymmetric competition: a low price and a new browsing model. I believe that these two attributes result in two opportunities: one for low end disruption and another of new market disruption. I reject the first and tentatively support the second.[1]

The price

It's immediately obvious that the price point of the Kindle Fire is well below alternatives. That forms the basis of disruptive potential, but before we jump to analyzing the disruption hypothesis we should determine whether and to what extent Amazon profits from the device directly. Profitability gives us a clue to where Amazon will apply resources and thus establish its trajectory of improvement.

We know the margin on the Fire is low because we can calculate the bill of materials for 7" tablets. Gene Munster of Piper Jaffray estimates that Amazon "loses" $50 for each unit sold. We also know that the design Amazon used is essentially very similar to the RIM PlayBook and was sourced from the same ODM. RIM priced the product at $499 but has struggled to find buyers and is reluctantly dropping the price. We also can estimate that Apple with a product having more than twice the screen size is keeping modest (~30%) gross margins for at a price point approximately double that of the Fire. It does seem that Amazon does not have much or any margin to dip into.[2]

So the Fire can be classified as a low price product. Does that make it a low end disruption?

Disruption requires asymmetry but it also requires the ability to go up a trajectory of improvement along the basis of performance that a majority of users demand. The first condition is met, but what of the second? In a combined system where one asset is used to leverage another--the subsidized being sacrificed to benefit the profitable--success is conditional on one element being "good enough" while the other "needing improvement". Investment follows accordingly.

But investment decisions have consequences. The subsidized device is starved of investment while the profitable service is nurtured. We see evidence of short cuts in investment in the off-the-shelf nature of Kindle products: from a second-hand (unsanctioned) OS to a second-hand (ex-RIM) hardware. Meanwhile, Amazon spends heavily on capex for the infrastructure that delivers the profitable content.

If the hardware is indeed commoditized and cannot be usefully improved, then this model works. If, on the other hand, the hardware and systems software can benefit from dramatic improvements in technology then the model fails. The very asymmetry of a service vs. a product turns into the latter having all the advantages and the former failing to gain traction.

I'll give three examples of this how service model creates limitations which lead to a failure to disrupt a product model.

The Game Consoles

The first is the game console business. In consoles, the vendors maintain long hardware product life-cycles to recover their hardware investment and subsidy by maximizing the number of games attached to each console. If you plot product cycles you realize that the bigger the subsidy, the longer the hardware lifecycle. The result is a very wide turning circle which prevents innovation in new dimensions.

Consider that the Playstation or the Xbox could have been a low end computing disruption. The original Xbox was in fact a PC. It was supposed to bring PC dynamism to the console business and create a cottage industry of new developers building games on commoditized hardware. However by the second generation the Xbox was a locked down, custom architecture, pure gaming machine. Gone was Intel, gone was the PC architecture and gone was any dream of cheap development.

This is entirely due to the economics of subsidized hardware. It compelled Microsoft, the world's greatest software company, built on the open and cheap PC architecture to make closed, expensive hardware. Sony followed in kind as did Nintendo. Each generation of consoles was a sustaining improvement on gaming and had no ambition beyond gaming[3]. The subsidy and the dependence on an integrated content value network led to a distinct lack of disruption and an insular industry which continues to seek out increasingly immersive experiences for increasingly demanding customers while itself being disrupted by casual, mobile gaming.

The Set-top boxes

The second example is the TV set-top box business. There again, the vendors maintain long hardware cycles in order to recover subsides. There too, the main value driver is the content and its distribution which stipulates the architecture, and through subsidy, defines its evolution. This offers the vendor no motivation to improve the user experience[4], secondary uses or the absorption of new streams of content (like those the internet can offer.)

Again, the set-top box could have been a budding disruptive opportunity for Microsoft. They invested billions in the 1990s to acquire placement of software on set-top boxes in an attempt to penetrate the living room. And again Microsoft was not alone. Since then Tivo, Google and Apple and many others tried to attach cheap hardware to video streams. They all failed to get on a disruptive trajectory. And again, the blame can be placed on the stifling effect of subsidies and dependencies on services or content which dictate where the value and hence the investments should go.

The Blackberry

The third example is the RIM Blackberry. Although RIM made most of its money on hardware and was by no means subsidizing it, the differentiation of their product was undoubtedly its service value. Both as a corporate device with BES and as a consumer device with BBS, customers "hired" the product as a service. By being committed to this model RIM management became blind to the hardware and client OS software innovations coming down the pike.

Through their own admission, they could not accept a touch screen because it would make the messaging experience too slow and it is messaging that sells Blackberries. They could not accept apps (and hence platform orchestration) as a differentiation because their customers did not hire Blackberries for "lifestyle apps". Merely being differentiated as a service leads to blindness and enough hesitation that you run off the disruptive rails.

People ascribe myopia or incredible absence of mind to RIM's management but the opposite is true. They were deeply committed and observant of the things which made the Blackberry successful. It just happened to be something that stopped being relevant.

The iPhone

I'll add one more "bonus" example on this. The iPhone is also a subsidized product and it seems very successful. How come it won? The answer is in details. As I mentioned, the other products ended up in poor life cycles or incorrect motivations. The iPhone differs in that the lifecycle of the product is much shorter (2 years ownership with 1 year for product updates). The shorter lifecycle works for the iPhone because it has a very high service revenue base to dip into to offset the subsidy. Something none of the content models above could count on.

Consider that each game console subsidy needs to paid off by a handful of game titles whose royalties to the console maker are modest. Or that the TV box needs to ride on top a service that also has thin margins from a stable or slightly shrinking user base. In contrast, the iPhone enables vast new consumption worth thousands of dollars to the operator. This is the famous ARPU uplift that smart phones enable. Users are doubling their telecom spending when they move to smartphones.

The margins for Kindle content are thin. Very thin. Apple runs its content business at break even though it transacts billions of items per month. The amount of content that needs to pass through the Kindle ecosystem (with lower prices than Apple charges) will need to be astronomical to make it profitable on the shortened cycle time the iPhone enjoys. Thus the Kindle is likely to languish in a leisurely update cycle with users encouraged to hang on to their devices for years. This is the case at least with the original e-Ink Kindles. How eagerly awaited are new generations? How many users stampede to update the hardware or even upgrade the software? How many users have owned every version of the Kindle?

Service Scale

Finally one last point about services. As Amazon asserts, they see Kindle as a service, which, I concede, is asymmetric to a product business. The problem is that services don't scale as well as products. Consider that none of the content streams that Amazon will depend on are available outside the US. The Kindle has not been a strong seller internationally. This is because book rights are limited to national boundaries as are movie rights and song rights. Apple has only this week finally completed the rollout of iTunes music to all of Europe! A process that took almost a decade. And they are still unable to sell music in most of Asia and forget about movies or TV shows.[5]

The reality is that there are no global service brands. Not in telecommunications (operators are, at best, regional), not in Media (TV, radio, publishing are a local businesses), not in Banking (not even in commercial banking) and not in Retail (even Wal-Mart was humbled trying to export its disruption). The internet has not broken down any of these boundaries and even Amazon has modest reach outside the US for any of their franchises. Services are local but products can be global.[6]

To wrap up, this discussion on the asymmetry of device-based services to product models leads me to conclude that the Fire will not have the opportunity to disrupt the iPad or tablets in general. Amazon sees the hardware and software of a device as a commodity and the content and its distribution as valuable. This assumes that the device is "good enough" and will not require deep re-architecting or that new input methods can be easily absorbed. In short, they see the tablet as at the end of its evolutionary path. Apple sees the exact opposite. The iPad is 18 months old, and as they say in the ads, they see it as only the beginning.

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Notes:

1. Due to length of discussion, in this post I will make the case against the low end disruptive potential and use a second post to make the case for it being a new market disruption.
2. Presumably, Amazon will also distribute only through Amazon.com and thus not incur channel mark-ups. This means that comparisons with other tablets should be at a price nearer to 70% of retail.
3. Gaming networks and video streaming are extensions but neither leveraged open architectures.
4. See also discussion from June 2010 on the challenges to Apple TV that Steve Jobs enumerated.
5. Apps are another story. Because it controls the medium, Apple can and does sell apps in every country where the iPhone or iPad or iPod touch is available.
6. Note also that because of distribution through Amazon.com, the Kindle cannot reach as many buyers as a tablet selling through the tens of thousands of points of purchase that operators and retail shops offer.

 

I've been providing analysis of Apple's operating and financial performance for some time. Recently we've begun to look at comparisons of financial performance for comparable companies. Now it's time to dig deeper and do comparisons of operating performance as well.

To start, Microsoft.

Whereas Apple has product lines (iPhone, iPad, iPod, Mac, iTunes, Peripherals and Software), Microsoft has business divisions (Windows & Windows Live, Server and Tools, Online Services, Business (Office), Entertainment and Devices). The charts show revenues for both Apple and Microsoft according to these defined segments.

 

The second chart should be a familiar one:

Note that the horizontal and vertical axes are the same. The period of coverage is from mid-2007 to the end of June 2011 which corresponds to the life of the iPhone. The vertical axis ranges up to $30 billion/quarter in both charts.

When shown this way, the exceptional growth for Apple becomes easier to understand (and perhaps Apple's valuation premium of 15.7 P/E vs. Microsoft's 9.5). Microsoft has been growing these past four years but not nearly at the rate of Apple. Microsoft grew quarterly revenues from the ~$15b range to ~$17b range.

Additional points of interest:

• The Mac business generates more Revenue than Windows
• iOS powered devices generate more revenue than all of Microsoft's products put together
• Apple's revenues grew 413% since Q2 2007 while Microsoft's grew 26%
• The release of Windows 7 had a marked effect on revenues in the launch quarter but the sales did not seem to grow above the previous version's run rate ($4.2b/quarter vs. $4.7b/q on average).

But most importantly, whereas Apple's growth has come from new businesses (iPhone and iPad), Microsoft has organically grown existing businesses. The condemnation of leadership at Microsoft should hinge on the absence of significant top line growth. Note that neither the Online Services nor the Entertainment and Devices divisions had appreciable net growth.

 

The question of low end disruption should be a concern to any manager. It's one of the most important sources of growth and has led to a vast amount of wealth creation.

Apple was an early low end disruptor by selling personal computers at a fraction of mini-computer prices. Toyota also offered "cheap" cars as an entrant in the market. Pixar made blockbusters for a lot less than live action studios. Google offers good enough office software without a license. Finally Microsoft built its whole business on low-end business software at knock-down prices.[1]

All these entrants made fortunes often at the expense of entrenched incumbents. Disruption grows the pie but also transfers a lot of value away from existing competitors.

So it should not be surprising that new products like the iPad should be scrutinized for their vulnerability to low end disruption. Brian Caufield asks the question if Apple has any future with the iPad given the potential for $99 tablets.

The question is indeed why not introduce an ultra-cheap tablet, for example from Amazon, which makes up for the low price with an innovative business model like selling content or user behavior data. After all, game consoles are sold this way. This is the classic razor/razor-blade business model.

The answer to why not is actually not simply that the economics don't work. They might work some day even if they really don't today.

The answer to why not is that the iPad is not good enough.

Disruption (low-end or otherwise) happens when a product over-shoots the market. It makes sense to compete on a new basis, be it low price or convenience or customization, if the prevailing basis of competition has led the prevailing products to be more than good enough. If you look through all the examples of low-end disruption, you'll find that the incumbents were motivated to flee up-market and to continue to improve their products even though they exceeded the demands and expectations of mainstream buyers.

For the iPad to be vulnerable, it has to be way better than the mainstream users' needs. Which asks the question of what needs are being served. If it's book reading, it probably is more than good enough. But if it's replacing a laptop computer, certainly not. Being too feeble is the most common complaint about the iPad. Being a bloated over-functioned and overly complex solution looking for a problem is definitely not on buyer's list of concerns.

So on this basis, the iPad and other tablets pass vulnerability tests with flying colors. The product is woefully inadequate for mainstream computing.

The consequence is that people will yearn and beg for more functionality and will drop the last generation for the next without hesitation. This pattern of breathless upgrades is symptomatic of a product racing up a trajectory of improvements which are relevant to buyers.

So until buyers find the n+1 version of the iPad to be superfluous and over-specced, having too much battery life, too big a screen, too much storage and with more speed and bandwidth than needed, the iPad need not fear the low end.

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Notes:

1. Other classic low-end disruptors are: Wal-Mart, GE Capital, Toys 'r Us, Sun Microsystems, Dell, Hyundai, MySQL, Amazon, Visa, Embraer, E-trade, Macy's, Japan Steel, Circuit City, Home Depot, Yahoo Travel.