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Visitors, visits and pageviews trailing 30 days and by various time ranges:
Research #Market #Ovi · 13 comments
With the number of active Nokia service users now reaching 140 million worldwide, the company today announced that more than 200,000 people are currently signing up daily to Ovi, and that Ovi Store has reached the milestone of 2.3 million downloads per day. Available in more than 190 countries,
via Nokia Ovi Services Continue to Grow.
Nokia updated its tally of download rates so we can put the numbers side-by-side with Apple's iTunes.
The slope of the Ovi curve does not yet compel one to get excited over the platform's prospects in the near term. However to get a true picture, one needs to not only look at absolute download numbers but also the probability of any one user or device being used to download an app.
For this we need to note how the number of devices relates to the download rate. Apple announced recently that they sold 120 million devices running iOS. Not all those devices are still in use. If we remove 20 million from that total we get approximately 100 million iOS devices. Nokia, on the other hand, specified exactly how many devices can access the Ovi store: 140 million.
Therefore 100 million iOS devices download at a rate of 17.7 million per day while 140 million Symbian devices download at the rate of 2.3 million per day.
That puts the weekly download rate per device at 1.24 for iOS users vs. 0.12 apps (or whatever is the appropriate content item for Ovi) every week for Symbian users.
As the table below details, the rate of downloads per device for iOS is more than 10x higher. This is the more interesting number if you are a developer.
If someone can point me to Android Market download rate (historic and/or current) I can add it to the mix.
Research #Industry · 12 comments
Of all the public statistics about platform share, Share of web use must be the most important measure for Google. The more browsing people do, the more searching they do and if Google search is most likely for a platform then the more income Google derives from that platform.
NetMarketshare.com has offered an insight into the split between Android and iOS as search platforms and it shows how iOS is still five times more likely to yield search revenue than Android. That multiple is likely to shrink as the gap narrows, but it still demonstrates the power of iOS to drive Google's bottom line. It's no wonder then why Google has renewed their default placement of Google search in mobile Safari (a guarantee they don't seem to share with all Android licensees.)
But Android launched later than iPhone, so everyone should be asking how rapidly the share of Web has grown since the start of each platform. When iPhone launched in 2007 it was almost competing with mobile web non-consumption. The alternative mobile browsing experiences were so bad that it's hard to remember anyone putting up with them. A year later, the bar was set higher and Android filled a vast chasm of demand for mobile browsing for people who could not buy an iPhone.
At the same point in the life of each platform, Android seems to be exploding in units sold. With this proliferation of Android licenses, it should be interesting to see if their unit share numbers are reflected in web share numbers. So far the story is not convincing. The growth in Web share is not pacing faster than iOS achieved at a similar point in time.
So far, 24 months into the life of each platform, iOS leads by almost 50% higher share.
iOS/mobile Safari has the advantage of iPod and iPad for distribution but that does not explain the relative lag of Android with respect to Web share as Android has a large number of SKUs.
It may be too early to draw conclusions, but anyone trying to analyze Google's strategy with Android should be paying close attention to this.
Research #Industry · 34 comments
The latest litigation lollapalooza over Android reminds one of the old web adage that if you're not paying for content, you're the asset being sold.
That's certainly one of the consequences of the Android licensing model. The mobile phone vendors with no software intellectual property are pawns in a game between IP holders. It's clear that Microsoft and Apple and Oracle (and perhaps Nokia) have IP issues with Google. But it's the licensee device vendors which are most often the accused. Whether Google indemnifies or not is an open question, but the evidence is that the vendors are exposed.
The proof is in the fact that HTC is paying Microsoft for the use of Android. It's conceivable that Microsoft also asked Motorola for Android royalty payments but were rebuffed. It's also possible that since HTC is still a large scale Windows Mobile licensee, they were given a way out of the Android IP trap by Microsoft. We don't know if there were confidential deals between LG and Samsung on this issue (as they are both committed to the Windows Phone platform but shipping Android). In either case, Motorola may be forced to do the same and pay (Microsoft) for Android.
It's understood that Google gains some value from Android but also has hidden costs from it as well. Now the licensees have to recognize their hidden costs of the platform as well. There is the IP tax but also the question of control over one's destiny. Google is selling the vendors as an asset class to advertisers. Is that a positive consequence for their brands?
Research #Industry · 18 comments
Microsoft Corp. said Friday it has filed patent-infringement lawsuits with the International Trade Commission and in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington against Motorola Inc., targeting Motorola mobile phones based on Google Inc.’s Android software
via Microsoft suits target Android phones - MarketWatch.
This follows infringement suits by Apple against HTC targeting Android and by Nokia against Apple targeting GSM patents (with obligatory counter-suits, of course.)
There was a time when Motorola was a key design win for Microsoft and their Windows Mobile in 2003 with the MPx series. In fact, Motorola still ships Windows Mobile devices like the ES400 and FR68. These are for industrial applications but there were many mainstream Motorola Windows Mobile volume products. The most famous perhaps was the MOTO Q in 2006.
I'm sure part of the value pitch for Windows Phone is indemnification from IP infringement. Windows Phone will be the only licensed OS that offers this coverage and it's a non-trivial selling point.
Research #Industry · 27 comments
Google has created a partial list of phones that run Google services.
I notice with interest that it's called a Google Phone Gallery not an Android Phone Gallery.
What's more, there is a distinction of All Phones and Phones "with Google". Of course that implies that we can get a list of Google Phones "without Google" (or maybe more accurately, "with partial Google").
To clarify, according to Google there are three categories of Android Phones:
I would also add a fourth category of Google phones:
Since the list is not complete, I won't tally it here, but it suggests a large number of Non-Google phones is possible.
[I drew the following Venn diagram to help explain the situation. The shaded areas are those which generate revenue for Google. The interesting struggle (marked with arrows) is between the non-Android Phones with some Google and the Android Phones without any Google.]
Now the question that needs to be asked is: How many of the Non-Google Android phones are built to compete with Google (e.g. on Search, Voice, Maps, Media and App sales)? And a second question: How are the Non-Android phones "with some Google" competing with the Non-Google Android phones.
In other words, from Google's point of view: how successful are companies other than Google at delivering Google services in spite of competition from companies with Android phones delivering services that compete with Google?
The classic example being: how effective are iPhones with Google services at competing with Verizon Droid Android phones that deliver Microsoft services? In this scenario Apple is delivering value to Google shareholders while Verizon (using Android) is taking it away.
Is this trade-off a net positive?
In other words, is Google's income from the iPhone offsetting its losses from Android?
Research #Industry · 5 comments
This mindset is compelling because it is simple and familiar, but it also leads to blind obsequiousness.
Historical edifices are held as indelible fact. "It's Microsoft v. Apple all over again." "There has to be one absolute, dominant leader." "Open will always prevail -- and should prevail -- over proprietary systems." "Market share matters above all else. Even profits."
...it helps to see the continuum of connected devices from the perspective of their means of mobility; namely, whether they are wear-able, pocket-able, bag-able or portable.
[Apple] target specific user experiences, and build the product around that accordingly.
via Apple's segmentation strategy, and the folly of conventional wisdom - O'Reilly Radar.
Lots of concepts that readers of this blog should find familiar ground.
Research #Technology · 98 comments
With QNX now firmly roadmapped at RIM and Android spreading among vendors like a virus, I wanted to point out that these operating systems share one ancestor: Unix.
Technically Linux, which underlies Android, among others, is walled off from Unix from an IP point of view, but the philosophical and architectural lineage goes back to 1969's Unix. It was an amazingly well thought-out operating system which has stood the test of time mostly due to its modular architecture. It was not always clear that Unix would make it this far, and in many ways it was written off.
There is some poetic justice in its comeback. Unix could have become a default for desktop computers. When Windows emerged from the shadow of DOS, Microsoft had the option to base NT on a flavor of Unix. But Bill Gates, no doubt motivated by license fee considerations, hired a group of developers from Digital Equipment Corporation and many elements of the NT design reflect earlier DEC experience with VMS and RSX-11. Microsoft went with that new architecture rather than Unix and that code lives on even in the current Windows 7.
So Unix missed a chance to become the core of the desktop experience throughout the 1990's. It was relegated to the perilous high end: Sun workstations, servers and supercomputers. It seemed to be at a dead end. Fortunately, in stepped open source. Linux picked up the pieces and forged ahead to become a serious server operating system but never got beyond a toehold in the desktop.
The death of Unix(tm) was also forestalled because of the efforts of others. Sun, IBM and even a startup called NeXT kept development alive. When NeXT was acquired by Apple, OS X was born and in 2000 Unix was once again on the desktop.
Meanwhile, the Linux kernel also became device friendly and it was embedded into an increasing number of vertical applications while powering most of the new web servers that fed the dot com era.
Now we've entered a new decade of devices where Unix(-like) operating systems will, on a CPU basis, probably out-install Windows. Not only is iOS based on Unix, but Android and MeeGo and even Bada are based on Linux as are QNX and WebOS. Google, Apple, HP, RIM, Samsung and Nokia are all now betting heavily on Unix or Unix-like implementations. The success is so overwhelming that there are really only two hold-outs: Microsoft and the rapidly depreciating Symbian.
There is more to this than a sentimental technology riches to rags to riches story. The history of kernel adoption is evidence of the evolution of value chains and the tension between modular and integrated business architectures. It also supports a hypothesis of why Microsoft could not respond to a tectonic shift of power.
As a kernel, Unix was modular which allowed it to scale both down to devices and up to mainframes. It could conform to the applications above it (like being a server or being an embedded controller) and did so far more readily than Windows. In fact, Windows could not conform to applications outside its core PC and server domain.
For Unix, the point of modularity was reached early in the 1990's and, through the Linux implementation, it allowed the lowest layers of the software to become commoditized (and free). This commodity status was actually what Microsoft tried to avoid by integrating Windows with the layers above it. This was a conscious and deliberate decision which also led to trouble with anti-trust regulators. The decision seemed to have paid off. Microsoft won.
However, the very strategy which Microsoft used to maintain a monopoly caused its rigidity of response to a new, post-PC market. Unix fit right in with the new shift in the basis of competition: toward more personal, portable and conformable computing. Windows did not. Microsoft had to build a completely new OS to deal with devices (Windows CE has little if any shared code with Windows NT et. al.). The dual OS strategy continues to hobble Microsoft as each is stretched into new dimensions: the desktop Windows being dragged into the high end and into tablets while the device Windows is re-written to accommodate new input methods.
The modular Unix just keeps conforming to new applications. It helps that it's open source but the open sourcing is a result of the modularity not the cause for it. So far, it looks like there is no stopping the revenge of Unix. It's been a long journey for Unix and I, for one, am cheering the comeback.
Research #Industry #Theory · 12 comments
In the last article on the P/E ratio vs. Growth for some of the largest companies, the question of PEG came up. PEG is the P/E over Growth and it's a good way to index valuation relative to growth. Usually Growth is measured as the forward twelve months consensus and a PEG of 1 is, as a rule of thumb, considered "fair value". However, forward growth is based on possibly inaccurate analyst consensus. If we instead look at historic growth, we have some actual performance to evaluate. Let's call this PEhG for P/E over historic Growth.
The following chart shows 30 large cap technology companies[1] and their five-year compound EPS growth vs. their current P/E multiples. If we draw a line at the PEhG of 1, i.e. when the P/E ratio is equal to the historic growth rate and split the pack into PEhG > 1 (overvalued)[2] and PehG < 1 (undervalued), we have the following split:
The chart makes for an interesting point of view over what the best positioned companies in the sector are doing and how business model innovation shows up as investment opportunity[2].
Apple, RIM, Google stand out for their business model innovation. Ericsson, Nokia, Yahoo and Dell show poor value for their lack of innovation. Microsoft, IBM, HP, TI and Oracle show in-line value for in-line or sustaining innovation.
[1] I omitted Baidu from the chart as it's off the scale: Growth is 151, P/E is 108. It would classify as undervalued. These are also not a complete set of all large caps. It's meant to be indicative.
[2] Notions of value are completely subjective. This does not constitute financial advice.
Yep, Amazon Launching Their Own App Store For Android Too.
No surprises here. Amazon, a retailer, is building a retail experience for apps. They are taking Android and throwing away Google's app store and a few other things as well and making their own tablet while at it.
Maybe they'll put Bing on it and Facebook too.
