Andy Rubin, the executive in charge of Google’s mobile software effort, said that international expansion lay behind the latest advance. Speaking in an interview with the Financial Times, he also predicted that a boom in sales in India, Brazil, Indonesia and other emerging countries would contribute to the fast growth rate for the foreseeable future.
Quoting independent research suggesting that Android has also come to account for half of smartphone shipments in China, Mr Rubin said that the open-source nature of the software had made it popular there. However, in the wake of Google’s dispute over censorship with the Chinese government, Android handsets shipped by China Mobile, the dominant supplier, do not carry the company’s search or e-mail services.
This was already confirmed by the data published here this morning.
Verizon alone or with the other US operators cannot account for the majority of Android volumes and anecdotal evidence points out that Europe is not contributing much more.
[Goldman Sachs analyst Bill] Shope also expects both iPad and iPhone sales to exceed expectations in 2011; he sees sales of 37.2 million iPads next year, “which could potentially make Apple one of the largest vendors in the global personal computing market,” if you include both tablets and PCs.
Apparently, it's not just the crazy ones who dare to think the iPad is computer.
My forecast for iPad in calendar 2011 was set at about 33 million since last summer. I may raise it if Q4 units top 6 million.
Meanwhile...
He re-launched coverage of the stock for Goldman this morning, setting a Buy rating and $430 price target, while placing the stock on the firms “America's Conviction List.”
I don't make stock price forecasts as they are based on a random number called 'sentiment'. But by forecasting earnings and assuming a range of P/E multiples between 15 and 20 (essentially in-line or below the S&P 500) values Apple's stock at between $360 and $480 by this time next year.
Goldman's target of $430 is about in the middle of this range so I don't see it as requiring much in the way of conviction.
[ITG sent an explanation of their methodology and there is no indication that the data represents inside information.]
ITG Investment Research analyst Matthew Goodman is forecasting monthly sales record for all of Verizon's devices "based largely on our proprietary daily point-of-sale data from thousands of independent wireless retailers across the US."
Assuming the data is accurate, we are going to dive into it but I will state up-front that without confirmation, the conclusions below should be taken with a grain of salt. All statements should be read with a preceding "if the data is accurate..."
So, if the data is accurate, here is what I conclude [1]:
Verizon Has three strikes against them:
The iPhone has stolen their growth
They are facing the prospect of a single OS platform supplier
Android is not competitive vs. iOS
The iPhone has stolen Verizon's growth
The chart below shows the performance of all of Verizon's smartphones vs. the iPhone at AT&T. The area chart shows how Verizon's volumes grew from 2.7 million in Q1 to 3.3 million in Q3. Not a bad story in itself. However, the iPhone at AT&T went from 2.7 million to 5.3 million in the same time frame. Relative to just the iPhone, Verizon has been underperforming over the last quarter.
Those additional 2.4 million iPhone/AT&T activations in Q3 could be due to replacements but the same could be said for Verizon's volumes. The fact remains that iPhone alone is nearly twice the volume of all of Verizon's smartphone activations.
Just to be clear, this is a direct, apples-to-apples comparison. AT&T and Verizon smartphone performance figures are highly comparable. The two operators are highly representative of the US market. AT&T and Verizon Wireless raked in 75% of all mobile data revenue in Q2 of 2010 and account for 62% of the U.S. wireless customer base.
In addition, Verizon enjoys a larger customer base (has 92.1 million subs vs. AT&T's 90.1 million.) Over the time frame of the data the overall market did not increase dramatically therefore the conclusion that AT&T's win is Verizon's loss is plausible.
I used quarterly data so that iPhone at AT&T could be compared. But if we look at monthly data, the story gets worse:
These are absolute volume figures. You can see how RIM's fade was replaced to some degree by new vendors. However, growth hit a wall in August. Following widespread iPhone 4 availability, sales dropped. Coincidence? Perhaps, but the drop happened even with the addition of Samsung volumes.
That's strike one.
Verizon is facing diminished degrees of strategic freedom
The other notable is that even though Verizon doubled the number of vendors selling smartphones, it seems they are growing their smartphone base slower than the overall market.
Consider each vendor's share is shown below:
From three vendors to six. Shares are roughly evenly split (except for Palm) but none of these vendors are able to drive volume growth.
Consider that Motorola Droid is outselling RIM. This should be rightly noted as amazing. It plainly shows the power of Android. However that power is not something Verizon will benefit from. Quite the opposite.
Consider the share map by units and share of each OS:
Android (and WM, though that's likely to be a very tiny part of the green area) made up 75% of all smartphones sold in October. It's possible that the share could grow to 90% as RIM continues to fade.
For Verizon this would be a serious problem. Although Verizon used to have a disproportionate share of RIM's products, that OS was not enabling an ecosystem like Google's. It was a product narrowly defined around messaging. Verizon is facing the prospect of a single OS supplier who may or may not maintain alignment with Verizon's core profit algorithm. If they diverge, Verizon's bargaining power will be strictly limited.
Strike two against Verizon.
Android is barely enough to keep the battle with AT&T from becoming a rout.
In an apples-to-apples comparison, in Q3 the iPhone at AT&T outsold Android at Verizon (remember, same addressable market) by a factor of 2.5. This is with a variety of devices and vendors thrown in the market. We hardly ever get to see this finely grained a comparison when looking at platforms.
I wrote this up as a lack of competitiveness. It may seem provocative, but I define competitiveness narrowly: the competition is for a purchase decision on equal terms. These purchase decisions are fiendishly complex to predict, but the data speaks: whether it's due to brand, visibility or performance and in spite of "antennagate" the iPhone is cleaning up.
That's strike three.
The devil they know
By 2009, Verizon was probably optimistic that they could head off AT&T (and Apple) at the pass. With the vast array of vendor Android roadmaps laid out in front of them they saw a way to stem the flood of defections. I think that optimism dissipated sometime this year and was replaced by a more dreadful prospect than what iPhone presented in 2007.
It is perhaps coincidental that the rumors of a Verizon deal with Apple seem to have started in earnest right after August. It's thin, circumstantial evidence, but the only evidence we have to corroborate the data above is that Verizon has been signaling more desperation.
Reading further into the data, I would say Verizon faced these problems and decided that they had to throw in the towel. Apple may be the devil, but so could be Google. Apple was predictably evil. But Google? The devil you know is perhaps better than the one you can't predict.
What's more, the devil Apple seems to be helping your worst enemy way too much and the unpredictable one does not seem to help all that much.
Final question: how many iPhones will Verizon sell
I think this data shows that Verizon has another reason to sell the iPhone. The underperformance of their smartphone franchise is not the only determinant, but it is perhaps another straw on the camel's back.
What would happen if (or more likely when) Verizon sells the iPhone? I believe they will sell them at the same rate as AT&T does.
The data shows that Verizon sold, on average, about 3 million smartphones per quarter during the first nine months. That's about 1 million a month. That was based on three platforms, six vendors and widespread promotion.
The iPhone sold almost 4 million a quarter over the same time period.
Verizon users bought smartphones at a lower rate than AT&T users bought iPhones. This is even though the two carriers have approximately the same subs base which churns very slowly. Since a mass-market product will appeal equally to statistically equivalent populations the product should be taken-up with similar vigor.
So the question is not whether Verizon can sell iPhones at the rate of 4 million a quarter. The question is only whether these 4 million will be in addition to the 3 million that are currently buying non-iPhones.
My guess is that the 3 million run rate for non-iPhones will drop, but not to zero.
The impact on the other vendors supplying Verizon may be strongly negative depending on the level of promotion Verizon puts on the product. That promotion budget is usually fixed as a percent of sales. What Verizon applies to iPhone will be taken out of what is spends on Droid. I have always said that operators will be motivated to balance their supplier power. The promotion budget is the primary instrument to meet that end.
On the other hand, the overall market will grow so 2010's 3 million/Q will be 2011's 6 million/Q. There is plenty of room for multiple platforms.
So my conclusion remains that iPhone will find at least 8 million new users with Verizon. The analysis above give me confidence to increase the upper bound to possibly 12 million.
Verizon striking out means they need to change the way they play. The iPhone is a new ball game.
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[1] To assemble this discussion I used only the data provided in the article linked above and the officially published iPhone activation numbers from AT&T. Obtaining specific smartphone vendor volumes is a matter of reverse engineering the share chart and cross-referencing it to the table of vendor sales.
When comparing smartphone platforms it's tempting to consider the global market as unified and commonly addressable. However, when you look at individual countries some strange patterns of behavior emerge:
Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the world (230 million people) loves Nokia's Communicator. It's the ultimate mobile status symbol.
Japan had one of the largest installed bases of Symbian phones. The version running in Japan is not compatible with versions elsewhere. Famous for its Galapagos mobile culture, the iPhone is changing what the Japanese consider the basis of phone performance.
The iPhone just became Korea's favorite smartphone even though hegemonic Samsung and LG are doing a roaring trade selling Android phones elsewhere.
The US has four incompatible 3G network technologies in widespread use. No widely distributed smartphone phone works with any two. Blackberry ruled supreme until AT&T started promoting the iPhone and Verizon started promoting Android.
Latin America loves BlackBerry. BBM is wildly popular as an SMS alternative.
Saudi Arabia loves BlackBerry. When face-to-face conversations are taboo, the BlackBerry is a social lubricant.
Australia loves the iPhone. Android is almost non-existent.
Italy has more smartphones per capita than the US. The majority are made by Nokia.
China uses two incompatible 3G technologies. The most popular (TDSCDMA) is not available anywhere else. WiFi was illegal in phones until this year.
Germany has a disproportionally large installed base of Windows Mobile
There are no Blackberries in Finland.
Although some of these idiosyncrasies may be cultural (like the Indonesian penchant for large devices) most of them are due to operator decisions. In some cases operators choose incompatible network technologies to protect from competition. In others they promote local vendors or price certain products out of reach.
Sometimes big bangs take place and demand explodes for "banned" technologies or vendors. However, it's just as easy to see how the pendulum can swing against free market choice.
Ultimately users and device vendors are at the mercy of operator decisions. In the long term operator control over platforms might diminish but it will take many years.
In the latest version of Android, Google shifted from bitmaps to vector rendering for maps. The shift is probably more a function of available processing power on the device than a strategic shift to position value on the device rather than in the cloud. Vector maps, which are much more efficient in terms of bandwidth and local storage, have been the choice for in-car navigators but Google has always been using bitmap tiles which are fetched from a server and delivered only if the device is using a data connection. The downside for vectors is that they require a bit more local processing power.
I doubt that Google's move to vectors is part of a shift to more app-centered/edge-of-network strategy.
How is this relevant?
Google has been riding a wave of re-centralization of value toward the center of the network as broadband made the cloud feasible. Keep in mind that Microsoft rode a wave of de-centralization as value moved to the PC and away from the mainframe. As intelligence was pushed to the edge, Microsoft accrued value from enabling the edge as a locus of productivity. This is no small thing.
Then came apps.
The supernova that is the App Store illuminated the possibility that apps are perhaps a "pushback" on the center. Like all good disruptions this was unforeseen: Apple built the store and the apps sold; by the billions. Apple joined the world in a scramble to react. Something profound was happening, but the very brightness of this explosive growth blinds us to what is actually going on.
My hypothesis is that there is a tug-of-war going on between the mobile cloud and the device-at-the-edge. Both will become better and neither is good enough. Technology roadmaps point to both higher availability of local storage/processing power as well as faster, cheaper and more ubiquitous mobile broadband. So technology insight by itself is not enough to give us a clue to the outcome.
What I would focus on is what is more natural for the user. Note that Twitter and Facebook both have better interfaces with their apps than they do with their browser interfaces. That and innovations in game interaction points out that apps are as much a disruption of UI metaphors as they are of the locus of power in the network. It would not surprise me if people end up spending a larger part of their lives tethered to device-enabled social media, "firing" the PC from the job of social interaction.
If we believe the app will grow as the preferred interface for the web (and I'm leaning in that direction) then the implications are potentially harmful to Google. Google does not "do" interfaces. Their strategic assumption has been that interfaces are commodities. The browser is the universal interface. Perhaps HTML5 will offer sustenance to the concept, but it's not a panacea. Web apps have a long way to go to become competitive with hand-crafted app UIs. (While web apps have been possible for iPhone since its inception, developers vote en-masse for apps and almost zero popular web apps exist. Ditto for Flash-to-app interface ports.)
This brings us to focus on the asymmetry of business models.
the App Internet
What we end up with is the "app internet": a potential disruption of the browser-as-interface and the re-integration of the user experience around the device. Because the iTunes store allows money to be attached to new interface innovations, developers follow and compete on better interfaces rather than on access to the back end. The asymmetry ensues from the fact that by attaching profit to the point where the user touches the screen, Apple took the basis of competition for developers away from the cloud.
In other words, the point where the electrical charge of the human skin is detected is suddenly the exact location of value capture from mobile computing.
Of course, Google is responding, but since they did not focus on seamless and curated experiences, developers are not seeing returns for investment in interfaces at the touch point. As a consequence, Google apps developers seek ad revenues. In turn, this is a road that leads to less innovation in interfaces and more innovation in network-dependent services.
I sense a distinct asymmetry in app trajectories between the platforms due to core business model choices. Asymmetric competition causes the great fortunes to be made and great fortunes to be lost.
The difficulty in analyzing the smartphone market lies in its extremely rapid growth. With the market growing at 90% (and 400% in some areas like China) the forces of demand and supply are disconnected. It's impossible to discern whether a purchase decision is made from a choice of comparable alternatives or if it's made from a choice between buying nothing and some alternative.
Furthermore, another problem lies in distribution inefficiencies. The global phone market is nominally serving 4.6 billion consumers but they are not all participating in the same market. Devices and the services they are bundled with are not fungible globally. You cannot buy a phone is one country and easily couple it with service in another. You can't even transfer one bundle from one owner to another within the same country. Products are available only in some countries or some operators and not in others.
Commentators focusing on mobile OS platform shares assume a zero sum game and a liquid, efficient market. Both assumptions are false. They also assume that the platform is a basis for the choices made (rather than the device, the pricing illusion attached to the device, the service plan, availability, point of purchase and network switching costs, etc.)
There is data where competition for a single purchase decision by two comparable products with comparable specs and price plans can maybe show a preference. However that data is not public. Only an operator like AT&T who sells both Android and iPhone through the same channel has that data and they're not sharing.
The closest I came to analyzing this was in a blog post last May. However, that data is obsolete. Since then Android growth has accelerated rapidly as vendors who were not making smartphones (Samsung, Asian second tier, Motorola and Sony Ericsson in that order) began making smartphones in volume. Their only choice in entering the market was Android. This supply-side view of the market is much more relevant than demand-side assumptions because the market is supply constrained.
Another way to see it is this: If there is a shortage of bananas, you can't make a case for Costa Rican bananas being preferred over Honduran bananas. People will buy whatever bananas they can get (even if one may be preferred over the other). If Honduras can produce twice as many as Costa Rica then they will sell them all and it says nothing about their quality or end user preference or whether that volume advantage will be sustainable once the shortage abates.
60.7 million people in the U.S. owned smartphones during the three months ending in October, up 14 percent from the preceding three month period, representing 1 out of every 4 mobile subscribers.[...] Despite losing share to Android, most smartphone platforms continue to gain subscribers as the smartphone market overall continues to grow.
29.7 percent of U.S. mobile subscribers now own smartphones that run full operating systems.
The most popular smartphones are the Apple iPhone and RIM Blackberry, which are caught in a statistical dead heat with 27 percent of smartphone market share in the U.S. Twenty-two percent of smartphone owners have devices with the Android operating system.
I've been tracking the Nielsen data and using it as a basis for forecasting the penetration of smartphones. While most coverage of this data focuses on splits between current OS platforms, I will look at competition with non-consumption and the impact on operator services.
The chart on the left shows the historic penetration of smartphones since mid-2009 based on Nielsen's reports. The chart on the right is my forecast. This is an update from the last quarter's chart here. My forecast was fairly accurate with respect to platform shares in the last quarter so I've had to make only small adjustments and extended the forecast one quarter further out. [1]
If my forecast is correct, smartphones will make up 50% of all phones in use by the end of 2011. That's up from nearly 30% today and 18% a year ago.
One in three of all phones in use will be either iOS or Android. That adds up to about 80 million users; up from 35 million today. Overall, 120 million Americans will be using smartphones.
Now consider the consequences for how services are delivered by operators. The most popular product operators will be selling will be unlimited data plans. One year hence, by 2012, unlimited data plans may become the largest service revenue generator for mobile operators in the US. Pricing and competition will inevitably be in a state of extreme flux. I leave the consequences to the imagination of the reader.
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[1] Note that the charts show share of phones in use, not phones sold in a particular point in time. In other words, this is measuring platform consumption, not units sold.
Yesterday I attended the first meeting of the Forum for Growth and Innovation. It's an initiative where practitioners of Clayton's Christensen's theory of innovation can review new academic research before it's published.
The Forum has another goal: to disseminate and propagate key learnings and ideas. As a keen student of the theory and a blogger, I am eager to provide a gateway for you, my audience, to this management theory.
My modus operandi has been to discuss an industry or a set of competitors in great detail while occasionally stepping back and suggesting a cause for the patterns of behavior we are witnessing. More often than not, the causes are described very well by the theories in Christensen's writings.
There are cases where the theory does not seem to match. That's actually the most exciting part of this process. Exception (or anomaly) handling is what allows the theory to evolve and improve.
Yesterday's event focused on M&A. It's a cliché to say that M&A is a recipe for failure but there are recipes to follow that minimize the chance of failure. The forum debated these recipes and we were treated to the wisdom from those who learned the hard way what works and what doesn't. (For example, the ex-CEOs of Best Buy, Arrow Electronics and a senior executive who worked under Jack Welch at GE.)
What I came away with was a new respect for the counter-intuitive and contradictory nature of acquisition integration. What often makes sense on paper like synergies or new growth can quickly turn to a loss of the core business. Recipes for deciding what to integrate and what to keep autonomous are an active area of research.
For this and many other reasons, it's easy to understand why Apple is reluctant to make large acquisitions. The market discounts Apple's cash because it is expected to evaporate in a mis-guided acquisition (since that's what management has shown a propensity to do in most other large US companies.)
I've written about why I think Apple's cash is worth more than other companies' cash (e.g. Microsoft.) Apple's reluctance to make large acquisitions and no record of such should provide some hope.
However, I don't think that reluctance is simply a coincidence or a lack of suitable candidates for acquisition. I think it's more a result of the company's processes and priorities. As long as the team in charge is focused on the details of execution and integration, and as long as acquisitions are complex and fraught with unknowable risk and lack of control, I see no acquisition in Apple's future.
According to Morgan Keegan analyst Tavis McCourt Chinese consumers purchased 8 to 10 million smartphones last quarter--implying 400% growth from the 2 to 3 million last year.
How quickly things change. According to McCourt, Android now represents nearly 50 percent of smartphone volume in the country, up from zero last year. And Apple’s iOS, while a niche player with less than 500,000 iPhones sold last quarter, is ramping up quickly, thanks to the successful launch of the iPhone 4 in the country last month.
The growth of Android is far beyond what a single company can engineer. It represents the effect of uncoordinated and uncontrolled distribution. Google does not have to market, license or write contracts for Android. It also does not necessarily benefit from this work. It enables excess device manufacturing and distribution capacity to embrace browser-enabled devices.
Android is clearly accelerating smartphone adoption and is competing very effectively with non-consumption. Without Android I doubt many of the Chinese manufacturers who are building more smartphones today would be doing it.
One question that remains with is whether Google will do anything to police the platform or leave it to run and splinter.
Another question is what will current Android users aspire to purchase for their next phone.
I've been traveling the past few days and did not have access to substantial enough bandwidth to make meaningful contributions to the blog.
However, I will be online for the next few days and will catch up.
One observation I had while visiting App World is how apps are affecting the future of television. The notion of single screen viewing is rapidly receding. In the UK among certain demographics, half of the viewers watch TV while interacting with a "companion" screen. This figure is significant in other markets as well.
The consequences of this dual-screen experience could be profound. More profound than what PVR technology enabled. What I would like to think about is whether the dual-screen experience enables new jobs-to-be-done for TV (e.g. "social" TV) vs. what PVR did which was make TV watching "better".
The key question is whether solitary TV viewing is a different job from accompanied viewing.
If viewing while in the company of others is a distinctly different job from solitary viewing then a dual-screen approach will allow interaction with a companion even if they are not in the same room. This implies that the more natural interaction for TV viewers is not with the programming but with other viewers.
On the other hand, solitary viewing may be hired for a very different job. Not all programming is suitable for a social experience. Producers need to carefully categorize their production according to what jobs it's getting hired for.
An even deeper strategic question is whether programs themselves should be designed with social interaction in mind, and if so, is TV production something that should be built in an inter-dependent way with the devices and the second screen in mind? Does there need to be a "studio system" for TV where production, talent and distribution are under one over-arching controller?
This discussion parallels that around the re-integration of the value chains where Apple participates. Perhaps the challenge for the re-invention of TV is really to what extent can any one participant in the value network orchestrate an integrated approach.
The release of the iPhone is rightly acclaimed as a watershed event in the history of telecom. It was a sensation. But it was also a product that was widely underestimated and dismissed. Even today expert opinion is divided. The critics of the product transitioned directly from labeling it a superfluous bauble to an obvious and copyable sustaining innovation. Advocates of the product describe it as revolutionary and dazzling with the potential for capturing significant profit share due to premium pricing and positioning.
So which is it?
I'll argue that it's none of the above. The iPhone is not superfluous, not easily copied, not revolutionary and not a premium product. What it is is disruptive.
First, we have to quickly define disruptive potential.
A product is disruptive if it competes with an existing, incumbent set of products on a new basis. It competes along a new measure of performance. That means it's either "low end" and hence cheaper, simpler, more modular and conformable, or it creates a "new market" where completely new measures of performance or quality are relevant.
In both "low end" and "new market" disruptions the product is usually wrapped in a business model that insulates it from incumbent response due to inherent asymmetries. Incumbents will find the economics of the entrant product unattractive and will be motivated to ignore it or actively avoid copying it.
The consequences of disruptive product entires are often catastrophic for the incumbents because, over time, the disruptor product vacuums up all the profits in the industry, robbing the incumbents of the fuel to respond by the time they become motivated to do so. In essence, the transfer of value to the new basis of competition happens so slowly that the threat is imperceptible until it's too late.
If we look at this definition, it's startling that the iPhone does not seem to fit.
As a phone, it's not cheaper, nor modular and hence not "low end". It did not create a new market. As a phone, although it did recruit more regular phone users into becoming smartphone users, it was not the first or last phone to do so. Its phone business model was not a radical departure. It was not ignored by the mobile phone incumbents who reacted with various degrees of urgency and vigor. It was actively copied in every way from the UI to the ecosystem to the pricing model and distribution.
The only thing that seems to have happened according to the disruptive formula was the transfer of profits from incumbents to Apple, at least temporarily.
So the iPhone seems to be correctly classified as a sustaining innovation. Something that moves the phone market forward and which, except for a temporary misallocation of profits, will entrench the incumbents after they manage to copy it effectively.
However, here is where we have to dig a little deeper.
Market analysis easily becomes myopic when looking only at a market defined by a product. I've argued in the past that strategic insight comes from looking at products that cross over their market boundaries. Especially products that are hired to do different jobs than the same products in their categories. The iPod may seem like an MP3 player but it caused catastrophic profit collapse in multiple industries. It knocked out the CD business, it crippled the component audio system "Hi-Fi" industry, it razed the music retail business and affected the entire music value chain. It's still pounding at the gates of video and TV production. And, almost as a side-show, it crushed the Walkman.
Even though it was a music player, the MP3 device market was the smallest target for the iPod. It turned out to be far more dangerous to ancillary industries. The reason is subtle: it competed as an integrated ecosystem. You hired the iPod to serve you music everywhere, not just in your living room. And it did the job in an integrated way from source to earbuds taking what was a hodgepodge of modular components built around analog music and smoothly integrated them to deliver music in new, non-consuming contexts.
The lesson is therefore that when looking at the iPhone one has to look at ancillary industries not just at phones.
Phones have always been a component in a wider inter-related telecom value network. Even today they are often called "terminals" in the industry meaning that they are the end points of a network. Similar to the PC, the iPhone enables a migration of intelligence away from the center toward the edge of the network resulting in a de-valuation of the network itself.
I argue that the real disruption of mobile computing (i.e. iPhone) is made possible not by the smartphone technologies but by mobile broadband. Once broadband became mobile with 3G the smartphone could shift its focus (jobs it's hired to do) from voice to data. That shift is disruptive to incumbents because they built their businesses around operator distribution and operator service economics. With apps, mobile computing brings with it services which allow all communications to be independent of operators. Selling ringtones, maps, email and video-on-demand are all dead business plans today. But operators clung on to these hopes for many years and forced vendors to comply to this strategy.
The incumbents relied so much on the telecom value chain, where the value flows from the monthly service charge, that they would not deploy technologies or business models that were asymmetric to operator business models. This is the root cause for Nokia and Samsung and Motorola and LG "missing the boat" on smartphones. All the vendors had the pieces of technology on their shelves. But when they took these technologies to their customers, the customers rejected the package.
This is why entrants like RIM and Apple could easily gain a foothold and grow. They had modest volumes, sold new concepts like business email and new UIs with iconic designs, but did not go after the core business model. This is similar to how iPod/iTunes got a toehold with the record labels. By the time the disruption took hold, operators were addicted to the new high-ARPU being generated even though they were all pure bitpipe plans. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, so the new device brands stuck.
Do the incumbents still have time to respond effectively? It's less and less likely. They cannot build the new computing ecosystem without the distribution power of operators. Note that iPhone 'clones' in Android are still sold via operators and that nobody is interested in making either iPod touch clones or iPad clones sold independent of the operator channel/subsidy model. This is not because of technical or economic reasons but because of a lack of distribution (and lack of integrated content).
When you step back and look at the phone in the context of the network business model as well as the shifts in consumer jobs to be done you realize the potential is far greater than taking share from incumbents. The iPhone is not divided into a portfolio of different phones, but it's a part of a portfolio of new mobile computing products. It just happens to be the only one which still depends on the cellular operator distribution network.
Seen as part of a new mobile computing paradigm and following the trajectory of the mainframe, mini-computer, PC and laptop, the iPhone is an essential, non-superfluous device for a vast population of new users.
Seen as an integrated app ecosystem with strong network effects, it's not easily copied. Responses that only account for it as a glass and metal object of desire will fall way short of being competitive. As the hardware was always available to competitors, it's not a revolution in hardware or even in user experience.
Most importantly, seen as a computing alternative merged with a communication appliance, it and its siblings are not premium products. The pricing and service structure around it make it seem a low cost alternative for solving the jobs it's hired to do.
