Office Hours #Q&A #WWDC #transcript
Recording and transcript of the June 9, 2026 Asymco One Office Hours, recorded the day after Apple's WWDC 2026 keynote. Horace Dediu shares his impressions of the event and takes questions from Asymco One subscribers.
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Pay attention to the quiet ones
Interviewed by Hansen Hsu on 2023-09-20 in Mountain View, CA
Serlet joined Xerox PARC’s Computer Science Laboratory in 1984, working in the Cedar/Mesa programming language and development environment, still creating design tools for VLSI, developing the multiprocessor Dragon machine. In 1989, Serlet followed Hullot to Steve Jobs’ NeXT Computer. At NeXT, Serlet worked with Hullot on the AppKit team, releasing OpenStep, the update to the NeXTSTEP operating system. With Hullot and Lee Boynton, Serlet wrote a new version of the Workspace Manager, the equivalent to the Macintosh’s Finder desktop environment. After spending a year working remotely in France, Serlet moved back to California and became a manager at NeXT, leading the effort to create the Foundation framework, factoring out fundamental data structures from the user interface-focused AppKit framework for the next release of OpenStep. Serlet’s group would go on to work on Enterprise Objects Framework (EOF) and WebObjects until NeXT’s acquisition by Apple in 1997.
At Apple, Serlet led the development of Rhapsody, which became Mac OS X. During the following years, Serlet would lead the development of OS X, ultimately becoming Executive Vice President of Software after Avie Tevanian, all the way through the beginnings of 10.7 Lion. Serlet also worked closely with Scott Forstall, who was instrumental in the development of the Carbon framework and the Aqua interface for OS X, and ultimately led the iPhone/iOS software development team, which was derived from OS X. Serlet would leave Apple in 2011 after recruiting Craig Federighi to replace him, and would go on to found startups involved with the cloud and silicon.
Source: YouTube, CHM
NB: This is one in a series on Apple's quieter heroes.…
Research #Industry #Market #Nostalgia #Technology #Theory · 73 comments
The iMac launched May 6 1998, exactly 20 years ago. It is not the most significant computer to ever exist. It was a clear descendant of the original Mac which established the "all-in-one" desktop computer category. That category, to which it still belongs, is a modest segment. The last time Apple reported portable sales separately was in late 2012 when the desktops/servers and pro systems combined made up only 20% of all Mac sales by units. If iMac were 10% of Mac sales, it would represent about 2 million units in 2017.
Desktops evolved into laptops and personal computing evolved into pocket computing. Becoming more personal means more intimacy and this is leading to wearable computing. There is more beyond that to be sure.
But the iMac is a historically significant machine. It allowed Apple to start on a new trajectory. It did this by first offering a financial lifeline. Sales of Macs, which were at the time the only source of revenues for Apple, increased from 2.7 million to 3.8 million a year. This at a time when Windows PCs were shipping about 100 million units. That was enough to ensure survival. Today Mac units are five times higher while Windows PCs are about 2.5 times higher. The following graph shows the impact of iMac on the Mac's trajectory.
Second, the iMac was the first host of OS X, an operating system built on Unix which made it extremely flexible. iMac gave Apple the space for OS X to be developed and to be optimized for various hardware. The experience with OS X and its inherent scaleability (down as well as up) meant that it could be considered for the post-PC devices of the future.
Lastly, iMac's design screamed "consumer product" which went from signaling inferiority to superiority. It set a standard for novelty, creativity and dynamism in the category that was considered second-rate. In the early 2000s consumers began to lead in the adoption of new technologies. DVD drives, internet connectivity, wifi, instant messaging, media consumption exploded. All the while institutions, hung up on legacy, began to block technologies. At this pivotal moment, the iMac spoke with its looks. It didn't just imply a new order, it stated it.
To me the incredible aspect of the iMac's entry is its uncanny timing. It came not only just in time to save Apple but exactly half-way between the first two ages of computing. In the following graph showing "share of computing" you can see it as launching precisely at "peak Windows".
In retrospect you have to wonder if Apple, with the iMac, was lucky to survive into this next era or if that era would have ever happened without the iMac. It's a question of causality which quickly devolves into an un-winnable argument about stochastic vs. deterministic existence.
Regardless, the result was felt more than seen. The computing industry was pivoting. The results are seen also in the graphs above. The iMac came right in the middle of the "desert" of platform choice of the late 1990s. By the 2000s mobile platforms detonated on the scene. The iPod was Apple's first entry, in 2001, but it was not a computer. It was an appliance. A stepping stone at a time when the early platform contenders Nokia, Palm, Microsoft and BlackBerry surged before realizing that they did not have sound foundations upon which to build ecosystems. Their advances could not be consolidated.
The spoils went to the later entries of iOS and Android. The resulting disruption was shocking and disorienting. Not only did the old order get up-ended but the magnitude of the new was 100x the old. The iMac enabled at least a trillion dollars of value to be created and made Apple the biggest company in the world.
As you would expect, at the time, 20 years ago, none of this change was anticipated. iMac was a 'cute' computer. Toy-like and obviously unprofessional. It attracted and relished contempt.
So now we are at a point where the second era of computing is at its apex. With markets near saturation, the device business is inflecting from growth to possible stagnation if not decline. There are two platforms--though unlike Windows, Android is fragmented and iOS is not just on one form factor. Nevertheless there is stasis. The touch UI which begat nine billion devices is normative. The next interaction metaphor has not emerged as an obvious successor.
The question for today is what is the new iMac? What is the enabler for change? It's not easy to spot. It is not the thing of the future but it points to the future.
Research #Industry · 34 comments
The history of the Personal Computer market (since 1981) is shown below:
Note that I added a forecast for 2015. Data from Gartner shows Windows PCs declining at a 6% rate in Q1 with a full-year forecast of -2.4% (including OS X). Assuming 20.7 million Macs, the Windows PC market will decline to 285.6 million units (from 295 million in 2014). My estimate is that iOS and OS X combined shipments will total about 302 million.
If this rather conservative forecast is correct then in 2015 Apple will ship more iOS and OS X computers than all Windows PCs combined ((This excludes iPod touch, Apple TV and Apple Watch. PC data is from public Gartner press releases.)) .
Research #Market · 74 comments
The increase in net sales of iTunes, Software and Services in the first quarter of 2014 compared to the first quarter of 2013 was due to growth in net sales from the iTunes Store, AppleCare and licensing. The iTunes Store generated a total of $2.4 billion in net sales during the first quarter of 2014 versus $2.1 billion during the first quarter of 2013. Growth in the iTunes Store, which includes the App Store, the Mac App Store and the iBooks Store, was driven by increases in revenue from App sales reflecting continued growth in the installed base of iOS devices and the expansion in the number of third-party iOS Apps available. Net sales of digital content, including music, movies, TV shows and books, from the iTunes Store was relatively flat in the first quarter of 2014 compared to the first quarter of 2013.
Apple Inc. Form 10-Q.
During the last quarter Apple changed the pricing for iWork and OS X to zero ((OS X server is still priced at $20 and iWork for previously unlicensed devices and computers is still priced above $0)).
I estimate the net effect to have been a reduction in revenues from those software titles of about $350 million for the quarter. Nevertheless, increases in services and app revenues means that the iTunes total reported revenues increased to a new record.
The total with estimated contributions by media and service components is shown below right.
Note that revenues do not reflect total billings. As Apple reports only the 30% of App transaction values, the full iTunes/Software/Services transaction values are shown in the above graph on the left.
The "gross" revenues are now nearly $7 billion per quarter. On a yearly basis the iTunes/Software/Services group had gross revenues of $23.5 billion with growth of 34% y/y.
Other estimates for full year 2013 growth are:
Although iTunes/Software/Services are not usually included in a "sum-of-the-parts" total contributing to Apple's overall enterprise value, the scale of volume and value of transactions is becoming harder to ignore.
To illustrate this, I plotted the history of gross iTunes revenues vs. Google's search business ((Excludes Motorola and "Other" segments as reported by Google))
On a yearly basis iTunes/Software/Services is nearly half of Google's core business and growing slightly faster.
The iTunes "empire" of content and services would be ranked as number 130 in the Fortune 500 ranking of companies (slightly below Alcoa and above Eli Lilly).
Research #Industry · 129 comments
Apple's latest product launch (new OSX, iPads, Macs and iWork/iLife) came with a change in pricing for software. OS X and iWork and iLife and updates are now made available free on new Macs and, in the case of the suites, on iOS devices as well.
Recall also that iOS updates are now free as well and that OS X had been reduced in price from about $129 to $29 with Snow Leopard in August 2009 and to $19 with Mountain Lion in July 2012. The iSuites have also dropped in price over time so the pattern of evaporating software prices is long-running.
But how fast and what is the impact? The historic performance Apple's Software business is not easily determined since it was always blended with additional businesses. Until September of last year, Software was reported as part of "Software and Services" and since then as part of "iTunes, Software and Services." Some assumptions allow the following picture to be drawn:
One additional wrinkle to the Apple software story is that OS X and iWork/iLife are not all the software titles available. Apple's software includes Pro apps as well as the non-free OS X server. The non-free software US prices are:
Given that and additional assumptions can lead to the following picture of the components of Apple's Software sales (in $ million/quarter).
Given this picture of the software business and the change in pricing, here is my forecast for the third and fourth quarters (in $ million/quarter):
The foregone revenues could be as much as $450 million from what would have been received with existing pricing model.
So the question that naturally arises is whether this is "worth it". Whether by offering free software hardware or service revenues rise.
Perhaps. Certainly service revenue in the form of iCloud might rise with more usage of iWork and iLife. But I don't think that this is the calculus underlying the decision. Remember that Apple does not have a Profit/Loss accountability. It's not necessary (and perhaps not even preferred) that a division balances costs and revenues. ((The graphs in this post (and the preceding 1900 on this blog) were created using Numbers.))
Fundamentally Apple remains a systems company where software is a key element in its definition of value. That is not changing. What is changing instead is the bundling of application software with the systems software and the system itself. The presence of iWork and hassle-free updating of that suite (and the same for the OS) means that utilization rates will increase.
I believe the logic for Apple is that usage of the products determines their value and therefore placing powerful software in the hands of more users means they will value the entire system more. This leads to the notion of greater "stickiness" or "lock-in" but also to higher satisfaction and loyalty, rate of upgrades and even more third party purchases and yet more usage.
This is the virtuous cycle platform custodians seek to engender. This is what Apple is trying to build and the transition of apps into the system bundle is part of this re-enforcement.
One wonders how long before Apple's approach becomes the norm for other platforms.
The following is another excerpt from a report titled "iTunes Business Review" which will soon be available for purchase through the Asymco Store. If you are interested in the product please get in touch.
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iTunes store will be 10 years old next month. From its inception Apple has stated that it aims to run the store "at break-even". The business has grown so rapidly however that its profit-free nature has come under severe pressure.
The reasoning goes that as more media types have been added costs have increased but revenues have increased even faster. Consider the estimated gross revenue base as shown below:
What is known as iTunes today has quintupled in seven years. Although cost of content sales are likely to have been preserved as a ratio (about 30%) the vastness of transaction volume (estimated at 23 billion item transactions in 2012 alone) implies that there are some significant economies of scale.
This implies that the operating costs are spread more evenly and that therefore the possibility exists for some operating margin.
Put another way, at break-even the cost of operating iTunes stores would be about $3.75 billion. It's hard to imagine this level of operational expense for digital content.
For this reason, management has begun since 2010 to suggest that at least the App Store is run "a little over break-even". How little is a good question. A one percent operating margin (from gross revenues) would imply as much as $45 million margin. I estimate 2% is possible on Apps and 1% on Music.
That's $150 million in margin content. Heady stuff.
However, since folding its Software group into iTunes (the blue area in the graph above) the margin picture changes dramatically.
The Software group is one of the forgotten heroes of Apple.
Apple’s software division “Apple Software” is responsible for the following products:
All these products are now sold through either iTunes App Store or Mac App Store. They used to be sold as traditional boxed software for many years but Apple has transitioned them all to be download-only and folded them into the catalog of third party apps while lowering prices.
My estimate is that Apple’s own software generated $3.6 billion in Revenues in 2012. As you can imagine, this is a high margin business which grows at nearly 20%/yr. Although I estimate that the software business has been overtaken by the Apps and Music businesses in gross revenues, it keeps an operating margin similar to that of Microsoft or about 50%.
This means that iTunes inclusive of Apple's own Software generates as much as 15% operating margin on gross revenues. That's over $2 billion a year.
So much for breaking even.
Research #Industry #Market · 40 comments
In January I noted that there were more iPads sold by Apple than PCs from HP, the largest PC vendor in the fourth quarter. Including all tablets, this is the distribution of market shares by units shipped.
Note the different color palettes for Windows and non-Windows.
By the metric of tablets+PC's Apple appears to be the leading vendor. However, if we consider only the Mac, Apple is still well behind. The historic unit volumes of the two is shown below:
Although Apple has nearly doubled its shipment volumes since 2008, it's still only one third that of HP. In addition to comparing volumes, we can also measure profitability. In this case HP's PSG (Personal Systems Group) reports operating profits and we can estimate the same from Apple based on a gross margin estimate and an operating expense estimate (as percent of sales).
The comparison looks like this:
The operating profit for Apple is 2.7 times higher from a third the units. This gap is a result of a vast difference in profitability. HP's operating margin for PCs is 5% while Apple's is 21%.
A few days ago I highlighted that Apple's iPhone yields disproportionate profits because of the way it performs the jobs its hired to do by consumers and operators.
With the Mac the story is that Apple's OS X is primarily responsible for delivering quadruple hardware margins vis-a-vis the most successful PC vendor.
Both iPhones and Macs are sold as hardware products and the entire econometric analysis of Apple depends on hardware cost structures. This is because hardware lends itself to easy measurement. However, a casual observer would be stumped by a comparison with competitors which cannot come near the profitability Apple enjoys. How can the same bundle of components (admittedly mostly off-the-shelf) be sold at triple the margins?
It comes down to software. Apple has a monopoly on iOS and OS X and charges for it through its hardware. That's a very valuable monopoly. It's worth at least $1 billion per quarter.
Research #Market #Nostalgia #Theory · 67 comments
Guessing the next Apple product has become the parlor game of choice for a whole generation of technology journalists and analysts. The premise of the game is that given a track record of breakthrough products, there is always another one just around the corner. Being the one to predict this next breakthrough product creates credibility and demonstrates the domain knowledge of the predictor. If the prediction fails to materialize there is consolation in dismissing the actual announced product as disappointing, unsophisticated or, worst of all, uninteresting.
Most often, these guesses are as much a reflection of the analyst as they are an analysis of the company. Too many predictions are designed to impress or demonstrate the imagination or knowledge of the predictor. They typically anticipate a giant leap of functionality, power or market re-structuring. They envision revolution not evolution; a cutting of the Gordian knot not a polishing of ugly rocks.
Yet nearly all of Apple's launches have been sustaining improvements in existing products, technologies or platforms. To name just a few:
John Gruber explained the process last spring as it relates to many of Apple's launches. Although the iPhone did introduce a new user input method and experience that takes consumption in a new direction, its building blocks were there for all to see for many years. The iPhone is a natural evolution of the computer with a handy little "Phone" app.
Likewise, the iPod came seemingly out of nowhere but by watching the original launch you see it as part of a "media hub" strategy that envisions the Mac as a personal server. The very products which ended up disrupting the Mac/PC began as extensions of their victims.
You can trace the DNA of almost all of Apple's products to previous products. If Apple did not have these foundations, the slow-motion revolutions would not have happened. Rather than a deliberate big bang, Apple's disruptions are the result of a discovery process. A test, iterate and improve loop. This is why they seem obvious after the launch but also why they seem to be such an anti-climax.
Therefore, the challenge of predicting Apple's next product should be tackled not only through an act of imagination but by carefully projecting the current products and understanding where they can evolve.
So it is that I approach the question of Apple's TV disruption. My working assumption about the next Apple TV is that it already exists. It's none other than the existing Apple TV, improved.
Here are the clues or hints I noted:
This last point is intriguing. I have not seen discussion of this feature, but if using an iPad 2 or iPhone 4S with iOS 5 and an Apple TV with the latest software updates it's possible to have an iOS device become a controller for TV-based game experiences. Developers are already using the API. When using a pinball game with screen mirroring, the device becomes a controller while the action takes place on the big screen. Switching display mirroring off bring the action and control back onto the small screen. There are still problems with lag and the processors are over-taxed on high frame rates, but the APIs are already there for developers. (I could also mention the potential of new a Bluetooth standard for better wireless response).
What these signals point to is Apple defining the TV as an iOS portfolio product. This means integration with iTunes, including an app store. This, in turn, means unleashing developer/creative talent through new monetization opportunities. This means new user experiences in discovery. This means FaceTime-like communication through the TV. This means many other things but mostly it means that the TV will be a platform product.
The only challenge is a (currently lacking) smooth interface. Perhaps that's where voice comes into the picture. But whether that is built-in at the next rev of the product or not is not the story. The story is going to be the sustaining improvement in the original Apple TV. A wonderfully asymmetric product begging to be ignored. A product that because of its apparent lack of success, effectively hides all its secrets in plain sight.
Research #Market #Theory · 58 comments
Last quarter the iPad had unit growth of 166% with revenue growth of 146%. The iPad is selling more than twice the (also rapidly growing) Mac. The two product lines are shown below:
A big reason the Mac is still growing is that it now consists of 74% portables and the MacBook Air and Pro products are still largely unmatched and have a near monopoly in their target price.
The Mac's average selling price has remained remarkably steady for three years.
But more importantly the iPad and the Mac both outgrew the PC market. Taken as OS X vs. Windows, the growth rates were 27.7% vs. 2.5%. If iOS is included along OS X, Apple grew its "computer" shipments at a rate of 99%.
The following chart illustrates the growth rates for Windows, Mac and Apple as a combined OS X/iOS.
The Windows platform still ran on 82% of PCs sold in the quarter with iOS taking second with 10.5%, OS X third with 4.7% and Android at about 3%.
Even though Mac OS X grew faster than the overall PC market for 20+ quarters, its market share is still below 5%--lower than what the iPhone has been able to obtain in the far larger mobile phone market.
That share has grown from 3.2% in the same quarter of 2008 but it's still a very slowly changing landscape.
However, if we include the iPad, Apple begins to not only grow very rapidly, it moves up sharply in terms of ranking among PC vendors.
Last quarter's 16 million OS X and iOS tablets brought it into second place behind the 16.6 million PCs that HP sold. That was enough to give Apple 15% share vs. 15.7% for HP. Over the last three years Apple has gained nearly 12 points of percentage of share.
The other vendors mostly lost share but the most affected were the smaller OEMs. HP lost 2.6 points, Acer 3.9 and Dell 3.4. However "Other" lost 10.5 points. Lenovo is the only major vendor to gain share (+4.48 points).
What's interesting about this pattern is that whereas in the phone business "others" is a rapidly growing group of companies, in PCs the smaller vendors seem to be suffering. They still make up about 30% of the market but that's down from about 40% three years ago.
In contrast, "Other" went from 15% to 24% of the phone market in the same time frame. Part of the explanation is that the entry of the iPad took the wind out of the "low end" netbooks and other cheap PCs. Consumers migrated low-end usage to a product re-built around those jobs.
In the mobile phone market, the disruption is in the opposite direction: communication is moving rapidly up-market from real-time voice to latent messaging and from storage consumption to broadband consumption. The companies being rewarded today in the phone business are those who are leading the charge to new markets.
In other words, on the PC, we are witnessing low-end disruption. On the mobile phone we are witnessing new market disruption. The irony is that the low end PC and the high-end mobile are very nearly the same thing but the industries, channels and incumbent business models are very different.
Podcast #Industry #Theory · 137 comments
[Updated with Mac OS versions. See footnote 3.]
I'm glad Windows 8 is named the way it is. With Windows 7 Microsoft went to a numbering system which is much more rational than the mixed naming of the past. The number 8 actually corresponds to the actual sequential number of major versions of Windows released to date.
Windows proper actually did not start with what was called "Windows 1.0". Windows actually started in April 1992 when Windows 3.1 was released. It was the first Windows which was an operating environment onto itself, apart from DOS. It was followed by Windows 95 (which we can call "2"), Windows 98 ("3"), Windows 2000 ("4"), Windows XP ("5"), Windows Vista ("6"), Windows 7 and now Windows 8.
Given this nomenclature and the dates of general availability of said versions, we can derive a measure of the frequency of upgrades. For example Windows "2" followed about 41 months after "1" and "3" took 34 months after "2". If we continue this for all the versions, and assume "8" will launch by October next year, we can plot the cycle times of new Windows versions.
To make the story more interesting I added the same data for other OS platforms. OS X, iOS and Android have version numbers which correspond to the sequential order in which they were released. I am assuming that the numbering system (1.0, 2.0, 3.0 etc.) are meaningful and that major releases are given a new integer value.[1]
I also added Windows Mobile which suffered from the same confused numbering that Windows suffered until the current Windows Phone 7. To create a map to integer values I used the following: Pocket PC 2000 is "1", Pocket PC 2002 is "2", WinMo 2003 is "3", WinMo 2003 SE is "4", WinMo 5 is "5", WinMo 6 is "6" and Windows Phone 7 is "7". There is no clarity when and what Windows Phone 8 will be so that is left off the chart.
The chart above does give a clue that Windows is a bit slower (more months between releases) than alternatives. However, the point I want to convey is that this cycle time can be a strategic advantage. A faster upgrade cycle means more rapid adoption of improvements, not to mention more revenues. Rather than a line chart, the better way to visualize it is as a turning circle.
The analogy is from aerial combat where a plane that can "turn inside" an opponent can get into a firing position. The tightness of turning circles also means that a competitor can iterate more quickly and thus move up the trajectory of improvements necessary to remain competitive more rapidly. To that end, I re-plotted the data above with radial axes.
The chart clearly shows how among desktops, OS X has been tighter than Windows[3]. Furthermore, mobile OS's have been, typically, more agile than desktop OS's. The exception being Windows Mobile which had significant architectural and business model challenges. It will be interesting to watch the radius of Android. So far it seems to be tight, but as tablet functionality has been added, the speed of change has slowed slightly.
However, the big contrast is between mobile and desktop. Microsoft tries with Windows 8 to merge the two. But these are different ecosystems. Buyers, OEMs, users, all have different behavioral patterns (jobs-to-be-done) for mobile OS vs. desktop/portables. Will the cycle time for Windows 9 and Windows 10 tighten up? Can Microsoft operate its OS division at this new cycle time?
What is even more bad news is that the most important customers for Microsoft, enterprises, actually upgrade every other version. The Windows "radius" is nominally averaging about 35 months but large account adoption is closer to 60 months.
The contrast is then striking: Consumerized devices with over-the-air updates on a 12 month cycle are five times more agile than a traditional corporate Windows desktop. Another way to look at this is that for every change in a corporate desktop environment, the average user will change their device experience five times. Although Microsoft might find comfort in Enterprises' leisurely pace of change[2], those are the wrong customers to keep happy going forward.
The implications are left as an exercise to the reader, but I would argue that along with the asymmetry in business model around pricing that I highlighted in the last Critical Path podcast, Microsoft has a significant operational asymmetry with devices as a new class of computers.
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Notes:
