app

In the latest version of Android, Google shifted from bitmaps to vector rendering for maps.  The shift is probably more a function of available processing power on the device than a strategic shift to position value on the device rather than in the cloud. Vector maps, which are much more efficient in terms of bandwidth and local storage, have been the choice for in-car navigators but Google has always been using bitmap tiles which are fetched from a server and delivered only if the device is using a data connection. The downside for vectors is that they require a bit more local processing power.

I doubt that Google's move to vectors is part of a shift to more app-centered/edge-of-network strategy.

How is this relevant?

Google has been riding a wave of re-centralization of value toward the center of the network as broadband made the cloud feasible. Keep in mind that Microsoft rode a wave of de-centralization as value moved to the PC and away from the mainframe. As intelligence was pushed to the edge, Microsoft accrued value from enabling the edge as a locus of productivity. This is no small thing.

Then came apps.

The supernova that is the App Store illuminated the possibility that apps are perhaps a "pushback" on the center. Like all good disruptions this was unforeseen: Apple built the store and the apps sold; by the billions. Apple joined the world in a scramble to react. Something profound was happening, but the very brightness of this explosive growth blinds us to what is actually going on.

My hypothesis is that there is a tug-of-war going on between the mobile cloud and the device-at-the-edge. Both will become better and neither is good enough. Technology roadmaps point to both higher availability of local storage/processing power as well as faster, cheaper and more ubiquitous mobile broadband. So technology insight by itself is not enough to give us a clue to the outcome.

What I would focus on is what is more natural for the user.  Note that Twitter and Facebook both have better interfaces with their apps than they do with their browser interfaces. That and innovations in game interaction points out that apps are as much a disruption of UI metaphors as they are of the locus of power in the network. It would not surprise me if people end up spending a larger part of their lives tethered to device-enabled social media, "firing" the PC from the job of social interaction.

If we believe the app will grow as the preferred interface for the web (and I'm leaning in that direction) then the implications are potentially harmful to Google. Google does not "do" interfaces. Their strategic assumption has been that interfaces are commodities. The browser is the universal interface. Perhaps HTML5 will offer sustenance to the concept, but it's not a panacea. Web apps have a long way to go to become competitive with hand-crafted app UIs. (While web apps have been possible for iPhone since its inception, developers vote en-masse for apps and almost zero popular web apps exist. Ditto for Flash-to-app interface ports.)

This brings us to focus on the asymmetry of business models.

the App Internet

What we end up with is the "app internet": a potential disruption of the browser-as-interface and the re-integration of the user experience around the device. Because the iTunes store allows money to be attached to new interface innovations, developers follow and compete on better interfaces rather than on access to the back end.  The asymmetry ensues from the fact that by attaching profit to the point where the user touches the screen, Apple took the basis of competition for developers away from the cloud.

In other words, the point where the electrical charge of the human skin is detected is suddenly the exact location of value capture from mobile computing.

Of course, Google is responding, but since they did not focus on seamless and curated experiences, developers are not seeing returns for investment in interfaces at the touch point. As a consequence, Google apps developers seek ad revenues. In turn, this is a road that leads to less innovation in interfaces and more innovation in network-dependent services.

I sense a distinct asymmetry in app trajectories between the platforms due to core business model choices. Asymmetric competition causes the great fortunes to be made and great fortunes to be lost.

I've been traveling the past few days and did not have access to substantial enough bandwidth to make meaningful contributions to the blog.

However, I will be online for the next few days and will catch up.

One observation I had while visiting App World is how apps are affecting the future of television. The notion of single screen viewing is rapidly receding. In the UK among certain demographics, half of the viewers watch TV while interacting with a "companion" screen. This figure is significant in other markets as well.

The consequences of this dual-screen experience could be profound. More profound than what PVR technology enabled. What I would like to think about is whether the dual-screen experience enables new jobs-to-be-done for TV (e.g. "social" TV) vs. what PVR did which was make TV watching "better".

The key question is whether solitary TV viewing is a different job from accompanied viewing.

If viewing while in the company of others is a distinctly different job from solitary viewing then a dual-screen approach will allow interaction with a companion even if they are not in the same room. This implies that the more natural interaction for TV viewers is not with the programming but with other viewers.

On the other hand, solitary viewing may be hired for a very different job. Not all programming is suitable for a social experience. Producers need to carefully categorize their production according to what jobs it's getting hired for.

An even deeper strategic question is whether programs themselves should be designed with social interaction in mind, and if so, is TV production something that should be built in an inter-dependent way with the devices and the second screen in mind? Does there need to be a "studio system" for TV where production, talent and distribution are under one over-arching controller?

This discussion parallels that around the re-integration of the value chains where Apple participates. Perhaps the challenge for the re-invention of TV is really to what extent can any one participant in the value network orchestrate an integrated approach.

More on this topic to follow.

The release of the iPhone is rightly acclaimed as a watershed event in the history of telecom. It was a sensation. But it was also a product that was widely underestimated and dismissed. Even today expert opinion is divided. The critics of the product transitioned directly from labeling it a superfluous bauble to an obvious and copyable sustaining innovation. Advocates of the product describe it as revolutionary and dazzling with the potential for capturing significant profit share due to premium pricing and positioning.

So which is it?

I'll argue that it's none of the above. The iPhone is not superfluous, not easily copied, not revolutionary and not a premium product. What it is is disruptive.

First, we have to quickly define disruptive potential.

A product is disruptive if it competes with an existing, incumbent set of products on a new basis. It competes along a new measure of performance. That means it's either "low end" and hence cheaper, simpler, more modular and conformable, or it creates a "new market" where completely new measures of performance or quality are relevant.

In both "low end" and "new market" disruptions the product is usually wrapped in a business model that insulates it from incumbent response due to inherent asymmetries. Incumbents will find the economics of the entrant product unattractive and will be motivated to ignore it or actively avoid copying it.

The consequences of disruptive product entires are often catastrophic for the incumbents because, over time, the disruptor product vacuums up all the profits in the industry, robbing the incumbents of the fuel to respond by the time they become motivated to do so. In essence, the transfer of value to the new basis of competition happens so slowly that the threat is imperceptible until it's too late.

If we look at this definition, it's startling that the iPhone does not seem to fit.

As a phone, it's not cheaper, nor modular and hence not "low end". It did not create a new market.  As a phone, although it did recruit more regular phone users into becoming smartphone users, it was not the first or last phone to do so. Its phone business model was not a radical departure. It was not ignored by the mobile phone incumbents who reacted with various degrees of urgency and vigor. It was actively copied in every way from the UI to the ecosystem to the pricing model and distribution.

The only thing that seems to have happened according to the disruptive formula was the transfer of profits from incumbents to Apple, at least temporarily.

So the iPhone seems to be correctly classified as a sustaining innovation. Something that moves the phone market forward and which, except for a temporary misallocation of profits, will entrench the incumbents after they manage to copy it effectively.

However, here is where we have to dig a little deeper.

Market analysis easily becomes myopic when looking only at a market defined by a product. I've argued in the past that strategic insight comes from looking at products that cross over their market boundaries. Especially products that are hired to do different jobs than the same products in their categories. The iPod may seem like an MP3 player but it caused catastrophic profit collapse in multiple industries. It knocked out the CD business, it crippled the component audio system "Hi-Fi" industry, it razed the music retail business and affected the entire music value chain. It's still pounding at the gates of video and TV production. And, almost as a side-show, it crushed the Walkman.

Even though it was a music player, the MP3 device market was the smallest target for the iPod. It turned out to be far more dangerous to ancillary industries. The reason is subtle: it competed as an integrated ecosystem. You hired the iPod to serve you music everywhere, not just in your living room. And it did the job in an integrated way from source to earbuds taking what was a hodgepodge of modular components built around analog music and smoothly integrated them to deliver music in new, non-consuming contexts.

The lesson is therefore that when looking at the iPhone one has to look at ancillary industries not just at phones.

Phones have always been a component in a wider inter-related telecom value network. Even today they are often called "terminals" in the industry meaning that they are the end points of a network. Similar to the PC, the iPhone enables a migration of intelligence away from the center toward the edge of the network resulting in a de-valuation of the network itself.

I argue that the real disruption of mobile computing (i.e. iPhone) is made possible not by the smartphone technologies but by mobile broadband. Once broadband became mobile with 3G the smartphone could shift its focus (jobs it's hired to do) from voice to data. That shift is disruptive to incumbents because they built their businesses around operator distribution and operator service economics. With apps, mobile computing brings with it services which allow all communications to be independent of operators. Selling ringtones, maps, email and video-on-demand are all dead business plans today. But operators clung on to these hopes for many years and forced vendors to comply to this strategy.

The incumbents relied so much on the telecom value chain, where the value flows from the monthly service charge, that they would not deploy technologies or business models that were asymmetric to operator business models. This is the root cause for Nokia and Samsung and Motorola and LG "missing the boat" on smartphones. All the vendors had the pieces of technology on their shelves. But when they took these technologies to their customers, the customers rejected the package.

This is why entrants like RIM and Apple could easily gain a foothold and grow. They had modest volumes, sold new concepts like business email and new UIs with iconic designs, but did not go after the core business model. This is similar to how iPod/iTunes got a toehold with the record labels. By the time the disruption took hold, operators were addicted to the new high-ARPU being generated even though they were all pure bitpipe plans. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, so the new device brands stuck.

Do the incumbents still have time to respond effectively? It's less and less likely. They cannot build the new computing ecosystem without the distribution power of operators. Note that iPhone 'clones' in Android are still sold via operators and that nobody is interested in making either iPod touch clones or iPad clones sold independent of the operator channel/subsidy model. This is not because of technical or economic reasons but because of a lack of distribution (and lack of integrated content).

When you step back and look at the phone in the context of the network business model as well as the shifts in consumer jobs to be done you realize the potential is far greater than taking share from incumbents. The iPhone is not divided into a portfolio of different phones, but it's a part of a portfolio of new mobile computing products. It just happens to be the only one which still depends on the cellular operator distribution network.

Seen as part of a new mobile computing paradigm and following the trajectory of the mainframe, mini-computer, PC and laptop, the iPhone is an essential, non-superfluous device for a vast population of new users.

Seen as an integrated app ecosystem with strong network effects, it's not easily copied. Responses that only account for it as a glass and metal object of desire will fall way short of being competitive. As the hardware was always available to competitors, it's not a revolution in hardware or even in user experience.

Most importantly, seen as a computing alternative merged with a communication appliance, it and its siblings are not premium products. The pricing and service structure around it make it seem a low cost alternative for solving the jobs it's hired to do.

In other words, it is as disruptive as it gets.

More than 400 000 new developers in past 12 months; 92 developers each top 1 million download mark; 1.5 million downloads of Qt software development toolkits

via Nokia - Show Press Release.

See the following chart comparing Ovi with iTunes Music and iTunes Apps download rates.

The last data point we have for iTunes App downloads was from October 18th when 7 billion total downloads were announced. The last update was around Sept 1st when 6.5 billion were announced. That comes out to about 10.6 million downloads per day. The previous interval suggested about 17.6 million/day.

Thanks to 148apps.biz we know how many apps are being submitted to the App Store.

For the year so far the average has been almost exactly 20k apps per month. Toward the last half of last year, 10k/mo was the norm.

The total number of apps available is about to cross 300k though over 350k have been "seen" on the store at any one time. Almost 61k apps have been removed from the store.

There are about 61k unique app publishers.

Books has been the most popular category for some time (51k titles). This does not include books available through iBooks.

The Android Market is growing at approximately the same rate with androlib.com estimating 21k being apps added in October.

When mobile platforms are discussed, the conversation frequently turns to market share battles between Android and iOS. I've pointed out before that the problem with this reasoning is that market share in a market that's growing at 90% is a false measure of performance.

The more important measure is how much of the non-smartphone market is being taken by smartphones and how fast the whole phone market is growing. Competition with non-consumption is very different from platform warfare.

But even when discussing the rivalry between current platforms, the Blackberry and Symbian are often overlooked as contenders. Windows Phone and iOS come in and out of discussion only on the basis of press releases. The truth is however that Symbian, Windows, Blackberry are not going to disappear anytime soon.  Why is that?

The reason is that when you stop framing the market as rivalry between platforms, you see that many buying decisions are driven by specific device value propositions or jobs that the products are hired to do. For many years smartphones were purchased because they had the best cameras or the best keyboards and users never downloaded any apps or even used data plans.

Later, smartphones were purchased because they allowed for browsing and gameplay. Very rarely did buyers opt for "iOS" or "Symbian". Most buyers don't even know what these words mean. Phones are rarely advertised according to their platforms. (As an aside, the mention of Windows in a PC ad is made possible by Microsoft funding, the same as "Intel Inside." So for platform recognition, someone needs to fund the promotion and that implies some revenue to justify it.)

To illustrate, consider the Blackberry: A product that continues to grow despite a completely different basis of competition from the large screen touch competitors. It comes down to being good at some very specific jobs. RIM continues to grow in certain markets like Latin America and the Middle East on the basis of BBM (RIM’s sales outside the U.S. climbed 94 percent last quarter from a year earlier.)

“A 15-year-old boy who likes a 15-year-old girl, sends her a BBM and he’s able to measure how important he is to her based on the speed of response after the letter turns to an R,” meaning it’s been read, he says. “No one else runs an end-to- end service plan like we do. That’s killer and is why it’s almost a social phenomenon.”

or

BBM is also popular in socially conservative Saudi Arabia where its speed -- messages are typically sent in less than two seconds, according to Morgan Keegan -- has made it a way for teenagers to communicate in a country where religious police bar unmarried couples from meeting in public.

You could argue that the other platforms also allow for free messaging (through free texting apps) but the combination of a low cost device, a data plan and attention to detail (like Message Read notification) gives the Blackberry an edge.

The general purpose smartphone that Google and Microsoft and Apple promote is still not the prevailing view of mobile usage for most buyers. One could also argue that many if not most Nokia smartphones are still being "hired" to do feature phone jobs.

The fact that all these devices are classified as smart and therefore competing misses the point that they are hired for different things.

What is it that makes the iTunes App Store so compelling? Will the value the App store added to the iPhone be added by the Mac App Store to the Mac?

Here are the characteristics I think make the App Stores valuable:

1. They redefine software as content. The pricing, marketing, discovery and buying process is identical to that for content like music or video.
2. They redefine the skill required to create a relationship with customers. They allow a new class of less-skilled and less-capitalized developers participate in selling software directly to the buyer. By "skill" I don't mean engineering skill but marketing skill. A developer can create a product that can reach millions without having to acquire with channels and distribution skills.
3. From a consumer's point of view, they simplify purchasing and lower the price of software.

These three characteristics of app stores make them disruptive. The disrupted companies are the traditional software publishers. The response from game publishers to the App store were predictable: they condemned it for destroying value, "cheapening" their product, and creating a race to the bottom. They also predicted that it would all end badly as nobody would make any money.

The truth is that they were disrupted by different cost structures. The entrants did not need to spend on market development, and focused on innovating on the essential novelty of the user interface.

So the Mac App Store could be disruptive to traditional software vendors. A large new population of software developers could emerge targeting the Cocoa environment and they may bring new apps that move the jobs that the computer is hired for to appeal to new users.

However there is a problem. The Mac is a small target market relative to iOS. Apple announced that there are 50 million Mac users. This compares badly to the 130 million (or so) iOS users. It won't be long before 50 million iOS users will be added every three months.

So the first thing that Apple needs to do is grow the Mac installed base. Perhaps the new Air and following updated to the MacBooks will do just that. But the growth rate needs to be an order of magnitude faster. And I suspect price is an obstacle to this growth.

Regardless of this obstacle, the Mac App Store has the potential to change the appeal of the Mac. As the first personal computer with an App Store, new uses may emerge and create the same app-platform effect.

I would like to thank Sunset Lake Software for sponsoring Asymco over the past week. Unlike traditional calculators, Pi Cubed lets you construct, typeset, and instantly evaluate mathematical expressions using an interactive menu system.

The ability to compose complex equations visually and then evaluate them instantly makes the iPhone a superior scientific calculator that, with this app, takes the concept to a new level. You literally touch the equation to edit it and can enter values to evaluate it. The visual representation lets you instantly recognize errors in composition, unlike formulas encoded in textual representations. You can share it, use templates and re-use it. It even exports to PDF for use with other documents.

If you are a student of any discipline where math is used, this $9.99 app is a no brainer. If you are a professional engineer, scientist, or an analyst like myself, this is an app you can't afford not to have.

Available at the App Store here.

Highly recommended.

Social games on iPhone, iPad and iPod touch devices are competing for television viewers.  In fact, these apps, tracked on the Flurry network alone, comprise of a daily audience of more than 19 million who spend over 22 minutes per day using these apps.  Treated as a consumer audience, its size and reach rank somewhere between NBC’s Sunday Night Football and ABC’s Dancing with the Stars, and only 4 million viewers shy from beating the number one prime-time show on television, FOX’s American Idol.

via Flurry.

I cannot tell from the original article if the iOS audience is US only and therefore not clear whether the TV shows compete for the same eyeballs, but the data shows just how far apps have come to capturing attention.

Chris Whitmore predicted 2.0 million iPads would be sold in 2010 soon after the product launched. (asymco | Analysts predict iPad sales)

More recently, Chris Whitmore writes for Deutsche Bank:

"We believe Apple's lead in the tablet market will prove difficult to close by the onslaught of competing products coming over the next several quarters," he writes in a note to clients issued early Monday. "Ultimately, we expect the slew of upcoming competition to fall flat from a user experience standpoint while struggl[ing] to materially undercut the iPad on price."

How far ahead is Apple (AAPL)? According to Whitmore:

12-18 months in content (see chart)

2 or more years in terms of other media acquisition and integration via iTunes

Untold dollars in terms of component pricing

via iPad lead seen as 'overwhelming' - Apple 2.0 - Fortune Tech.
Compare this fresh (re-)assessment with the following points I made in May of this year:

The iPad comes with an even bigger value chain [than the iPod] bolted on: the App Store. Apple is flogging not just an “app player” but also a new way to develop and distribute software. If you cut “music” and paste “apps” you see the immediate parallel between iPod and iPad. The app ecosystem will quickly grow to be larger than the music ecosystem with the mobile software business already eclipsing the music business.

...

So the iPad challengers face five daunting obstacles:

Recognition of a threat from a seemingly benign product

Execution on hardware against the best integrator on the planet

Execution on software against a new UI metaphor fortress surrounded by a patent moat

Integration of hardware and software to a sublime whole

Re-building a value chain for which they have no handle vs. a broad and deep existing universe of app/content creation distribution and consumption enjoying logarithmic network effect value.

asymco | Will Apple rule the iPad market? (part II)

Welcome to the club, Chris.

With the number of active Nokia service users now reaching 140 million worldwide, the company today announced that more than 200,000 people are currently signing up daily to Ovi, and that Ovi Store has reached the milestone of 2.3 million downloads per day. Available in more than 190 countries,

via Nokia Ovi Services Continue to Grow.

Nokia updated its tally of download rates so we can put the numbers side-by-side with Apple's iTunes.

The slope of the Ovi curve does not yet compel one to get excited over the platform's prospects in the near term. However to get a true picture, one needs to not only look at absolute download numbers but also the probability of any one user or device being used to download an app.

For this we need to note how the number of devices relates to the download rate. Apple announced recently that they sold 120 million devices running iOS. Not all those devices are still in use.  If we remove 20 million from that total we get approximately 100 million iOS devices. Nokia, on the other hand, specified exactly how many devices can access the Ovi store: 140 million.

Therefore 100 million iOS devices download at a rate of 17.7 million per day while 140 million Symbian devices download at the rate of 2.3 million per day.

That puts the weekly download rate per device at 1.24 for iOS users vs. 0.12 apps (or whatever is the appropriate content item for Ovi) every week for Symbian users.

As the table below details, the rate of downloads per device for iOS is more than 10x higher. This is the more interesting number if you are a developer.

If someone can point me to Android Market download rate (historic and/or current) I can add it to the mix.