Asymco

Asymmetric Intelligence

Nokia

  1. The fate of mobile phone brands

    Research · 99 comments

    The violence with which new platforms have displaced incumbent mobile vendor fortunes continues to surprise.

    • Nokia's Symbian platform has gone from 47% share to 16% in three years
    • Microsoft's phone platforms have gone from 12% to 1%
    • Other platforms have gone from 21% to zero
    • Although far less dramatic, RIM's decline from 17% to 12%  is causing acute pain and anxiety

    This while entrants have grown share in spectacular fashion:

    • Android from zero to 48% (A two year period)
    • iOS from 2% to 19%
    • Bada from zero to 4% (two quarters only)

     

    The picture of platform share over time looks like this:

     

    The platform volume growth is shown in the following graph:

    Shocking

    Or is it?

    The surprising thing is that it should not be surprising. When the iPhone re-defined the basis of competition (at the beginning of the time frame of these charts) it unleashed forces which are still spinning the industry into a new configuration.

    In that context, Android is a natural consequence. As iPhone created a threat, the response from all other vendors (other than Nokia and RIM) was to seek something that would sustain their business. Android was salvation.

    It enabled the pursuit of better margins and hence better returns. So much so that Android offers the escape up-market they have always sought. It enables vendors to abandon the profit-free feature phones to low-end entrants like ZTE and Huawei.

    LG, Samsung, Motorola and Sony Ericsson all took the bait. They are racing as quickly as possible to turn their feature phone portfolios into Android portfolios. This is certainly something that Google also wants to see happen and has been planning all along.

    However one of the consequences of the modular (aka "open") approach is that the low end disruptors gobbling up low-end share are also motivated to move into the Android business as soon as it comes within reach.  The only reliably predictable consequence of Android will be the postponement of displacement of the existing brands by the low-end entrants.

    Is this fate unavoidable for all brands?

    Clearly some vendors see the trap. For all its apparent failings, Nokia saw this outcome and chose to attempt a "Hail Mary Pass" with Microsoft. The strategic point being that because they no longer had faith in their ability to execute on an independent platform, they would pick a platform that gave them at least some control or leverage. There are serious risks and problems with this approach--something which has been covered here already--but the bet being made is a clear rejection of the slippery Android slope.

    RIM is trying to resist with QNX which is a similar approach but timing may also be the undoing of this strategy. HP's approach with WebOS and Samsung's Bada are also hedges to avoid this fate.

    And what about Apple?

    Apple is always skating in a different direction. iOS needs to be seen as not so much a phone platform but a computing platform. Given what we know, iOS was always conceived as the future of computing. Voice, after all, is just an app on iOS. So my expectation is that Apple's iOS will continue its attack on the mobile computing market, skimming (or carving as the case may be) profits from the phone business to sustain its ultimate target of reclaiming the computing universe.

    By this thinking iOS lives only by improving more rapidly than anything else in dimensions that redefine the basis of performance. In other words, doing more of what the iPhone did in the first place to set off this disruption.

  2. The Competition

    Research · 20 comments

    Smartphones made up about 30% of global phone sales last quarter. That is a significant increase from 10% in Q4 of 2007.

    From this perspective, iPhone obtained 5.6% share, Android 14.2%, Nokia Symbian 4.6%, RIM 3.6%, Bada 1.1% and Windows 0.4%.

    The competition however still has 70.5%.

    The chart to the right shows the challenge remaining and the progress being made.

    The good news is that the non-smartphone market is not growing while the smartphone market is. In fact, the non-smart market has had a three year CAGR of 0% and a y/y growth of 1.0% and a sequential decline of 6%.

    The non-smart portion of each branded vendor's business is pretty dismal:

    • Nokia saw 17.57% decline y/y
    • Samsung's non-smart business declined by 8.14%
    • Sony Ericsson's dropped by a dramatic 80%
    • LG's fell by 38.56%
    • Motorola is the only one that grew y/y, by 17.86.

    The reason all these brands fell is because the unbranded vendors took their place. "Other" non-smartphones grew by 43%. They have been sustaining growth at the rate of 57% compounded over three years.

    The following chart shows the increasing share taken by the "other" vendors in non-smartphone units:

    The non-smart business is so dismal for branded vendors that I've been assuming that they will cease to build such devices in the near future.

    The trend is shown in the following chart which shows the percent of units for branded vendors which are smartphones.

    Motorola, Sony Ericsson and Samsung are fleeing to smartphones as rapidly as they can. LG is following as quickly  as possible as well.

    The only question remains with Nokia. While their smartphone business evaporates they've also made a commitment to the non-smartphone market and are thinking about "the next billion" users who, presumably, will not buy smartphones and will buy some variant of Nokia's Series 40.

    Targeting the low end may be commendable, but the question they need to answer is why would those next billion buy anything other than a low cost smartphone? And if not, then what's so different about the next billion?

     

  3. The Android and iOS pincer movement

    Research · 47 comments

    Nearly all the data on smartphone shipments is now available for the second quarter 2011. Some fragments are still not public, including ZTE and Huawei (and any others) shipments. We also have estimates for the various platforms including an estimate for Windows Phone and Bada (though not for WebOS).

    This allows the following chart:

    Using the traditional color scheme which separates "integrated" from "modular" vendors, the chart shows overall volume growth and how the volumes are split among vendors.

    The market grew at about 73% y/y and 50% compounded over three years and 9% sequentially. The y/y growth rates for individual vendors were:

    1. Samsung 525%
    2. Apple 142%
    3. HTC 124%
    4. Motorola 63%
    5. "other" 29%
    6. RIM 18%
    7. Nokia -30%

    In terms of unit share, the pie charts below show the before and after (three year span):

    And the stacked area below shows every quarter over a four year period.

    The story is largely unchanged since last quarter except perhaps in the rapidity or deterioration in Nokia's performance and Samsung's partial exploitation of that decline.

    It should be noted that not all of Samsung's volumes are licensed platforms. An increasing share of Samsung smartphone volumes is Bada, an internally developed OS.

    In the charts above I arranged the bars to place Nokia and RIM in the middle to show their double envelopment. A pincer movement is only an analogy but perhaps it's evocative of what's happening.

  4. The end of easy growth in smartphones

    Research · 176 comments

    At the end of last year I was saying that the smartphone boom was a tide that lifted all boats. That is no longer the case.

     

    But the big story is that there has been a clear non-seasonal counter-cyclical decline in Nokia and RIM's smartphone performance. RIM's steady rise has come to an abrupt halt. Nokia's decline has accelerate precipitously. So much so that Samsung and Apple have overtaken Nokia and RIM and it looks like HTC will overtake RIM within one quarter and perhaps Nokia as well.

    The fortunes of vendors is now clearly tied to the fortunes of their platform choices. Android has a spotty record with Samsung[1] and HTC having accelerated growth with Android, Motorola and Sony Ericsson have not rallied to a similar degree (though they did remain operational). But it's at least very clear that BlackBerry OS and Symbian are now a burden to their owners.

    The fact that not all vendors benefit from a boom indicates that the early, happy days are over. People are noticing that there is a difference between smartphones and are not buying any and all. An era of competition will follow. I hinted that such a shift would happen when a "tipping point" was forecast and that point has been reached in several mature markets.

    The consequences are that weaker platforms and vendors will come under increasing pressure.

    ---

    Notes:

    1. Samsung decided to stop reporting the number of smartphones they sell. They also refuse to report the break-down between different platforms--they sell Windows Phone, Bada and Android devices. The figure I gave to Samsung is 19.9 million units, higher than 19.0 and 19.3 million from other analysts.
  5. Apple captured two thirds of available mobile phone profits in Q2

    Research · 81 comments

    The major publicly traded phone vendors have all reported results for the second quarter. Based on the data available so far we can begin putting together a picture of the market.

    The first picture I'll draw is usually the last: profitability. The following chart shows operating profit from the sale of mobile phones among the eight vendors I follow (Nokia, Samsung, LG, Sony-Ericsson, Motorola, HTC, Apple, RIM).

    This quarter saw a slight sequential decline in overall profit for the sector, but four vendors did not manage a profit from selling phones. Nokia, Motorola, Sony-Ericsson and LG all saw losses. The other vendors split the slightly decreased pie with Apple getting two thirds of it (66.3%)

    This share is up from 57% in Q1 and 50% in Q3 and Q4. Samsung's share went to 15%, though that's not a peak level historically. In Q1 2008 the company was at 21%. RIM was at 11%, a level in a range that has been unchanged for three years. Finally, HTC captured 7.4%, a new high and an increase from 6% since last quarter.  The profit share chart follows:

    The ranking chart for profitability follows:

    Finally, the "before-and-after" view of profit capture showing the change in profit share over a four year period.

     

    The story remains largely unchanged from last quarter: Three companies which captured 11% of the profits before the modern smartphone era started (four years ago!) now capture 84% of the profits. Only one global brand phone vendor selling non-smart voice-oriented feature phones is still profitable however, as we shall see later, the only reason profits still exist for any vendor is due to the strength of their smartphone portfolio.

  6. Nokia a trop écouté les réseaux télécoms

    Research · 70 comments

    My thanks to Robert van Apeldoorn, journalist for Trends Tendances Magazine, for asking good questions. My responses are reproduced below. The article (in French) is titled "Nokia a trop écouté les réseaux télécoms" and can be found in the June 23rd edition of the magazine along with more details in the article "Comment Nokia peut-il renaître?".

    -About your post “Does the phone market forgive failure”, that puts forward the idea that all mobile device vendors experiencing losses never really recover… It seems that this possible “rule” is more severe than in the computer industry. If Digital Equipement, Compaq, WordPerfect did fail, IBM and, yes, Apple, did survive failure and rebound strongly. Do you think that there is a difference between the industries? What makes the failures more lethal in the mobile device market ?

    The observation is unique to the mobile phone market and even there it's only an observation not a rule. It could be that Nokia will be the first mobile phone company that will recover from severe crisis, but history shows it to be very unlikely. I try to shed some light on the reasons why it's unlikely and what makes the mobile phone market so unforgiving. I think much of the problem rests with the fact that mobile phones are sold indirectly, through intermediaries who are amplifying both success and failure. A company like Apple was able to recover in the computer industry because it launched new products like iPod which could be sold directly to consumers. It had to convince the consumer and only the consumer. Having to convince a distributor, retailer, value added reseller, operator and consumer would be much more difficult. These intermediaries are "institutional" buyers who are risk averse and have low tolerance for untested ideas. Institutional buyers need to think about dealing with other people's money not just their own so they are doing the right thing from their point of view.

    Nokia needs to persuade first operators, then distributors and then consumers that its new products are great (even though maybe the old ones were not so great.) That's tough. Apple works in the other direction. It creates consumer demand then "sells" that demand to the intermediaries as needed.

    These intermediaries (which Steve Jobs famously called "orifices" to the market) amplify the success and failure of a company. For a long time after a product may lose favor with consumers, it will still be sold out of momentum of the channel. But it works the other way as well. If you're out of the channel, getting in is much harder even if the product may have favor with consumers. This is Microsoft's problem with Windows Phone. Surveys show that it's well liked by users, but because Microsoft relies on a long chain of intermediaries, it's still very hard to get started. Microsoft (and Nokia) rely on momentum to carry them once they get some traction and they plan to spend a lot of money ($ billions) to ensure they get some traction.

    -You are absolutely not optimistic at all about the Microsoft partnership (see “in memoriam” post). What could be the best solution? To enhance Symbian platform? Go for Android?  To create a new market with a new kind of device (cf book “How new ideas can win fast”)? Or to go back in the tire business ;-) ?

    I only observe and record data and then try to have a theory of why it happens that way. The empirical data shows that Microsoft has been very unsuccessful with mobile. Their partners seem to all have failed and the list is long. So the question is why. Is it just bad luck? Is there something wrong with management? Is it that perhaps there is a failure in strategy or business architecture?  All these are possible hypotheses but I believe the problem is that Microsoft has chosen not to integrate products and to rely on intermediaries at a time when that strategy leads to uncompetitive products. One can understand why they went with this strategy: They believe the scale of the market is so large that they cannot address it like they did with Xbox (building their own complete solution). However, that also means that they are likely to be uncompetitive during the time when integrated products/ecosystems are still not good enough and can iterate more quickly to capture the market. This was true for the iPod where Microsoft tried to license technology to device makers. It was true during the time of Windows Mobile when Microsoft's OS could not compete with either Blackberry or Symbian and it may still be true today with iPad which redefined what a computer could be.

    -What and when, precisely, Nokia did fail to understand how to be remain the market leader and innovator?

    I think the answer goes beyond the failures in execution or software development. Being late or sloppy with Symbian evolution is a symptom not a cause of the failure. What Nokia failed to understand is that software and data-oriented products would be built and sold and valued differently than voice-oriented products. Nokia listened very carefully to its best customers, the operators. Operators saw data as a sustaining improvement to their core business and steered Nokia into building "voice-plus" products. Every technology that came out of the laboratories was used to enhance the phone *as a terminal* in a network. Nokia never framed the product as a computer using the network as an accessory the way modern smartphones are valued (or if they did as with Maemo, it was a half-hearted effort). Users today are glued to apps and local media storage and see network access as a necessary inconvenience. The network is only valued in terms of being available.

    The re-framing of the device from being a terminal to being the center of user's focus is the "disruption" which is sweeping aside all the incumbents in the phone space. They all did what was expected of the best managers: they listened very closely to their best customers. That also leads to blindness when the industry itself is being ripped apart by disruptive forces.

    -In many aspects, Nokia developed many innovations (email on the phone, music store, smartphone with applications, tv on the phone,..). I remember visiting a Nokia exhibition four or five years ago, in Nice, with a broad and incredible new services range that I almost never see on the Belgian market. Many of the innovations were related (dependant) to a deal with telcos, as network device vendor. Blackberry (RIM) or Apple were more successful. Is it because they had nothing to sell as network device vendors ?

    This is answered by the previous answer as well. All of Nokia's services were designed to help operators improve their business. Operators were the best customers and they ensured Nokia would sell large volumes. But consumers did not see it that way. When a competitor came with an alternative, consumers defected en masse. By then it was too late to change the strategy. It takes years. Nokia still perseveres with this operator-first strategy. Elop continues to say they will do what operators need first. The first thing he did when on the job was visit every major operator. The decision on Windows Phone was based on whether operators saw it as a viable third alternative to the iOS/Android duopoly. Strategy is a matter of priorities not capabilities.

    -How is the Nokia strategic problem perceived in Finland ?

    The problem is very deeply felt in Finnish society. Nokia was a source of pride for the country and also a large employer both directly and indirectly. I think the impact is felt more psychologically than financially. There was a sense of betrayal when Symbian was publicly "terminated". Many people criticize present and past management, but I think that anger is misplaced. The failure of a company rarely comes from the failure of character or intelligence. It's usually a failure of being too rational, too reliant on best practices. What Finns need is a dose of independence in thought and a re-assertion of their willingness to take risks.

    The Finnish character is one of independence and perseverance in face of adversity. If Nokia loses its independence then it will need to deal with a lot more adversity. I believe however that innovation will continue. Case in point: Rovio, the maker of Angry Birds is a Finnish company.

  7. Capital.bg | Nobody wants to buy RIM

    Research · 24 comments

    Технологии и наука | Хорацио Дедиу: Никой не иска да купи Research In Motion RIM - Капитал.

    My thanks again to Andrian Georgiev for interview questions [Bulgarian] related to RIM. My answers to his questions (in English) are below:

    Q: What should RIM do to reinvent itself? Should it stray from its business-oriented image?

    RIM had begun to move away from a business image already in 2005 or so when it started its "Pearl" brand and a consumer-oriented strategy. The company probably foresaw that business customers would not be enough to maintain the growth they had become accustomed to. The strategy has led to a growing popularity in Latin America and other regions like the Middle East where the product is used as a low-cost alternative to SMS for avid texters. Even in the US, many teenagers use Blackberries instead of iPhones because they can use it for the BBM service (at a lower cost). I believe that it is not coincidence that iMessage was launched.

    The company's salvation is not in branching into new markets but in establishing a credible platform. When Nokia announced that they would be the "third option" after the iPhone and Android ecosystems, they did not even mention the Blackberry. The fact that Blackberry is not seen as an ecosystem is the root of the problem.

    Q: How should RIM accelerate the introduction of QNX?

    QNX is a solid operating system and I believe RIM should have begun developing with it much earlier. By waiting long after the iPhone launched (and even after Android) to upgrade its OS, RIM missed a great opportunity. The foothold market the company had was wasted by not leveraging it into building a mobile computing ecosystem.

    There is little that can be done to move any more rapidly now. Product development cannot be done any faster. What the company could do is to very carefully define why QNX based products are better than the competition and not rely on specifications. In other words, what jobs does their platform solve for users that current solutions don't address? I note that this is the problem with the Playbook. It's not differentiated on what it does to improve the life of the user.

    Q: Should RIM move on with just one CEO?

    The problem is not the number of managers but their view of the world. What would benefit the company is a better marketing manager where marketing is defined as understanding of user needs. Engineering expertise is not enough.

    Q: What would you advice RIM to do in terms of R&D?

    RIM is an engineering led company. Many successful companies rightly develop their engineering skills first because that is what allows them to create new products more quickly. This is true of Nokia and also of Apple and Microsoft in their early years. What is difficult is to allow marketing people to define products after that early phase. This is partly due to the fact that there is less respect for "Marketing" among engineers. Many see it as a "soft" discipline where there is little rigor. But this is not an accurate or fair picture. Great marketing determines what products should be built not just how they should be sold. Engineering can discover new products based on new technology becoming available, but Marketing can discover new products based on unmet user needs. Both need each other.

    My advice would be to allow a way for R&D to absorb input from marketing.

    Q: Do you think that RIM could be bought by a bigger company in the short-term?

    Mature companies are usually bought for their assets and not so much for their vision or priorities. The opposite is true for young companies who are selling themselves to the public via IPOs. For young companies the vision or priorities of business models is seen as more important. When companies are only valued for their assets, they are usually very under-valued. When companies are only valued for their vision, they are usually over-valued.

    RIM's challenge is that nobody believes they have any vision and their assets are weak (no good ecosystem as I pointed out above.) So the price anybody would pay for RIM today would probably be far lower than what management thinks it's worth. And since they are still profitable they won't sell the company at a deep discount.

    So my guess is that we won't see any acquisition soon.

  8. Apple could buy the mobile phone industry

    Research · 75 comments

    The second quarter ends in less than two weeks. When it does, I expect Apple will have over $70 billion in Cash, Cash Equivalents, Short-term marketable securities and long-term Marketable Securities. That figure has been growing predictably.

    Also predictable has been the decline in value of Apple's mobile phone competitors. Most spectacularly Nokia and RIM. The enterprise values of the public companies selling 75% of all phones sold world-wide are as follows:

    • Nokia $22.6b
    • RIM $13.8b
    • HTC $25.4b
    • Motorola Mobility $4.2b

    The values of the profitable phone-making subsidiaries are a bit more difficult to estimate but we can use multiples of trailing operating profits. I generously use the multiple applied to HTC (14).

    • Sony Ericsson $0.21b x 14 = $3.0b
    • Samsung $3.76b x 14 = $53b

    That leaves valuing LG's phone business which has not been profitable in the last four quarters. I assume a nominal value of $10b. These data points are shown in the following chart:

    Given the current valuations, it would not be difficult for Apple to acquire every phone vendor except for Samsung with cash alone.

    The more remarkable thing is that as market values of phone vendors continue to decline, Apple's cash will continue to grow dramatically. Indeed, a time may soon come when Apple's cash will be worth more than the entire phone industry.

  9. Does the phone market forgive failure?

    Research · 59 comments

    One of the details of Nokia's warning which did not get a lot of attention was the mention that profitability for the current quarter could not be guaranteed. That is to say that Nokia may make a loss, perhaps for the first time in more than a decade.

    This may not be that newsworthy except for the strange fact that as far as I've been able to observe, any company in the mobile phone market that ended up losing money has never recovered its standing in terms of share or profit (i.e. AMP index value has never recovered).

    Here is a list companies that have "hit the rocks" in terms of mobile phone profitability and their fates (in no particular order).

    1. Alcatel of France. Sold its brand and operations to TCL Communications of China in 2004.
    2. Siemens of Germany. Exited in 2005 through acquisition by BenQ of Taiwan.
    3. BenQ of Taiwan. Mobile devices division declared bankruptcy in 2006.
    4. Ericsson of Sweden. Exited by merging with Sony in 2001 even though third in volume share the prior year.
    5. Sony of Japan.  Joined with Ericsson to form Sony Ericsson in 2001. Held less than 1% share prior to merger.
    6. Motorola of the United States. Even though once the largest vendors, after a period of severe distress, Motorola spun off Motorola Mobility. Market value shows long-term viability still a concern.
    7. Casio of Japan. Merged with NEC and Hitachi in 2010.
    8. NEC of Japan. Merged phone units with Casio and Hitachi in 2010.
    9. Hitachi of Japan. Merged phone units with NEC and Casio in 2010.
    10. Fujitsu of Japan. Merged with Toshiba in 2010. Held 15 percent of Japanese market prior to merger.
    11. Toshiba of Japan. Merged with Fujitsu in 2010. Held 4% share in Japan.
    12. Palm of the United States. Sold to HP in 2010.
    13. Handspring of the United States. Sold to Palm in 2003.

    That makes 13 large phone brands that, in less than a decade, have either exited or lost independence after suffering crises of profitability.

    As the following chart shows, at this time Motorola, Sony Ericsson and LG are still operating but have been dipping into the red.

    The three suffered severe volume contractions in feature phones and have no differentiation in software or platform products which makes their position precarious.

    This cursory survey shows that it's difficult to be optimistic once a company reaches a point of crisis. It's a curious outcome given that the market is so vast and growth is so robust.

    But the fact is that because of the technology cycle time, rapid business model evolution and fairly low barriers to entry, there is great rivalry between competitors. Profitability is the canary in the coal mine. It causes a brand to be tarnished in the eyes of distributors who, because of sales cycle times, are extremely sensitive to obsolete inventory. A loss maker is seen as a maker of damaged goods.

    It then turns off the tap of incentives, promotions and hence visibility in the eyes of consumers. It's a vicious cycle from which few (if any) can recover. Past greatness offers no succor.

    And so, with Nokia about to join the list of loss-makers it's only natural to question its fate as an independent company.

  10. Is Nokia worth less than Skype?

    Research · 57 comments

    Yesterday Nokia warned that its guidance for the quarter and the year were "no longer valid." The surprise to me is that management was surprised. In February I warned that even if Nokia could fool consumers into buying products whose platform was publicly executed, distributors and operators would not likely go along with the deception. Pricing collapse is the proof of a channel breakdown.

    That seemed predictable. What I struggled with was how Nokia itself could present such an optimistic forecast. Absent any explanation, Nokia's forecast of robust sales for Symbian products into the near future belies a failure of understanding of the dynamics of platforms and especially the impact of destruction of trust and brand value that commenced in February. Distress is a slippery slope and it does not model well in a spreadsheet. It takes a leap of non-linear faith to predict the piling-on effect on the up- and the down-side.

    Faith in the company's guidance meant that the market reacted to the bad news by discounting Nokia down to a market cap of $26.7 billion. One analyst even cut his target price down to $4/share, 57% of yesterday's close. How can this fair? What is Nokia's phone business worth?

    Here's a quick sum-of-the-parts analysis. After yesterday's hair cut Nokia's overall enterprise value is about $20 billion. The Navteq part of the business (purchased for $8.1 billion in 2008) could get a value of $3 billion (based on about 3x sales) and the value of Nokia Siemens networks could be at $6b (less than 0.5x sales). That makes Nokia's phone business worth about $11 billion.

    An alternative view based on "the Motorola case study" $4 target price would imply an overall enterprise value of $11 billion. This either makes Navteq and NSN worthless and Phones worth $11 or it makes the phone business worth a lot less than $10 billion. Perhaps less than $8.5 billion which is what Microsoft paid for Skype. Should we be shocked? Nobody would argue that Nokia is worth more than Facebook so who's to say that Skype or Twitter aren't more valuable than a device company in crisis?

    I don't try to predict the market's behavior, nevertheless, the markets are now very skeptical that there is much in Nokia to salvage. It's perhaps unfair and illogical but this is the end game of disruption. It ends much more suddenly than it begins. It's the consequence of nobody noticing the beginning that makes the end so shocking.

  11. "Other" vendors sell 10% of Smartphones but 30% of voice-oriented phones

    Research · 12 comments

    In the last post, I highlighted the difference between smartphones and non-smart device sales last quarter. The trajectory of share growth for smart devices would appear to have accelerated due to Android.

    The following charts show the evolution of smartphone vendors and platforms over the last few years.

    Like in the past, I used color clustering to show the separation between "integrated" (in green) and "modular" (in brown) platforms and their users.

    Unlike the non-smart market where "other" make up 30% of the market, smartphones are still a big brand business. "Other" make up only 11% of units. and that number has been trending down. It would seem that the age of unbranded Android phones is still not upon us.

    Comparing three years "before and after" here is Q1 2008 vs. Q1 2011 by vendors share:

     

    Apple added 15% of share, Samsung 13%, Motorola 4%, RIM and HTC 2%. Nokia lost nearly 20% of share.

    From a platform point of view, the unit chart looks like this:

    Note that Android's growth came at a time when Symbian had a terrible quarter. The evidence is visible in the share chart:

    Android's gain seems to be at the expense of Other, Windows Mobile and Symbian. In the pie chart snapshot over a three year period the transfer seems clear.

    Android took 35% of share, iOS 14% and RIM 1%. Windows Mobile/Phone has collapsed to 2%.

    But again I would caution about drawing "sustainability" conclusions from looking at this market with a share perspective. As it's growing at a huge rate (73% year/year) it's bound to be become so large that single digit share numbers still amount to vast ecosystems while huge shares of fragmented products don't amount to much of value. To emphasize the point, I would remind that in 2008 Symbian was not just Nokia but a lot of "Other" was made up of Symbian in Japan. The combined fragmented footprint of Symbian was well over 60% of the market. It did not do much good for the platform.