Microsoft

When mobile platforms are discussed, the conversation frequently turns to market share battles between Android and iOS. I've pointed out before that the problem with this reasoning is that market share in a market that's growing at 90% is a false measure of performance.

The more important measure is how much of the non-smartphone market is being taken by smartphones and how fast the whole phone market is growing. Competition with non-consumption is very different from platform warfare.

But even when discussing the rivalry between current platforms, the Blackberry and Symbian are often overlooked as contenders. Windows Phone and iOS come in and out of discussion only on the basis of press releases. The truth is however that Symbian, Windows, Blackberry are not going to disappear anytime soon.  Why is that?

The reason is that when you stop framing the market as rivalry between platforms, you see that many buying decisions are driven by specific device value propositions or jobs that the products are hired to do. For many years smartphones were purchased because they had the best cameras or the best keyboards and users never downloaded any apps or even used data plans.

Later, smartphones were purchased because they allowed for browsing and gameplay. Very rarely did buyers opt for "iOS" or "Symbian". Most buyers don't even know what these words mean. Phones are rarely advertised according to their platforms. (As an aside, the mention of Windows in a PC ad is made possible by Microsoft funding, the same as "Intel Inside." So for platform recognition, someone needs to fund the promotion and that implies some revenue to justify it.)

To illustrate, consider the Blackberry: A product that continues to grow despite a completely different basis of competition from the large screen touch competitors. It comes down to being good at some very specific jobs. RIM continues to grow in certain markets like Latin America and the Middle East on the basis of BBM (RIM’s sales outside the U.S. climbed 94 percent last quarter from a year earlier.)

“A 15-year-old boy who likes a 15-year-old girl, sends her a BBM and he’s able to measure how important he is to her based on the speed of response after the letter turns to an R,” meaning it’s been read, he says. “No one else runs an end-to- end service plan like we do. That’s killer and is why it’s almost a social phenomenon.”

or

BBM is also popular in socially conservative Saudi Arabia where its speed -- messages are typically sent in less than two seconds, according to Morgan Keegan -- has made it a way for teenagers to communicate in a country where religious police bar unmarried couples from meeting in public.

You could argue that the other platforms also allow for free messaging (through free texting apps) but the combination of a low cost device, a data plan and attention to detail (like Message Read notification) gives the Blackberry an edge.

The general purpose smartphone that Google and Microsoft and Apple promote is still not the prevailing view of mobile usage for most buyers. One could also argue that many if not most Nokia smartphones are still being "hired" to do feature phone jobs.

The fact that all these devices are classified as smart and therefore competing misses the point that they are hired for different things.

Google Nexus S is real, gets leaked by Best Buy [U] | Electronista.

Can you imagine Microsoft launching a Microsoft branded phone to compete with its Windows Phone licensees? When Microsoft launched the Zune, their licensing model (PlaysForSure) was quietly folded up.

A Google phone makes little sense, but then again Google does not seem to care much about its ecosystem or relationships with Android device vendors. They even claim that they have no idea how many phones are being built using Android and, except for activations, have no way of measuring the number sold.

From their point of view, if Motorola feels it's unfair to have to compete with a Google branded Samsung (or HTC) designed phone then too bad. There's lots of white label vendors lined up to make these with or without anyone's blessing.

In fact, the biggest opportunity for Android growth seems to be the large unlicensed (and illegal) grey market which seems to be rapidly expanding.

Belfiore wasn’t shy about criticizing Google’s Android OS. Even though Google currently dominates the mobile OS market, its strategy of licensing the Android OS to manufacturers is similar to Microsoft’s previous approach with Windows Mobile: It’s open-ended, and there are few restrictions on how manufacturers can use or modify the OS.

As a result, Android is suffering from some of the same issues as Windows Mobile did: Android works better on some phones than others, manufacturers are shipping different versions of the OS on different phones, some Android phones are shipping with bloatware made by carriers, and some app developers complain that it’s difficult to make software because of the hardware and OS fragmentation.

via How Microsoft Hit CTRL+ALT+DEL on Windows Phone | Gadget Lab | Wired.com.

Android was initially an attempt to commoditize Windows Mobile with a symmetric but "free" alternative. The idea was to conform to OEMs and operator business models. This was directly copied from Microsoft's early 2000's playbook for entry into mobile.

Trouble is that Microsoft realized their purely modular, operator and OEM centric approach was failing to be competitive on the user experience and decided to move into a more integrated approach, closer to Apple's integrated model.

But while Microsoft dropped their vision, Android was still patterned after their approach.

Windows Phone had its day in the sun yesterday. After discarding its previous seven-year effort with Windows Mobile, Microsoft started with a clean sheet of paper. However, whereas the software has been re-built, the business model has not. WP is still a licensed operating system whose primary customers are mobile phone vendors. With Symbian mostly out of the picture, WP becomes only the second viable commercially licensed mobile OS, after Android.

So with two licensed platforms in the running, how do we measure success in the licensing business? Units sold to end users is one metric. But that data will have to include the performance of vendors and operators and other distributors. And it will take a year to do valid comparisons. The only indicative metric we have available today is how many devices have been committed by vendors.

As WP is out of the gate with device announcements, we can actually measure this. We can plot each vendor's commitment to various platforms as an early indicator of strategic success. To that end, here's the methodology: I took all smartphone vendors and tallied how many SKUs they have announced or leaked for either the WP or Android platforms (source: pdadb.net). I then plotted each vendor on two "commitment axes" (see notes below).

The more to the right a vendor lies, the more committed they are to Microsoft's platform. The more to the top a vendor lies in the chart, the more committed they are to Google's platform. The vendors which don't have any licensed products lie below the origin.

What we can observe is that Microsoft has pulled several, though not all vendors partially to its side. The level of commitment is not yet very high and it has not likely reduced their commitment to Android. In other words, points are moving to the right but not (yet) down.

Framing the platforms this way helps us discuss how the market might evolve with these questions:

1. Is Microsoft's re-entry going to peel vendors away from Android. In other words, will points move down as well as to the right.
2. Is there motivation for some vendors to move to their own platforms like the non-committed? We've shown that profits accrue disproportionately to the vendors below the origin. As a result, is the pool of available top tier vendors going to shrink?
3. Will vendors commit to single platforms or maintain this split OS loyalty strategy? Will we see LG migrate to WP exclusive and will Others remain exclusive in Android?

I'll throw out my predictions to start:

Microsoft's strategy is aimed at top tier vendors more than to the "others". This is due to a lesson they learned with Windows Mobile: having a ton of SKUs does not guarantee a healthy ecosystem (a lesson that Android has not acknowledged as true). There are positive and negative consequences. The positive is that Microsoft control the experience better, create a better brand and can participate in an effective dialogue with operators. The negative is that they are going to deal with a diminished licensee pool.

On the second question my prediction is that vendors are going to move "down and to the left" away from the licensing model. If they can't go direct to that quadrant, vendors will consolidate portfolios around one licensed platform. The distribution of commitment I forecast will look like this:

Maintaining multiple platform development teams is expensive. Branding is also confused. The upside is that you get to play the operator's divide-and-conquer game of platform dilution (aimed at the non-licensing players in the lower left corner).

In particular, Samsung, with Bada, is likely to find ways out of license-land. Sony Ericsson may stick with Android and LG may move to Windows exclusively. That really leaves only HTC and Dell as licensees with multiple licenses.

This axial alignment is not a healthy thing if you are a platform vendor. Having one or two dedicated customers means the power of the buyer is much higher and their wishes become your command.

Which leaves only one true prize in the game: the "others". Android is clearly the darling of "Others" who are being shunned by Microsoft. Can "Others" become the lever for Google to pry open the market? History and the tangled web that is operator distribution does not point in that direction.

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Notes:

1. I considered products announced only since Jan 1, 2010
2. I did not consider any Windows Mobile legacy commitments
3. "Other" vendors are off the scale with over 100 SKUs but represented as having 40 SKUs so as to be kept on chart

In an interview with PCMag, Rubin said,

"Look, the world doesn't need another platform. Android is free and open; I think the only reason you create another platform is for political reasons. Why doesn't the whole world run with [Android]? They don't like the people who developed, or "not invented here [NIH]"

I note some irony in the suggestion that Windows Phone is superfluous when the acquisition of Android was an attempt to limit the growth of Windows Mobile. But that historical footnote is not entirely relevant here. The point Rubin raises is that WP is politically motivated. And by political he suggests two things: that there is mistrust of Google or NIH among potential licensees.

The NIH argument falls flat because anyone considering WP7 would also have NIH issues with Microsoft. So that really leaves only the question of trust.

Why would anyone mistrust Google when they offer operating systems software? How about these reasons:

• There is the IP hidden liability issue
• There is the question of who is selling whom
• There is the question of split loyalties
• There is the question of copyright infringement in the Android Market
• There is the Nexus One

It's clear that Microsoft is buying its way back into Mobile (it went so far as to pay incentives and guarantees to established developers to convince them to port existing apps or write new ones for WP7), but that is not a political ploy. It's just good old fashioned brute force.

The mistrust that Google earned for itself with operators, device vendors and potential content partners is rooted in its business model with Android. Hiding the costs of "openness" behind a veneer of freedom. In addition, putting forward competing products like Nexus One threaten the entire value chain.

I'd say the politics of Microsoft licensing are a lot more transparent. Redmond is the devil they know.

Adobe is one of the last surviving desktop software companies. So is Microsoft. Consolidation happens when an industry matures and excess capacity and excess overhead can be squeezed out of the value chain, giving a temporary burst of earnings growth.

So, in this way of thinking, recognizing that the sun is setting on desktop software, a merger of old schools of thought may make sense. Rather like Sun and Oracle or HP and Compaq.

But then a lot of other things make more sense. Like both companies trying to expand into new growth areas. Like Microsoft talking to RIM or Adobe developing tools for HTML5. Adobe's cash cow products are not going anywhere without a deep reset. Same is true for Microsoft. They will both face these challenges whether standing alone or together.

There would be nothing strange about a Microsoft Adobe merger, but there would be nothing great about it either.

"We believe the intrinsic value of shares cannot be unlocked if the status quo remains, and we have increased caution near term on a more elongated PC refresh cycle, combined with the newer threat of notebook cannibalization from tablets, where Windows does not yet have a presence," write Goldman Sachs analyst Sarah Friar and associates in the introduction to the report.

More advice about what to do about this in the linked article: Goldman downgrades Microsoft, makes case for major overhaul.

I'd skip over the recommendation to break up the company but the observation that Microsoft might face earnings threat from iPad is provocative. Usually it takes a few years for the incumbent to feel pain and react. The pain might be sooner than expected though the reaction might still take some time as the Windows Phone response to iPhone is taking its sweet time.

The latest litigation lollapalooza over Android reminds one of the old web adage that if you're not paying for content, you're the asset being sold.

That's certainly one of the consequences of the Android licensing model. The mobile phone vendors with no software intellectual property are pawns in a game between IP holders. It's clear that Microsoft and Apple and Oracle (and perhaps Nokia) have IP issues with Google. But it's the licensee device vendors which are most often the accused. Whether Google indemnifies or not is an open question, but the evidence is that the vendors are exposed.

The proof is in the fact that HTC is paying Microsoft for the use of Android. It's conceivable that Microsoft also asked Motorola for Android royalty payments but were rebuffed. It's also possible that since HTC is still a large scale Windows Mobile licensee, they were given a way out of the Android IP trap by Microsoft. We don't know if there were confidential deals between LG and Samsung on this issue (as they are both committed to the Windows Phone platform but shipping Android). In either case, Motorola may be forced to do the same and pay (Microsoft) for Android.

It's understood that Google gains some value from Android but also has hidden costs from it as well. Now the licensees have to recognize their hidden costs of the platform as well. There is the IP tax but also the question of control over one's destiny. Google is selling the vendors as an asset class to advertisers. Is that a positive consequence for their brands?

Microsoft Corp. said Friday it has filed patent-infringement lawsuits with the International Trade Commission and in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington against Motorola Inc., targeting Motorola mobile phones based on Google Inc.’s Android software

via Microsoft suits target Android phones - MarketWatch.

This follows infringement suits by Apple against HTC targeting Android and by Nokia against Apple targeting GSM patents (with obligatory counter-suits, of course.)

There was a time when Motorola was a key design win for Microsoft and their Windows Mobile in 2003 with the MPx series. In fact, Motorola still ships Windows Mobile devices like the ES400 and FR68. These are for industrial applications but there were many mainstream Motorola Windows Mobile volume products. The most famous perhaps was the MOTO Q in 2006.

I'm sure part of the value pitch for Windows Phone is indemnification from IP infringement. Windows Phone will be the only licensed OS that offers this coverage and it's a non-trivial selling point.

With QNX now firmly roadmapped at RIM and Android spreading among vendors like a virus, I wanted to point out that these operating systems share one ancestor: Unix.

A technical triumph

Technically Linux, which underlies Android, among others, is walled off from Unix from an IP point of view, but the philosophical and architectural lineage goes back to 1969's Unix. It was an amazingly well thought-out operating system which has stood the test of time mostly due to its modular architecture. It was not always clear that Unix would make it this far, and in many ways it was written off.

There is some poetic justice in its comeback. Unix could have become a default for desktop computers. When Windows emerged from the shadow of DOS, Microsoft had the option to base NT on a flavor of Unix. But Bill Gates, no doubt motivated by license fee considerations, hired a group of developers from Digital Equipment Corporation and many elements of the NT design reflect earlier DEC experience with VMS and RSX-11. Microsoft went with that new architecture rather than Unix and that code lives on even in the current Windows 7.

So Unix missed a chance to become the core of the desktop experience throughout the 1990's. It was relegated to the perilous high end: Sun workstations, servers and supercomputers. It seemed to be at a dead end. Fortunately, in stepped open source. Linux picked up the pieces and forged ahead to become a serious server operating system but never got beyond a toehold in the desktop.

The death of Unix(tm) was also forestalled because of the efforts of others. Sun, IBM and even a startup called NeXT kept development alive. When NeXT was acquired by Apple, OS X was born and in 2000 Unix was once again on the desktop.

Meanwhile, the Linux kernel also became device friendly and it was embedded into an increasing number of vertical applications while powering most of the new web servers that fed the dot com era.

Now we've entered a new decade of devices where Unix(-like) operating systems will, on a CPU basis, probably out-install Windows. Not only is iOS based on Unix, but Android and MeeGo and even Bada are based on Linux as are QNX and WebOS. Google, Apple, HP, RIM, Samsung and Nokia are all now betting heavily on Unix or Unix-like implementations. The success is so overwhelming that there are really only two hold-outs: Microsoft and the rapidly depreciating Symbian.

Value Chain Evolution

There is more to this than a sentimental technology riches to rags to riches story. The history of kernel adoption is evidence of the evolution of value chains and the tension between modular and integrated business architectures. It also supports a hypothesis of why Microsoft could not respond to a tectonic shift of power.

As a kernel, Unix was modular which allowed it to scale both down to devices and up to mainframes. It could conform to the applications above it (like being a server or being an embedded controller) and did so far more readily than Windows. In fact, Windows could not conform to applications outside its core PC and server domain.

For Unix, the point of modularity was reached early in the 1990's and, through the Linux implementation, it allowed the lowest layers of the software to become commoditized (and free). This commodity status was actually what Microsoft tried to avoid by integrating Windows with the layers above it. This was a conscious and deliberate decision which also led to trouble with anti-trust regulators. The decision seemed to have paid off. Microsoft won.

However, the very strategy which Microsoft used to maintain a monopoly caused its rigidity of response to a new, post-PC market. Unix fit right in with the new shift in the basis of competition: toward more personal, portable and conformable computing. Windows did not. Microsoft had to build a completely new OS to deal with devices (Windows CE has little if any shared code with Windows NT et. al.). The dual OS strategy continues to hobble Microsoft as each is stretched into new dimensions: the desktop Windows being dragged into the high end and into tablets while the device Windows is re-written to accommodate new input methods.

The modular Unix just keeps conforming to new applications. It helps that it's open source but the open sourcing is a result of the modularity not the cause for it. So far, it looks like there is no stopping the revenge of Unix. It's been a long journey for Unix and I, for one, am cheering the comeback.

"You could buy your way in, if you are Microsoft," he said. "This is a market where a deep balance sheet will help Microsoft determine where they want to go."

He notes a good marketing campaign can do wonders for adoption, with Ehud predicting Microsoft will hit 15% market share in 2012 (about the same as the iPhone’s share now)

"With [Microsoft's] resources, I think they can sustain double-digit market share," he said.

He notes Microsoft, with $36.8 billion in the bank, could win market share in multiple other ways, including subsidizing phone costs.

He still however predicts Android will lead the pack with 30%, Apple next with 25%, and RIM, Nokia and Microsoft all having 15% of the market.

via Morgan Stanley analyst predicts Microsoft will triple smartphone market share in 2 years.

There you have it: users are so easily persuaded that a platform purchasing decision can be acquired via small outlays of cash for ads and subsidies for vendors and operators.